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This thesis is situated within recent debates concerning the nature of, and
prospects for, alternative 'socialist' development strategies in the countries of
the so-called Third World, and within the Latin American context specifically. It
traces the experiences of the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN)
in their attempts to instigate such a strategy in Nicaragua between 1979 and
1990.
The study is primarily concerned with the economic dimension to those
experiences and it explores in detail the factors which underlay the descent into
economic crisis which characterized the revolutionary years in Nicaragua.
Whilst taking into account the disruptive and costly (in both human and
financial terms) effects of the ContraWar and the incidence of the international
economic crisis of the period, the study focuses on an evaluation of the
evolution of the FSLN's economic strategies and policy decisions and the
various changes in direction which occurred during the course of the 1980s, as
the regime responded to the intensifying military conflict and the deepening
economic crisis. More specifically, the study provides a detailed analysis of the
rationale and performance of the economic and agrarian policies of the FSLN
toward the all-important traditional agro-export sector of the economy.
The study is placed in its historical and regional context through a detailed
tracing of the origins of the dependence of the Nicaraguan economy upon the
export sector, and the social relations which sustained the model of
accumulation instigated, and the placing of the Nicaraguan experience within the
economic and political crisis which beset the Central American region at the end
of the 1970s from which it largely still has to emerge nearly fifteen years later.
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Introduction:
In the years since the triumph of the Nicaraguan Revolution in July 1979 the
Central American region has been thrown into the centre of international affairs.
Before that period, Western academic interest in the region had been generally
limited to a few discussions of the limited agrarian reform programmes and
rural development schemes of the 'Alliance for Progress' period1, a number of
specialized studies of the Central American Common Market (CACM)
sponsored industrialization of the 1960's and 1970s, and a few pieces on
historical themes (such as the search for a trans-isthmian canal route). The
1980's, however, saw an explosion of writing about the region, ranging from
journalistic accounts of the Contra-War in Nicaragua, the conflict in El
Salvador, or the widespread and horrific human rights abuses in the region, to
in-depth analyses of the historical background to the economic and political
crisis of the region in the 1980's or the nuances of the Sandinista's attempts to
transform Nicaraguan society. This has produced a flood of academic material
analyzing the region from a myriad of different perspectives. Discussions of the
isthmus, and Nicaragua in particular, have enlightened the study of international
geopolitics, agrarian transformation, the processes of socialist transition and
social transformation, the relationship between liberation theology and
revolutionary marxism, the nature of democracy, and the study of the inter¬
relationships of the international economy, to mention only the most obvious
examples.
This thesis, with the benefit of retrospection, explores the processes of
revolutionary transition embarked upon in Nicaragua during the period between
the triumph of the Nicaraguan people over the Somoza dictatorship in 1979 and
the surprise defeat of the FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional) in
the elections of February 1990. The experiences of the Nicaraguan revolution in
the early 1980s provided a source of inspiration to the 'broad left' throughout
the world in its adoption of wide-ranging programmes of social transformation
and its brave stand against the US's attempts to batter it into submission. By
1990 a thoroughgoing transformation of Nicaraguan society had occurred
(largely through the relative erosion of the power of the dominant classes and
1 The Alliance for Progress, initiated in 1961, was the brainchild of John F. Kennedy. It represented
a massive expansion in US aid and investment to the Latin American region, and was intended to
instigate limited processes of social reform, within an effort to limit the attractiveness of the Cuban
revolution to the region's poor and repressed (Niess, 1990:173-179).
the creation of a new class of small farmers), although quite to what extent this
reflected the intentions of the FSLN's leadership is open to debate (see Dore
and Weeks, 1991:4). A wide-ranging agrarian reform had transformed social
relations in the countryside through the titling of thousands of individual
landholdings, the formation of various forms of cooperatives and the
maintenance of a state farm sector. In the initial three or four years there had
been an ambitious series of social programmes which had been carried out in
large measure through grassroots voluntarism. The major example of this was
the 1980 UNESCO-praised literacy crusade, but such programmes also
included mass vaccination campaigns, popular housing programmes and the
development of primary health care systems. Furthermore, despite their
limitations, there were observable developments in the evolution of both
representative and participatory political systems.2
By the end of the decade, however, the social achievements of the early years
had largely been reversed as the economy spiralled into an unprecedented crisis
and, with the electoral defeat of the FSLN in 1990, the 'Nicaragua of Sandino'
has fallen from international grace and world headlines. This thesis reflects
upon the lessons to be learned from the struggles of the Nicaraguan people
throughout the 1980s for those who subscribe to the "questfor a more
egalitarian and less asymmetrical process ofdevelopment" (Corbridge,
1991:311). It places the fall from power of the FSLN within wider discussions
of the changing nature of socialist influenced ideologies in the 'periphery' and
the collapse of the state communist model in Eastern Europe. In particular,
however, attention is focused upon the reasons which underlay the descent into
economic crisis, and the effects of that crisis upon the hegemony of the FSLN's
revolutionary project and the direction of national processes of economic and
social transformation. Whilst taking into account the devastating impact of the
US funded Contra War and the incidence of the international recession of the
period, the study's main emphasis is upon the evolution of the FSLN's
development strategies and economic policies. In particular, it is shown how
continued economic deterioration culminated in the late 1980s with the necessity
of the FSLN imposing a drastic series of economic stabilization measures; the
social and political costs of which served to further undermine the level of
popular support for the revolution, which had already suffered erosion due to
2 See later chapters for in-depth discussions of these themes.
the inconsistencies and unintended effects of the FSLN's original state-centred
model of accumulation.
The major focus of the thesis is directed, therefore, toward an analysis of the
factors which underlay the descent of the Nicaraguan economy into crisis
during the 1980s. A detailed analysis of all of those factors, nonetheless, is
obviously beyond the scope of a single thesis, therefore the study specifically
directs its attention toward one particular sector of the economy, the all
important agro-export sector. The performance of that sector was crucial to the
financial solvency of the revolutionary process, since at the time of the
revolution, in common with the other Central American republics, the
generation of foreign exchange earnings still remained heavily dependent upon
the export of agricultural commodities.3 Throughout the revolutionary period,
therefore, the performance of the export sector continued to dictate, in large
measure, the overall levels of economic growth.
The centrality of the export sector, however, imposed a series of contradictions
between the intentions of the FSLN toward the transformation of the
exploitative structures of Nicaraguan society and the stability and growth of the
national economy. This was because despite the dramatic economic growth that
the export-led model of development had produced over the preceding decades,
it had done little to improve the position of the great majority of the region's
inhabitants, and had actively impoverished large sectors of Nicaraguan society,
through the displacement of the nation's largely peasant basic grain producers
from the most fertile agricultural lands and the processes of marginalization,
semi-proletarianization and informatization it was accompanied by. Thus,
although the reactivation of the export sector was to be an economic necessity in
the post-revolutionary years (representing the most important means of
providing the foreign exchange needed to facilitate the processes of social
transformation the FSLN wished to instigate), it would have to be achieved on
an alternative basis which did not exclude the majority of Nicaraguans from the
fruits of its success. At the same time, however, the previous profitability of the
sector was seen as largely based upon the over-exploitation of labour.
Therefore, the desired overthrow of the exploitative relations which had
sustained the export-led model were likely to have serious repercussions on the
overall profitability of the sector, putting at risk the very transformations the
FSLN wished to initiate. The intensification of these contradictions under the
3 For specific Figures on Uie weight of Uie agro-export sector in the Nicaraguan economy and the
problems which this involves see Chapter Five.
combined impact of the collapse of international commodity prices of the period
and the onset of the ContraWar form the major focus of attention of the study.
The Framework of the Study:
Chapter One provides the theoretical framework for the study by situating it
within a detailed review of recent theoretical writings on the subject of
'development.' The approach taken here, whilst recognizing some of the
insights of the evolving post-Marxist and Postmodern literatures, can be
situated within a broadly defined political economy perspective. As such, the
work remains committed to a largely materialist form of analysis; and whilst
Marxian claims to exclusivity are rejected, the profound insights which
Marxism has to offer with regard to the ways in which whole societies are
reproduced and transformed remain central to the study.
In this particular case, however, the society under consideration has been in the
throws of a revolutionary transformation, instigated within the long term goal of
the establishment of a socialist society (however defined). Much of the
framework of analysis applied to the political economy of capitalist 'developing'
societies has not been so rigorously applied to states pursuing (or attempting to
pursue) other models of accumulation. Indeed, even Marxist analyses, have
tended to focus upon the conditions leading to socialist revolutions rather then
the dynamics and outcomes of those revolutions. As expressed by Foran and
Goodwin (1993:209),
"MostMarxist writing about revolutions.... has focused on the great
question: how to get started? What are the causes of revolutions? There
has been much less interest, surprisingly, in outcomes."
Chapter Two, therefore, builds upon the exploration of radical approaches to
development geography outlined in the first chapter, through a consideration of
the evolution of academic thought regarding the processes of revolutionary
change and social transformation in the 'periphery.' Attention is first centred
upon the contemporary circumstances facing Leftist governments and political
movements in the Latin American context. The two chief areas of concern that
emerge from this discussion, those with regard to a) the wide-ranging economic
problems faced by socialist regimes and political movements and b) the
relationship between socialist forms of organization and the extension of
'democratic freedoms,' are then discussed in turn, although, given the focus of
the study, attention is primarily given to the former. There then follows a brief
commentary upon the nature of 'Sandinismo' as a political ideology, as well as
an introductory characterization of the economic programme of the FSLN, both
of which are discussed in the context of the issues outlined in the foregoing
discussion. The exploration of these issues provides a comparative context
within which to evaluate the FSLN's endeavours to transform Nicaraguan
society and to situate the experiences of the Sandinistas in wider debates
concerning the contemporary experiences and future prospects for 'socialist'
forms of organization in the 'Third World.'
The rise to power of the FSLN and any assessment of their achievements and
limitations must also be placed in their historical context. Chapter Three,
therefore, in the context of the theoretical debates outlined in the first chapter,
discusses the historical specificity of the development of capitalism in
Nicaragua; outlining the processes which have helped to shape the development
of the Nicaraguan economy, and, in particular, the rise to dominance of the
agro-export-led model (as well as the changing social relations which have
characterized it).
Chapters Four to Seven constitute the major part of the study and together
compose an extended analysis of the evolution of economic policy and its
outcomes during the revolutionary years. Chapter Four first provides a
summary and interpretation of the economic performance of the Nicaraguan
economy over that period. It details the evolution of the FSLN's economic
strategy, its intentions, and the specific policies which were implemented
toward the meeting of its objectives. Specifically it details the descent into
economic crisis which characterized the 1980s and explores the evolution of
economic policy as the FSLN reacted to the deteriorating economic situation.
The following three chapters build upon the characterization of Nicaraguan
economic policy provided in Chapter Four to consider in more detail the specific
experiences of the key agro-export sector. Chapter Five sets discussions of the
sector in a theoretical and regional context through an analysis of the major
schools of thought regarding externally-oriented development strategies and the
problems imposed by high levels of dependency upon earnings from the agro-
export sector. It also provides an assessment of the dynamics of the regional
Central American model of agro-export-led growth and its descent into
economic and political crisis at the end of the 1970s. Taken together these
issues provide a framework for the detailed analysis of the evolution of agrarian
policy toward Nicaragua's agro-export sector during the course of the
revolutionary years, and the social and political transformations that occurred
within the sector.
Chapter Six, following a brief description of the dynamics of agro-export
production in Nicaragua, focuses upon the performance of the sector during the
revolutionary years. The chapter explores the complex interplay between the
incidence of external factors (such as the international recession, the collapse of
the CACM, and the onset of the ContraWar and the US trade embargo) and the
evolution of the FSLN's own strategy toward the sector. Analysis descends to a
more detailed level in Chapter Seven, through an account of the distinct
experiences of the FSLN in four of the major commodities of the sector,
specifically, coffee, cotton, beef and sugar production.
Finally, the Conclusion, utilizing the experiences of the Sandinista years
discussed in the preceding chapters, returns to the more general themes raised in
Chapter Two to offer some interpretations of the experiences of the FSLN and
their significance. A few tentative remarks are also directed toward the future
prospects for the FSLN and the popular movement in the 1990s in the context
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Development Geography: Theory, Methodology and
the Research Process
In this chapter the background to the study is considered in more detail through a
discussion of its methodological and theoretical aspects. This stems from the premise
that any analysis of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua needs to be grounded
within a comprehensive examination of the various interpretations of the historical
evolution of Nicaraguan society. Furthermore, such a study must also be placed
within the context of analyses of the functioning of the global economy, and different
perspectives on the relationship between Nicaragua's position within that global
system and domestic political and economic developments. This chapter, therefore,
reviews the contemporary evolution of geographical thought regarding the processes
of 'development' and situates the present study within that context.
1.1 Introduction:
" Back in the 1960s and 1970s, lecturing on development theories was a
rather well-defined domain ofknowledge transfer. Authors on the subject
used to be divided into 'the good' (neo-Marxists), 'the bad' (modernization
theorists) and 'the ugly' (the computerized doomsday
specialists) Now, well into the 1990s, things have changed. The
goodfeel bad, the badfeel good, and the ugly underwent plastic surgery."
(Frans Schuurman in his introduction to Schuurman, 1993:ix)
The ways in which human geographers, and other social scientists, write about and
conduct research on 'development' issues have undergone considerable changes in the
past two decades. Probably the most important of these changes relates to the
evolution of the theoretical perspectives which have underlain research. During this
period the most influential ideas informing research have been the broad range of
literatures which might be considered as Marxist. In most social science disciplines,
although to differing degrees, neo-Marxist and Marxist theorizing about development
have played a key role in placing at the centre of academic concern such factors as;
inequalities at national and international scales, the dynamics and contradictions of
capitalism as an economic system and a specific form of social relations, and the
eurocentric nature of western assumptions about the processes of 'modernization' and
social transformation.
Recent years, however, have seen an increasing questioning of the utility of Marxist-
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influenced development theories in furthering our understanding of the changing
nature of the international capitalist system or the continued manifestation of
widespread poverty, repression and inequality. Within development economics, never
a stronghold of radical political ideas, the 1980s has seen a marked swing to the
political right and the consolidation of the hegemonic position of neoliberal ideas
within the sub-discipline (as well as the international financial institutions; see
discussions in Chapters 2 and 5, Colclough and Manor, 1992 and Toye, 1987). There
has also, however, been a wide-ranging critique of the Marxist perspective which has
arisen from within the Left itself, particularly in development sociology and
development geography, but also in the field of critical politics.1 The present work
situates itself within these discussions by following a position that is influenced by
these developments but remains broadly committed to the utility of Marxist theory in
informing the study of 'development.' The following discussion examines these recent
debates as they have affected the rationale and practice of geographical research on
development themes.
This thesis is written from within the framework of what has been termed 'radical
development geography' (Corbridge, 1986). The adoption of a radical perspective
toward development issues in geographical studies over the past two decades is
reflected in the ways in which academic interest in the issues studied has been matched
by a concern for social justice and a commitment to 'progressive' political and
economic change.2 Thus,
"Radicals refuse to blame homelessness and starvation, the rape ofwomen
and abuse ofchildren, the theft of labour and land, hope and self respect on
divine providence or unchangeable human nature. Rather, they believe that
much ofit comes from injustice, exploitation, violence, and organized cruelty
that can be eradicated." (Gottlieb, 1992: ix)
or in the specific case of studies of the Central American region,
"I use the term radical to refer to socialist and non-socialist advocates ofleft-
ofcenter progressive social, political, and economic thought and action
They (radicals) do not always possess the same ideology but they are linked
by an abhorrence of injustice, and by a common understanding of their
political and social roles in society." (Liss, 1991:2)
1 For further analysis of these critiques see; the discussions below, the seminal article by David
Booth (Booth, 1985), the various works of Stuart Corbridge (Corbridge, 1986; 1989 and 1990) and
David Slater (Slater, 1992a; 1993a), the series of articles collected together in Schuurman (1993), as
well as Mouzelis (1988), Sklair (1988), and Vandergeest and Buttel (1988).
2 For revelations into the way in which radical approaches became influential in Geography in
general, see what has been termed the 'relevance' debate in Area during the early 1970s, the evolution
ofAntipode as a forum for radical ideas and Richard Peet's (1978) History of Radical Geography.
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However, in the critical tradition ofMarx, radical geographers have combined a
concern for the oppressed with a commitment to the development of coherent
theoretical frameworks for understanding the evolution and contemporary dynamics of
the structures and processes of the international economy and individual nation states.
Thus, it should be stressed from the outset that this thesis is written from a perspective
that welcomes, and indeed celebrates, the Nicaraguan Revolution's triumph over the
Somoza dictatorship and one that is broadly supportive of the efforts of the FSLN to
transform the basis of Nicaraguan society and overcome the inequalities and
repression of the past. On the other hand such a supportive perspective does not infer
an uncritical view of either the intendons or the pracdce of the actions of the FSLN
during their years in power in Nicaragua. The study seeks to provide a coherent
analysis of the direction of the Nicaraguan revolution, in terms of the evolution and
outcomes of economic policy in the agro-export sector, in the light of the goals of
social transformation inherent within the revolutionary project. Such a position
introduces the theme of the relationship that the individual researcher has to the
research process. An issue which, in terms of the conducting of research in distinct
cultural settings, is attracting an increasing amount of attention from academics.
1.2 The Researcher and the Research Process:
In a recent piece in the journal Area James Sidaway briefly addressed some of the
important personal (and wider political) issues that need to be explored in relation to
the carrying out of research in different cultural circumstances (Sidaway, 1992). His
timely article has instigated (or rather rekindled) many much-needed debates about the
conducting of research, the relationships between the observer and the observed, and
the 'positionality' of the researcher him or herself (see Potter and Unwin, 1988;
Crittenden, 1988; Crush, 1991; Madge, 1993; Potter, 1993; Sidaway, 1993; and on
the role of foreign and Latin American intellectuals in that region see Petras, 1990;
Liss, 1991; Vilas, 1990 and Petras and Morley, 1992: chapter 7).
These debates have centred upon several themes. Madge (1993), for example,
comments in some detail on the importance of gaining a better understanding of the
key significance of the role of the researcher in the research process (a theme she
suggests was somewhat underplayed in Sidaway's article); and the need for us as
individual researchers to recognize how our identity (as multiple-selves) inevitably
influences, in a multitude of different ways, the nature of the research that we are
engaged in. Whilst concurring completely with Clare that a consideration of the
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"role of the researcher in the research process—through a consideration of
'boundary disputes' (in both political andpsychoanalytical terms), may have
an important role to play in the 'political' debate." (Madge, 1993:294-295)
it is my intention here to concentrate on some of the wider 'political' issues concerning
our role as researchers (and teachers) concerned with 'Development' issues and the
unequal global (and local) power relations within which we function.
In his brief article Sidaway was unable to enter fully into a discussion of the distinct
issues that are involved in the conducting of different types of research activity or the
various agendas involved in working in different countries or particular localities. It is,
nonetheless, important to be aware that it is not just the implications of the new
position towards the "top ofa (different) social hierarchy" (Sidaway, 1992:403) in
which we find ourselves when engaged in research in some hypothetical Third
World' society which needs consideration, but also the fact that such a position will
have differing significance, and different implications for the direction of research, in
diverse cultural and spatial settings. The relationship that the individual researcher has
to foster with governments, NGOs, political parties, social movements and all manner
of individuals and the specific nature of each of those in distinct cultures and localities,
will all influence the information which is available to the researcher, how it is
collected, and the way in which it is viewed. This is unavoidable in any research and
there is no suggestion here that there is some magic formula for obtaining 'objective'
truth; as we are becoming increasingly aware, all of our knowledge and understanding
is subjectively constructed. The issue instead is to accept this and to be aware, not just
of our own forms of interpretation (mediated through our existence as 'multiple-
selves') but also of the effects of our involvement in the specific social formations and
political cultures in which we find ourselves; without, however, losing sight of the
political power structures which inhabit and constrain those formations and cultures
and our relationships within them.
Thus, although we might accept that, as Western academics, we are, as Sidaway
suggests, practically an international class, we must also recognize that, 'in the field,'
our class position is differently constructed in the specific contexts of the many diverse
societies in which we work. To understand this we need to emphasize, not only the
broad distinctions between 'First' and 'Third' worlds, but also the need to develop a
greater sensitivity to the differences between the various places in which we work,
according to culture, social structure, gender relations etc. To illustrate this I only need
to point out that there are more differences than similarities involved in the position of
a researcher carrying out an in-depth anthropological village study in Ghana and one
carrying out a broad political economy of the formulation of economic policy in
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revolutionary Nicaragua.
All of the above should not be seen to negate the importance of the unequal global
power relations within which we all exist and function but rather suggests that it is
more important to be aware of their local manifestations and our position in the local
political struggles which they encompass. Again concurring with Clare Madge, I
would, therefore, suggest that "it is unlikely that the power relations involved in doing
research in the Third World will be displaced." (Madge: 1993:297). Given the
conditions which dictate how we end up carrying out research in the 'Third World,'
and the nature of the 'academy' within which we exist, we shall continue to have to
work within the 'them' and 'us' distinction which Sidaway so rightly deplores. This
does not mean, however, that we can have no political role in our activities (and we all
have one whether it is implicitly recognized and thought through or not) but we must
recognize that we have to work within the existing global and local power relations.
Nevertheless, as Clare Madge (1993:297) argues, we have the opportunity to be
involved in challenging the systems which determine those relations in the specific
localities where we carry out research.3
Another important aspect to these debates concerns the way in which research
findings are disseminated, and also with whom, and where, we discuss our research;
both in terms of the specific implications of our own work, and the ways in which we
couch debates about theory, significance and meaning. Far too often the groups
involved in political links with 'Southern' popular organizations, or those
campaigning for wider political changes at an international level, tend to see the world
as a somewhat naive dichotomy between 'first' and 'third' worlds. There is no doubt
that as academics we have been guilty of these oversimplifications for long enough,
hence such a comment is not meant to be judgmental in any way. What it is important
to stress, however, is that academic efforts which are presently emerging into
deconstructing these received categorizations, and the images associated with them,
(see the excellent series of articles in Sachs, 1992 and chapter six of Hall and Gieben,
1992) need to be occurring at a far wider level. Far too often what are in fact extremely
important debates about political action and understanding end up as academic
exercises in navel gazing.
Of course the debates concerning these issues are much more widespread than this
brief consideration has been able to encompass, nonetheless, their importance has
3 As an illustration any researcher working in Nicaragua during the 1980s found themselves at the
centre of intense political disputes regarding the effects of government policy - as the Sandinistas, the
internal opposition groups and the US Administration waged a bitter ideological struggle over the
ways in which the revolutionary process was depicted both nationally and internationally. Struggles
within which the researcher often found themselves embroiled.
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been raised. The relations between popular organizations in Central America, the
Western solidarity organizations and the academic community with research activities
in the Central American region provide a good illustration of the issues which have
been raised. The Sandinista revolution marked a rapid expansion in academic activity
in the region, with a number of radical Western academics working in the various
government ministries in Nicaragua (as well as other non-governmental research
institutions), and, over time, strong political links between Western solidarity and
human rights organizations and the popular movements in the region were developed
and consolidated. In particular, academics and the solidarity organizations formed
strong relationships with the Sandinista government and the former informed many
government sponsored research programmes.4
It was particularly interesting being in Nicaragua at the time of the FSLN's electoral
defeat in 1990, and to observe the reaction of the various academics, activists and
'internationalistas' (myself included), to the election results. I remember particularly
vividly a meeting I attended just a few weeks after the elections, at which
representatives from many different countries, many of whom had been working in
Revolutionary Nicaragua for many years, met with several of the commandantes of the
FSLN. Many of the former expressed positions which they felt they had been
unwilling or unable to express previously when the Contra War was at its height and
when the FSLN were still in power. During those difficult years it had often appeared
that to criticise the government was to give in to the US aggression in some way. In
addition, others had felt that it was their role as outsiders to support the FSLN
unequivocally rather than to offer critical advice, which to them smacked of cultural
imperialism. In some ways, despite the considerable confusion that has existed
amongst those 'outsiders' who had supported the Sandinista Revolution, since the
defeat of the FSLN in the 1990 elections, that defeat has at least transformed and
restructured the relationships between the various strands of the academic community,
international NGO's and the solidarity community and the popular movement in
Nicaragua, opening the relationship and often diversifying the links which had been
established.5
4 Many of the participants in the debates about agrarian structure, which had great influence in
informing the evolution of FSLN policy toward the sector, were foreign academics. Some originating
in other Latin American countries such as Eduardo Baumeister and Carlos Vilas, with others coming
from the US and Europe (especially those from The Free University in Amsterdam who were heavily
involved in the National Autonomous University's (UNAN) Department of Agricultural Economics
(see the discussions in chapter six for an evaluation of those debates).
5 I do not have the time to go into all of these changes here but the interested reader might like to
consult an unpublished paper of mine, Brown (1993), or Quandt (1993), or recent articles which have
appeared in Envio, Barricada international, NACLA Report on the Americas, Latin American
Perspectives and Central America Report. Basically, in the same way as the electoral defeat had led to
a restructuring of the relationship between the FSLN and the popular movement within Nicaragua,
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1.3 The Evolution of Geographical Theory:
Geographers were late in taking on board the concerns for more rigorous theorization
which had characterized many of the other social science disciplines during the 1950s
and 1960s. Toward the end of that period, however, one can discern a marked
transformation in the way that geographers in general viewed their discipline and the
role that geographers played in both the wider academic community and society at
large. There were two basic elements to this transformation; firstly, changes in the
theoretical underpinnings of the discipline and the methodology of research and,
secondly, the political context of research. With regard to the former, the post-war
period had seen geographers increasingly look beyond traditional descriptive regional
studies to, through the increasing adoption of quantitative methods, a concern for
interpretation, causality and model building. In the 1960s these trends were
consolidated through the growing depiction of geographical research as spatial science
and human geography as the spatial science of modelling human spatial behaviour
(Cloke et al, 1991:12-13). Thus, instead of simply describing the differences between
regions, human geography became concerned with the application of scientific method
(through quantitative statistical analysis) in the search for explanation of the spatial
relations of phenomena.6
Ironically geographers had taken on board the positivistic philosophy of spatial science
at a time when such perspectives were becoming increasingly outmoded in the wider
academic world. Thus, over time, the theoretical underpinnings of this 'new' spatial
science began to be questioned (Livingstone, 1992:321). Cloke et al (1991) in their
insightful survey of the major theoretical debates within contemporary geography
through the increased autonomy of the trade union movement, the communal movement, and other
grassroots organizations (such as those women's organizations outside the FSLN sponsored
Associacion de Mujeres Nicaraguense Luisa Amanda Espinosa (AMNLAE) and the environmental
movement), the international 'solidarity' movement has moved beyond its somewhat uncritical
support of the FSLN to consolidate links with grassroots organizations. For a perceptive discussion
of the problems of the relationship between supportive academics and the FSLN, written before the
electoral defeat, see Dunkerley (1988:226).
6 It must be stressed here that inherent in any discussion of theoretical developments in a discipline
such as geography is a tendency to present the evolution of ideas as if they occurred in a relatively
smooth progression and that one perspective basically replaced the one that had previously dominated.
Neither of these premises are correct. The evolution of ideas is chaotic, individual researchers often
remain unaffected by the evolution of theoretical ideas, others are influenced by new ideas but try to
incoiporate them into the perspectives from which they have traditionally written. In the case of the
history of geographical ideas explored here many authors continued producing traditional regional
geographies, unaffected by the demands for a systematic approach to research. In the case of the
evolution of broad theories of development explored below, new perspectives have been added to
traditional economic growth theories and functionalist sociological theory, but this does not imply the
eclipse of the latter two. Indeed the influence ofNeoliberal thought in the 1980s could be interpreted
as a resurgence of a rejuvenated form of modernization theory. The following discussions must be
viewed within such a context.
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outline the substance of this critique. Firstly, it was argued that, the idea of spatial
science as a form of natural science created the false impression of objectivity and
'value neutrality'; that somehow observers could be separated from the social
phenomena that they investigate. Livingstone suggests that it also imposed strict limits
on moral reason,
"Spatial scientists.... sought to uncover (using algebraic codes) a few
fundamental axioms by which the patterns andprocesses ofhuman
interaction could be explained. Similarly utilitarians had, for long enough,
sought to evacuate language ofvalue judgement and to replace it with a
formal calculus." (Livingstone, 1992:328)
Secondly, the scientific analysis of spatial patterns and processes tends toward the
abstraction of empirical observations from, both the deeper economic, social and
political structures which condition and constrain human existence, and the ways in
which those empirical phenomena are the reflections of the perceptions, intentions and
actions of 'human beings as conscious agents' (Cloke et al, 1991:14).7 From the late
1960s the concerns about the philosophical basis of the new geography emanating
from the critiques of spatial science spawned a wide range of possible directions for
alternative theoretical frameworks within which to conduct geographical research. For
our purposes, the most important of these was the development of a radical Marxist
approach to geography which attempted to overcome the 'disregard for the deeper
structural conditions of social existence contained within the spatial scientific agenda'
(Cloke etal, 1991:16).8
The 1960s were also a period of great political change in the academic community.
Many of the young scholars entering the discipline during those years questioned the
relevance of the work which they were engaged in to the political struggles of the day.
Thus,
"This focus on the broader determinants... ofspatialpatterns (the deeper
economic, social andpolitical structures) coalescedwith a growing critique
ofthe relationship between geographic research and the broader world;
(leading geographers) to question earlier assumptions about the purpose of
7 It should be noted, however, that "Many of these weaknesses andproblems have subsequently been
recognized by proponents ofspatial science, who have taken on board a more conscious recognition
and evaluation of the philosophical implications of scientific methodologies ....Cox (1989,
p.208)...cautioned against excessive dependence upon both modelsfor their own sake and large data
sets as the route to scientific explanation, worrying that 'too much research in the Brave New World
will be guided by whatever data happen to be readily and copiously available." (Cloke et al, 1991:14).
8 The other major direction of research was toward amore 'humanisitic' geography based on the
study of 'agents' rather then 'structures', on the role of individuals in society, their actions and the
meanings attached to them (Johnston, 1989:62). Many of the most important theoretical controversies
in Geography during the years which have followed have related to the attempt to unify the more
structural approaches with the 'hermeneutics' of the more humanistic approaches.
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geography and its connections with government objectives. Notjust the
content but also the intent ofgeography became a matter ofsome debate....
In this wayMarxist approaches developed an early emphasis on grounding
geographic research in the material conditions ofexistence." (Cloke et al,
1991:16)
The experiences of geographers concerned with 'development' issues have mirrored
some of the facets of the evolution of mainstream geography considered above (for
further and more detailed discussions of the evolution of mainstream geographical
theory see Cloke et al, 1991; Livingstone, 1992; Johnson, 1985, 1986 and 1991;
Gregory, 1978; Macmillan, 1989; Kobayashi and Mackensie, 1989; Peet, 1978 and
chapters in Peet and Thrift, 1989 and Gregory and Walford, 1989). The ways in
which geographers have approached 'development' issues have also undergone
considerable change over the past two decades. In general these processes have
represented an increasing concern to theorize the continuing high levels of international
inequalities as well as national processes of development, the reasons for the success
and failure of economic strategies, the social and political effects of 'modernization'
and the linkages between the international and the national.
When the discipline finally consolidated itself as part of the corpus of new modern
sciences at the turn of the century it was on the strength of its position as an imperial
science. The evolution of geography into its regional-descriptive form, with its
emphasis upon exploration and the classifying and evaluation of resources, had been
well suited to the needs of the imperial project and the direct connection to imperial
activities continued with the development of geography in the first part of the twentieth
century (Hudson, 1977 and Forbes, 1987:25). However, despite these origins, for the
most part of the twentieth century, geographers have hardly placed central importance
upon the study of the non-European world. By the time of the Second World War,
and during the following decade attention to such issues was largely confined to the
production of large and detailed regional geographies. Most work carried out by
geographers on the Non-European World continued, until the late 1960s, to be devoid
of any clear attention to theory and did not fit into any definable school of thought.
Instead there appears to have been an almost conscious decision to steer clear of the
major theoretical undercurrents and 'concentrate on broad questions traditionally
defined' (Forbes, 1987:57).
Gradually, however, during the 1960s there occurred an increasing questioning of the
theoretical vacuum in which development geographers worked. This reflected the
growing concern for the development of the systematic side of geography, the analysis
of processes and causality rather than the simple description of regions, that
characterized the discipline as a whole during that period. Development geographers
began to utilise the 'number-crunching' and spatial science of the quantitative
revolution to search for 'scientifically' testable laws and patterns with which to chart
the processes of modernization. Researchers at the time spoke of finding, in the
development of spatial models used to back up the claims of the major theorists of
modernization and the stages of economic growth, a framework,
"which would tear development geography away from its suffocating
dependence on a 'predominantly idiographic approach' (Keeble, 1967:245)"
(Corbridge, 1986:5)
As suggested by the above, those development geographers interested in applying the
'new geography' to development issues looked first for models of causation to the
orthodox theories of economic and social development theory; the stages of economic
growth theories and functionalist sociological (or modernization) theory. During this
period, therefore, within an effort to affirm the logic of the linear stages model of
economic growth or the social transformations involved in societal modernization,
geographers modelled and statistically analysed such factors as; the spatial diffusion of
new technologies or 'modem' amenities, the optimum human carrying-capacity of
particular regions or the role of growth-poles in facilitating 'trickle-down' processes in
regional economic development (Corbridge, 1986:5).
This growth of interest in theoretical issues amongst development geographers,
however, occurred at a time when the central tenets of both the linear stages model of
economic growth and functionalist modernization theory were coming under sustained
criticism in other fields. This, together with the increasing radicalism of geographers,
meant that geographer's flirtation with these theories was short-lived.
1.4 Marxism and Development Geography:
During the period from the beginning of the 1970s until the mid 1980s Marxist
inspired theories of development became the most influential perspectives in
geographical studies of development. Positions informed by Marxist analysis were the
most influential of the critiques of both traditional development geography and the new
quantitative approaches. In fact, after the field of Marxist urban studies, development
geography was probably the most important arena in which Marxist approaches gained
a foothold in geography. Their influence on the subsequent evolution of development
geography has transformed the way that geographers think about development issues;
11
in ways, that for me personally, appear to have been productive, stimulating and
contextual.
Marxist ideas had infiltrated into development geography through the popularizing of
the neo-Marxist writings of Gunder Frank which had grown in influence in the wider
academic debates about development during the 1960s. Over the following years,
drawing upon critiques of Frank being articulated by more orthodox Marxists in wider
debates within development studies, geographers began to engage with a number of
different Marxist perspectives, particularly through the work of David Slater (see
Slater, 1973 and 1977). The most influential of these perspectives was the structural
Marxism associated with the writings of Louis Althusser (see Resch, 1992). Many of
the debates that have occurred since, both within Marxist influenced development
geography and between Marxist theoriticians and others in the radical school, mirror
those that have occurred within the wider field of development studies and it is to
those wider debates which we now turn. It is interesting to note, however, how
development geographers have evolved from the theoretical vacuum in which they
worked before the 1960s, through a stage where geographers became consumers of
theoretical developments in other fields (firstly through exposure to the empiricism and
positivism of the quantifiers and secondly in the opening of the discipline to the
influence of radical social theory) to a position where today geographers involved in
theorizing development are contributing actively to the advancement of theory through
the innovative work of scholars such as David Slater and Stuart Corbridge.
1.5 The Contribution of Marxism to Development theory:9
Marxism had entered (or more accurately re-entered) academic debates about
development during the 1960s in the form of ideas developed from the neo-Marxism
of Paul Baran which had been developed and popularized by Andre Gunder Frank.
Frank's writings were part of a powerful critique, mainly emanating from Latin
America, of the conservative and misguided nature of the then dominant forms of
thought about 'development.'
The idea of 'development' had been reborn10 in the period following the second world
war as the colonial powers began to pursue a more developmental, or modernizing,
approach to the administration of their overseas territories in Africa and Asia, and the
9 It lies far beyond the scope of this chapter to attempt a detailed examination of the evolution of
development theory and, in particular, the emergence of dependency theory and the expanded influence
of Marxism. This section can only briefly outline the major facets of these developments. For more
extended treatments see any of the burgeoning number of development textbooks and, in particular,
Kay (1989), Hettne (1990), Hunt (1989), Larrain (1989), Roxborough (1979) andLehmann (1990).
10 For a discussion of the origins of the concept of 'development' see the first chapter of Larrain
(1989) and Heffernan (forthcoming).
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colonies themselves began to achieve independence. In addition the successes of the
Marshall Plan in Europe suggested the plausibility of initiating economic growth
through large injections of capital and heavily state directed economic programmes;
ideas which, it was then suggested, could be applied to the transformation of Latin
America, Asia and Africa. These factors meant that the ideas of progress and
modernization were placed at the centre of international concerns and a new discipline
of 'development' studies, based around the emerging idea of the Third World,' began
to take form.
The ideas which underlay the development of the new theorizing about development
were largely based on two bodies of theory. The paradigm of the expanding capitalist
nucleus (emanating from the new development economics sub-discipline)11 and the
structural functionalist approach to modernization which was reflected in the growth of
theories ofmodernization in sociology and politics. Common to both of these bodies
of theory, and they have often been presented as synonymous, was the idea of
development, or 'modernization,' as a universal linear progression through a series of
stages from a traditional (or undeveloped) society to modern (or developed) society. A
transition largely based upon the experiences of western nations. Modernization
theorists thus looked to the experiences of the development ofWestern capitalism to
provide indications of which norms and institutions were likely to impede, and which
facilitate, development in the emerging countries of the Third World. In sociology
authors such as Bert Hoselitz attempted to apply the theories of Talcott Parsons
regarding the different roles and social relations in traditional and modern societies
(Parson's pattern variables), in the development of a series of indices which could
characterize the changing nature of social relations in developing countries. Once these
norms were theorized then the process of modernization could be characterised as the
progressive expansion of those roles conceptualized as 'modern' and the contraction
or erosion of those labelled 'traditional'. The task for modernization theorists was,
therefore, to explain how such transformations occur and how they could be best
facilitated.12 In economics similar characteristics, but in this case in terms of the
appropriate forms of economic organization, were searched for, and much early
11 For a particularly illuminating discussion of the evolution of development economics as a
separate sub-discipline of economics see Leeson (1988). Other accounts include Hunt (1989:41-64,
86-112) from where the concept of the expanding capitalist nucleus is taken, J.Toye (1987),
Hirschmann (1982), Pomfret (1991 :i-46), Seers (1979), Ranis and Fei (1988), Stern (1989), Wilber
(1986), Rosen (1983) and Killick (1986)
12 For further and more detailed discussions of the ideas underlying modernization theory and its
relations with development economics see Hunt (1989: chapters 2 and 4); Hettne (1990:27-75);
Roxborough (1979:13-41); Peet (1991:21-42); Larrain (1989:chapter 3) or for the original authors
themselves see Hoselitz (1965), Lewis (1955), Parsons (1951), McClelland (1961), Rostow (1960)
and Eisenstadt (1973).
theorizing in the field was devoted to identifying the most important internal barriers to
economic growth which impeded developing countries from following the same stages
of economic modernization which had occurred in the industrialized world.
These essentially eurocentric ideas had not been without their critics but it was not
until Frank synthesized the work of Latin American structuralist economists (on the
specific problems of Latin American development) with the global neo-Marxist
analyses of Paul Baran and postulated 'a model of underdevelopment', that one could
begin to talk of the development of an alternative body of theory in development
studies as a whole. Frank's work, rather than placing the reason for the persistence of
underdevelopment in the relative backwardness and lack of modernization of
developing societies, argued that underdevelopment was an inherent outcome of the
functioning of the international capitalist system, and that the possibilities for
development (or the lack of them) in those countries were conditioned, if not
determined, by their insertion into that system. This system was characterized by a
dualistic dichotomy between the countries of the core and the periphery; with the
wealth and affluence of the former seen as historically dependent upon the exploitation
of the latter. To this way of thinking, therefore, poverty and underdevelopment in the
periphery were not related to the traditional or backward nature of such societies but
rather to their early incorporation into an international capitalist system which had
plundered their resources, appropriated their economic surplus and instigated, as
Frank (1969) called it, the development of underdevelopment through which they
were condemned to economic stagnation.
Theories of modernization were thus attacked by Frank, and other authors in the
rapidly ascending dependency school, for their lack of attention to; historical realities
such as the legacy of colonialism and the inequitable nature of internadonal economic
relations, the vastly transformed nature of the international economy facing
'latecomers' in contrast to the position which 'pioneers' had faced in the development
of industrial capitalism in the West (terminology used by Bell, 1989) and the political
implications of their analyses. In this way such thinking challenged the idea that Third
World societies would basically go through the same or a similar series of stages as
the Western economies in their transition towards modernity. Instead it was argued
that analyses would need to be historically situated and that
"The diffusionist model ofmodernization theory must he rejected and
replaced by a historically oriented, holistic political economy approach; that
the diffusion ofcapital, technology and culture from the capitalist centre to the
periphery should not be conceived ofas an ahistorical, 'disembodied'
process taking place in a vacuum.." (Mouzelis, 1988:23-4)
14
Frank's ideas gained currency at a time when the global post-war economic boom was
beginning to run out of steam and a period when the continued existence of, and even
extension of, poverty in the countries of the Third World, despite the experience of
two decades of rapid economic growth was beginning to be recognized. In this context
the popularization of Frank's ideas, and an engagement with a whole range of
innovative theorizing about development, emanating from the Latin American
dependency school more widely, instigated a welcome shift in the study of
development, away from the search for internal obstacles to 'progress,' towards a
consideration of the insertion of peripheral economies into the international capitalist
system and the ways in which this distinguished them from the experiences of the
Western powers.13 This engagement with dependency theory revolutionized thinking
about development in the 1970s. The promulgation and development of the approach
by Latin American scholars countered the eurocentric assumptions ofmodernization
theory and the whole arena of the debate about development was radically politicized.
Despite the advances of dependency theory over the previously dominant approaches
Frank's ideas came under attack from a number of sources and from a number of
different perspectives. At an empirical level the stagnationist argument of the
dependency framework was countered by pointing to the lack of statistical evidence
for surplus transfer (the chief mechanism of the transfer of resources from the
periphery to the core postulated by Frank and exemplified in the work of Emmanual)
and the undoubted economic advances that had been made in certain countries. The
most stringent attacks on the perspective, however, came from within the radical field,
and in particular, represented the reaction of more orthodox Marxists to the neo-
Marxist elements of the dependency approach which were notable in the work of
Frank in particular. It was argued that dependency suffered from a number of
fundamental weaknesses. Firstly, there was the suggestion that dependency analyses
suffered from a tendency to define underdevelopment as a lack of sustained industrial
13 It should be noted that although Frank's interpretations of dependency, and the discourse of the
'development of underdevelopment' with which he has been associated, have been the most widely
discussed of Latin American theories of development, many have suggested that his work is
particularly deterministic and over-generalized. Often when dependency analyses have been subject to
critical commentary it has been undertaken through a brief cursory review of Frank which is then
generalized to encompass all dependency writings. Many of the works referred to below offer much
more in depth treatment of the evolution of the dependency perspective. Cristobal Kay in particular
(Kay, 1989) offers a remarkable study of the diversity of Latin American thought which includes
consideration of the work of a great variety of the region's scholars including: Osvaldo Sunkel, Raul
Prebisch (never really a 'dependista' but incredibly influential on the direction of academia in the
region), Fernando Henriquez Cardoso, Anibal Pinto, Celso Furtado, Ray Marini, Theotonio Dos
Santos and Anibal Quijano.
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growth, but at the same time, they ascribed the causation of said underdevelopment to
the same lack of sustained growth, leading to an unhelpful cycle of tautological
reasoning that led nowhere (Vandergeest and Buttel, 1988:684). In a similar vein,
Frank's analyses of capitalism as an international system rested upon the definition of
capitalism as an international system characterized by production for an international
market. Authors such as Brenner (1977) and Laclau (1971) argued that such a
definition was rather unhelpful and that to consider capitalism simply as the
engagement in market relations robbed the concept of any explanatory power. Instead
they argued that capitalism should be conceived of, as had originally been argued by
Marx, as a particular mode of production encompassing specific relations of
production (namely the separation of direct producers from ownership of the means of
production through the commodification of land and labour). The circulationist logic
of much of dependency theory also had the effect of limiting the specificity of
analysis. Thus, if the problems of underdevelopment were seen to lie, in the last
instance, within the workings of the international economy and the extraction of
surplus from the periphery, then analysis tended to focus upon the functioning of that
'system' in search of a global explanation for underdevelopment. This was
unfortunate because the neo-Marxist position could logically have allowed for the
identification of historically specific incidences of dependency in particular forms in
different places. As Mouzelis (1988:26) again argues;
"From the neo-Marxistpoint ofview, the process ofdiffusion is
understandable only if located within a matrix ofdomination/subordination
relationships.... operating at both the national and the international level....
One would expect as a logical outcome a research strategy, stressing
context in terms ofspace and time, a research strategy that ceases to treat the
Third World in blanketfashion and draws attention to the enormous
complexity and variation of the various coun tries of the so-called Third
World. Instead of this, the neo-Marxist dependency tradition hasproffered a
plethora oftheories which; in their attempts to accountfor the development or
lack ofdevelopment of the Third World as a whole, repeat some of the very
mistakes that the neo-evolutionists committed in the early fifties."
Secondly, it was argued that dependency theories tended to be overly economistic with
factors such as class relations, the nature of the state and ideology seen as
fundamentally determined by the needs of metropolitan capital. Frank in his later
works went some way toward meeting these criticisms by claiming that his work was
meant to complement class analysis rather than replace it. However, as Larrain (1989)
argues, on the one hand he tries to emphasize the participation of different classes in
the determination of historical processes but, on the other, he still maintains that class
political practices are determined by the dependence of peripheral countries upon the
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imperialist metropolis. In addition the dependency position was characterized as being
stagnationist in that it argued that the only possibilities for development rested in
withdrawing from integration into the international economy and pursuing a more
autarchic approach to development. Frank's avowal of this position was based upon
analyses of the growth of Japan and the progress made in certain Latin American
countries during the two wars and the great depression when their links to the global
economy were particularly weak. As Corbridge (1986:43) argues, Frank's perspective
ignores a couple of important issues underlying the phenomena he seeks to explain.
Firstly, he negates the importance of domestic factors in producing the trends he
notes, and secondly, he fails to explain how economic growth was achieved under
very different international conditions during the post war period, above all by the
successful industrialization of the Asian Tigers (the newly emerging industrial nations
of South East Asia). The slightly more flexible World Systems approach of Immanuel
Wallerstein did go some way toward modifying the Frankian approach to enable it to
deal with these successes through the addition of what he termed the semi-periphery to
Frank's dualistic core-periphery model.
One final point related to the political significance of the dependency school. By
negating the possibilities for sustainable and independent capitalist development in the
periphery Frank in particular fell into the trap of postulating a false dichotomy between
underdevelopment and socialism. Even if Frank's analysis of capitalist development as
untenable in the periphery was accurate there is nothing in his analysis to suggest that
an autarchic form of socialist development which he suggests as an alternative to
dependency would provide a valid route to more sustainable and equitable
development. In fact the influence of Frank's ideas on a whole generation of Latin
American revolutionaries led to the rejection of the more orthodox Marxist position on
the need to encourage national bourgeois revolutions as a necessary first step on the
road to socialism. The implications of this are considered in more detail in the
following chapter. The perceived inadequacies of the dependency framework detailed
above served to stimulate an increasing engagement with a variety of other Marxist
perspectives.
Bill Warren (Warren, 1980) in particular argued strongly for a return to what he saw
as Marx's original emphasis on capitalism as an emancipatory rather than a regressive
economic system, suggesting that, whilst capitalism would eventually be superseded
by socialist organization, when it collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions,
there could be no socialist substitute for the capitalist stage of development. He argued
further that Frank's depiction of capitalism as imposing economic stagnation and
'underdevelopment' was dangerously naive and misplaced and that the dynamism of
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the spread of capitalist relations had, in many 'developing countries, produced
impressive levels of industrialization in the post-war years. The continued existence of
poverty and underdevelopment was related to the perseverance of pre-capitalist social
relations and the lack of capitalist development, rather than any recessive effects
necessarily imposed by capitalism as an economic system per se. Although Warren's
work was welcomed by some for its attack on the simplistic assumptions of
dependency theory it was quickly recognized to be as ahistorical as the accounts it so
vigorously denounced. The problems of underdevelopment could not simply be
expressed as the failure of capitalism to take root in developing countries. In essence
Warren's arguments were not far removed from those of the modernization theorists.
Other Marxist scholars also argued that underdevelopment was related to the
perseverance of pre-capitalist social relations but articulated theories of much greater
theoretical complexity than the somewhat economistic and over-determined perspective
of Warren and other similar Marxists (such as Sender and Smith, 1986). These
theorists were concerned with the articulation of the capitalist mode of production with
various pre-capitalist modes and how, under certain conditions, the survival of those
pre-capitalist forms was functional to the needs of the capitalist sector thereby warping
the processes of development and in some cases promoting stagnation.14 One of the
main advances of this approach was that, through the influence of the work of
anthropologists such as Philippe Rey (1976), attention was turned away from the
global theorizing, characteristic of the dependency approach, to national and local
studies of the articulation of these different modes of production in the search for the
historical processes which underlay underdevelopment (Ruccio, 1986). Debates rose
concerning the different ways in which various pre-capitalist modes co-existed with
the capitalist, and how functional the latter were to the former. One of the major
benefits of the local level of much of this type of analysis was that it offered fruitful
analyses of the specificity of different social forms and in particular challenged the
characterization of the peasant producer as operating according to the logic of capitalist
producers (Schuurman, 1993:7)
What set the more traditional Marxist approaches apart from the neo-Marxism of Frank
et al was the centring of analysis upon production and class relations rather than the
sphere of circulation, and at the national level rather then the global (although the
14 Apartheid is suggested as one system where the needs of capital were apparently served by the
maintenance of an exploitative racist social system rather than through the consolidation of labour
commodification. Another example comes from De Janvry (1981) who sought to explain the
deficiencies of Latin American agricultural development through the way in which the commercial
agricultural sector was guaranteed access to an ample supply of poorly remunerated labour from the
peasant sector which proved functional to the profitability of the sector and discouraged further labour
commodification.
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importance of international factors was recognized). Thus attention was focused upon
the articulation of different modes of production, the analysis of the nature of the
peripheral state and the historical development of class relations. This rejuvenated
Marxism introduced a theoretical rigour to the study of the development process in
particular countries based upon the conceptualisation of the structures of societies and
the ways in which they were transformed and on a political level offering the
possibility for much more informed and sensitive analyses of the prospects for local
opportunities and struggles (Corbridge, 1986:60-61). Another strand of Marxist
theory attempted to explain the international phenomena noted by dependency theorists
through the nexus of international class analysis rather then the sphere of circulation
favoured by Frank. In this way they suggested the existence of a New International
Division of Labour which could explain the development of the NICs through the
changing needs of metropolitan capital (these arguments are considered in detail by
Jenkins, 1987: chapter 2)
1.6 The Impasse in Marxist Development Theory:
Despite the advances in understanding achieved through the adoption of the more
orthodox Marxist approaches; when David Booth expressed a concern that Marxist
development theory had reached an impasse, from which it was unable to free itself
without radical transformation, he was expressing the fears ofmany authors (Booth,
1985, for follow up articles see Sklair, 1988; Mouzelis, 1988; Vandergeest and Buttel,
1988, Corbridge, 1988 and 1989 and the collection of articles in Schuurman, 1993).
Despite the advances made in terms of recasting the academic agenda of the study of
development toward the analysis of the effect of differential levels of development at a
variety of scales and the challenge made to the assumptions of mainstream
development theory, Booth claimed that there were a number of inherent weaknesses
within Marxism as a theoretical framework which were not only to be found in the
neo-Marxist accounts but also the more traditional structuralist Marxism considered
above.
Firstly, it has been argued that Marxism in all of its forms is overly economistic in
nature; a claim which Marxists had themselves used to attack the dependency
perspective. There has of course been a common conviction, within Marxist theory as
a whole, of the importance of the economy in shaping the nature of society in general.
Few would contest the fact that the economic sphere has been of significant
importance in the determination of development processes. In certain cases, however,
this has been interpreted in a crude mechanistic way whereby the political 'super-
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structure' and social formations are seen as being strictly determined by the economic
base. This finds expression in the modes of production literature described above.
Thus Gottlieb (1992:41) explains how;
"In one version of this position, our supposedly 'scientific' analysis of the
mode ofproduction gives us generalizations that are like those ofnatural science.
We think of them as embodying universal laws ofhuman development rather
than as what they in fact are: temporarily stable patterns ofhuman action in
particular social, technical and cultural contexts.""
Thus Marxist theory is criticized for being reductionist, that is, that to arrive at a
conclusive explanation for particular processes, political processes must, in the last
instance, be "reduced" to economic processes. Similarly, Marxist theory is
characterized by Booth as class reductionist in that by and large all political processes
are explained through the contradictory dynamic of the two major classes of capitalist
society; the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; thereby impeding the ability of Marxist
theory to analyse contemporary political struggles, struggles led by social movements
rather then classes (Vasconi, 1990:26). There is much that could be written about
these issues. Perhaps the most cogent point is that these characterizations of Marxist
theory are crude generalizations failing to take into account the rich history of Marxist-
influenced social and political theory, even if such 'vulgar Marxism' has underlain the
political philosophies of some organizations. The representation of Marxist theory
through these crude generalizations creates a reverse "reductionism"; "reducing the
economic to the political, and the political to the ideological." (Vasconi, 1990:26)
The criticisms of Marxism have also occurred at a much more fundamental level. The
current fascination of geographers with the post-modern15 has not by-passed the
development field. Even if the condition of post-modernity is often seen as the cultural
logic of late, or post-industrial, capitalism (see Jameson, 1991), post-modernism, as
an approach to knowledge, does have some relevance to the concerns of development
geography, through its attack on the meta-narratives of both mainstream and radical
social theory. Given the centrality of Marxism to the corpus of development theory,
however, it has been Marxism which has suffered the brunt of the lash of the post¬
modernist's pen or word-processor. Essentially, and this is seriously condensing
varied and disparate strands of thought, those writing from within the post-modern
perspective (if indeed there can be such a thing) claim that knowledge is inseparable
from the discursive form in which it is expressed and that there can, therefore, be no
claims to the primacy of particular forms of analysis or even agreement on the
15 See Soja (1989) or Harvey (1989) for the key texts by geographers on post-modernism; although
see also the recent paper by Andrew Sayer (Sayer, 1993) and the responses to it in Antipode.
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concepts employed in analysis.
Over recent years, therefore, there has emerged a new body of literature concerned
with deconstructing the language (or discourse) of writings on development themes.
Concepts of truth and falsity and of determinacy, together with any ideas of the
progressive development of knowledge have been subjected to extensive critique, and
attention has shifted away from "metanarratives and totalizing discourses" toward " an
openness to (indeed, a celebration of) difference and an advocacy of local
knowledges" (Sayer, 1993:332, 320).
In certain ways these shifts of attention away from economics and causal determinacy
and toward the study of difference, of language, and of power, have been refreshing
and emancipatory, and the work of those who have used the insights of
postmodernism to further a radical agenda to the study of gender, civil society, the
environment, and raised the profile of concepts such as resistance, enpowerment and
emancipation are to be welcomed. Such approaches can be seen in the work of Said16
in employing Foucauldian analysis to explore the ways in which the development of
Western discourses of 'Orientalism'17 have "not only create(d) knowledge ofother
places and subjects but also the very reality they appear to describe" (Watts,
1993:261). Similar elements can be found in the work of Jonathan Crush (Crush,
1991) on the various competing discourses on South African historiography, as well
as an emerging set of writings concerned with critiquing the whole idea of
development itself. This Anti-Developmentism (see Sachs, 1990; Latouche, 1993;
Galli, 1992 and Watts, 1993) points out the similar assumptions of both mainstream
and radical theories of development within which 'development' is consistently
viewed as a universal process (or a desired if unattainable end-state) of increasing
living standards, normally, but not exclusively, associated with industrialization.
These assumptions are subjected to an exhaustive critique through analyses which
"unequivocally reject developmen t as degenerate and ecologically maladaptive; an
empty idea" (Watts, 1993:258).
It is my view, however, that there is another nihilistic strand to 'the postmodern turn'
which is destructive, misplaced and ultimately conservative in its championing of
individual subjectivity, disassociation from the political struggles of the oppressed and
its ultimate reversion to untheorized empiricism.
It is easy to agree with certain of the critics of the 'postmodern turn' that at times it can
appear to be,
16 For example, Said, 1978; although see Prakash, 1992 and O'Hanlon and Washbrook, 1992.
17 Similar arguments can also be developed with regard to Africanism, Third Worldism, Latin
Americanism etc. See for example the extensive literature on Post-Colonialism which is reviewed in
Watts (1993).
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"A specious invention of intellectuals in search ofa new discourse and source
ofcultural capital... or yet another conservative ideology attempting to
devalue emancipatory Modern theories and values." (Best and Kellner,
1991:1h18
and that,
"Extreme postmodern critiques ofmodernity and ofmodern theory wrongly
abandon the progressive heritage of the Enlightenment, democracy and social
theory along with the dubious features ofmodernity. We find much
postmodern critique to be excessive, abstract, and subversive of theoretical
andpoliticalprojects that remain valuable. Extreme postmodern theorists
wish to throw out the notion ofcritical social theory altogether, denying its
metatheoretical assumptions (representation, social coherence and agency)
and even claiming that in contemporary postmodern society 'reality' has
dissolved into fragments and subjects are in the process ofdisappearing."
(Best and Kellner, 1991:257)
Thus, although the attention which has been paid to the problematic nature of Marxism
has some justification it should not be seen as a carte blanche for the abandonment of
the whole project of critical social theory. As suggested above, there are aspects to the
historical development of Marxism which have escaped from the more extreme forms
of determinism and teleology explored above. The insights of discourse theory into the
ways in which the 'development issue' has been formulated do not, to my mind,
suggest the end of social theory but rather its transformation. The need to
contextualize, the necessities of caution, and the openness to alternative ideas,
embodied in the approach, are important, but they do not suggest the irrelevancy of
studies based upon the functioning of the international economy, nor the processes of
class formation and political struggle in individual nation states, but rather the need for
caution in claims for their primacy in relation to cultural factors. These issues are
explored further below.
1.7 The Continued Relevance of Marxist and Neo-Marxist Approaches
to Development Geography:
Dependency theory has probably been the most maligned ofMarxist influenced
theoretical perspectives. Many of the charges of teleological and tautological reasoning
which have been levelled at dependency have been articulated on the basis of a
particularly deterministic and mechanical version of such writings, loosely based on
18 Although, as the examples discussed above have shown, there are certain issues raised which
'resist easy dismissal or facile incorporation into already existing paradigms (Best and Kellner,
1991:1).
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the work of Frank. This is then used to construct an indefensible 'straw man' which is
then easily invalidated. There have, however, recently been a number of attempts to
re-evaluate the contribution of the 'dependistas' to the study of development19. First
and foremost it is stressed that dependency analyses were never meant to offer a
coherent alternative theoretical framework for the study of development, but were
rather attempting to redress an imbalance within its analysis. Namely, what was seen
as, a lack of awareness of the constraints imposed on 'developing' countries by their
experiences under colonialism and their position in the international division of labour.
Whilst the theoretical failings ofmany of the authors within the dependency school, as
outlined above, cannot be doubted, this is not sufficient reason to doubt the important
advances in understanding generated at the time.
Secondly, the writings of dependency authors have been so diverse that it really makes
no sense to lump them all together as one. Recent contributors have suggested that a
distinction may be drawn between the systematic model of 'the development of
underdevelopment' proposed by Frank (and also apparent in the writings of Amin,
Wallerstein and Emmanuel) and the analyses of concrete situations of dependency
where, rather than offering a global model of exploitation and stagnation, dependency
is employed as a framework for assessing the impact of colonialism, international
economic relations, and the spread of transnational capital, upon the productive forms,
social relations and political systems of the periphery.
The central issues are explained well by Mouzelis (1988). He argues that there is
nothing inherently wrong with attempting to examine changing global inter-relations;
as attempted by the neo-Marxist dependency authors and the world systems project of
Immanuel Wallerstein. The problems arise when such studies attempt to make crude
generalizations about 'necessary' outcomes in the core and periphery (and semi-
periphery). Thus;
"When one shifts the focus ofanalysis from the world system to the Third
World, ...theories which do not go beyond the periphery/semi periphery
dichotomy, i.e. theories which do not take seriously into account the variety
ofdevelopmental trajectories within the Third World, soon run into
difficulties.... Thus dependency theory, in sofar as it tries to create a general
theory about the ThirdWorld without taking variations into account, cannot
escape the fate ofall contextless, universalistic theorizing in the social
sciences." (Mouzelis, 1988:28).
At the same time, however, there is an equal danger in empty rhetorical statements
about the complexity and uniqueness of the individual circumstances of each nation or
19 See in particular Kay (1989), Larrain (1989), Palma (1989), Slater (1993b) and Peet (1991).
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even each social formation. Untheorized empirical investigations offer the same dead
ends. What is needed is "the hard, painstaking, macro-historical, comparative work
requiredfor translating such statements into concrete analyses." (Mouzelis, 1988:28).
Whether the less deterministic strands of dependency theory could be of use in
informing such a research goal remains a point of controversy; with most
commentators content to assign dependency analyses, in all their forms, to the
wastebasket of theoretical endeavour (see Booth, 1985; Vandergeest and Buttel, 1988
and Corbridge, 1990). Others, however, call for a renewed attention to the wide
variety of dependency analyses. Kay (1989), in his in-depth study, stresses the
diversity of the Latin American contribution to development theory and its possible
role in the forging of an alternative to neoliberal hegemony in the region in the 1990s
(see my discussions in the following chapter). Peet (1991:53-54), stressing the
contemporaneous influences upon the origin of dependency analyses, lauds its effect
on the rejuvenation of Marxist analyses through its reintroduction of the idea of
regional differentiation as a complement to Marxian class analysis, and points to the
broad literature on 'uneven development' as evidence of its continued influence and
importance. The strongest call for the continued relevance of dependency analyses,
however, comes from Jorge Larrain. In his book Theories of Development, he argues
that,
"The issue ofdependency arises in the study of the development ofcapitalism
in the periphery. It does not replace a Marxist analysis of classes, relations of
production andproductive forces, it only contextualizes it..... The critique of
dependency went too far and threatened to throw away the baby with the
bathwater. In trying to emphasize the developing capabilities ofcapitalism
everywhere it tended to neglect the specificities andpeculiarities ofcapitalist
development in the periphery." Larrain (1989:201/10)
Finally it is worth remembering that Dependency Theory was a child of its time and its
place. Whilst it has faded from fashion in radical circles in the West, in Latin America
the dependency perspective "has not been rejected but rather situated in its time as a
necessary andfruitful critique ofboth modernization theory and the erstwhile
strategies of the Communist Parties ofLatin America," (Slater, 1993a:16-17). In the
years that have followed a wide and varied literature has emerged which has built upon
the foundations of the 'dependencia' perspective.20 This does not paint over the
deficiencies of dependency, which have been outlined above, but rather stresses the
20 Examples might include the treatment of issues such as, political power and authoritarianism,
civil society and democracy, and the growth and role of social movements.
fact that it was,
"an intellectual/political movement... which argued, wrote and theorized
back. This was the significance ofdependencia and the fact that associated
modes of reflection emerged in other parts ofthe South during the same
years In the encompassing context ofNorth-South relations, the
dependency writers constructed and deployed a geopolitical imagination
which sought to prioritize the objectives ofautonomy and difference and to
break the subordinating effects ofmetropolis-satellite relations. To the
Western mind inculculated in the Cartesian tradition, dependency' seemed
little more than a vague discontent, but in actual fact it was a key body of
alternative critical thought." (Slater, 1993a: 18-19).
The challenges to Marxist development theory mounted during the 1980s have already
been considered in some detail. It is my view that, in the same way as there are
elements of dependency theory which, through their sensitivity to the diversity of the
so-called Third World can be retained in the formulation of contemporary critiques of
capitalism, so these elements can be employed within a basically Marxian analytical
framework, but a Marxism that is transformed in the light of present debates. In
essence this means that the critiques of structural and orthodox Marxism as overly
deterministic and reductionist, and of the undue emphasis often placed upon statist
political and economic ideologies, must be upheld. This, however, should not be seen
as representing the transcendence of Marxism 'en toto'. Marxism has never been
reducible to a set of 'laws' about societal development and there are many traditions of
Marxist analysis which allow for the view of Marxism as a conceptual framework that
can be employed for the analysis of specific circumstances. Again drawing upon
Mouzelis, it can be argued convincingly that Marxism still retains the advantage of
offering an effective synthesis of systematic and action-oriented approaches to
development, in that the Marxist paradigm offers the theoretical means for looking at
societies in terms of the actions and goals of individuals and groups in societies,
whilst retaining a vision of systemic wholes and their requirements for reproducing
themselves (Mouzelis, 1988:35).21 For Marxism to escape from the charges of
economic reductionism, however, it has to respond to the challenges of
conceptualizing the relationship between economics and politics. The Althusserian idea
21Mouzelis outlines how in practice the balance between structure and agency within Marxist theory
has been difficult to achieve. On the one hand, we find 'ultra-voluntaristic' class analyses where the
processes of social development are 'read off from the actions and 'machinations' of a dominant class,
whilst, on the other hand, we find theories which stress the constraints and limitations imposed by
economic structures to such a degree that the role of actors is reduced to, in Althusserian terms, the
"bearers of structures'. Despite this, he argues that there is, within the paradigm, the "theoretical
means for looking at societies both in terms of actor's goals and strategies and in terms of systemic
wholes and their reproduction requirements"; as outlined above (Mouzelis, 1988:35-36).
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of the 'relative autonomy' of the political sphere provides a starting point; in that,
within that conceptualization, the economy is not meant to determine political forms,
but only sets the limits as to what is possible. This, however, still builds into the study
of the political the alleged primacy of the economic through the fact that, because of its
failure to 'elaborate specific conceptual tools for the study of politics,' it reads the
economic into the definidon of the political (Mouzelis, 1988:37). What is needed, if
Marxism is to provide an effective conceptual tool for theorizing the relations between
the economic and the political, is a way of dealing with the non-economic sphere
which does not build into its very definition the relationship which it has with the
economy. For some, such a rejuvenated non-reductionist Marxism is Marxism no
longer. For others, the more humanitarian strands of Marxism (for instance in the
work ofGramsci) have long been concerned with precisely these problems, and there
is every hope that a Marxism which avoids economism can be articulated that does not
abandon its central features; its holistic political economy approach and its agency-
structure synthesis (Mouzelis, 1988:40).
1.8 Marxism, Post-Marxism and the Study of the Nicaraguan
Experience:
The foregoing discussion has outlined in detail the debates currently raging within
radical development theory. The position taken in this thesis, as revealed in the
discussion above, is of a Post-, as opposed to an ex-, Marxist character, influenced by
the insights of authors such as Nicos Mouzelis and Michael Watts, and to a lesser
extent by the work of Stuart Corbridge and David Slater. Such a perspective means
that whilst certain Marxist claims to exclusivity are rejected, it is regarded as foolhardy
to deny or stop using the 'profound insights that Marxism has still to offer to those
who are interested in how whole societies are reproduced and transformed' (Mouzelis,
1990:155-156); the very issues which dominate the concerns of this work. Thus, the
arguments advanced here concerning the historical evolution of Nicaraguan society
and how it might be conceptualized, the nature of the Sandinista's project of social
transformation, and the possibilities for the development of some form of popular
alternative to capitalism in Latin America in general, bear the imprint of Marxian theory
on the processes of class formation, the articulation of interests between different
social sectors, and the maintenance of political power. Nevertheless, the importance of
insights from beyond the broad Marxist camp are also emphasized, and are highlighted
particularly in discussions of the limited applicability of traditional Marxist theory to
both the problems of economic policy formation in the transitional socialist state, and
the relationship between socialism, democracy and civil society. In particular, an
26
attempt is made to explore developments in Nicaragua during the 1980s both in terms
of the goals and strategies of the various classes and social movements of the country
and in terms of the economy and polity as a systemic whole with its own structural
constraints and requirements.
The discussion above may raise some questions as to the primacy given to the
economy within this thesis, and in particular, the importance attached in latter chapters
to the performance of the Nicaraguan economy in determining the legitimacy, and even
survival, of the Sandinista government in Nicaragua during the 1980s. Lancaster
(1988:141-2) substantiates such questions well;
"ForrestD. Colburn's study ofagrarian policy andperformance in
Nicaragua asserts that "legitimacy for a revolution depends on political
issues; legitimacy for a post-revolutionary regime depends on economic
performance" (1986:22). It is the premise of this chapter that legitimation in
Nicaragua rests substantially on bases other than economic performance.
While no one would argue that economic performance is an insignificant or
specious issue in the legitimation ofgovernments, post-revolutionary or
otherwise, a simple economic deficiency model overstates the case.
Originally bom ofan economic reading ofMarx, this homo economicus
theory has lately been taken to heart by even the most conservative circles of
opinion, for it allows a simple consumerist standard of "economic
performance" in which quantitative standards ofproduction and consumption
appear as positive grounds in their own right, severedfrom and independent
of the qualitative issues ofsocialpower and class relations."
Such a perspective, does not, however, to my mind, negate the importance of the
economic sphere in determining the viability and direction of post-revolutionary
society; so long as analysis is placed within the context of an understanding of the
changing dynamics of social power and class relations outlined by Lancaster. There is
an equally insidious and dangerous anti-economism, based on the post-modern
critique of materialism considered above, which is just as problematic, as the overly
deterministic versions of Marxism which have been so parodied in recent years.
To conclude, although a blinkered examination of the development of economic policy
in revolutionary Nicaragua, or an analysis of the dynamics of the revolutionary
process which gave undue primacy to the articulation of economic interests, would be
misplaced, it must not be forgotten that it has been in the economic sphere which the
battle for socialist development in the 'periphery' appears to have been won and lost
(see the discussions on this in Chapter Two) Thus, although the inherited economic
structure and the heavy dependence upon agro-exports, the imposition of the US trade
embargo and the effects of the international recession did not determine the success or
otherwise of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua in the 1980s, they did at least
determine the relative feasibility of alternative strategies of social transformation, and
the likely success of particular directions in economic decision-making.
1.9 The conducting of the Research Project:
The field research for this thesis was carried out in Nicaragua between June 1989 and
May 1990. Most of that time was spent in Managua, Nicaragua's capital city, carrying
out research in that city's many libraries and institutions. These included the new
National Library located in the Huembes Market, the library of the Department of
Agricultural Economics of the National Autonomous University, the main library of
the independent Central American University, the research library of the Instituto
Nicaraguense de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales, and the collection of the
Harvard affiliated INCAE. The three major daily newspapers Barricada. El Nuevo
Diario and La Prensa were also extremely important sources of information, as were
the publications of the many smaller research institutes of the country.
Time was also spent undertaking interviews with individuals from many different
parts of Nicaraguan society. Formal semi-structured interviews and informal
discussions were carried out with representatives of the main export ministries,
officials from several of the Newly formed National Commissions set up in 1989 to
bring together state beaurocrats, private and state producers, and the workforce of
many of the major agro-export commodities, individual researchers such as Eduardo
Baumeister ofCIERA, Amaru Barahona and Vilma Ubau of INIES (Instituto
Nicaraguense de Investigaciones Economicas y Sociales), leaders of Trade Unions
such as the CST (Central Sandinista de Trabajadores) and the ATC (Asociacion de los
Trabajadores del Campo) and the farmers union UNAG (Union Nacional de
Agricultures y Ganaderos), Opposition leaders and representatives of the private
sector from organizations such as COSEP (Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada)
and INIESEP. Furthermore I also spent time talking to union representatives from the
Camilo Ortega state enterprize, visited a number of cooperatives around Masaya and
spoke to some of the members, and attended a number of conferences including the
first annual convention of UNAG.
Probably the most important part of the year that I spent in Nicaragua, however, was
simply living in a country that was going through such social upheavals. My
experiences of living in Managua helped to shape my understanding of the
revolutionary process and provided the means of contextualizing the information
gained through the interviews and the materials consulted. I also travelled to many of
the other regions of the country; although unfortunately I was never able to visit the
Atlantic Coast region. In addition I travelled to Costa Rica, Honduras and Guatemala
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in search of material to give my work its regional context I am particularly grateful for
information received from and discussions with staff at FLACSO (Facultad
Latinoamericano de las Ciencias Sociales) in San Jose and materials from the CMC
(Consejo Monetario Centroamericano) in the same city
The statistical information used in this thesis comes mainly from governmental sources
such as INEC (Instituto Nicaraguense de Estadisticos y Census), the Agriculture
Ministry (MIDINRA), the Central Bank, and CIERA (Centro de Investigaciones y
Estudios de La Reforma Agraria), especially the data included in the 10 volume study
of the Ten Years of Agrarian Reform produced in 1989, as well as regional bodies
such as FLACSO and the CMC. Some alternative data on Nicaragua was also obtained
from INIESEP, the research arm of COSEP, but on those few occasions where
figures differed, preference was given to the governmental sources due to the lack of
information given by INIESEP as to the methods used in data collection.
The recognized problems in the reliability of data collection in developing countries
were compounded in this instance because of the effects of the Contra war and the
massive dislocation of individuals that it caused, as well as the disruption to the
normal channels ofmarketing of agricultural produce, and other forms of
transportation, which had serious effects on the ability of the government to properly
assess overall production levels within the economy. Further problems of reliability
relate to the fact that even figures collected from the various government ministries and




Socialism, Marxism and the Future of 'the Left' in
Latin America
2.1 Introduction:
This chapter builds upon the generalized discussions of the concepts and analytical
frameworks of radical development geography, which were outlined in the previous
chapter, through a selective review of the evolution of academic thought on
revolutionary change and social(ist) transformation in the Periphery.' In this way,
consideration is given to the dynamics of, and prospects for, alternative 'socialist'
development strategies, thereby providing a context for the analysis of the evolution
and outcomes of the FSLN's programme of social transformation in Nicaragua in
the following chapters. The aim of the chapter is, therefore, to explore the
theoretical context that must underlie any attempt to evaluate the Sandinistas'
endeavours to transform Nicaraguan society, or to locate them within wider debates
about the future of 'socialism' in the 'ThirdWorld'; providing a comparative and
theoretical context within which to retrospectively evaluate the revolutionary period.
2.2 Socialism after 'The End of History':
The 1980's were hardly an easy period for a new socialist regime to have emerged
in the Third World, or for socialists anywhere. The FSLN's ascension to political
power, their experiences in government, and their eventual electoral defeat in the
elections of February 1990, occurred during times of intense change and
deliberation for the international socialist movement. As the twentieth century
reaches its final stages, socialism, communism, Marxism and revolutionary action
(some of, if not the most, influential ideas of the twentieth century) appear to have
collapsed as valid ideologies and guides for political praxis. In particular, the eclipse
of the self-styled 'socialist' states of the Eastern Block has been greeted with glee by
the ideologues of the 'right,' who have proclaimed liberal Western capitalism
triumphant over its only competitor and are now basking in the 'end of history'
(Fukuyama, 1989).
Within such a context, the question arises as to whether there are still any
alternatives to the consolidating hegemony of Liberal, or more essentially
Neoliberal, political and economic ideas (see Overbeek, 1993). In the case of many
parts of the Third World' (particularly Africa and Latin America) the continuing
existence and, indeed, even the intensification, of abject poverty within large sectors
of the population, the social dislocations resulting from the severe economic
adjustments that have had to be made through the long years of the 'Lost
Development Decade' (see Singer, 1989), and the continued resistance of a whole
range of different social movements to the dictates of 'modernization' in all of its,
and their, different forms (see Scott, 1990, but also Guttmen, 1993), all point to the
continued importance that counter-hegemonic discourses, ideas and political
organization will play in the future. In order to elucidate more clearly the changing
conceptions regarding the possibilities for alternative paths and meanings of
development this section will continue by briefly critiquing current work on the
demise of Third World' socialism, before charting some of the recent experiences
of the Latin American 'Left' in the context of the regional consolidation of
Neoliberal ideas.
2.3 The Global Context:
The widespread sense of ideological and political confusion (and economic
malaise), characteristic of the recent experiences of 'Peripheral' socialist regimes,
has seen a flurry of recent publications concerned with evaluating recent changes
that have occurred within socialist policy-making and the likely future (if any) for
socialism in the Third World'1 It is a matter of some concern that the historical
paucity of academic consideration of the nature of Third World socialism has given
rise to a rather generalized treatment of the present crisis. Firstly, there has been a
tendency to consider the future of socialist movements in the 'developing world' as
synonymous with the fortunes of the 'actually existing socialist states,' be they
Eastern European or Asian. This has produced a preoccupation with the changes
that have occurred in Eastern Europe and other wider international factors, which
has tended to blind observers to the domestic factors giving rise to the attractiveness
of socialist ideologies.2
1 The pioneering works on Third World Socialism wereWhite et al (1983), Chase-Dunn (1982), and
Wiles (1982). Since then the rapidly changing context of the late eighties has seen a number of
important contributions which have included Fitzgerald and Wuyts own work (Fitzgerald and Wuyts,
1988), Fagen et al (1986), Utting (1992a and b), Forbes and Thrift (1987), Post and Wright (1989),
the special edition of the relaunched Third World Quarterly in 1992 and an edition of the Journal of
Communist Studies in the same year, and the regional studies by Harris (1992), De Vylder (1991),
Cohen and Goulbourne (1991) and Keller and Rothchild (1987). Short pieces by Corbridge (1991) and
Galeano (1991) are also of relevance.
2 Such factors might include the historical association of peripheral socialist ideologies with
nationalism and the continued importance of such an association given the current importance of
nationalism worldwide, as well as the successes of various Latin American 'Leftist' political parties in
taking advantage of the social effects of neoliberal economic policies to score surprisingly good
election results, the successes of the Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT) in Brazil being a case in
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Secondly, there is a debilitating lack of detailed study of the performance of those
socialist organizations which have attained political power in the Periphery. Thus,
although during the period following the Second World War a number of regimes
expressing an intention to embark upon a non-capitalist (or expressly socialist) path
of development have emerged in the Third World, discussion of the dynamics of
this Peripheral socialism (within the widest definition of such a concept) have
remained, to an alarming degree, absent from the 'theoretical corpus of development
economics' and that of development studies more generally. This is regrettable since
the economic priorities of such regimes, and their effects upon the social and
political processes of the countries in which they have attained power, have differed
significantly from the dynamics of the liberal capitalist model of development
favoured in other Peripheral states and also from the state communist model recently
overthrown in Eastern Europe (Fitzgerald and Wuyts, 1988:1).
Both of these factors have played their role in producing a inclination within the
literature to portray the experiences and failings of the 'Third World' socialist
regime as relatively homogenous. In reality, however, there has been a wide
diversity of regimes that could be classified under the wide umbrella of 'Peripheral'
socialism. These have ranged from the short lived, broadly social democratic,
Popular Unity government of Allende's Chile to the now thirty five year old Cuban
communism of Fidel Castro, from the African socialist ideology of Nyerere's
Ujaama to the Leninism of 'the Derg' in Ethiopia, and from Mao's China to the
liberation theology influenced Marxism of Nicaraguan 'Sandinismo'. The breadth
and diversity of the 'Alternative' Peripheral regime can be seen clearly just from this
short list. Despite these distinctions, much academic enquiry into the successes and
failures of the non-capitalist Peripheral regime has been founded upon the search for
a 'checklist' of criteria by which all these regimes may be characterized and their
achievements and limitations studied. This has often involved ignoring examples
which do not fit into the Soviet-Style model.3 In an attempt to avoid these problems
of broad international over-generalization, the following section of the chapter
focuses attention on to the regional dimension through a consideration of the
contemporary situation facing the broad socialist movement in Latin America
2.4 The Latin American Context:
point. Polemics on the demise of peripheral socialism chose to ignore at their peril the continued
attractiveness of a wide range of broadly socialist ideologies to the peoples of the Third World.
3 The most often cited classification is the one developed by White et al (1983)
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" It seems that there is no place for revolutions anymore other than in
archaeological museum display cases, nor room for the Left, except the
repentant Left willing to sit at the right of the bankers. We are all invited to
the world burial ofsocialism. All ofhumanity is in the funeralprocession
they claim,
I must confess, I don't believe it. This funeral is for the wrong corpse."
(Eduardo Galeano, 1991:250)
Galeano's comments on the apparent 'death of international socialism' come from a
short piece written on the recent experiences of the Latin American 'Left' within the
rapidly changing international political environment of the past few years. One
figure who springs to mind, as the embodiment of Galeano's idea of the
disillusioned or repentant 'Left', is the Brazilian, Fernando Henrique Cardoso.
Cardoso, often seen as the most insightful of Latin America's dependency theorists
4 now appears as part of the government team of those who triumphed over Lula's
PRT (The Brazilian Worker's Party).5 As argued in a recent NACLA Report on the
Americas (see quote below) he is representative of those on the Left in Latin
America who have, through their dissatisfaction with their experiences of state-led
development and/or popular (or 'populist') experimentation, embraced an emerging
'Neoliberal' orthodoxy in the region.
"So completely do(es) Neoliberal(ism) dominate the current Latin
American debate that opposing ideas are increasingly treated with the
bemused condescension usually reservedfor astrological charts andflat-
earth manifestos: We hope the astrologers will come around, but there's
nothing Left to argue about. When ..Cardoso....spoke a few
months ago to an audience ofbankers and investors atManhattan's
America's Society, he was introduced as a well-known dependency
theorist who had outgrown his old ideas: an astrologerfinally come to
terms with Copernicus." (NACLA Report on the Americas, Feb. 1993,
Vol 16(4):16)
The questioning of socialist and populist models of economic development, which
has intensified during the long and drawn-out years of economic crisis which have
characterized the 1980s within the region, has left the "Left' struggling to find new
alternatives with which to challenge the currently dominant stresses upon free
markets, declining state intervention, and export-orientation. The position facing the
Latin American Left in 1994 is hardly optimistic. Even twelve years ago the
situation was quite different. Despite the fact that the region was then falling into the
4 His major work was meant to be understood as a stringent attack on the more deterministic
elements of the development of underdevelopment school; see Cardoso and Faletto (1979)
5 For a discussion of the evolution of Cardoso's ideas see Lehmann, 1990:73-6.
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grips of a recession from which it still has to emerge today,6 the perspective of
many of the region's popular movements toward the prospects for social change
was one of cautious optimism. The Sandinista revolution seemed to be making
impressive strides toward meeting the pent up demands of the Nicaraguan people,
through a highly innovative democratic brand of socialism, the FMLN in El
Salvador looked on the point of toppling the Salvadoran oligarchy, and the Cuban
revolution was moving toward the acceptance of a more 'open' system of economic
management.7 Everywhere it seemed that Latin American capitalism was in crisis
and events seemed to be proving that the time was right for some sort of
revolutionary social transformation.
By the time the Sandinistas lost the Nicaraguan elections in February 1990 the
situation was markedly different; a wide range of internal and external factors
having conspired to produce an undeniably pessimistic scenario for Latin America's
progressive movements.8 Firstly, whilst Latin American socialist movements have
differed in their historical relationships with Moscow, the rapid changes in Eastern
Europe, and the apparent collapse of socialism as a viable political ideology have left
many organizations floundering. Even though few regimes or organizations have
had the close relations with Moscow of Cuba, or the 'official' communist parties of
the region, the collapse of the socialist block has removed an important source of
support, be it ideological, military or economic, for the Left in the region. Socialist
experiments in the region have always been condemned to economic marginality by
the interplay of international market forces but the collapse of the Soviet Block has
accentuated this markedly.
Secondly, changes in the international political economy are also influencing the
structure and organization of the global space economy, and hence that of Latin
America itself. As the competition between the divergent political ideologies of
socialism and capitalism recedes from the centre of the international political arena,
the world economy appears to be restructuring according to the globalization of
Neoliberal policy ideas which give predominance to market forces (Bitar and
Bradford, Jr, 1992) There is, however, within this scenario an emerging tension
between: attempts by the US to reconsolidate its global political hegemony within
an increasingly integrated international system (with relatively uniform norms), and
6 Although see the discussion on recent tum arounds below.
7 See Deere and Meurs (1992) on the experiments with parallel and peasant markets in Cuba during
this period.
8 Whilst recognizing that any endeavour to construct a form of representation that takes in the whole
of the region inevitably involves a great deal of abstraction, and that the region is far from
homogenous, I feel that it is still useful in the following section to outline, what I feel to be, some
of the key features affecting the contemporary political economy of the region.
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the drive to create greater economic spaces within regional economic powers centred
upon the US, Japan and Europe.9 The extent to which the international system
comes to be characterized by this regionalization is obviously a pressing issue which
Latin American governments must confront in their regional dealings with the US
and in considering their position in the international division of labour. Particularly
important in relation to this at present are such factors as; the eventual outcome of
the current GATT round, any opportunities presented from a growing economic
relationship between the EC and Latin America, and the possibility of a regional free
trade agreement for the Americas. For the 'Left' in the region it is important to
consider what the significance of any of these developments for the evolution of
Latin America's productive structure, and hence aspects of its political organization,
might be.
Thirdly, as well as facing the contemporary pressures outlined above, Latin
America's productive structure has already experienced far-reaching changes due to
the experiences ofmore than a decade of widespread debt and recession and the
processes of adjustment with which they have been met. Furthermore, the onset of
the debt crisis has led to the final collapse of the previously dominant state-led
development strategies of the region. The collapse in primary commodity prices,
declines in living standards and so on, highlighted the wide-ranging deficiencies in
previous economic strategies which had proved unable to react to changing
international realities.
Fourthly and finally, the past decade or so has seen the development of an extended
and enhanced role for the international financial organizations in the economic
affairs of all Latin American countries. This changing role has been accompanied by
the adoption of an increasingly militant Neoliberal stance by the institutions in the
policies which they 'recommend.' The expansion in the influence of the financial
institutions occurred as the debt crisis took hold in the 1980s and as alternative
sources of foreign credit disappeared. Cheaply available sources of such credit in
the 1970s had allowed the state-led strategies of Post-War Latin American
economics to survive beyond their feasibility in many countries. When the
international recession hit at the turn of the decade this meant that the region suffered
particularly severely. It also enabled the institutions (with some justification) to
point to economic incompetence, entrenched beaurocracies and misguided
development strategies as the primary roots of the crisis. Given their monopoly over
the supply of new credits and the arrangements for rescheduling the massive debts
9 For a discussion of the integration process in Europe and its effects upon the EC's poorer trading
partners see my paper in the Journal Qf Area Studies, Brown (1993).
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built up in the 1980s, the institutions have been able to intervene more directly in
internal economic management than ever before. In accordance with their analysis of
the roots of the crisis, the structural adjustment and stabilization programmes
designed by the World Bank and the IMF as the conditions for access to financial
resources (supposedly in consort with local governments) seek to restructure the
economies of the region. This restructuring is designed to open the region to the
influence of international market forces; through the widely discussed emphases of
the programmes upon liberalization, export promotion and fiscal austerity.10 As
such, the economic options to non-Neoliberal governments of any description
appear bleak to say the least. As expressed more generally by Michael Watts;
"The 1980s brought debt, retrenchment and austerity; short-term crisis
management, stabilization and the so-called counter-revolution in
development theory were their handmaidens. Inflation, lack of investible
funds and external conditionalities imposed by global regulatory agencies
rendered alternative development strategies, as much as statist
development initiatives, largely irrelevant." (Watts, 1993:258).
Nonetheless, the consolidation of the Neoliberal perspective in Latin America cannot
simply be seen as having been externally imposed by the conditions associated with
the structural adjustment programmes of the institutions. Neoliberalism has been
accepted, even embraced, by political movements throughout the region. Moreover,
even governments elected on a 'populist' platform have, once entering office, ended
up, given external conditions, administering severe austerity programmes; Fujimora
in Peru being a case in point. Even the Sandinistas in Nicaragua oversaw a severe
package of pro-market economic reforms in their last 2 years of office (see Chapter
Four below).
The 1990s then, has seen the almost complete establishment of the supremacy of the
Neoliberal perspective on development in Latin America. Not only has the Left been
faced with the task of dealing with its own failures (i.e. the economic, political and
developmental inadequacies) but it now finds itself dealing with 'the enemy' in a
new well-organized modernizing guise, and it has few alternatives to offer. The
following section looks in a little more detail at the rise of Neoliberalism in the
region and its significance for the future orientation of the region's progressive
movements.
10 For discussions of the nature and effects of IMF and World Bank structural adjustment
programmes see Addams (1993), Ghai (1991), Corbridge (1993), Helleiner (1990), The South
Commission (1990), Singer (1989), Killick and Malik (1991), Killick, Malik and Manuel (1991),
Bird (1991), Commander (1989), Pastor,JR. (1987), African Environment. (1990), nos 25-28, vol.VII
(1-4), Race and Class (1992), World Development (1991), vol.19, no.12, Demery and Addison
(1987), Todaro (1989), Gore (1992) and Stein (1992)
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2.5 Lessons for the 'Left' from Neoliberalism's Rise to Ascendancy
in Latin America:
The timing of Neoliberalism's drive to intellectual and political ascendance in Latin
America has had much to do with the, now well-documented, take-over of the
international financial institutions by economists of that persuasion at the end of the
1970s (see Toye, 1987 and for a wider study Overbeek, 1993). However, its roots
go back a good deal further. Chile had been developing what would now be termed
Neoliberal policies since the earliest days of the Pinochet regime. Furthermore many
of the tenets of the Neoliberal position were central to the orthodox neoclassical side
of the arguments about inflation with the structuralists which have dominated Latin
American debates about economics since the 1930s (see Ruccio, 1993). The shift in
perspective, and increasing power, of the international institutions, coupled with the
onset of prolonged economic depression, facilitated a profound shift in internal
politics which enabled the rapid consolidation of the Neoliberal model. Vasconi
(1990:30-31) argues further that the roots ofmany of these changes in social and
political organization arose from the earlier onset of authoritarian rule in many Latin
American countries. He suggests that it was under the control of these authoritarian
states that the domination of international finance capital was established and "the
old 'compromise' or 'populist' state, was liquidated, the workers' movement and
the popular movement were driven back (and) their corporative organizations and
fundamental policies destroyed" (Vasconi, 1990:30).
Latin America's experiences in the 'lost development decade' are now well
documented and need not be discussed in detail here (see Ghai, 1991 for example).
It appears that the state-led models of economic development and the paternalistic
politics that supported them were finally discredited by the economic collapse of the
1980s. For much of this century the 'Left' has been involved in populist coalitions
with the more nationalist-oriented of the middle stratas of society which have vied
for political power with conservative elites, or those sectors of the bourgeoisie allied
with international capital. They have thus been associated (often rightly) with the
economic decision-making and policy errors associated with the ISI-based models
of economic development that such coalitions invariably adopted when they
achieved power. Now it seems that, in purely economic terms, the Neoliberal
critique of previous Latin American models of development appears to have been
proved right. The World's press repeatedly stress that the turn-around in Latin
America's economic fortunes has begun. One only has to glance at the triumphalist
special Latin American sections in publications such as the Economist. Time
magazine or even the Financial Times to see the stories of the beginnings of capital
inflows, the first, albeit marginal, positive economic growth figures for years, and
possibly more importantly, marked 'improvements' in the way in which the region
is viewed from outside - i.e.. the way in which potential investors view the security
of their investments.
Whatever one's view of this supposed turn around, and its implications for the
advocates of alternative economic strategies, it is important to understand that the
nature and functioning of Peripheral capitalism in Latin America has been
fundamentally altered by the experiences of the economic crisis of the 1980s and the
Neoliberal packages with which it has been met. The Latin American regional
economy in 1993 has very different dynamics to the system which all but collapsed
at the end of the 1970s. It still remains far from clear, for example, what the
distributional consequences of the debt crisis have been. Probably of greater
importance, however, is the fact that the cheaply available external financing of most
of the post-war period is now past and gone. It is no longer feasible to run large-
scale fiscal deficits to finance populist or socialist development strategies. The
changes in the international economy outlined above mean that there appear to be
few alternatives to the maintenance of balanced budgets even at the costs of severe
recession (Fitzgerald, 1991:8).
Such changes as have occurred over the past decade or so have had a tremendous, if
under-documented, affect upon the balance of power amongst the various social
groups in Latin America. In Central America, for example, it appears that the
traditional oligarchies11 are gradually giving way to modernizing sectors of an
emerging bourgeoisie committed to the Neoliberal model and to the maintenance of
political power through open 'democratic' processes rather than the use of coercion
and military repression (see discussions in Chapter Five). Elsewhere in the region,
those rent seeking elites attached to state beaurocracies are losing ground to those
sections allied to international capital as liberalization opens up the region to
investment. The chief concerns for these latter sectors is to establish a consensual
vision of the region in the eyes of the international community which is seen to
provide stability and a suitable environment for the operation of international capital.
All of these processes, and they are operating to different degrees within individual
countries, are having effects upon the regional balance of power between capital and
labour and the functioning of the region within the wider international political
economy. It remains to be seen whether the Left's understanding of the dynamics of
11 Or reactionary despots as they are termed by Liz Dore and John Weeks; see Dore and Weeks,
1992b.
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Latin American capitalism, the important changes in the region's economic
structure, and hence aspects of its political organization, can respond to these
changes in their search for the formulation of popular alternatives for the countries
of the region.
The emerging Neoliberal movement in Latin America has grasped the significance of
the far-reaching changes in Latin America's position which have been outlined
above and, moreover, has actively been involved in creating its own vision of a new
'modern' Latin America suited to those changes. As suggested by David Lehmann
(1990:76) the adoption of Neoliberalism means that Latin American conservative
thought has rid itself of its corporatist and organicist mould and has become
enamoured of the market; in the process relinquishing its traditional concern for
Latin American identity; through its wholesale adoption of the need to integrate the
region both culturally and economically into the world market. Attitudes which they
interpret as having set South Asia apart from Latin America in its pursuit of capitalist
modernization. As argued by German Sanchez,
"Governments throughout Latin America have virtually abandoned, their
efforts to win national independence and economic development- goals
which to one degree or another they hadpursued in past
decades To begin with, we are in the midst of a profound
and acceleratedprocess ofeconomic restructuring andforeign takeovers of
Latin American productive systems. Industries characterized by low
productivity and outdated technology, nearly all of them owned by mid¬
sized national capital, have been destroyed and replaced by speculation and
imports." (Sanchez, 1993:20)
The key to understanding the significance of the shift towards Neoliberalism, as has
been pointed out by Ian Roxborough, lies in grasping the ways in which Neoliberal
movements have been attempting to manage expectations both nationally and
internationally. In the latter case this means the development and presentation of an
attractive image of national consensus and stability to the international financial
community. In national terms it involves persuading the electorate that there are no
alternatives to their austere economic prescriptions. If such arguments are successful
then it could be argued then the social costs involved in the implementation of
Neoliberal economic programmes may not prove to be such a political liability as
might be imagined. As Roxborough (1992) argues the issues are presented as a
choice between the boom and bust cycles of the previous state-led policies, and the
immensely damaging levels of inflation with which they were associated, and the
shorter term sacrifices involved in the restoration of stability.
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"Between the desperate hope that a massive sacrifice will bring a return to
price stability and a resumption ofgrowth and the perceived collapse of
Left-wing alternatives to government austerity programmes, these
presidents have generated a volatile mix of resigned quiescence and active
support." (Roxborough, 1992:426)
The Neoliberal perspective differs from the paternalistic and often authoritarian
models of development previously hegemonic in the region to the extent that,
although it now prioritizes the operation of international market forces in the
determination of national economic activity, it recognizes the importance to such an
economic strategy of domestic norms, standards and political behaviour. This
means that great store is placed in the development of national legal systems,
political culture and other institutional issues designed to consolidate an attractive
environment for international capital. There is therefore an implicit recognition of the
need for consensus in the transformation of Latin America's economic structure
towards a form that is seen as conducive to economic activity (Espinal, 1992). This
therefore, in the context of the much lauded transformation of the region away from
authoritarianism and towards liberal democracy, opens up spaces for the
development of an open political culture which therefore includes the possibility of
the articulation of popular alternatives.
This opening up of political activity has, however, also occurred in the context of
the imposition of economic policies that have severely affected the position of the
poor. The Neoliberal success story and its democratic human face, which I have
tried to portray here, has another darker side. The loss of sovereignty and regional
culture, and the destruction of uncompetitive national capital, have already been
mentioned. Most critiques of Neoliberalism, however, also draw upon the high
social costs of their economic programmes and the mockery that these make of its
democratic face. It is difficult to build an electoral democracy when the electorate
have empty stomachs. The following quote sums up the sense of this well;
"
(In these) Neoliberal "success" stories.- macroeconomic growth has
been accompanied by stagnant or declining real wages, an unambiguous
growth ofpoverty, a loss ofsocial benefits, a breakdown ofcommunity,
and explosive growth of the informal, marginal sector of
society But for now, Vargas Llosa is right: liberalism is an idea
whose time has come in Latin America. It will last - since you can't beat
something with nothing- until a credible alternative arises to take its place."
(NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol 26(4), pp.17).
This discussion has placed the current crisis of 'Leftist' political thought and action
in Latin America within the contemporary context of the changes in the region's
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productive structure, its position within the international economy, and the
consolidation of the dominant position of Neoliberal ideologies, rather than the
simplistic arguments outlined earlier associated with the demise of the Eastern
Block. The following section considers the reaction of the 'Left' to this context and
the search for fresh new popular alternatives, suited to the changing regional
dynamics, and sufficiently distinct from the discredited economic policies and
political praxes they have been associated with in the past.
2.6 The Search for Renewal:
"Crisis as always breeds opportunity. A Left that can offer credible
alternatives to statist inefficiency, Neoliberal inequality andmilitary
dictatorship might well carry the day." (NACLA Report on the Americas,
1993, Vol.26 (4): 3)
In the last few years the Latin American Left has been involved in wide-ranging
discussions over its future and the search for an alternative to the Neoliberal model
of development discussed above . Whilst Shining Path continue in their attempts to
overthrow the Peruvian version of that model by force of arms, the majority of the
region's popular organizations have, by and large, embraced the civic struggle for
some form of socialist society. The search is on for the most appropriate forms of
political organization with which to attempt to gain national hegemony and for
alternative forms of economic organization with which to provide viable popular
alternatives. The problematique revolves around the development of national
programmes which reflect the lessons learnt from the Nicaraguan, Chilean and
Cuban experiences in government, as well as the recognition of the inadequacies of
CEPAL style state-led development strategies from which the swing to the political
right was a seemingly justifiable reaction.
In addition, the discrediting of previous statist models of development, and the
social consequences of the Neoliberal model which has asserted itself in the space
left by their demise, provide wide ranging possibilities for the Left to rearticulate
their understanding of the nature of the state in its political and economic contexts.
The critique of the role of the state emanating from the right, is now coming under
increasing criticism itself, as the need for a redimensioned state intervention is
increasingly recognized and the limitations of over-reliance upon markets
rearticulated, both in mainstream and radical economic and political thought (see the
series of essays in Colclough and Manor, 1991, the essay on 'markets' by Berthoud
in Sachs, 1990, and the writings of Tony Killick, especially Killick, 1989). In
addition the importance of the state as the political arena for the struggles between
different classes and social movements is clear.
One arena for these discussions has been the establishment of the Sao Paulo forum
which encompasses some 68 progressive organizations throughout the continent.12
The series of annual meetings developed in the Forum have proved to be a important
arenas for the discussion of ideas with which to challenge the hegemony of
Neoliberal ideas. More importantly it is providing the opportunity for the popular
organizations of the region to share ideas and experiences and group themselves
together politically in a context of severely restricted room for manoeuvre.
2.7 Neoliberalism and the Left in Latin America: An Overview:
It might seem strange to have dwelt so long upon a discussion of Neoliberalism in a
Chapter which outlined its objectives as involving the evaluation of the prospects for
socialism in Latin America. This has been done because it is my contention that to
understand the contemporary problems and future prospects of socialist movements,
such as the FSLN, requires a detailed understanding of the changing political and
economic context of the region. This then provides the setting within which to
discuss the successes and failures of the Sandinista's experiences in government, as
well as the fortunes of the Latin American 'Left' more generally.
The issues explored above reveal that, fundamentally, the organized 'Left' in Latin
America appear to be losing the regional struggle with Neoliberalism on two inter¬
related questions. Firstly, the formulation of a demonstrably coherent and clearly
articulated economic programme and, secondly, the rhetorical and organizational
struggle over the meaning of, and means of, extending liberty and democratic
freedoms. As outlined in the Introduction, this thesis is mainly concerned with the
first of these two questions (although in reality the two cannot readily be separated)
in that it attempts to provide a detailed examination of the economic ideology of the
FSLN and the results of government policy in the most important sector of the
economy, the agro-export sector.
The discussions outlined, however, do not simply serve as a context for the study
of 'Sandinismo,' the relationship can also be reversed. If a successful socialist
challenge to Neoliberalism is to be articulated in Latin America then the hard lessons
of the experiences of past decades must be learnt. The FSLN's attempts to
implement a popular socialist alternative economic model in Nicaragua suggest a
12 These include: The FMLN in El Salvador, Nicaragua's FSLN, the Simon Bolivar Front of
Colombia, most Latin American Communist parties including the Cuban, the Haitian Lavalas
movement, the URNG of Guatemala and the Brazilian Workers Party (see Fischer, 1992).
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number of these lessons, regarding such factors as; the relationship between
markets and planning in social transformation, the importance of the articulation of
different, and often antagonistic interests, to the maintenance of the hegemony of
any revolutionary project, and the importance of basing social transformation
strategies within an informed understanding of inherited economic and social
structures and political and cultural norms.
The following section details the substance of the problems faced by Peripheral
socialist regimes through wider discussions of the two important issues identified.
First, that of the economy and, second, the struggle for democracy and the
extension of civil society.
2,8 Economic Problems of the Transition to Socialism:
It is by now a truism to state that the socialist revolutions that have occurred in this
century have taken place, not in the most economically advanced industrial capitalist
states as was originally envisaged by Marx, but rather in predominantly agricultural
countries without substantial prior development of the productive forces under the
capitalist mode of production. This has meant that the transition to socialism and the
dynamics of socialist societies have had far more to do with the pursuit of economic
growth and the development of the productive forces of the economy than was ever
envisioned by Marx. This has had the effect of intensifying the economism inherent
in much Marxist theorizing (see the discussions in Chapter One) when it is applied
to the theorization of socialism, in that, whilst socialists have never set themselves
purely economic aims, and their ideal or end state has always been the creation of a
new type of society, there has been a common conviction of the importance of the
economy in shaping the nature of society in general (Bottomore, 1988:1). As argued
in the previous Chapter, however, it is my contention that it is equally dangerous to
over-react against the more severe forms of economic determinism to the extent
where the economic analysis of material issues is relegated to a subsidiary concern.
The following section therefore details the complicated debates which have evolved
with regard to the pursuit of socialist economic policies in the developing world and
how they relate to the contemporary situation facing the Latin American Left
outlined above.
Since the vast majority of socialist regimes which have attained political power in
the Third World have at least expressed a commitment to Marxist analysis, and
many have had strong links to the former socialist block, it would make sense to
briefly consider some of the traditional Marxist ideas regarding the proposed
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transition toward socialism. The first point to note is that many of the original
writings on the transition to socialism assumed that such a transition would arise
from the ascension to political power of an industrial proletariat out of the escalating
contradictions of mature capitalist societies. Thus, it was assumed that the economic
strategies which would be employed within the transition to socialism would be
built upon an economy which had already experienced a high level of the
development of productive forces. This led in certain quarters to a deterministic
emphasis upon the impossibility of any transition toward socialism without the prior
transformation of society under the expansionary influence of capitalism (see
Warren, 1980 for a reassertion of this view).
Over time, however, as the scene of revolutionary transformations has become
rooted in the developing world, a body of literature, and the examples of praxis,
have emerged concerning the economics of the transition toward socialism in the
Periphery. In an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of too restrictive classifications of
regimes as socialist or non-socialist the economic dynamics of Peripheral Socialist
regimes can perhaps best be characterized in the following way;
"Usually under severe political andmilitary pressure fromformer
hegemonic powers, these countries have attempted to overcome the
immediate problems ofpoverty, to establish a new position in the
international division of labour, and to initiate a process of rapid
accumulation. They have also tried to do this on a basis distinctfrom the
criteria offree markets, private investment and comparative advantage that
characterize the rest ofthe Third World."
(Fitzgerald and Wuyts, 1988:1)
The strength of such a characterization is that it is open-ended enough to include all
of the regimes listed above in Section 2.3 and does not limit study to those countries
which fulfil some set criteria such as levels of nationalization or economic linkages
to the Soviet Block.13
2.8a The State-Led Model:
Despite the different emphases and histories of the various regimes encompassed
under the Peripheral socialist umbrella, the development path chosen by most has
involved the rapid expansion of the role of the state, within an effort to overcome
13 It is true to say nonetheless that historically Third World socialist regimes, given the automatic
enmity with which they have been viewed from Washington, have by and large been closely
associated with the Soviet Block and the models of socialist development which have emanated from
there; although, even those most closely linked to the Eastern block have had their own strategies,
achievements and problems.
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poverty and transform the productive base and social organization of society.
Despite the emphasis placed upon the economic role of the state, most regimes have
accepted the necessity of the maintenance of a mixed economic strategy, with space
given for the reproduction of a private sector, sometimes involving the maintenance
of a capitalist sector, but generally related to the sustenance of a traditional peasant
sector. Within such a strategy, however, it has been assumed that accumulation will
be centred in the state sector, whose main task is seen as the progressive
replacement of the private sector through its own expansion (Fitzgerald and Wuyts,
1988:4-7). This approach, often termed 'state-centred accumulation', owes much to
the legacy of Eastern European thinking on socialist transition, and has led to an
emphasis upon such factors as; rapid processes of industrialization (fuelled by
surpluses from the agricultural sector), broadly based subsidization policies, the
collectivization and rapid modernization of agriculture, and centralized planning
systems (for further elaboration see Post and Wright, 1988; Fitzgerald and Wuyts,
1988, White et al, 1983 and Utting, 1992b).
One of the central issues of contention within the state-led strategy has related to the
difficult decision as to whether attention should be focused primarily upon the
development of the forces of production or primarily upon altering the social
relations of production or both. As Griffin and Gurley (1985:1129) argue, there are
obvious political advantages to the rapid development of programmes designed to
quickly expand the processes of socialization in society through nationalization, land
reform programmes, the expansion of the role of the state in the economy
(especially in the provision of credit), and the development of social programmes in
the spheres of social security, health, housing and education. The problem with the
widespread and rapid adoption of such programmes is that they need to be financed
somehow and, as Bukharin (1979) insists, production is bound to fall in the
immediate transition period. Experience has proved this to be the case.
Thus, despite certain advances made in the fields of education, health care and
income distribution in individual countries, reviews of the developmental
performance of socialist regimes have tended to dwell upon the economic problems
that they have faced. Many regimes, having attained political power by military
means, have been faced with the difficult task of reactivating and reconstructing a
severely war-damaged economy, as well as the prospect of armed counter¬
revolutionary activity. In addition, in many cases, the first few years of
consolidation of the revolutionary regime have been characterized by somewhat
over-optimistic forecasts of economic growth rates, which have helped to fuel
already rapidly expanding public expectations for improved living standards. At the
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same time, however, following the immediate post-triumph euphoria of the
'honeymoon period', the economy is not likely to grow sufficiently rapidly to meet
these expectations and in fact is likely to experience serious dislocations.
As argued by Carlos Vilas (Vilas 1990b: 126)
"The characteristics of the agroexporting nations of the Third Worldmake
high levels ofeconomic activity and efficiency impossible in the initial
stages of revolutionary transformation. Many of the limitations and
tensions of the previous regime are intensified. The contradictions between
production and distribution or between development and social justice are
intensified even in comparison to the pre-revolutionary stage. Only with
access to wide andflexible external cooperation may these economies
overcome these difficulties in the first stage and begin a more autonomous
path ofdevelopment with increased social justice."
In countries such as Nicaragua the export sector has great significance since it
provides the resources with which to finance the social programmes and
modifications to productive structure deemed desirable to the government.
However, the dependence upon the earnings from that sector mean that the new
government are heavily dependent upon the producers within that sector.
Griffin and Gurley (1985:1129) succinctly outline the dilemmas facing
revolutionary governments in this type of situation.
"There are several strategies that combine....the development ofa
country's productive forces, on the one hand, and the transformation of its
relations ofproduction, on the other. A strategy that gives priorityfor
some time to the former, while the latter is changed less quickly, is based
on the belief that "socialist institutions andpractices are unsustainable if
they are not supported by higher levels ofproduction" (Gurley 1983). The
opposing view is that such a strategy runs the risk ofsooner or later
undermining whatever gains have been made toward a socialist
society because capitalist incentives, values and institutions
would be relied on heavily to achieve the production gains. A second
strategy gives immediate priority to the radical transformation of the
society's relations ofproduction, while productive forces move ahead
more slowly The opposing view is that socialist institutions
cannot be sustained in the absence ofa highly productive economy."
The basic question at stake in these arguments is whether the interests of the popular
classes (however defined) are best served by pursuing, for a certain length of time,
primarily productive gains rather than immediately radically transforming the
relations of production, whatever the cost to productive activity.
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2.8b Beyond the State-Led Model:
In response, at least in part, to mounting economic problems (and to changing
external situations) there has been a marked shift in the polidcal economy ofmany
'Peripheral' socialist regimes, during the 1980s, away from what Utting terms the
orthodox socialist model (i.e. the state centred model described above). There has
instead been a move towards economic and political strategies that appear to place
greater emphasis upon; the importance of the peasantry as petty commodity
producers, denationalization and limiting of the productive role of the state, the
abandonment of pricing controls and subsidization policies, and greater monetary
rigour (Utting, 1992a:43-44). Debate currently rages as to what exactly the
significance of these changes has been.
It could be suggested that the pursuit of these alternative strategies has been a tactical
response by socialist regimes to the increasingly limited options open to them in the
economic sphere. Thus, the new strategies may simply represent the necessity of
meeting the stringent economic liberalization requirements imposed upon continued
access to (ever more urgently needed) external resources in the highly 'conditional'
world of the international financial institutions. In this sense the economic reform
process would be seen as being little different from the general move towards
economic liberalization and the 'retreat of the state' evident throughout Latin
America, Africa and Asia. Another argument rests on the premise that the
withdrawal from the 'state-led model' represents a final withering away of any
commitment to the construction of socialism; drawing allusions to the collapse of
state communism in Eastern Europe. A triumph of 'reformers' over dogmatic
'orthodoxy' as it were.
Alternatively, as claimed by Utting, the changes in strategy may not so strongly
reflect a reaction to external circumstances and pressures, but rather a response to
the perceived domestic failures of the 'state-centred model of socialist development.'
Thus, the economic reforms may be seen as an attempt to tackle the apparent
inability of the previous state-led model to either guarantee the generation of the
economic surplus necessary to cover basic needs and accumulation or to adequately
maintain control of the direction of the economy towards the objectives of social and
economic transformation.
Utting goes on to suggest that the reform process has usually been accompanied by
political changes, representing the recognition by socialist governments of the
importance of political tensions which have existed between the central role of the
state within the transition process and the continually evolving internal political
struggles between different social groups. He argues that the state-centred model
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had not proved sensitive in responding to the changing balance of forces between
different groups and has often lead to the undermining of the hegemony of
revolutionary regimes as they have lost contact with the changing social reality of
their populations. The reaction to any loss of consensus has often been to resort to
political coercion (Utting, 1992a:63). It is such realizations that have lead regimes to
give greater political space to groups adversely affected by previous policies to
articulate their concerns; as well as to the recognition of the limitations, in the
pursuit of socialist objectives, of economic strategies based upon centralization and
the control of markets. Nonetheless, the political and social costs of the re-
introduction ofmarket mechanisms, transformations in long-term productive
strategy and the re-thinking of popular participation have lead to a large degree of
confusion over what remains socialist about the new economic strategies, how
market forces might affect long-term transformative goals, and what a less state-
centred socialist strategy might look like.
The following section builds upon these general discussions by applying them in a
consideration of the prospects for socialism in the specific Latin American context
outlined in the discussions above.
2.8c Lessons for the Left in Latin America:
The previously detailed failures of state-led economic strategies, be they
developmentalist (as in the state-led strategies advocated by structuralist economic
theorists) or socialist (as in the state-led models of socialist transition described
above), have left the ideological battle against Neoliberal economic theory somewhat
short of ammunition. The Left's adherence to the broadly discredited state-lead
approach to the development of the forces of production and the construction of a
socialist society means that they appear now painfully short on alternative economic
models.
In Latin America, the Left on the few occasions when state power has been attained,
with the exception of Cuba, has tended to implement broad 'populist' policies
designed to improve the living standards of their constituency (mainly the urban
working classes although also at times the peasantry) through the expansion of
domestic demand and income redistribution, whilst at the same time, however,
preserving the profitability of the middle classes. Furthermore, in other situations,
the Left has tended to be involved in populist coalitions (see Kaufman and Stallings,
1991 on the nature of populist economic programmes) associated with CEPAL-style
developmentalist philosophies and paternalistic politics. The one to one association
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made between both of these types of economic system and inflation, budget deficits
and productive stagnation means that they are now largely discredited. Current
debate on 'the Left' centres around with what the old exhausted models might be
replaced within an effort to respond to the changing realities which the Neoliberal
movement has both responded to and helped to create. At present there seem to be a
number of competing perspectives:
1. A Redefinition and Strengthening of the State-Led Model: This perspective is
based on the success of the Cuban model in comparison with other socialist
experiences in the region. There is a school of thought which suggests that on the
attainment of state power much broader processes of nationalization should be
undertaken to bring the majority of the economy under the control of the
government, in order to facilitate a rapid transition to socialist forms of productive
activity. The key issues here relate to;
a) whether it is politically feasible that a 'Left' political party could, given present
political conditions, attain unshared state power and hence have the opportunity to
implement such a programme;
b) whether, given such circumstances, the state would have the administrative
capacity to carry out such a programme;
c) whether such a programme would really represent a viable economic strategy.
Experience (East European, Cuban and even the Nicaraguan) suggests that the
efficiency of such a programme is, at best, highly debatable, especially in the
present international context outlined above. It is evident that any socialist
governmentwill have to continue to play their role in the international economy.
Given this the strategy is flawed for a number of reasons, Firstly, there is the poor
productive record of state-run economies (both in terms of the productivity of state
production and the control of pricing and procurement) and, secondly, there is an
importance, given current conditions, in the negative way in which such strategies
would be viewed by the international community and potential investors. In sum,
therefore, an advocation of an unreconstructed state socialist model fails to take on
board the lessons of the recent past.
2. In a similar way any attempts to either reformulate a nationalistic state-led
structuralist project, in conjunction with the relevant sectors of the national
bourgeoisie, through a rejuvenated import substitution process (based upon labour
intensive rather than capital intensive economic sectors) would also be of doubtable
economic feasibility given contemporary conditions. Furthermore, for the Left to be
involved in a political coalition to reinvent a state-centred structuralist model would
be to fail to learn the lessons that the events of the 1980s have taught As David
Ruccio suggests,
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"The challenge facing the Left, therefore, is to move beyond its traditional
critique offree-market Neoliberal policies and its close association with the
more state-centred structuralist pole ofthe debate, and to call into question
the limits imposed by both sides of the debate." (Ruccio, 1993:39)
3. Another strand of thought suggests a relative accommodation with the Neoliberal
reforms and a recognition of the international constraints presently operating upon
Latin American economies. The political agenda then revolves around the
development of an alliance of working and middle class interests organized around
the amelioration of the social costs of Neoliberal strategies. This could broadly be
called the social democratic position. This perspective is sometimes associated with
the recognition that the differences between Latin America and the successful
economies of SE Asia relate to the distribution of wealth. Therefore another central
tenet involves the advocation of the redistribution of assets such as land which then
tends to replace the centrality of the pursuit of income equality. This, in some cases,
could be articulated within the formulation of a grassroots style peasant populist
programme (as advocated for example through the 'Food First' school, see Lappe
and Collins, 1979). The background to such a strategy would involve the
development of a more efficient and accountable state structure and a modified more
inclusive social safety net which could act as a precondition for the development of
the political conditions for a transition towards socialism in the future.
These three options continue to suggest that the only reasonable goal for the Left is
the attainment of total, or a share in, state power and that the political organization
associated with such options revolve around successful engagement in national
electoral systems. There is, however, an emerging perspective that political
organization should be geared around the pursuit of social transformation in itself,
rather than the attainment of state power, and that through such strategies a
transformed civil society can act as a catalyst for people's participation in, and
transformation of, social institutions. In this case organization for the Left comes to
constitute the struggle for democracy, respect for constitutional rights, and the
development of grassroots activism with little or no interest in the active pursuit of
state power.
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In each of these cases the main issue of debate is how to gain popular support for a
particular programme; which brings us onto the second major area in which the Left
appears to be on the retreat within the struggle against Neoliberalism; that is the
struggle for democracy
2.9 Socialism and Democracy:
Despite the long association of the Latin American Left with those movements
demanding basic political freedoms in the region, it has been under Neoliberal
domination and severe economic crisis that the region has swung back towards
more 'democratic' forms of political organization (Espinal, 1992 ; Rial, 1991). At
the same time socialism has come to be seen as a byword for a lack of basic political
freedom, whilst Neoliberalism has been able to present itself as the champion of
individual freedoms and citizenship. The importance of both of these aspects needs
to be addressed if the Latin American Left is to successfully challenge the Neoliberal
domination of the region.
Within Latin America 'the Left' has had a long running mistrust of liberal
democracy. However, the events of recent years have seen the Left begin to come to
treat the problematic relationship between socialism and democracy more seriously.
This has involved paying greater attention to such issues as; the struggle to attain
state hegemony through the mechanisms of civil and institutional society, the
different ways of meeting the interests of divergent sectors once state power has
been attained, and in more general terms, a recognition of the emancipatory nature
of the pursuit of democratic freedoms at the local level and the way in which
struggles at that level can link into wider national struggles for popular programmes.
The internal deliberations within the Left about the relationship between socialism
and democracy can be divided into those that have to be faced once state power has
been captured (the appropriate relationship between participatory and representative
democracy; the somewhat uneasy relationship between administration of the
revolutionary state, party politics and grassroots mobilization) and debates about the
forms of organization appropriate for either the capture of state power and/or the
representation of popular interests (the aperture for democratic organization, the
necessity or otherwise of armed resistance and the relationship between party
politics and autonomous social movements).
2.9a Paths to Socialist Hegemony: The Armed Struggle and the Civic
struggle:
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Since the Second World War, two major events have coloured Latin American
perceptions concerning the feasibility and the practical dynamics of the transition
toward socialism: the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and the fall of Allende in Chile in
1973. Over time, the fall of the FSLN in Nicaragua will probably be added to this
list. The successful example of the Cuban revolution lent substantial support to
those Latin American socialists who were opposed to the involvement of the Left in,
what they saw as, the bourgeois facade of elections and formal democracy. What
the Cuban example suggested was the centrality of the role of a vanguard party and
the possibility of a successful socialist revolution, without the need for a prior
bourgeois revolution. Previously, Latin American communist parties, and other
parties of the Left, had seen their role (at least in practice if not in rhetoric; see
Walker, I., 1991:447) as encouraging broad nationalist, anti-imperialist and anti-
oligarchic alliances with a wide range of classes and political organizations. The
Cuban example, however, suggested that the bourgeois revolution was unnecessary
and indeed counter-productive, diverting resources away from the real task of
developing socialist consciousness. Attention instead was directed toward the
development of a vanguard party and the advocation and organization of the armed
struggle in order to proceed to socialism by directly overthrowing the previous
system. This way of thinking owed much to Leninist ideas as well as the example of
Che Guevara and the analyses ofmany Dependency theorists. To such thinkers
bourgeois ideas about democratic freedom corresponded to the interests of that
class, in that to participate in the electoral process was to accept the rules of the
game dictated by bourgeois institutions (Walker, I., 1991:449)
In contrast, however, the overthrow of the Allende regime in Chile and the onset of
the authoritarian rule of Pinochet (and other Latin American dictators) during the
1970s, has lead to a prolonged reconsideration of the nature of the relationship
between socialist organization and democracy.
"In the early 1970s under the Popular JJnity government in Chile (and
elsewhere in Latin America), the socialist Left coined the slogan "fascism
or socialism," However, the advent ofauthoritarianism soon lead these
sectors to conclude that the real dilemmas was between "dictatorship and
democracy." (Walker. I., 1991:452)
It is becoming more generally thought that socialism can only be developed fully
within the boundaries of political democracy and its institutions. Thus, the issues no
longer revolve around the relative strengths and weaknesses of socialist and
bourgeois revolutions, but rather the type of political regime. In such a way
socialism is revealed as a political process, rather than a fixed end product or a
revealed truth, and a process of gradual change rather than a 'single storming of the
bastions of power.' However, because the Left has centred so much of its political
discourse and actions upon influencing the role of the state, or the assumption of
state power, the apparent collapse in statist development theory has left it unable to
take advantage of the new democratic apertures in the region. Lehmann (1990)
explains the routes of this in some detail. Latin American Marxism (dependency) in
particular, he suggests, has been characterized by a 'systemic' vision of the nature
of Latin American society. This system they argued could be defined as both
capitalist and dependent and incapable of tolerating change. Thus, such a system
could not be reformed piecemeal from within but needed to be overthrown and
replaced with a different system- socialism. Common to this vision was that of the
new socialist system as providing a final stasis in which the conditions of society
and economy would be overcome and a state of harmony achieved (Lehmann,
1990:50). Thus the conquest of state power and the consolidation of an alternative
socialist system by a party enjoying massive popular support could create a society
in which social conflict no longer had any material basis. In this way, as in their
characterization of capitalist systems, state and society were presumed to move in
harmony although quite what the relationship of one to the other was never
elucidated (Lehmann, 1990:85-86).
However, recently some radical Latin American intellectuals have begun to shed the
unifying assumptions that
"political institutions, social structure, the mode ofproduction and the
international system all hold together indissolubly, attempts to reform one
without all the others no longer attract the perjurative label of reformism"
(Lehmann, 1990:59)
Thus, no longer are the interests of peasants and workers seen to be ranged
unquestionably on one side against international and domestic capital, and no longer
are the interest of social classes and social movements seen as objective and easily
known. The experiences of socialist governments in power (especially the
experiences of the FSLN in Nicaragua and those of the Cuban revolution) and the
much discussed 'discovery' of social movements (see Slater, 1985) have introduced
a new concern for the complicated nature of civil society, its relationship to the state
and its control under any government, whatever its ideology. This then has
introduced the Left to far-ranging discussions over the ways in which the interests
of different groups within society are articulated and, more importantly, over the
constantly changing nature of those interests. The position emerging from an
increasingly influential group of Latin American post-Marxists is that
"Social classes' interests are not monolithic or homogenous; they are not
agents on their own behalfand should not be instrumentalized by an all
powerful party politics is not merely the interaction of 'class
representatives, 'power is not 'there' in the state, to be seized." (Lehmann,
1990:61)
Thus, a perspective has been introduced which switches the political attention of the
Left away from replacing the systems imposed by capital or the state towards a
vision that prioritises 'social movements' as ways in which "collectivities try to
create identities and worlds of their own making' (Lehmann, 1990:62), and the
creation and/or protection of the democratic spaces which enable just such processes
to occur. Within such a perspective, the opening up of democratic systems under the
Neoliberals is seen no longer as simply an irrelevant legitimizing action of the
capitalist state, but rather as a laudable goal which facilitates the mobilization of
forces with the facilities to affect their own destinies.
There is a simple attraction to such arguments but they do, however, neglect a
number of perspectives. First of all there is little or no attempt to get to grips with
the nature of the state and its biases, where is the concept of social justice in this?
The practice of democratization, furthermore, can hardly proceed without paying
attention to the constitutional make up of the state. In addition there is little
consideration of the political and economic power that elites have to influence or
even purchase the democratic process. The danger of the swing towards an informal
politics and the prioritization of changes in civil society is that the discourses of the
Left, in abstracting from issues of power, interests and economic exploitation,
become little more than a disguised plea for the constitutional spaces of liberal
democracy.
As Vasconi (1990:31) argues,
"It is absurd to suggest that class domination by military means is identical
to class domination by political means. Equally absurd, however, is the
opposite idea that the resurgence ofcertain institutional orders- freedom of
political organizations, elections and so forth- automatically establishes the
equality and sovereignty of the people."
The challenge, therefore, for the Left, is to find a way of creating out of grassroots
movements' concern for civil society a force for purposeful, but not necessarily
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centrally imposed, social transformation. (Lehmann, 1990:84).14 Of even greater
importance is how such perspectives can be bought to bear on the broader debates
we have touched upon regarding the development of wider economic programmes
in the context of national electoral systems.
2.10 An Overview:
The 1990s thus sees the Latin American Left in a very different position to even that
which faced them only twelve years ago. The limited economic options open within
which to formulate a popular alternative to Neoliberalism have been outlined,
whilst, on the political level, influential factors have been shown to include; the
collapse of the East European state socialist model and the beaurocratic and
authoritarian principles which sustained it, the emerging democratic space for
electoral organization in the region, and the failure of armed struggle to achieve
either a lasting peace or a positive outcome for the popular sectors (here we can see
the examples of Peru, EL Salvador and Nicaragua). In these circumstances Leftist
political parties and popular organizations in the region are rethinking and
reorienting their strategies with regard to their own inter-relationships and their
attitude toward liberal democracy and the nature of civic society. In the final section
of this chapter the nature of the FSLN's economic programme and the nature of
Sandinismo as a political ideology are examined in relation to the themes explored in
the discussion above, providing a context for the detailed study of Sandinista
economic policy which follows in the ensuing chapters.
2.11 The Sandinista Conception of Socialism:
"For eleven years the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) held
state power in Nicaragua and undertook a profoundprogram ofpolitical,
economic and social change... The years ofSandinista rule left an indelible
mark on Nicaraguan society (Vanden and Prevost, 1993:89)
All attempts at the construction of socialism are mediated by the material circumstances
in which they are born. The final section of this chapter therefore considers the
ideology of Sandinismo in the context of the issues which have been explored above.
Chapter Three will examine the historical legacy inherited by the FSLN in 1979 and
which governed the development of their programme for government as well as the
14 For further discussions of the important role of social movements see Slater (1985), Escobar and
Alvarez (1989), Fuentes and Frank (1989), Schuurman and Van Naerson (1989) and Friedmann
(1991).
ideology that lay behind it. Chapter Four, in turn, will consider the development of
Sandinista economic policy in the context of the debates explored in this chapter. This
section, however, briefly examines the nature of the FSLN, the influences operating
upon the development of the various strands of its ideology, and how its position
relates to the concerns discussed in the major part of this chapter.
Since the revolution in 1979 and the sudden appearance of Nicaragua on the centre-
stage of international affairs, the nature of the FSLN has been the subject of intense
argument and counter-argument. This has been apparent in the rhetoric of the US
administration, the official pronouncements of the FSLN itself, and the political
language of the Contra,15 as well as the myriad of different analyses of academics,
journalists and politicians of all ideological hues. From an initial position of tentative
accommodation with the FSLN as the focus of nationalist feeling in the struggle
against Somoza, the electoral defeat of Jimmy Carter (which saw the far more
reactionary Ronald Reagan elected to the Whitehouse), together with the FSLN's
consolidation as the leading political power in post-Somoza Nicaragua,16 saw the
US increasingly seek to characterize the FSLN as an arm of Soviet and Cuban
expansion in Central America.
In this way the Reagan administration presented the FSLN as an undemocratic and
authoritarian regime bent on the destruction of all private property and political
opposition and working towards the construction of a totalitarian Stalinist society.
The FSLN, whilst never denying the influence of Marxist thought upon their
ideology, presented their intentions as being basically nationalist in orientation
whilst making clear their commitment to the long term construction of socialism.
Their ideology is encompassed under the term 'Sandinismo,' after the Nicaraguan
hero Augusto Sandino from whom they took their name, which is examined
below.17
15 The term the 'Contra' refers to the various groups active in armed resistance against the FSLN
during the 1980s. In the first two years of the revolutionary period these were mainly limited to
marauding groups of ex-members of the deposed dictator, Somoza's, National Guard. Following the
inauguration of Ronald Reagan as US President in February 1981, the organized resistance began to
grow as they received funds from the new US administration. Their numbers grew from an estimated
500 fighters in the early part of 1981 to a zenith of 15,000 in the mid eighties, although by that time
they were enjoying considerable support from certain sectors of the Nicaraguan peasantry from where
their numbers were increasingly recruited. Groups ofContra operated out of both Honduras and Costa
Rica, and there were also several groups made up of disaffected indigenous groups from the Atlantic
Coast. By the time of the 1990 elections the Contra had ostensibly been defeated militarily but their
horrific activities had seen the death of around 30,000 Nicaraguans.
16 Especially following the resignation of Violeta Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo from the ruling
junta, see Black, 1981:195
17 The growth and organization of the FSLN is briefly detailed in the section on the downfall of
Somoza in Chapter Three.
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Despite the attempts of the Reagan and Bush administrations, and internal
opponents, to characterize the FSLN as fundamentally anti-democratic and
committed to the creation of a totalitarian Leninist state, the nature of the FSLN is
much more complicated than this. One of the major elements to Sandinista ideology
is the legacy of the thought and actions of Augusto Sandino. Sandino's name has
been envoked by both the FSLN and the Contra to justify their struggles. Many of
the critiques of the FSLN suggest that the movement misappropriated the symbol of
Sandino, subverting his nationalist ideology into the rigidities of their Marxist
philosophy (see the comments by Jeanne Kirkpatrick on this which are described in
the conclusion to Hodges, 1986). There are elements of truth to both positions, in
that whilst the FSLN rescued and interpreted Sandino's writings for their own
political struggle, and Sandino's anarcho-syndicalist leanings18 had much more in
common with the FSLN's socialist project than they did with the Contra, the FSLN
moulded Sandino's legacy to their own ends. Carlos Fonseca, one of co-founders
of the FSLN in 1961, had spent several years collecting and interpreting Sandino's
writings, and had seen within them a means whereby to focus resistance to the
Somoza regime under his image.
The use of the name and image of Sandino in the generation of opposition to the
dictatorship and the struggle for a new society, reflected the influence upon the
FSLN of the writings of the Peruvian Communist Jose Mariategui and Antonio
Gramsci, both of whom had emphasized the formation of a wider revolutionary
consciousness through the use of nationalist and cultural symbols (Hodges,
1986:179 and Rowe and Schelling, 1991).
"Gramsci's interpretation ofMarxism.... appealed to Nicaraguan
revolutionaries because ofits strong voluntarist and activist bent, aimed at
conquering the hearts and minds of the working class. Like Mariategui,
Gramsci provided a justification for the FSLN's emphasis on the subjective
conditions of revolution andfor its reliance on a specifically Christian as
well as Marxist-based ideology." (Hodges, 1986:183).
There were also a number of other influences upon Sandinista philosophy beyond
the legacy of Sandino. The influence of Marxism was obvious, although it was
more in its Guevaran Cuban form than the orthodox Marxism which had
characterized the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) which many of the FSLN
activists had originated in. The quote from Hodges excellent book on the intellectual
foundations of Sandinismo also suggests the influence of liberation theology upon
18 See the discussions of Sandino's writings in Liss (1991), Dunkerley (1988), Selser (1980), EES
(1985), Hodges (1987), Serrano (1988), Ramirez (1981) and Wheelock (1985)
the FSLN. A factor made evident in the high posts given to the priests Ernesto and
Fernando Cardenal in the Sandinista administration once they had attained power.19
The fluidity in the dominance of the three elements to Sandinista thought can be
interpreted in several different ways. To some the appeal to the nationalist figure of
Sandino or the Christian morality of liberation theology reflected a calculated
strategy by the FSLN to downplay their commitment to Marxism in the light of
contemporary international circumstances. Others suggest that the influence of
ideologies other then Marxism have given Sandinismo a nationalistic rather than a
class-based perspective (see Weeks and Dore, 1992a and discussions below with
regard to the maintenance of a mixed economic strategy). But as argued by Vanden
and Provost (1993:90),
"A truer assessment of the development of the FSLN's political philosophy
would include a significant role for both Sandino andMarxism- to focus on
either one exclusively is simply not historically accurate- and adequate
attention to the role of liberation theology."
or Sheldon Liss (1991:169),
"The Sandinista leadership.... confirmed the principle that theory is not
dogma but rather a guide to action. By blending Sandino's thinking, social
democracy, Marxism, Castroism, Christian communitarianism and
liberation theology, the Nicaraguan revolutionaries attempted to prevent
their movement from becoming monolithic."
To this I would add that it is important to realize that the experiences of government
forced a fair degree of pragmatism upon the FSLN's leadership and policies often
seemed to have little relation to the ideological basis of Sandinismo. In particular the
appearance of a sizeable beaurocracy, with the expansion of the state under
Sandinista rule, gave impetus to a technocratic problem-solving approach to
government Despite this it is still important to assess the ideological basis of
Sandinismo in order to provide a context to the evolution of government policy
discussed in later chapters. Hodges (1986:185-87) provides an excellent discussion
of this,
"Sandinismo developed in two quite different ways, both under FSLN
sponsorship. One was popular andfolkloric, the other intellectual and
systemic. The first consisted ofSandino's political legacy as recovered by
the FSLN... a collective memory and heroic image ofSandino as a man of
the people. The FSLN disseminated., stories trammelling a desire for
social change and opposition to imperialism and dictatorship. Commitment
19 This influence, Hodges (1986:185) suggests, is equivalent to the anarcho-mystic tendencies in
Sandino's thought.
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to this popular version ofSandinismo required neither an acceptance of
communism nor a knowledge ofMarxism-Leninism. The secondform of
Sandinismo reinterpreted and reformulated its popular content in the light
of the new Marxism. In legitimizing Sandino's thought, Fonseca
transformed it into the ideological axis for adapting Marxism to
Nicaragua.... For the FSLN the first and underdeveloped version of
Sandinismo served as a stepping stone to the second or developed version.
By Marxism-Leninism, they meant the new Marxism rather than the old
Unlike the Marxism of the PSN the new Marxism allowedfor a residue of
Sandinismo that was not an extension ofscientific socialism; it was a
residue of revolutionary myths, the moral values ofChristianity, the liberal
commitment to human rights, and the patriotic values ofSandino. The
ideology of this new Marxism... although at variance with scientific
socialism, was one of the keys to making the revolution."
This extended passage helps to explain the novelty of Nicaraguan socialism,
wrought by the development of the specific Nicaraguan revolutionary ideology of
Sandinismo. The nature of the programme initiated by the FSLN under the influence
of this ideology is briefly summarized below.
2.11a The FSLN's Economic Model and the Transition to Socialism:
In bald economic terms the Sandinista's efforts to instigate a strategy designed to
transform Nicaraguan society involved the breaking of what was seen as
Nicaragua's dependent position within the international system, through the re¬
insertion of the national economy into the international division of labour. This
reflected the FSLN's interpretations of the structural weaknesses of the Nicaraguan
economy given what they saw as the agro-export dominated model of
accumulation's dependence on the over-exploitation of labour. The overcoming of
these problems was to be achieved through a programme of agro-industrial
development based upon comparative advantages gained through productivity
increases and technification, which would serve to rearticulate the economy away
from the traditional over-exploitation of labour (MIPLAN, 1981). In this way (and
through a series ofmeasures designed to redistribute wealth) the FSLN planned to
fundamentally transform the relations of production existing in Nicaraguan society
and embark upon a model of accumulation based, not on the logic of the market and
capitalist profit, but rather on, what was termed, 'the logic of the majority'
(Gorostiaga, 1987).
The ways in which the evolution of Sandinista economic policy evolved during the
1980s and the struggles that emerged between different perspectives on the
appropriate economic model are analysed in detail in Chapter Five. A few factors
should be noted here. The programme described above was heavily reliant on an
expanded role for the state within the economy, both in productive and directional
roles. Despite an explicit commitment to a mixed economy, and a realization that
conditions in Nicaragua were not favourable to a rapid transition to socialist
relations, the FSLN were, therefore, still committed to a variant of the state-led
model of socialist development outlined in Section 2.8. This was reflected in the
early nationalization of the financial apparatus of the country, the centralization of
the all important export sector under a nationalized export agency, and the creation
of a relatively large state productive sector. In addition centrally controlled prices
were introduced for many domestic and export commodities. By the middle of the
1980s this model had descended into crisis as the state failed to adequately control
the economy, production plummeted, and the war against the Contra intensified.
During the succeeding years several innovations to economic strategy followed; the
markets governing food crops were partially liberalized and the agrarian reform
deepened within an effort to reverse the worsening position of the peasant sector
and to integrate them more centrally into the revolutionary process. The
expansionary investment programme was cut back and efforts to ensure financial
solvency expanded through a series of incentives to the export sector and the cutting
of subsidies to basic consumption. The worsening economic scenario finally
resulted in the adoption of far-reaching austerity measures in 1988, which again
placed emphasis on the need to increase exports, the limitation of state intervention
within the economy, and the control of the fiscal deficit By the end of the decade
the economy was in crisis, with the brunt of the worst effects falling upon the
poorest sectors in Nicaraguan society; the urban informal sector, the poorest farmers
and the rural and urban proletariat.
These issues link into the more general questions explored in this chapter
concerning the relationship between markets and planning within socialist strategies,
the balance between production and consumption, the role of the peasantry, and the
search for alternatives to recessionary measures designed to balance budgets. All of
these issues are explored further in the discussions of economic policy outlined in
Chapter Four.
2.11b Sandinismo and Democracy:
The FSLN from its inception considered its position in the classic role of a
Vanguard party. This is conceived of in terms of a leadership role that lays
emphasis, at least in theory, upon mobilizing and transforming the masses to
become masters of their own destiny rather than on other elitist conceptions of
leadership that look to neutralize the political demands of the masses. A guerrilla
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organization, with three distinct and contrasting strands, upon taking power in
1979, by the mid 1980s the FSLN had become something of a cross between a
political party and a state administrator. In the early revolutionary years the
participation ofmass organizations in economic and political decision making had
been encouraged and expanded through the setting up and promotion of local barrio
organizations (the CDS), labour organizations, peasant organizations and the
Women's movement. Sandinista leaders regularly met to discuss issues in local
meetings and encouraged the full participation of the mass organizations in the
running of the country and the maintenance of revolutionary hegemony. By the end
of the decade these relationships had begun to break down, and with the electoral
defeat of 1990, the Sandinista leadership appeared seriously out of touch with the
state of public opinion.
It is somewhat easy to criticise the FSLN for the adoption of top-down structures of
organization and somewhat paternalistic relationships with the mass movements and
grassroots organization but any consideration of the political organization of
Nicaragua during the revolutionary period must take into account two factors in
particular.
Firstly, there is the lack of historical precedent for a democratic political culture in
Nicaragua. The traditional political parties in Nicaragua had been effectively
managed by the Somoza dynasty since the 1930s. Under the FSLN, despite its
limitations and their close association with the party, considerable space had been
given to the development of grassroots organizations and the trade union
movement.20
Secondly, the onslaught of war obviously constrained the development of a
genuinely participative democracy. Factors such as the closure of La Prensa (the
opposition daily newspaper) and the use of popular organizations as top down
structures or administrators, or the means whereby resistance to policy was
controlled, must be seen in such a light. However, it is true to say that the vertical
relations that were established between the FSLN and the grassroots organizations
meant that the processes of class struggle tended to be subsumed under the fervour
of nationalist rhetoric in the struggle against the Contra. There was thus no forum to
thrash out the clash of interests between, for example the capitalist or landed classes
and the workforce, or between the peasantry and urban workers for example.
20 UNAG, for example, has come to represent one of the strongest peasant organizations in the
continent, a fact shown by their influence upon the development of FSLN agrarian policy (especially
1985-1988) and the respect with which they are viewed now, even by some of the former Contra.
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2.11c Concluding Remarks:
A detailed discussion of the economic and political project of the FSLN at this juncture
is somewhat premature. Before going on to outline in more detail the economic
programme of the FSLN, and its achievements and limitations (Chapter Four is
devoted to this end). The rise to power of the FSLN and the influences upon the
development of its economic programme have to be placed within their historical
context. One of the central tenets of this thesis is that a clear understanding of the
political and economic experiences of revolutionary Nicaragua cannot be attained
without grounding analysis in the nature of the historical development of the
Nicaraguan economy, and its placement within a wider understanding of the dynamics
of the Central American region as a whole. To this end Chapter Three, in the context
of the theoretical debates outlined in this and the previous chapter, will examine the
historical specificity of the development of capitalism in Nicaragua. This provides for
a discussion of the importance of the historical legacy of social and economic
structures inherited by the FSLN after the victory of July 19th 1979, as an overriding
influence in the formation and effects of economic policies in the main period of study
of this work.
The specific processes that have helped to shape the development of the Nicaraguan
economy and, in particular, the rise to dominance of the agro-export sector are
outlined as a guide to understanding the origins and dynamics of the situation that
emerged in the 1980s. The dynamics of the agro-export-led model and how it has
evolved and changed over time have conditioned (although not determined) the
development of the political institutions of the nation (above all the nature of the
state) and the formation of socio-economic classes and social groups. The nature of
the relationship between the model of accumulation and these wider processes needs
to be explored in some detail before any attempt is made to interpret the implications
of the structural transformations wrought in Nicaragua since 1979.
Chapter Three
The Historical Development Of The Nicaraguan
Economy To 1979.
3.1 Introduction:
The sources available for studying in detail the development of productive forces and
social relations in Nicaragua are somewhat limited, and studies of Nicaragua's social
history are very much in their infancy. For example, Jeffrey Gould in his review of
Bradford Burn's 'Patriarch and Folk' states that;
"In 1888, the Nicaraguan historian Jose Dolores Gamez, upon completing his
'Historia de Nicaragua, commented, "It would have been a human
impossibility to do more, given that Nicaragua's contemporary history has
yet to be written and in addition there are no libraries or archives. "A century
later Bradford Burns faced a very similar challenge." (Gould, 1992:632, see
also Dore and Weeks, 1992a).
Within such a sparsely studied history, our knowledge of the working conditions,
way of life, or even the commodities produced by, the vast majority of ordinary
Nicaraguans, are the most limited of all. As argued by Elizabeth Dore (1990:103);
"One reason for the scarcity of information and analysis about the historical
development of the peasantry is that their marginalization and oppression is
mirrored in historical documentation- by omission."
However, within the constraints of these limitations a general characterization of
historical processes can be made. Jaime Biderman (1982:1), in the introduction to his
study of the development of capitalism in Nicaraguan agriculture, expresses a useful
rationale for the study of these processes.
"As it evolves the process ofcapitalist development or accumulation generates
significant changes in the composition of the productive forces in resource
allocation, in class relations and in the character of the state. The specificity of
capitalist development in Nicaragua stems from the particular ways in which
these changes and contradictions have been manifested and the ways in which
different classes and the state have contributed or reacted to them."
Biderman's Marxist approach, whilst providing insights, does not present the whole
story, focusing as it does upon the impact of changes in the economy upon political
and social developments. To more fully appreciate the specificity of Nicaraguan
development necessitates reversing this relationship, through the exploration of the
impact of political developments upon the formation of economic strategies and their
effects upon economic structures, and assessing those political developments without
building into their very definition their determination by economic factors. Thus, such
factors as, the influence of political ideologies, the formation of class consciousness,
and how these have evolved over time, also need consideration, if the account is not to
become overly dependent on considerations of the development of productive forces.
A Marxist perspective on the development of Nicaragua's agro-export led model (or
models) of development, whilst sensitive to the influence of the development of
productive forces, should not, therefore, see these as automatically determining the
course of Nicaraguan history.
Before proceeding two general comments should be made. The first is that any study
of Nicaragua's history should not understate the constant influence of external
powers. The importance of this has been made explicit at this juncture since, as has
been noted in Chapter One, following the much discussed demise of dependency
theory, it is not 'fashionable' within contemporary development theory to stress the
importance of externally imposed constraints upon development. In general this
reflects a justifiable reaction against the external determinism ofmuch 'dependista'
theorizing. However, this reaction can serve to obstruct an understanding of the
central importance of international factors in the historical experiences of specific
nations and regions. Thus, for example, it is important to stress the particularly high
level of dependence on trade (in relation to the overall size of each economy) which
characterizes the Central American region, exposing it excessively to the vagaries of
international market movements.
At a more general level, ever since the 'discovery' of Central America in 1502,
external powers have exerted a major influence upon the historical trajectory of what
would eventually become the Republic of Nicaragua. From the horror and barbarism
of the initial Spanish conquest and the progressive destruction of indigenous culture
and the ruthless extraction of resources, both mineral and human, during the Spanish
colonial period, through the domination exerted over the province by the Guatemalan
Captaincy-General and the growing influence of the US and the British in the
nineteenth century, to the interventions of the United States from the end of the last
century and throughout the present one including their active sponsorship of the
Contra War; the history of Nicaragua has been one of external intervention and
political influence.
The second point concerns the fact that even those works that have attempted to place
the contemporary study of the Central American region within a historical perspective
(e.g. Bulmer-Thomas, 1987; Dunkerley, 1988; Williams, 1985; orWheelock, 1985)
have tended to limit their analyses to the period following the rapid development of
coffee exports at the end of the last century. Relatively few have thoroughly
investigated the legacy of the colonial era upon the nature of latter developments in
Nicaraguan society. At best, the importance of the colonial period upon the nature of
later developments is acknowledged, but it is generally treated as a relatively
homogenous period. The social relations inherited at independence are thus often taken
as given; the remnants of a previous feudal order that came under the transforming
influence of liberalizing elements at the end of the nineteenth century. Macleod
(1973:xi) suggests that an understanding of the colonial period is of greater importance
than this;
"But the colonial Spanish society of the sixteenth century was very different
from the one described in the eighteenth century. What happened in the Latin
American economies between the first conquests, the seizure of long-
accumulated Indian wealth, the first silver booms, and the period ofmodern
raw material supply? How did Latin America move from one stage to the
other? What were these intermediate economic stages, and what effect did
they have on the peoples living in Latin America."
And with what effects on the later development of the independent Nicaraguan state?
In order to understand the particular legacy of the Colonial period upon the evolution
of Nicaragua's social formations, and its economic and social development, it is
important to examine the nature of colonial society and the social relations embodied
within it, their evolution over time and, most importantly, those colonial institutions
and arrangements which survived the period in one form or another. An understanding
of the processes at work during the Colonial period will help to place the later
development of Nicaraguan capitalism into its specific historical context, shedding
light upon the initial insertion of the economy into the international economy.
3.2 Nicaragua's Pre-Colonial Heritage:
Most accounts of Nicaraguan history appear to start as if from a vacuum in 1502.
Even the official documents of the Republic itself often make no mention of the fact
that Nicaragua was populated before that date (see CIERA 1984:11). There are in fact
various estimates as to the total Indian population that was encountered by the Spanish
conquistadors. These oscillate between figures of around 600,000 to those of over one
million (compare, for example, Radell, 1969:78 with Biderman, 1982:23).
Stanislawski (1983:9) suggests that even Radell's higher estimates may be
conservative, claiming that, in spite of colonial reports that exist, Western historians
have refused to accept the higher population densities which are described therein.
Newson (1987:87-88) provides the most compelling arguments for the total figures.
Using estimates of ecological carrying-capacity and the archival evidence of eye¬
witnesses, she estimates the total population of Nicaragua at the time of the conquest at
around 1.6 million (75% of which were located in the Pacific region). This population
was scattered into "a mosaic ofsmall tribal confederations" (Brignoli, 1985:38), that
expressed a mixture of Mexican and South American origins, although the former
dominated.1
These indigenous peoples were concentrated in the coastal regions and the lakes of the
Central Pacific region, although they were spread through out the whole province. The
different groups also had diverse agricultural practices, hunter-gatherers
predominating in the Atlantic region, with various forms of sedentary agriculturalists
in the Pacific and Central regions. Our limited knowledge of the nature of Pre-Colonial
agriculture is summarized well in the following quote from Newson (1987:50);
"Unfortunately there are only a few accounts ofthe land-tenure system at the
time of the conquest, but it would appear that land was communally owned
and allocated to individualsfor cultivation. On the clearedplots various food
crops were intercropped, the most important ofwhich were maize, beans,
manioc and sweet potatoes. Other crops such as cacao and cotton required
specially cleared andpreparedplots.,r2
Given contemporary tendencies to idealize pre-Hispanic cultures in the epoch of the
Colombian quincentenary it is also important to stress that,
"Pre-Hispanic (Nicaragua) was no romantic idyll. Conflict and waifare
existed between Indian communities. Slavery was an established institution,
and (the influence of) Mayan culture had encouraged a respectfor religious
authoritarianism which would soon be exploited by the Spanish clerics."
(Smith, 1993:39).
Nonetheless, the devastation wreaked by the Spanish and the subsequent enslaving of
the indigenous communities is made no less repulsive by the retention of a less
idealized view of the pre-Colombian period.
3.3 The Conquest and its aftermath:
After its initial discovery by the Spanish in 1502, the Central American region was
largely bypassed by the conquistadors until the 1520's. The first to arrive in Nicaragua
^ee CSUCA (1973:17). The two most important tribal groups, the NIcarao and the Chorotegans,
had arrived from Mexico over the preceding centuries (Stanislawski, 1983:5).
2 Mention is also made of the growing of tobacco, cassava, numerous fruits and vegetables, chilli and
henequin (Biderman, 1982:25; Stanislawski, 1983, 1983:4-5 and Walker, 1991:12).
were Andres Nino and Gil Gonzalez Davila in 1522.3 Their reports of the gold that
they had collected led Pedrarias Davila, the infamous governor of Panama, to send an
expedition to Nicaragua in 1523, under Francisco Hernandez de Cordoba, who was
responsible for the foundation of the cities of Leon and Granada in 1524. Pedrarias
himself entered the fray in the following year, executing Hernandez on suspected
treachery, and setting himself up as governor (Stanislawski, 1983:l-3).There was no
political unity with which the Indian populations of the region could have withstood
the new invaders and they were subjugated relatively easily by the Spanish.
Having secured the region,4 the Conquistadors first turned their attention toward the
rapid extraction of whatever resources the newly conquered area contained. This
resource base was found, first via the exploitation of the indigenous Nicaraguans
themselves and, later in the extraction of precious metals and shipbuilding woods.
By 1548 it is estimated that the indigenous population had been reduced
catastrophically to a level below 40.000. This devastation reflected, not only those
who had been killed in the conquest itself, or by the epidemics that often accompanied
the conquistadors,5 but also by the mass export of slaves to Panama and the Peruvian
mines (Romero, 1987:24). The export of Nicaraguan Indians as slaves had started
soon after the conquest and by the 1530's the Conquistadors had turned the slave trade
into a lucrative operation. Table 3.1 provides a series of estimates for factors thought
to underly the decimation of the Indian population.
Table 3.1 Estimates for the decimation of Nicaragua's Indian
population during the first years of colonial Rule. Source: Radell (1969:78-9)
Individuals removed from Nicaragua by the
slave trade between 1527 and 1548. 450,000 - 500,000
Death via disease, war or flight from
Nicaragua between 1527 and 1548. 300,000 - 400,000
Further population remaining unsubjugated
in the Central Highlands who were
progressively decimated in the ensuing half
century.
200,000 - 250,000
3 Smith (1993:52) mentions a defeated attempt by Diego de Nicuesa to establish a settlement in
Nicaragua in 1509.
4 Although the lack of centralization of the Indian communities facilitated their subjugation by the
Spanish, it also meant that there was no natural power centre upon which the Spanish could
concentrate their control. Because of this certain parts of the province were to maintain outside of
Spanish control for much of the colonial period.
5 The most notable killers were smallpox, measles, typhus, plague, yellow fever and malaria
(Newson, 1987:10).
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Indian slave labour was also employed in mines instigated in the Segovias (although
this was later outlawed), gold panning in the rivers, and the cutting of wood and its
transport to the coastal port of Realejo. All of these activities were administered
ruthlessly and were intensely wasteful of human life. These activities were not only
wasteful in terms of human life but also meant that, since slaves were exempt from the
payment of tribute, they reduced the income accruing to the settlers as a whole from
that source (Newson, 1987:99-103). The overall picture of these first twenty years or
so of Spanish domination is summarized succinctly by Macleod (1973:100-104):
" The first two decades after the conquest were ones ofgreat confusion in
Central America. Labor was absurdly plentiful atfirst and was used
capriciously and wastefully. Everywhere the Indian population declined
catastrophically. The wars ofconquest and the skirmishing between
conquerors, overwork on goldpanning, exorbitant Spanish demands for
tribute and labour, the dislocations brought to the food supply andmarketing
systems by deprivations andforced migrations, the rapid shattering of the
native culture, allplayed a part."
By 1550, however, the slave trade had slowed to little more than a trickle as the
population level crashed. In addition, most of the metal extracting activities had been
abandoned by this time6 The combination of these factors meant that the settlers
suddenly found themselves searching for new means of enrichment. They began
finally to recognize the importance of the remaining Indian population to the
development of activities that could be the key to their long term livelihood (Wortman,
1982:3).
3.4 The Colonial Period:
The Mid-16th century represented the end of the conquest period and the beginning of
the construction of the new colonial society of the province. In addition, from that
time, the domination of the conquistadors was increasingly challenged by the Spanish
Crown and its vassals, the relationship of the Spanish to the Indian communities
6The abandonment of the mines related to two factors in particular. Firstly, the declining Indian
population meant that it was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain the labour power needed to
work the mines, due both to the overall numerical decline and the growing tendency of the
'encomenderos' to guard their 'own' Indians more zealously. Secondly most easily accesible rreserves
had already been worked out.
reformulated, and the immediately exploitable attributes of the area exhausted. The
search for profitable exportable commodities continued, but gradually the economy of
the colony would come to be dominated by the largely domestic activities of the large
estates.
During the period of the initial conquest the social relations established between the
Spanish and Indian communities had been that of slavery. Gradually, the Crown had
granted the conquistadors 'encomiendas'7 of Indians which were placed under their
own personal protection. As well as extracting tribute from the Indians under his
control, and facilitating their conversion to Catholicism, the 'encomendero' in reality
used the system as a personalized means of labour coercion.8 Eventually, however,
the encomienda system was abolished under the 'new laws' of 1542 (Woodward,Jr.,
1985:43).9 These 'new laws' saw the responsibility for collecting tribute from the
Indian communities pass from the encomenderos to royal officials who were placed
under the regional control of the Guatemalan 'Audiencia'. The laws recognized the
rights of the conquistadors to the lands which they already held, and later decrees in
1574 and 1601, established that a certain proportion of the tribute now collected for
the Crown, would be granted to the local 'settlers'; although these also imposed the
abolition of slavery and placed the government of the province into the hands of
colonial administrators (Woodward, JR., 1985:43).
From the passing of the 'new laws' onward the keys to the colonial economic system
became the tribute paid by the Indian communities to the Crown and local landlords
(which supported government, church and military expenses as well as remittances to
Spain) and a new labour system - the 'repartimiento'. This system was a form of
compromise with the Spanish settlers for the loss of part of the encomienda tribute and
the forced labour control that it had implied. Under the repartimiento each Indian
community had to send a quarter of its tributary population to work on local haciendas
successively. The combination of these two colonial institutions provided the
economic relationship of the colony with the metropolis and the dominant internal
labour relationship (although later both were to be superseded in some areas by free
wage labour). Both the repartimiento and the encomienda were suitable for colonial
7Encomienda: A right granted by the King to the conquistadors that allowed them to collect tributes
(in the form of goods or money and until 1549 labour services) from conquered peoples in return for
bringing them into the polity, giving them temporal care, and teaching them Christianity
(Stanislawski, 1983:17).
8 Both Conquistadors and the newly appointed Governors were given the right to grant encomiendas
to individuals and the struggles that resulted over this allocation led to considerable instability, as
encomiendas were granted, confiscated and re-granted.
9 The problems of administering the changes, the activities of the settlers' representatives at the
Spanish Court, and the institution of the 'repartimiento' system (see below) ensured its continuation
throughout the Hapsburg period, if in a different form
administration in Central America because the dominant Indian societies in the Pacific
region had been accustomed to labour drafts and the imposition of tribute in the Pre-
Colombian period; and the stratified nature of their social organization enabled the
relatively small Spanish population to dominate them through their traditional forms of
social organization. The Spanish were imposed as a kind of further higher tier in
society above the village caciques (Newson, 1987:10-14).
3.4a The Development of the Colonial Hacienda:
The development of these arrangements shows that, at least at first, the control of
labour was considered of greater importance than the control of land. At the same time
as the Spanish cities had been founded10 the surrounding lands had been distributed
amongst the 'settlers'; but Spanish, as opposed to Indian, agriculture was very slow to
develop during this early period. The colonists' food needs were met by imports from
Spain and the Caribbean, and through the tribute paid by the Indian communities. As
the income to be earned from the slave trade, mining activities, or from the tribute paid
by the declining Indian population, neared exhaustion toward the middle of the
sixteenth century, those settlers who had opted to stay in the colony began to see their
future prosperity as dependent upon their land holdings, and they gradually turned
toward the development of agricultural activities (Newson, 1987:131). It was not,
however, until the latter part of the century that further land occupation and titling
started to any great extent and, at first, this reflected the acquisition of land for
speculation in cacao or indigo exports, rather than for subsistence purposes. After the
halting of the first boom in indigo production in 1630,11 however, more landowners
began to live for the greater part of the year on lands which they had originally bought
to develop indigo exports. Gradually, therefore, although some landowners continued
to try to develop export commodities, the consolidating Spanish land holdings came to
display the characteristics of the archetypal semi-subsistence Latin American hacienda
(Macleod, 1973:383 and Romero, 1987:223).
Biderman (1982:27) explains how the process of land colonization and the expansion
of agricultural activities progressed in the early seventeenth century. As the control of
land took on greater significance, the provincial officials petitioned the Spanish Crown
to set up a land register in Granada, in order to allow the frontier lands to be regulated
10These towns and cities were the dominant symbols of Spanish domination throughout this early
period. They were established in areas where there were large Indian populations or close to mineral
deposits and chiefly functioned as secular and ecclesiaistical administrative centres rather than
economic ones (Newson (1987:93).
1 ^ee the section on export crops below.
on behalf of the local elites and for their land claims to be legitimized. The claims were
mainly made by those who had settled in Leon and Granada and in large measure
reflected the expansion of ranching activities. Ranching seems to have offered
particular opportunities in Nicaragua because of the availability of large tracts of
under-utilized grasslands, the growth in domestic demand for beef, and possible
opportunities to develop exports to other areas of the region. The major areas in which
the cattle haciendas were established were on lands to the North-East of Leon, and, in
the case of those from Granada, the areas around Rivas and Chontales. During the
seventeenth century the number of animals grew rapidly and the cattle ranch became
constituted as the dominant form of the Nicaraguan hacienda.12
It is worth pointing out here that the expansion of Spanish landholdings does not
appear to have occurred via the direct displacement of Indian communities from their
communal lands, as has been suggested by some (e.g. Enriquez, 1985:66), although
this did occur on occasion. Instead they developed on unused or abandoned land
generally near to Indian villages, for easy access to labour. The decline in the Indian
population meant that the expansion of Spanish agricultural production did not often
interfere with Indian patterns of land use, although the increase in demand for Indian
labour that it embodied had obvious effects on the labour available for work on
communal lands (Romero, 1987:31).
This 'formative' period, which lasted until the end of the seventeenth century, was
marked by demographic and economic stagnation as the colony searched for a new
form of economic dynamism and a new social equilibrium. As suggested above, the
majority of the estates developed were for subsistence purposes and, in general, the
commercial surplus generated was relatively insignificant (Romero, 1987:371,
although see Newson, 1987:131-132). Gradually from this point onwards the
haciendas became the focus of political and economic power in the colony. Most of the
population continued in subsistence production, either on the Indian communal lands
or on individual ladino plots, but were linked in various ways to the cattle haciendas.
The haciendas thus employed both Indian and Mestizo labour in various labour
relations. Solorzano (1982) mentions debt peonage and bastard salary in the case of
ladino labour, with Indian labour being provided through the repartimiento system and
the periodic renting of Indian labour from the village caciques.
3.4b The continued search for profitable export commodities:
12 Medal (1987) estimates that by 1750 there were around 200,000 head of cattle in the country.
Although the subsistence-based hacienda came to dominate the colonial economy,
external economic relations with Spain and the other colonies continued following a
boom and bust cycle. The Central American region was marginal to the colonial
trading system and hence less export oriented than other parts of the empire (Flores
and Torres-Rivas, 1989:1). This was also reflected in the fact that the region was not
well connected to the major inter- continental transport routes, making Central
America's trading possibilities somewhat uncertain. The colonial trading system
limited the colony to trade with Spain and even this had to be carried out via the
monopoly run in the Guatemalan audiencia. This also affected regional trade, which
was only legal if the produce was sold in Guatemala. Thus, Nicaraguan ranchers, if
they wanted to export beef to El Salvador, had not only to endure the cost of
transporting their produce to Guatemala, where they were only allowed to sell on
certain festival days at the fairs ofCuajiniquilapa, Chalchuapa or Amatillo (Solorzano,
1982;16 and Wheelock, 1985:25 and note 20), but also had to accept the prices
imposed by the Guatemalan oligarchy, who then appropriated the benefits when they
resold to Salvadoran merchants.
These conditions then determined the limited export possibilities open to colonial
Nicaragua. Since there was little effective demand from the internal market likely to
stimulate the processes of economic growth, the problems in the development of any
viable export sector seriously weakened any movements toward economic dynamism.
The two major export crops that developed to any great degree in the colonial period
were first cacao and later indigo.
Cacao was an indigenous crop that had been used both as a means of currency and as
a privileged beverage in pre-colonial days. The Spanish first recognized its export
potential in the mid-sixteenth century after the collapse of the slave trade. Commercial
production in Nicaragua first developed near Rivas, although since domestic
production increased markedly as well, it is difficult to calculate exactly how much
was exported. The first growth cycle ended at the end of the century but there were
further peaks in the mid-seventeenth century and at the end of the eighteenth century.
These boom and bust cycles show the fragility of the export sector in this era and
reflected such diverse factors as drought, pests, competition from less costly
Ecuadorian producers, continued labour shortages and, later, British piracy.13
Indigo, the other major colonial export crop, was exported outside Central America. It
was first developed in the Coastal Pacific region (around Leon, Granada, Rivas and
13 The labour problem was compounded by the fact that, although cacao cultivation is not ordinarily
a labour-intensive activity, in Nicaragua the strains were not hardy and required substantial attention
and irrigation with obvious effects on demand for scarce labour (Newson, 1987:139).
Managua) at the end of the sixteenth century, but its growth stagnated for the majority
of the following century reflecting market changes, the predictable labour shortages
(from 1581 it was illegal to employ Indian labour in indigo processing due to the
extreme health hazards) and the lack of infrastructural development. Further booms
followed in the late seventeenth century and for much of the eighteenth century. The
latter reflected the breaking of the Spanish trading monopoly as the dye was exported
to meet the demands of the developing British textile industry.
Despite the periodic successes in the exports noted above, the colony remained
relatively self-sufficient. The hacienda, the dominant unit of production, continued in
many ways to be a practically self-contained domestic concern, that engaged in export
production only as a secondary activity.
This is shown clearly in the two following passages;
"Cacao was not exported heavily, indigo did not approach Salvadoran levels
and the sparse population effectively determined that ranching predominated
with cattle outnumbering human beings. Indeed so substantial were the
opportunitiesfor subsistence farming that the ejido was consistently defended
as a means ofkeeping the labourforce near urban settlement and thus
available at harvest time. Production ofgold and silver was too modest to
exercise much impact except, perhaps, to make state power rather more
attractive than would otherwise have been the case." (Dunkerley, 1988:18).
"Even so by the end of the eighteenth century commercial export was still not
the mainstay of the most of the region's inhabitants. Even the landholding
class was engagedmore in subsistence farming andproduction for local
markets than in plantation production for overseas markets." (Woodward,Jr,
1985:69).
In general terms, it seems that the dominance of the cattle hacienda was such that their
owners in the late colonial period did not look to develop the production of the
classical export commodities to the same extent as the other Central American
Republics. The hacienda functioned as security for the latifundista, guaranteeing his
own subsistence, the provision of beef for the growing domestic market, and
periodically exports to neighbouring countries (Lanuza, 1983:21).
Levy, writing at the time, was clear on the long-term stagnationary effects of the
dominance of the cattle hacienda;
"The cattle hacienda has been until now the base upon which the few
moderate fortunes that there are in Nicaragua have been founded. That
peculiarity, that the richest families, and by consequence ofgreatest
influence, are owners ofcattle haciendas, is one of the facts that most
contributes to hinder the development of the republic." (Levy, quoted in
Lanuza, 1983).
In summary, the problems imposed by Nicaragua's position in the colonial trading
network, meant that export production tended to be intermittent and economic activity
continued to centre upon goods for which there was an internal market By the end of
the colonial period, however, the Spanish mercantile system had undergone a gradual
process of liberalization. First the Seville/Cadiz monopoly had been dismantled in an
effort to provide a legal alternative to the widespread practice of smuggling. Then a
further series of reforms in the 1760's lead to the General Free Trade Act of 1778.
Thus, the Bourbons effectively opened participation in the previously closed colonial
trading system to a wider circle of both Spaniards and colonists. Despite the increased
opportunities, however, Nicaragua's position on the fringes of the colonial trading
system meant that commerce continued to be limited and the fortunes of the export
sector did not have a substantial effect on internal economic cycles (Woodward,Jr.,
1985:65). The proportion of exports to GNP, whilst difficult to calculate, was
assuredly not high, Medal (1987) estimates the total exports of the colony for 1799 at
569,000 pesos, a level of perhaps three pesos per capita. The composition of exports
for the same year is shown in Table 3.2 which illustrates the dominance of livestock,
indigo and cacao at the time.
3.4c Social Relations during the Colonial Period:
Following the conquest, the remaining indigenous economy was at first maintained in
a relatively autonomous form, subsisting, paying tribute, and providing labour for the
haciendas via the repartimiento. However, over time as the demand for food and
labour grew in the haciendas and cities, and various export commodities were
periodically developed, the cohesion of the Indian communities began to be partially
broken down. Over time, Indians began to leave their villages, either for the cities, or
to work as employed labourers on the haciendas. Quite to what extent this occurred is
open to some debate because the sources concerning agricultural production for the
period are sketchy at best, and give only vague inferences as to the relationship
between subsistence production and labour on the haciendas. As discussions below
will suggest, however, an important Indian population still existed at the end of the
colonial period. What it is possible to maintain is that by the end of the eighteenth
century the ladino population had become the dominant social group numerically in
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Table 3.2
Nicaraguan Exports in 1799 (in pesos)
Outside Central America: Intra-Regional
Indigo 160,000 Cacao 220,000
Pitch 10,000 Cattle 100,000
Wood 5,000 Horses 6,000






Adapted from Medal (1987) p. 17.
Nicaragua.14 Over what period this actually occurred, and to what extent, is the
subject of some debate. Macleod (1973) even claims that by the mid-seventeenth
century the Indian communities had practically disappeared in Nicaragua. Nevertheless
Medal (1987) argues that, even as late as 1881, the major victims of Pedro Joaquin
Chamorro's agrarian laws were the Indian communities. In the latter years of the
colonial period, however, it is certain that the haciendas began to rely more and more
on ladino rather than Indian labour.
It is interesting to note, however, that the importance of the repartimiento in the
provision of labour in colonial Nicaragua did persist for much longer than in the rest
of Latin America. This can be explained to some extent by the nature of the labour
shortages in the Nicaraguan economy and the lack of profitability ofmany of
Nicaragua's economic enterprizes. Despite the continuation of the repartimiento, other
forms of labour relations came to dominate Nicaraguan society (e.g. debt peonage,
other forms of servile relations and, in some cases, free wage labour). Furthermore,
the agricultural production from the Spanish haciendas and small ladino farms came to
exceed that of the remaining Indian villages. Thus, towards the end of the colonial
period, tribute had become less fundamental to the functioning of the colonial
economy (see Solarzano, 1985 and Romero, 1987). This does not infer, however, the
disappearance of Indian communal production or the dominance of market relations.
Wheelock (1985:60) argues that the major part of Nicaragua's population continued to
remain marginal to the developing market economy and that most continued to subsist
on small plots (according to Levy, 1969 even in 1870 the major part of the population
were engaged in subsistence production of which over 40,000 continued in communal
indigenous production).15
14 The distinction between Indian and ladino is not as simple as it might appear. If 'Indian' is
understood as a racial category then by the end of the colonial period there would have been few Indian
villages where miscegenation had not penetrated and thus few biologically defined 'Indians'. But if the
term is defined culturally then where is the distinction between Indian and ladino to be drawn? Even
those Indian communities surviving into the post-colonial period would have experienced profound
changes in their economic organization and socio-political institutions.
15The decline in the centrality of Indian tribute to the functioning of the colonial economy is
important to understand since it carries with it a number of important implications. Often the whole
of the period of Spanish domination has been characterized as a dual system of Spanish as exploiters
and Indians as victims. Obviously such a conception has some validity when applied to the period of
the conquest and the first decades of colonial rule, but the situation becomes more complicated with
the growth of the mestizo/ladino population and the breakdown of the indigenous communities
(Romero, 1987:285). If the social relations inherited from the colonial period are thought to have had
a degree of influence upon the later trajectory of the Republic then it is important to go beyond the
dualistic conception. By the time of independence the 'Indian/Spanish' dichotomy was of less and ever
decreasing significance in Nicaragua than the 'landlord/ladino/campesino' relationship.
3.4d The Emerging Nicaraguan State and Regional politics in the
colonial era:
Internal politics during the colonial period revolved around the rivalry of the cities of
Leon and Granada and the domination exerted over the whole of the Guatemalan
Audiencia by the oligarchy ofGuatemalan merchants. In many ways these two factors
were inter-related since the political and economic domination of the Guatemalan elite
precluded the development of a strong national identity in the Nicaraguan province
which fomented the rivalry between the two city-states. Leon was the administrative
centre of the colonial province, whilst Granada had developed initially as the chosen
place for the richest merchants as they arrived from Spain or Panama. The economic
growth of each city occurred independently. Leon controlled the ports of Realejo and
Corinto and was important in the development of ranching activities, whilst Granada,
more active as a commercial centre and tied to cacao, tobacco and sugar production,
developed the maritime route of Lake Nicaragua-Rio San Juan-San Juan del Norte.
The existence of these two isolated and often antagonistic groups was a strong
obstacle to any strengthening or centralization of the weak colonial state.
The change from Hapsburg to Bourbon rule in Spain seemed to offer the possibility of
a strengthening and centralization of the state apparatus in the colonies which might
have overridden the basis of the intrigues between the two cities (Woodward, Jr.,
1985:63). Flora and Torres-Rivas (1989:8) characterize the establishment of Bourbon
rule as representing a shift in Spanish policy toward its American colonies from an
extractive perspective toward a more developmentalist one; in that their officials began
to invest in the colonies rather than simply acting to facilitate the flow of tribute to
Spain. As suggested by Wortman (1982:131);
"Unlike their predecessors, the Bourbons did not depend upon remissions
from Central America as a sign of the loyalty of the kingdom to the
metropolis but viewed the colony as an integral part of the empire from which
earnings could be better extracted through commerce andmore efficient
government"
Indeed after the great fiscal reforms of 1763, remissions to Spain were largely ended
and a new colony-wide fiscal administration was set up. The increase in local revenues
was used to enhance the development of an emerging state beaurocracy and, later, to
expand defence spending in an attempt to combat the increasing influence of other
foreign powers in the region. At the same time the last forty years of colonial rule,
before the onset of the struggle for independence, saw a boom in overall Central
American trade figures which began to transform the economies of the region.
Wortman argues that the expansion of productive activities in the Nicaraguan
tablelands reflected their incorporation into this expanding trade network, as suppliers
of grain, cloth and meat to the growing populations of the indigo regions of the other
republics. Thus, the last years of the colonial period began to see the differential
development of particular regions of the Central American territory with specific
economic characteristics and the formation of new interest groups (Torres-Rivas and
Pinto, 1983:74).
For a number of reasons, however, the increasing engagement in international trade
and the modifications introduced into the workings of the colonial system by the
Bourbon reforms, did not bring about as many fundamental changes as might be
imagined. First, and foremost, the power of the Guatemalan oligarchy over trade and
its overall economic management of the region was not broken despite attempts
instigated from Spain to do so.16 The emerging commercial production in the different
regions was still weak, even in El Salvador, and the Guatemalan oligarchy managed to
outmanoeuvre any attempts at breaking their control over it. Their power over trade
was therefore not broken under the Bourbon reforms, they simply found new ways of
exerting it. This was mainly achieved through their rigid control of commercial capital
which was used to maintain their privileged position in relation to production.
Overall, therefore, by the end of the colonial period commercial activity was still very
limited and the development of the national state apparatus still severely constrained.
However, the Bourbon era had seen some changes in the functioning of the colonial
system, the development of new interests geared around production for export markets
and increasing diversification in the economic activities engaged in across the
republics.
3.4e Overview of the Legacy of the Colonial Period:
Summing up the effects of the colonial period upon the development of the emerging
Nicaraguan state a number of themes emerge. The legacy of the conquest and the slave
trade of the sixteenth century produced a recurrent problem of labour shortages, that at
least contributed towards the labour extensive style of agricultural development that
came evolved - the cattle-based hacienda. This dominant cattle-based hacienda
produced a particularly inward-looking elite in comparison with the other parts of
Central America (see discussions in the following sections).
1 Torres-Rivas and Pinto (1983:78) explain how Galvez, one particular president of the Guatemalan
audiencia, sent by the Crown to break the economic power of the oligarchy, founded the Montepio, a
kind of colonial bank, to liberate producers from the oligarchies' monopoly of credits, and also
liberalized the cattle fairs. He ultimately failed in his intentions, not least due to the insufficient size
of funds available under the system.
The discussion has also served to seriously question the validity of a certain type of
characterisation of the colonial period which has been expressed in a number of
discussions of Nicaraguan history. This position argues that the contemporary
dependency upon export production originated in the colonial period and helped to
determine the direction of later developments. A number of examples of this position
follow;
"The most important legacies of those years (The 300 years ofcolonial rule)
are an economy built around export agriculture" (Close, 1988:10).
"From the first incursions of the Spaniards in the sixteenth century however,
indigenous subsistence agriculture began to be squeezed out by export crops
such as indigo." (Fagen, 1987:18)
"At the beginning of the seventeenth century, Nicaragua began producing
indigo, which soon replaced cacao in terms of its importance in agro-export
production. In addition to reinforcing the emerging agro-export model of
development, indigo production initiated the dramatic seasonal variation in
labor demands that have characterized the agrarian sector ever since."
(Enriquez, 1985:266)
Enriquez, in particular, places her study of the agro-export sector in Nicaragua within
a dependency perspective and, in many ways, this is from where the problem arises.
Within such a perspective Nicaragua is said to have become increasingly integrated
into the emerging capitalist world economy during the colonial period via its agro-
export crops. In addition, Enriquez claims that the repartimiento system and other
forms of ensuring labour on the haciendas gradually brought the majority of peasant
farmers under capitalist relations of production. However, it has been observed in the
present study that the vast majority of agricultural production remained on a
subsistence or domestic basis during the colonial period and even the seasonal demand
for labour in the periodic indigo booms did not touch the majority of the rural
population. As expressed in CIERA(1989: vol.2, p.20) the colonial economic system
was relatively independent of the international system.
One further related point is that the majority of historical accounts of Nicaragua have
treated the three hundred years of colonial rule as an homogenous period of feudal
social relations. In fact the development of social relations in the colonial system
followed a complicated path. The initial extractive period was characterized by servile
social relations and entrepreneurial ambitions on the part of the first conquistadors.
Gradually the development of large land holdings came to form the social and
economic base of the colony and the relationship of the landholding classes to the
Indian and ladino populations was varied and changed over time, as did their
relationship to the colonial administration. Finally the advent of the Bourbon Spanish
monarchy started to give an impetus to the processes of state formation that were to
emerge more fully with all their contradictions in the Post-Colonial period. It is in fact
this consolidation of a peculiarly Central American version of Spanish feudalism that
provides the most important legacy of the colonial period, no! any emerging
engagement in international trade.
3.5 The Post-Colonial Period: Intra-Elite Tensions and the 'Age of
Anarchy': From Independence to 1858
If interpretations of the colonial experience in Nicaragua and its legacy have been
subject to misapprehension and oversimplification then the same can most definitely be
said for the first decades after independence. As Bradford Burns (1991) shows in his
excellent study of the period, this 'Age of Anarchy' represents almost the only stage of
Nicaraguan history when the nation was not under the sway of some external power.
The period was, however, characterized by an almost continual struggle for
domination between the various sectors of the Nicaraguan elite, and in particular,
those belonging to the city-states of Leon and Granada. In the majority of Nicaraguan
historiography this has been presented as a struggle between Liberal (Leon) and
Conservative (Granada) ideologies over the future direction of the republic, but what
exactly the terms meant in the specific context of Nicaragua in that period, how
influential they were, and their role in the emergence of the Nicaraguan nation state in
the years following 1858 need careful consideration.
3.5a Introduction:
The Nineteenth Century was a period of dramatic change in Nicaragua. Independence
was achieved with a minimal degree of conflict but then, after a brief period of
regional federalism as part of the short-lived Central American republic, the nation
descended into a period of inter-oligarchic struggle. This first period of independence
was thus characterized by the intensification ofmany of the internal contradictions
which had been fomenting during the latter stages of the colonial era, and the political
unrest which this embodied led to continuous economic stagnation or even decline.
Independence came to Nicaragua on the 15th September 1823. Towards the end of the
colonial period, as shown in discussions above, Nicaraguan merchants and
landowners had begun to challenge colonial trading patterns, they had also started to
come under the influence of Liberal European ideas. During the following years these
ideas bestowed to the competing sectors of the elite a vision of future prosperity which
could be secured through the exploitation of Nicaragua's unique geography (as a
potential commercial channel between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans), and abundant
natural resources, through the rapid expansion of agrarian exports. This vision of
commercial success through the development of agroexports, although somewhat
tardy in its eventual implementation, was to provide the building blocks for the
consolidation and modernization of the Nicaraguan state, and in many ways still
remains hegemonic today. In the Nicaraguan context, however, this incipient
liberalism was pursued in an economic, rather than a political form (shorn of the
democratic voice which characterized liberalism in say its Mexican or Colombian
context). A commitment to equity was voiced in the various constitutions which
appeared, but the central tenet of Nicaraguan and Central American liberalism was
(and remained) the pursuit of free trade and the expansion of commercial agriculture
(Dunkerley, 1988: 4).
3.5b The Roots and Nature of the Conflict between Leon and Granada:
The often ruthless struggles between the Liberals and Conservatives which dominated
this period meant that, in relation to the majority of newly independent Latin American
colonies, Nicaragua was late in facilitating the emergence of a centralized nation state.
One of the most important reasons underlying this was that in Nicaragua the ruling
elites owed more in allegiance to the strongly localized power centres of their city-
states, than to any more abstract idea of the nation. As the nineteenth century
progressed, however, the influence of notions of modernization, nationhood and
development began to be felt and, over time, the modern nation-state of Nicaragua
started to take shape. However, this was a long and slow process. As expressed by
James Dunkerley;
" Pockets ofcommercial agriculture and alliedmercantile circuits existed in a
much more extensive economy dedicated to subsistence farming andpetty
commodity production within a semi permeable provincialism, yielding very
little revenue to a minuscule state apparatus controlled through the conduct of
a largely pre-modem politics." (Dunkerley, 1988:4)
It wasn't until the devastating conflict between Leon and Granada had brought virtual
ruin upon the two cities that the elite began to become more unified and the modern
Nicaraguan state began to take form (Bradford Burns, 1991 4).17
17 A detailed discussion of the military struggle between the Conservatives and the Liberals does not
need to be outlined here. For an excellent account see Bradford Burns (1991).
As noted in the last section, Leon was the political and administrative centre of the
province. It has been suggested that the Liberal elite there were most representative of
the influence of the Bourbon reforms and also demonstrated the influence of
republicanism and liberalism, the former in contrast to the federalist goals of the
Liberals in other Central American states, and the latter through a desire for free trade,
economic development and progress, anti-clericalism and anti-slavery (Torres-Rivas,
1969:37-39 and Flora and Torres-Rivas, 1989:9-10).
The Conservatives of Granada, on the other hand, had been most closely associated
with the social relations and cultural norms that characterized the colonial order, and in
some ways represented a continuance of the Hapsburg colonial mentality, with an
emphasis upon the desire for stability, continuity, order and moderation. This group
was comprised of traditional agrarian interests along with the more conservative
ladinos and merchants. Granada was a smaller city than Leon (in 1823 the population
of Granada was around 10,000 as opposed to 32,000 in Leon, Bradford Burns, 1991
7-8) but was in many ways the most influential merchant city, controlling the outlet to
the Atlantic through Lake Nicaragua and the Rio San Juan, as well as dominating the
fertile lands of Masaya and Rivas and the cattle dominated region of Chontales. In
addition Vasquez (1983:145) outlines how Granada, at least until the end of the
1850s, practically monopolized control of national customs revenues.
Despite the differences between the two cities and the precedence that they have been
given in traditional examinations of this period (in particular the impression given of
Leon as the centre of liberalism and change, and Granada as the centre of continuity
and conservatism), it could be argued that there were more factors held in common by
the elites of the two cities than those which divided them. The elites of both major
cities held a common vision of future prosperity and modernization, based upon the
perceived need to enter the international market place through a rapid expansion in the
export of agricultural commodities and the development of an inter-oceanic transit
route.18 Thus, the internal divisions of the elite related not so much to different
ideological visions, but rather to the question of who was to oversee the modernization
process, and how, i.e. which families would make the most economic and political
benefits (Bradford Burns, 1991 12-14).19
18To this we could add that those purporting to hold 'conservative' or 'liberal' positions resided in
both cities. There were no real political 'party structures' and the statements of intent or principle
issued by the two sides of the conflict in many instances differed remarkably little. Furthermore, when
in power both groups exhibited remarkably similar intentions within the constitutions which they
promulgated (although see Bradford Bums, 1991 21-24).
19Thus the struggle between Liberals and Conservatives in Nicaragua was not a struggle between
rival political parties in the contemporary sense. Neither was it a manifestation of the classical
As the authority of the Spanish crown and the Guatemalan audiencia diminished, so
the struggle within the Nicaraguan elite had intensified as the two city-states vied for
dominion. This process was first reflected in the different positions of Granada and
Leon with regard to Iturbidean annexation, continued in struggles within the Central
American federation, and climaxed with the Liberals' involvement with William
Walker in the 1850s. The question remains as to why Nicaragua appears to have been
so much more fractured than other Latin American states in this period. One of the key
factors is that the military and the church, powerful and directional influences in other
parts of the region, in Nicaragua were weak, and in many cases, as much a part of the
factional strife as other sectors of society. Furthermore, each of the cities was self-
sufficient in food production through their control of the fertile lands around them, and
more closely linked to foreign markets, through the ports they controlled, than they
were to each other. Overall then,
"No institutional structures and no psychological solidarity existed to ensure
the creation ofa viable nation state on either an isthmian or local level.
Contrary to the experiences throughout much ofLatin America, no caudillo
emerged to consolidate the state and substitute personal strength for the
missing or feeble political institutions. Furthermore, centripetal social,
economic andpolitical trends polarized the inhabitants around Granada and
Leon, contributing nothing to the task ofnation-building." (Bradford Burns,
1991:67)
or as expressed by Lanuza,
"In terms of the state the period reveals the preponderancy of regionalism
over integration, the consolidation ofsocial groups within each of the
regions, and the practically total absence ofan agroexporting bourgeoisie that
would consolidate the nation for its own ends and that of the metropolitan
countries." (Lanuza, 1983:94)
3.5c The Economic Dimension:
The first decades of independence saw the continued dominance of the cattle hacienda
as well as the long and drawn out demise of indigo and cacao production. In the
decades immediately following independence, therefore, the Nicaraguan economy
continued to be fundamentally domestic in nature; although its links to the regional
market as a supplier of food and cattle-related products continued to have some
struggle between conservative remnants of a colonial oligarchy and an emerging liberal urban
bourgeoisie.
importance. In economic terms the period can largely be characterized as one of
stagnation and decline, excepting a brief recovery during the 1820s and early 1830s
(Close, 1988:14). The cacao market collapsed under the pressure of increasing
competition from Venezuela and Ecuador; whilst expanded cattle production in El
Salvador supplanted Nicaraguan exports in the Guatemalan market (for a more detailed
discussion of economic fortunes during the period see Lanuza, 1983:32-35).
As Lanuza (1983:34-35) explains, our understanding of the economics of this period
is at best partial. Those national figures that do exist are limited in detail (often not
including cattle exports) and, more importantly, say nothing about the control of
production, the means of employing the labour utilized, how the activity was financed,
and how production was marketed. He does, however, outline aspects of the
development of a number of commodities during this period. There were some
experiments with the production of indian rubber (chiefly after the 1860s), timber
continued, periodically, to be an important export through Realejo (chiefly in the
1830s), and mining activities continued to play a key role (although the exploitation of
newly discovered deposits was seriously impeded by the civil war). Indigo also
continued to figure in Nicaragua's exports but, from a peak toward the end of the
colonial period, production declined throughout the nineteenth century, apart from a
brief resurgence in the 1830s. 20
In sum, throughout this period the export sector still represented a very small
proportion of economic activity in Nicaragua. The subsistence economy of the
indigenous communities, ladino smallholders, and to a certain extent the hacendados
and ranchers, continued to provide for the needs of the Nicaraguan people, largely
through providing for their own subsistence, but also through the production of
sufficient surplus to serve local markets. Despite the dislocations of the constant
conflict, the domestic economy continued to be so productive that Bradford Burns
(1991) refers to contemporary reports of remarkably well stocked markets in Leon,
Granada and Managua. He goes on to say,
"The total value of the products sold or bartered annually in the local markets
is unknown: the amount and value offoods consumed in households before
surpluses reached the market places have not even been estimated Economic
history concentrates exclusively on foreign exports. The unbalanced
assessmen ts ofeconomic performance make it difficult to assign a value
comparison between internal and external trade and to calculate total
production. Still, several tentative conclusions should be
considered. During the period 1821-1858 the known activities of the
20In 1800 indigo production had constituted around 28.1% of Nicaraguan exports (Lanuza, 1983:72)
by the end of the 1860s indigo production had all but ceased in Leon and Granada and was largely
limited to the area around Rivas.
internal and external markets suggest that the internal market was more active
andprobably more lucrative in very modest terms for more people Very
importantly, subsistence agriculture in conjunction with the internal network
marketprovided Nicaraguans with a decent and regular diet." (Bradford
Burns, 1991:64)
The very success of the domestic sector threatened the modernizing and commercial
aims and intentions of the elites, but, as Burns argues, both the elites and the rural
communities benefited from this domestic trade, which is more than could be said for
the participation in foreign markets which was to increasingly marginalize the rural
communities in later years. However, Burns' perspective on this does tend to hide the
fact that exploitative relations of production also existed in this domestic sector. It is to
the changing nature of rural social relations that this encompassed to which we now
turn.
3.5d Social Relations in the Countryside:
"The church, the land ownership patterns, the patriarchalfamily, the
concentration ofeconomic andpolitical power in the hands ofa few, the
privileges and benefits accruing to the socially favoured- passed into the
national period virtually unaltered and seemingly unalterable." (Bradford
Burns, 1991:30)
Independence did little to affect the position of the rural majority, although in many
ways the anarchy of the first decades of independence actually served to protect the
simple way of life of the majority of Nicaraguans. In the final years of the eighteenth
century there had been an increasing process of land concentration, in particular
through the development of ranching in the Northern and Central regions. This was
possible without having a severe effect on the rural communities, not least because of
the limited requirements that the ranches had for labour. Alongside the consolidation
of the catde latifundios the majority of smallholders and Indian communities worked
small multi-crop parcels of land, mainly for subsistence purposes, although some
generated a small surplus (Biderman, 1982:37).
Bradford Burns' (1991) account of the period rests heavily upon the distinction that he
draws between 'patriarch' (a concept which he never adequately defines but by which
is meant the landowning elites) and 'folk' as existing in their own separate worlds.
His depiction of the rural communities as existing separately from the political struggle
of the patriarchs ultimately fails to convince. Although he is right to stress the lack of
interest expressed by the majority of Nicaraguans in the elite's programme of
modernization, trade and nation-building, he tends to underplay the relations that
existed between the patriarchs and the folk (to use his terminology) and the historical
bonds that tied specific communities to specific patriarchs.
Land had never been in short supply in Nicaragua. The biggest economic problem that
the elites faced in implementing their vision of future prosperity based upon trade,
apart from their failure to agree upon a power-sharing compromise, was obtaining
labour. The control of labour, however, depended upon the ability of the elite to
control the access of the rural communities to land (Biderman, 1982:35). Only a small
amount of national land was under cultivation and the patterns of land ownership were
varied; including church land, communal and ejidol lands associated with villages,
towns and cities, private land of all sizes and government land (i.e. vacant land, which
represented up to 80% of the national total).
This suggests the coexistence of diverse and distinct relations of production. In
various ways, however, the Indian communities and other small farmers were
becoming increasingly tied to the consolidating estates through a variety of measures
(Dore, 1990). Thus, although, Bradford Burns (1991) argues that the mechanisms of
labour control of the colonial period faded in the early years of independence (through
the abolition of slavery and the relaxation of the regulation of Indian labour) and were
not quickly replaced, giving the rural communities a unique and short-lived control of
the labour market at that time, this probably under-estimates the ties that still existed.
Admittedly forced labour was officially abolished in 1812, but it seems that new forms
of labour coercion were developed and, in reality, many of the less 'formal' social
relations established in the colonial period (such as rent in labour services or in kind,
see Romero, 1987) continued to function, and both were used to tie labour to the
consolidating large estates. It is also apparent that the 'folk' and 'patriarch'
communities of Burns' account were far more vertically inter-connected than he gives
credit to. In some areas the Indian and other rural communities lived in relative
isolation from the local elites, whilst elsewhere they were tied into complicated
systems of labour relations. The communities were most closely controlled, although
not exclusively so, in the more densely populated and heavily cultivated areas of the
central zone, especially where the major plantations had been developed, and less so in
the more extensively farmed and marginal areas of the North (Wheelock, 1985:66).
The major feature of the period was the further reinforcement of the
latifundia/minifundia distinction via the continued opening up of land by the estates.
Large tracts of land were confiscated from small farmers because they were unable to
prove their legal ownership. However, it still remained difficult to ensure an adequate
supply of labour and, despite the methods of coercion mentioned above, this was one
of the major problems faced by the elites in their drive to commercial success. As
argued by Lanuza (1983:15);
"The dispersion of the population, the existence ofabundant unused land, the
fertility ofthe soil, the inexistance ofa central power capable ofmaking
effective the tough agricultural laws decreed- came together so that, during
the period ofstudy, the supply of labour was scarce."
To combat this problem, the attempts to tie labor more closely to the expanding estates
were combined with laws to limit, or even destroy, the access of smallholders to land.
In reality, however, the state was too weak and too divided to enforce the laws that it
passed to effect this, and individual landlords continued to have the major
responsibility for tying labour to their estates (Biderman, 1982:42). Thus, with the
reservations outlined, one has a tendency to concur with Bums in his summary of the
period that, during the 'Age of Anarchy', Nicaragua's rural communities enjoyed the
greatest freedom that they had achieved since the Conquest.
"While anarchy inflicted undeniable hardships on the poor, they might have
drawn more advantages from the inefficient patriarchal system than they
could hope to wrestfrom a strong, modern, capitalistic nation-state dependent
on agrarian exports." (Bradford Bums, 1991:109)
3.5e Popular Uprisings and their defeat:
As has been noted in the foregoing discussions, following the horrors of the first few
decades of the Spanish Conquest, although the Indian communities were subject to the
relatively heavy demands for tribute, labour, and later, taxation of the Spanish elite,
they did at least enjoy reasonably secure tenure on the lands that they worked. It was
not until the growth and consolidation of the large cattle haciendas, toward the end of
the colonial period, that the communities began to run into conflict with the Spanish
over their control of, and access to, their communal lands, but even this was at quite a
small scale. In reality the communities tended to come into more conflict with the
attempts by landless ladinos to encroach upon their lands. Independence did little to
alter this situation.
The 1826 constitution guaranteed the property rights of both individuals and
communities and the communal lands and ejidos were recognized in all of the towns of
the newly independent state (Bradford Bums, 1991:131-133). As the period
degenerated into anarchy and the various sectors of the elite were faced with their
evident failure to turn their 'modernist' economic visions into reality or to achieve any
semblance of political stability, they became more and more obsessed with how they
were to secure labour from, and limit the access to land of, the rural communities and
smallholders. Legislation began to be developed which attacked the basis of communal
land holdings. During the following years these intentions were developed in a series
of further agricultural laws which were to finally came to fruition under the Liberal
regime of Zelaya at the turn of the century.
The picture painted thus far tends to portray the Indian communities and poorer ladino
farmers as acquiescent in all of this; helplessly buffeted by the whims of the battling
elites. Of course in reality Nicaragua's history shows the constant struggle (both active
and passive) of the communities against the ruling elites. The 'Age of Anarchy' was
no exception. Indeed the struggle intensified to a scale unseen since the first years of
the conquest. As the emerging state tried to coerce the rural communities to accept and
involve themselves in their vision of a modern nation, based upon commerce, they
resisted in a number of different ways; refusing to work on the large estates, resisting
conscription into the private armies, acts of armed rebellion etc. Bradford Burns
(1991:148) sees the end of the 1840s as key in this respect. He claims that the rural
communities had little role in the anarchic situation in the republic until the rebellions
of that time. All of this was epitomised by the struggle of the elites against the
revolutionary bandit Bernabe Somoza which, he claims, represented the attempt by the
rural communities to reassert their independence and emphatically reject the
modernizing pretensions of the elite.
Other commentators, however, suggest that the Somoza episode was an intregal part
of the Liberal-Conservative struggle, with the popular forces of Burn's folk rebellions
firmly on the side of the Liberals.21 In contrast, it appears that other Indian
communities saw their future as tied up with the continued hegemony of Conservative
interests. Gould (1992:632-33), in his review of 'Patriarch and Folk' explains the
complexity of the relations between the rural communities and the various sectors in
the following way,
"An alternative reading, however, might suggest a more vertically connected
society, a social andpolitical world with greater inter-penetration between
Folk and Patriarch. Although Burns is surely on target when he argues that
the folk were notparticularly interested in partisan politics andpreferred "to be
left alone" this trend had important exceptions Indeed, it could be argued
that Indian identity was closely tied to politics, and that the Indians allegiance
depended on local historical factors and could not be deducedfrom their
geographical proximity to Leon or Granada„"
21 See Gudmundson (1992) for example.
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In this way, Gould proceeds to explore briefly the political allegiances of particular
communities showing how the Indians of Jalteva (on the outskirts of Granada) were
allied to the Liberals and how several communities of Indians in the Northern
highlands were linked to different sectors of the elite and at times fought against each
other. These political allegiances therefore impeded any possible 'Folk' or indigenous
unity in the volatile political situation of the period (Gould, 1992:633). Despite these
different interpretations of the political position of the folk rebellions of the period,
there can be little doubt that the final defeat of Bemabe Somoza represented the
consolidation of the dominance of the elite, which coupled with the relative truce
between the Liberals and Conservatives following the William Walker episode
described below, marked the firm consolidation of the modern Nicaraguan state and
drew the 'Age of Anarchy' to a close.
3.5f The International Dimension: Britain, the US and the Inter-Oceanic
Canal:
Nicaragua first gained international significance through an evolving interest in an
inter-oceanic canal route, caused by the spectacular growth of international commerce
in the nineteenth century. Thus, despite the continued marginal position of the republic
within continental and inter-continental trade, Nicaragua began to be a focus of wider
international interest; a factor which was intensified by the activities of the various elite
groups in the search for international allies to bolster their pursuit of state power.
The first external power to become involved was Britain. For a long time the British
had been cultivating trade and generally extending their influence upon Nicaragua's
Atlantic Coast. The severe financial problems of the Nicaraguan state (the lack of state
revenue, the debt inherited from the Central American Federation etc.) laid Nicaragua
open to outside interference in its internal financial affairs. The main player in this was
the British consul to Central America, Frederick Chatfield. Chatfield used the power
of the British navy to support the claims of British bondholders on the accumulated
debt of the Central American confederation and the specific claims of individual British
citizens.22
22For example, Lanuza (1983:105 quoting Dunlop) shows how on the 21st August 1844 the British
blockaded the port of Realejo with the intention of forcing the Nicaraguan government to meet the
financial claims of three British subjects; Jonas Wilson, Thomas Manning andWalter Bridge. The
Nicaraguan government were not in a financial position to comply and were forced to hand over the
revenue from the state tobacco monopoly for the next four years to satisfy the demands of the first
two, and had to pay the other via duties from the Realejo customs (see also Smith, 1993:67). All of
which had the effect of reducing the less than sufficient state funds available to the Nicaraguan
government still further.
The expansion of British interests eventually culminated in their occupation of San
Juan del Norte on the Atlantic Coast in 1848, and its renaming to Greytown, which
the Nicaraguan government was forced to recognize in the truce of the 7th March 1848
(Smith, 1993:67). That same year, 1848, was also decisive in terms of the
involvement of the United States in Central America, with the annexing of California
from the Mexicans. Suddenly Nicaragua's position as an inter-oceanic route took on
greater significance. The short-lived Central American Confederation had earlier
commissioned a study into the feasibility of an inter-oceanic canal which had sparked
the attention of various Dutch, French, British and US interests. The Nicaraguan
government had also carried out negotiations with the French and the Belgians in the
1840s. In 1849, however, the Nicaraguans entered into secret negotiations with the
US government with the intention of gaining their support against the aggression of
the British. Finally, a treaty was signed between the two governments in September
1849, which recognized the claims of the US capitalists Cornelius Vanderbilt, Joseph
White and Nathaniel Wolfe (Directors of the Atlantic Pacific Ship Canal Company) to
exclusive rights over the construction of any future inter-oceanic canal in Nicaraguan
territory. This was offered in return for US protection of Nicaraguan interests. The
ensuing months saw a series of minor confrontations between the two Imperial
powers as the relative strength of the two in the region shifted in favour of the US
(Smith, 1993:70).
The Nicaraguan government were to be disappointed, however, if they thought that
their protection by the US against the aspirations of the British was purely altruistic.
This was evidenced by the British/US treaty of 1850 in which those two governments
bilaterally agreed that any future trans-isthmian canal would be subject to joint British-
US control (Smith, 1993:71). Any mistrust of the intentions of the US administration
were overshadowed by the continued internal political struggles within the Nicaraguan
elite. During this period the Conservatives were in the ascendancy but struggling to
maintain their grip on power. In 1854 the Conservative administration of Fruto
Chamorro tried to push through changes in the organization of government, through
the passing of a new Constitution. This was resisted by the Liberals who looked to
enlist the aid of American forces. In 1855 the Liberal leader Francisco Castellon
commissioned an American entrepreneur, Byron Cole, to provide a force of American
fighters to join the struggle against the Conservatives, for which they would receive
land grants in Nicaragua. When Cole organized his forces they were under the
command of a professional 'soldier of fortune,' William Walker, whose name has
now become marked on Nicaraguan history as a symbol of American imperialism
(Smith, 1993:72).
Walker, together with a force of some sixty Californians, entered the fray in 1855 and
rapidly defeated Conservative forces in the capture of Granada. The Liberals,
however, quickly began to regret their rashness, as Walker set about developing his
own agenda. He forced a coalition government upon the defeated Conservatives and,
as commander of the Nicaraguan army, effectively ruled Nicaragua through the puppet
Liberal president Patricio Ricas. Although Walker was defeated by the intervention of
Costa Rican forces in the Spring of 1856, they were forced to retire because of the
onset of an epidemic of cholera. Walker ran a facade of an election in June of that year
and by July had declared himself president. Confident in his position, Walker then
proceeded to institute English as the official language of the Republic, and in
accordance with his 'Southern' background,' reconstituted the practice of slave
labour.
Walker's dream was, however, short lived, and he soon found himself arrayed against
a rather unlikely group of allies. Firstly, the other Central American states were
intensely wary of the creeping spread of the US's philosophy of 'manifest destiny,'
and turned to the equally anti-American British for support. In addition, Walker had
angered the powerful figure of Cornelius Vanderbilt of the Atlantic Pacific Canal
Company by revoking his license for the Inter-Oceanic canal route. Vanderbilt
therefore effectively stopped the transit ofWalker's ships and actively assisted the
Costa Ricans in their efforts to secure the transit route against Walker (Smith,
1993:73). In addition, those erstwhile enemies, the Nicaraguan Conservatives and
Liberals, had finally joined forces in an effort to oust the American. On the 14th of
September 1856 their combined armies defeated Walker's forces at San Jacinto. By
November a united Central American army had forced Walker to retreat to his original
stronghold in Granada where he was eventually defeated. At that time he was saved
from complete defeat by the intervention of the US navy and he returned to a
presidential welcome in the US. He was eventually captured by the British navy in
1860 during the second of further expeditions to Central America. The British handed
him over to the Honduran government where he was summarily executed (Smith,
1993:74).
This brought to an end the first episode in the catalogue of US interventions in
Nicaragua. The US continued, however, to pressurise the Nicaraguan government
over their claims to the prospective inter-oceanic canal. The Conservative regime of
Tomas Martinez which was instigated after the defeat ofWalker looked to the support
of the British and the other European powers to counteract the growing presence of the
US in the region. The American Civil War in the 1860s finally brought this period of
the Imperial power struggle to an end.
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3.5g The Age of Anarchy: Concluding Remarks:
In summary the period from the 1840s had been dominated by the intrigues between
the British, the US and the various sectors of the Nicaraguan elite. These international
concerns took precedence over any interest in the development of the nation's agro-
export potential and represented the first indications of interest and involvement of the
US, as well as a number of European nations, in Nicaraguan affairs. In more general
terms, the period was characterized by the almost constant armed conflict between
Leon and Granada and the steady growth in the interest of the Imperial powers in the
geographical uniqueness of Nicaragua, both of which reinforced a decline into
economic stagnation, despite the continued consolidation of the large cattle estates
which had occurred during the period.
3.6 The Internal Repercussions of the Walker Episode: The
Consolidation of the State: Thirty Years of Conservative
Rule:
"
Ifnationalism be an emotional identification of the individual with the
nation-state and its well-being, then itmatured during the difficult years of
1855-57. Nearly all Nicaraguans participated to some degree in the struggle.
Indians too fought in the struggle." (Bradford Burns, 1991:213)
3.6a Introduction:
TheWalker episode was a turning point for the Nicaraguan elite. The Liberals,
weakened by their association with the American, compromised with the Conservative
government of Martinez in the following years. The defeat of the rural rebellions of the
1840s, the final petering out of the Leon/Granada struggle to a form of compromise,
and the incipient stirrings of a Nicaraguan nationalism, all enabled the following
period to see the strengthening of the nation state, a level of political stability, and the
embarkation upon the road to economic 'modernization'. The period from the 1860s,
therefore, marked the escalation of attempts to modernize the economy through direct
state intervention; processes which intensified under the Liberal presidency of Zelaya
at the end of the century.
The discrediting of the Liberals, through their involvement in the Walker affair, was to
be significant in the following years; although the details of that significance have been
the subject of some debate. For some, (e.g. Velasquez, 1977) the period is significant
because it represented the consolidation of the power of the most conservative groups
of the traditional oligarchy, and thus helps to explain the lack of progress made during
the period toward the development of a strong export dominated economy and the
maintenance of archaic pre-capitalist forms of economic activity and political
coercion.23 For others, however, the period marked a turning point in the
consolidation of the nation state and the pursuit of economic development through the
years of peace which followed. Following Lopez (1987:28) I would suggest that the
latter argument is more convincing and that the period is important for the economic
and social transformations instigated and the consolidation of national identity. During
this period the Conservatives were able to consolidate their political dominance which
finally provided for the emergence of a more consolidated national state.24 Ironically
many of the liberal reforms which were to come to fruition under the Liberal regime of
Zelaya in the 1890s had their roots in measures taken by the Conservatives in the
decades following the defeat ofWalker. These measures are detailed below.
3.6b The Liberal/Conservative Pact:
The Martinez administration oversaw far-reaching political changes which would in
the fullness of time eventually serve to undermine, to a certain degree, the traditional
sources of political power, as the processes of modernization and state-building
created new political institutions and new social classes or interest groups that grew to
challenge the traditional mechanisms of labour control and the genetic mandate of
political power (Bradford Bums, 1991:226-8). It is interesting to note, however, that
the discrediting of the Liberals and the establishment of Conservative rule did not
simply lead to the enrichment of the Granadans at the expense of the Leonese (again
reaffirming our questioning of the utility of the Conservative and Liberal labels being
attached to the two cities). Instead Martinez oversaw what Vasquez (1983:83) has
termed a virtual pact between the different sectors of the elite.
This pact can be seen as having three basic elements. Firstly, the consolidation of the
judicial and institutional base of the state through which to facilitate the expropriation
of communal lands and the privatization of national lands in the expansion of
economic activities. Secondly, the development and effective utilization of appropriate
measures to ensure an adequate labour supply, e.g., the development, or
strengthening, of vagrancy laws and other forms of extra-economic coercion. Thirdly,
23Evidence is provided from the relative lateness of the Nicaraguan state in following the lead of
Costa Rica in the establishment of a dynamic coffee export sector.
24The Conservatives also gained from the growing importance of the transit route between San Juan
del Norte and San Juan del Sur. The income which they earned from this, whilst not massive, did
increase the value of, and the marketing of agriculture in the Granadan dominated Department of Rivas
via the new road linking I^ake Nicaragua with San Juan del Sur. (CIERA 1989 vol2).
the state was to more directly administer the economy, breaking the Granadan
monopoly on trade, and also facilitating the development of new enterprizes through
the expansion of a national system of credit facilitation through the emission of state
bonds. The credit capacity of the state was developed to free producers, to some
degree, from the control of merchants. Granada's trade monopoly was broken through
the reopening of the ports of Corinto and Barquito, the sharing out of the income from
the transit route and the development and implementation of state subsidies for the
production of several export crops, in particular coffee (Vasquez, 1983).
One of the central issues which the new government addressed therefore was how to
effect an acceleration in the consolidation and expansion of landholdings. By the end
of the 1850s, despite the continued consolidation of the large estates outlined in
Section 3.4 of this chapter, property rights were still not clearly defined and it is
estimated that only about a third of all land holdings were registered (Biderman,
1982:42). There were a number of contradictory pressures operating upon attempts at
further legislation. The collapse of colonial rule had left some degree of ambiguity
about the control of land and labour which was revealed as the expansion of land
holdings came up against severe problems of labour shortages (see the discussions in
the previous section). The first land legislation passes in the early Post-Colonial period
had been designed to implant liberal ideas about property rights which were even
extended as far as the indigenous population. As time went on, however, measures
more directly aimed at easing the labour shortages were introduced. These measures
were, however, in the main, half-hearted and uncoordinated, given the political chaos
of the time, and it was not until the post-Walker settlement amongst the elite, that the
rural communities really began to experience the full impact of the processes of
agricultural modernization.
Thus, in the years following the defeat of Walker, numerous agrarian laws were
passed, in particular, during the period between 1857 and 1869. These were designed
to facilitate land consolidation, free commerce, and legislate for labour recruitment and
retention Biderman (1982:43). The procedures whereby this was carried out can be
seen in such legislation as the 1859 Decree when prices for national lands were set at
such a level that only the richest could afford them. Thus, the process of land
consolidation reinforced the power of the landed elites and was intended to ease the
problems of labour shortages by dispossessing smallholders of their means of
production. In 1859 individuals had been granted permission to acquire ownership of
land within communal land holdings if they had worked it for four consecutive years.
The process of legislation intensified into the 1870s as the price of land was raised still
further, the limits to personal holdings scrapped, and most importantly a series of
severe vagrancy laws were passed. Agrarian judges were also constituted to oversee,
approve and adjudicate all work contracts in agriculture.
3.6c The Consolidation of the Export Sector:
Coffee production really began to take off in Nicaragua in the 1870s and rapidly
increased its share of total exports, although not to the extent that it had in several of
the other countries of the isthmus (Dunkerley, 1988:35).25 By 1890 nearly 25,000
manzanas of public lands had been appropriated of which nearly 70% were turned
over to coffee production. It seems that the development of coffee production was not
plagued by the shortages of labour which had affected the possibilities for most other
commodities (see discussions of the Colonial period). Production was initiated in the
most populous zones and areas of the most stable population growth. Furthermore,
coffee cultivation was developed in those areas where the state was most easily able to
implement policies designed to ensure a stable supply of labour (Lanuza, 1983:83). In
addition, it appears that the lack of local capital was not such a barrier to the
development of coffee cultivation as had been with regard to some other commodities.
Although in Nicaragua coffee did not have the vast transformatory effects which it had
in El Salvador and Guatemala during the same period, as production intensified, it did
have a considerable effect on the republic. Firstly, the areas of coffee cultivation were
located at some distance from the established ports which necessitated the development
of the transport infrastructure. Secondly, the sheer scale of the expansion of coffee
cultivation, and the active role played by the emerging state in promoting its
cultivation, fundamentally altered the systems ofmoney lending and credit and further
enhanced the role of the state in the economic life of the Republic. Thirdly, although
many of the 'new' coffee growers came from the more 'progressive' elements of the
Leonese and Granadan elite, there were also an important group centred upon the new
capital Managua. Managua became one of the largest agriculturally productive regions
of the country and a counterweight to the struggle between Leon and Granada. In
relation to this Vasquez (1983) argues that the appearance of new coffee-based groups
within the ruling elite transformed the nature of political struggle in the republic by
revitalizing more liberal ideas, he writes;
25 Coffee had first been introduced from Costa Rica in or around 1825 by Dr. Manuel Matus Torres
of Jinotepe, although that date has been the subject of some controversy. Lanuza refers to the writings
of Dionisio Martinez Saenz in evidence, claiming that although Levy refers to the introduction by
Matus as having occurred in 1849, Squier provides evidence for an earlier date by describing coffee
cultivation in full production in Las Sierras de Managua in the latter year (all authors quoted in
Lanuza, 1983:75-79).
"In this sense it was the coffee group that would directly grasp the liberal
ideological elements in order to face the conservative oligarchic sectors....The
dynamism of this new sector also affected some traditional merchant/finance
groups, which in partprovoked an ideological division within the traditional
oligarchy- a schism that was made manifest in the appearances in both parties
ofdissident factions called 'progresistas' that in the ideological sphere were
identified as sympathisers with the liberal ideology." Vasquez, 1983:154.
Other export activities grew following on from the end of the civil wars. Mining of
gold and silver expanded in the department of Chontales and to a lesser degree in
Nueva Segovia and Matagalpa. A number of mines had been instigated in the final
years of the colonial period but many had fallen into disrepair during the turbulent first
few decades of independence. These and newly discovered deposits were developed
rapidly in the second half of the nineteenth century. Lanuza (1983:65) argues that links
to the rest of the domestic economy were poor, especially in Segovia where it proved
very difficult to attract workers from the dominant local cattle latifundios. Some of the
expansion in mining operations was facilitated by finance from Granadan merchants
but over time, encouraged by the liberalization of controls on foreign investment in
mining, the more productive mines passed into foreign ownership (mainly British).
This added to the insularity ofmining activities which basically appear to have
functioned as an export enclave.
The 1860s provided a short-lived opportunity for Nicaraguan producers to exploit
opportunities in the international market for cotton occasioned by the American Civil
War between 1861 and 1866 (Lanuza, 1983:65).26 Sugar production for both
domestic and export markets also expanded. Despite the continued labour problems,
outlined above, the total volume of sugar and sub-products expanded from around
20,000 lbs (0.1% of total exports by value) in 1864 to over 300,000 lbs (2.9% of total
exports by value) by 1870 (Lanuza, 1983:68). The expansion was actively promoted
by the government through incentives and importation rights.
Despite the development of these activities and in particular the initiation of coffee
production, throughout the period Nicaragua continued to be dominated by the cattle
haciendas. Indeed, Levy suggests that in 1871 there were 1,200,000 head of cattle in
Nicaragua and cattle continued to dominate the export trade of the republic. Even
26 This period saw the massive disruption to cotton cultivation in the Southern states of the US lead
to a dramatic increase in international prices. Taking advantage of this Nicaraguan producers (mainly
in Chinandega) markedly expanded production for the export market from 1864 to the extent that for
1864 and 1865 cotton exports accounted for almost a half of the Republic's total exports. Being based
upon the problems of the US producers, however, such dramatic increases could not possibly be
sustained when market conditions readjusted.
though others have rightly cast doubt on Levy's 27 estimates there can be little doubt
that castle raising continued to be the dominant economic activity within the Republic.
3.6d Interpreting the 'Thirty Years':
Summarizing the discussions of this period it has been outlined how the thirty year
period of Conservative rule, especially the ten years under Martinez, saw the
consolidation of political stability and the evolution of an export culture as coffee
cultivation began to expand in earnest. Pre-capitalist patriarchal social and political
structures began to give way to protocapitalist trends as the state became more
centralized.
"At the historical juncture ofNicaragua beginning in the mid-1850s, an
increasingly effective nation-state obliterated much of the communalpast and
charted a new capitalistfuture." (Bradford Burns, 1991:237)
Nonetheless, as stressed at the outset, interpretations of the period, whilst
acknowledging the transformations which were instigated, have differed in their
interpretations of their significance. The differences in perspective have in large
measure related to disputes as to whether the transitions embarked upon during the
period can truthfully be seen to represent the evolution ofmore capitalistic relations of
production, given the extensive use of extra-economic coercion used to obtain labour
(Gould, 1993:402). Some have argued that such a transition did not really begin to
occur in Nicaragua until the Liberal regime of Zelaya and then only partially.
Velasquez (1977), thus argues, that the consolidation of the Nicaraguan state under the
Conservatives during this period, and the increasing confrontation between the state
and the Indian and ladino rural communities, represented attempts by the Conservative
strata of the elite to reinforce servile social relations, rather than any commitment to
modernization or the expansion and commercialization of agriculture. Schinke
(1986:24) in the same way argues that the consolidation of the Conservatives during
this period served to retard the capitalization of Nicaraguan society in contrast to the
other countries of the region. In addition, he suggests the importance of the continued
27Lanuza (1983:90) criticizes Levy's estimates through much lower figures that he quotes for the four
most heavily ranched departments in 1867 and a national figure of only 313,000 head of cattle for
1897. Even this latter figure represents a ratio of about one head of cattle per Nicaraguan! Lanuza
argues that what Levy did wrong was to assume that all the carcasses exported in the year for which he
carries out his calculations were slaughtered in that year. To this estimated figure Levy added on an
estimate for domestic consumption and cattle exported live to neighbouring countries and then
assuming that a cattle hacienda has a productivity of 10% he calculates a total population of
1,200,000 head of cattle from his estimated figure of 120,000. What figure he would have arrived at if
he had taken exports from another year is open to question.
dominance of the cattle hacienda as the dominant form of productive relations in
reinforcing an overarching conservatism amongst all sectors of the Nicaraguan elite.28
Elizabeth Dore (1990:104) also argues that the spread of coffee production did not lead
to the proliferation of free wage labour, but rather a form of 'second feudalism',
whereby the expansion of coffee production was achieved not with a fundamental
change in the social relations of production but through an expansion and rigidification
of labour relations based on servitude and force.
Another strand to the discussions stressed the fact that whatever the intentions of the
Conservatives, the measures they implemented were not far-reaching enough to
produce any profound transformations in Nicaraguan society. Thus Lanuza (1983:99)
argues that,
"Historical evidence seems to indicate that in practice they were not very
effective. The explanation thatfits is that the dominant classes of the epoch:
the Granadan rancher-merchants, did not have the necessity ofdeveloping
that type ofexport activity, the proofof this is that it is another social group
that took on the cultivation of coffee but under the financial lead of the
former."
To my mind the controversies regarding whether or not, and when, the Nicaraguan
economy became 'capitalist' are rather unhelpful. Any transitions between modes of
production do not occur over night and any attempt at defining dates for such a
process is doomed to failure. It can be convincingly argued that the development of
capitalist social relations evolved partially and at different rates in different parts of the
country,
"Nicaraguan capitalism was born in the period 1874-1892; consolidated in
that of 1893-1909, and reinforced in the period 1910 -1949, eventually
leading, from 1950, to an extraordinary surge until 1966." (Vargas,
1990:27).
The period of Conservative rule therefore represented the initialization of a process of
capitalization which was to continue throughout the twentieth century. Many of the
definitional problems arise from misguided attempts to locate Nicaraguan history
within over-generalized considerations of the over-arching role of liberalism in
affecting a bourgeois revolution in feudal society as had occurred in Europe. Or,
28 In particular he argued that the dominance of that productive form was reliant on longer-term fixed
capital. El Salvador on the other hand had inherited a greater dependence upon annual crops such as
indigo, tobacco and rice and hence had employed more fluid uses of capital which had produced much
stronger tendencies toward capitalization.
alternatively, from ahistorical 'dependista' ideas of the instigation of capitalism with
the arrival of the Spanish. The gradual development of capitalism in Nicaragua, as a
specific form of social relations, was not instigated through the colonial social
relations imposed by the Conquest. Neither was it initiated by a 'classical bourgeois
democratic revolution' which had destroyed the vestiges of the existing pre-capitalist
and semi-capitalist features' of society (Vargas, 1990:52). Instead the transition
towards capitalist social relations was a gradual and partial process, with the most
important features being the articulation of the pressures toward the commercialization
of production and the modernization of the state, with the partial maintenance of
traditional forms of extra-economic coercion (see Dore and Weeks, 1992a &b)
3.7 Zelaya and the Liberal Revolution: 1893-1909
Whilst the foundations for the transformation of the Nicaraguan economy and the
development of the agro-export model of development had been laid in the thirty years
ofConservative hegemony it was the Liberal regime of Zelaya which marked the
definitive insertion of the Nicaraguan economy into the international system as a major
supplier of coffee. The period of Conservative domination was ended following the
death of President Carazo in 1889 after which the Nicaraguan Assembly were unable
to agree upon a successor. After a series of skirmishes the Conservatives were
defeated by the 'July Revolution' of 1893, the leader of which was Jose Santos
Zelaya, the son of a Managua Coffee-grower.
3.7a Liberalism and Modernization:
Zelaya oversaw a widespread expansion of the role of government in promoting
economic development through the development of an economic infrastructure (roads,
telegraphs and railways were built which laid the foundations for the expansion of
coffee production in the Central Highlands) and the centralization and strengthening of
the institutions and finances of the state (Salazar, 1987:214). Under his rule, the
period saw a constant increase in exports at an average rate of 2.1 % per annum
(Barahona, 1989:21) and the continuing spread of capitalist relations of production
into several spheres of the economy. Gould argues that the developments of this
period, as well as representing the expansion of export agriculture, also saw the
beginnings of the modernization of the domestic economy. The Ingenio San Antonio
provides a case in point, with over half of its sizeable production consumed within
Nicaragua, presupposing the existence of a reasonably-sized domestic market.
Furthermore, he suggests that the nature of the ingenio was such that it could not have
functioned without at least a partially free labour market (Gould, 1990:20).
Despite his association with liberal political ideas, Zelaya did not believe that free
markets would be able to drag the republic through his vision ofmodernization and
transformation. The period of his rule was therefore one of strongly directed socio¬
economic transformation as the role of the state was extended and the conditions for
economic growth created, although not for all equally. As Gould suggests;
"During the Zelaya years, politics dominated the economy in two distinct
ways. First, the state intervened in the economy. Such intervention ranged
from forced labour recruitmentfor coffee and sugarplantations to tariff
protection. Second, since so much of the government's programme involved
the creation ofmonopolies politicized economics became quite personalized
and by definition a matter ofgovernmentfavouritism. This latterform of
political economy alienated a large sector ofthe elite who felt discriminated
against by the Zelaya regime." (Gould, 1990:24)
Communal lands were broken up, small producers expropriated, church lands
confiscated and public lands distributed. The 1902 Agrarian Law offered land grants
to those willing to use land for 'public utility' and the state expanded greatly its
promotion of agricultural commerce. This was taken up by many including a large
number ofGerman and English immigrants attracted via favourable immigration
policy.29 The legislation passed under the Conservatives to expand coffee production
were also built upon through further tax concessions, cash subsidies per tree and the
granting of extra land to those owning more than a given number of trees (Biderman,
1982:55).
3.7b Social Relations and the Demise of the Indian Communities:
Once again the 'Folk' were not passively acquiescent to the further encroachments
made by the elite against their traditional way of life. They had first reacted to the
intensification of coffee production, and the alienation of their lands, when thousands
of peasant farmers were killed in the brutal repression of the 1881 uprising by the
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro government (Smith, 1993:75). Many authors have given
particular significance to that date in the demise of the remaining indigenous
communities. Following the savage repression indicated above, it is suggested that
vast tracts of the land of the indigenous communities were swallowed up and the
communal productive relations of the communities broken for good.30 As argued by
29 Vargas (1990:54) suggests that 113,713,990 manzanas of expropriated lands were granted to
foreign immigrants.
30 For examples of this perspective see Wheelock, 1981 and CIERA, 1984. The latter of which
details the break-up of the indigenous communities ofMatagalpa and Jinotega.
Gould (1993:394), however, this robs the analysis of the social relations of the period
of their complexity, and also helps to create the impression of one of the dominant
myths of Nicaraguan historiography; that of the complete disappearance of Indian
culture in Nicaragua and the idea of a Mestizo nation which pervades the majority of
writings on the country.
How far exactly, however, had the Indian communities survived into the nineteenth
century? Estimates as to the percentage of the population that could still be considered
Indian vary, not least because of the difficulties involved in determining what the very
term Indian represents. Bradford Burns (1991:32), however, in reviewing evidence
provided by contemporary observers in 1823, 1848 and 1870, shows how, despite a
considerable variance in their estimates, they all point to the continued existence of a
large Indian population. During this period then, the Indian communities were
probably still numerically the dominant group within Nicaraguan society (although by
the end of the century the ladino population would have been the greater).
In his excellent article Gould explores the series of tensions and ambiguities which
characterized the relations between the indigenous communities and the processes of
capitalist expansion which occurred during the thirty years of Conservative rule and
the Zelaya regime. He argues that,
"Ladinoizacion entailed an intricate web ofboth friendly and antagonistic
interventions in the indigenous communities by Jesuits, the lay clergy, the
state, political parties, and landed elites. Thatprocess combined not only real
violence involving land expropriation and coerced labour, but also symbolic
forms thatfostered cultural alienation while enhancing the elites' claim to
rule." (Gould, 1993:394)
In a similar vein he argues that the process whereby the communities were integrated
into the modernization process were extremely flexible and their effects variable. The
expansion of landholdings for export production, following the 1881 uprising, was
accompanied by attempts to turn the rural communities into pools of permanent labour.
These measures were met by continued resistance both through escape and continued
sporadic violence. These trends were accelerated under Zelaya, through the granting of
large tracts of land to both Nicaraguan coffee growers and immigrant Americans and
Germans and their accompaniment by further measures designed to ensure sufficient
access to labour, including the expansion of vagrancy laws (see Dore, 1990).31
Finally in 1906 the Zelaya regime decreed the abolition of the Indigenous
communities, whereby half of the communal lands were to be distributed to individual
31,In 1894, for example, judges were given the right to force anyone over the age of fourteen to work.
Whilst in 1898 and 1899 the 'ley de los vagos' was established, as well as a system of worker passes.
Indian families, and the other half, offered for sale to other interested parties. The
funds realized from the sales were then ostensibly to be used for the 'education' of the
Indians (Gould, 1993:408). However, although,
"The abolition of the comunidades was the culmination of the prolonged
attack on the highland Indians thatfollowed the defeat ofthe rebellion of1881
(which) gathered strength with the development of the coffee industry in the
1890s It must be added that the common assumption that coffee growers
expropriated most of the communal land in the highlands is simply not borne
out by the available data. Coffee growers did appropriate some 50,000 acres
of Indian territory in Matagalpa from 1890-1910. Yet when Zelaya fell in
1909, the comunidad ofMatagalpa was still functioning with 5,000 to 7,000
families possessing more than 135,000 acres of land." (Gould, 1993:409)
The expansion of coffee production during Zelaya's rule, therefore, further eroded the
position of the various rural communities. The peasantry and remaining indian
communities often lost their land and became proletarianized as workers on the
expanding estates, ranches and plantations, or managed to maintain access to small
amounts of land but were increasingly forced to sell their labour power to supplement
their own production. Others migrated to more marginal lands at the agricultural
frontier, whilst still others migrated to the urban areas, despite this, outside of the
areas directly effected by the expropriation of the coffee estates, large parts of the
domestic economy remained untouched by the processes ofmodernization.
3.7d The End of the Liberal Period:
Zelaya's liberal regime ended in 1909 when he was overthrown by a US/Conservative
alliance which ushered in 25 years of on/off US occupation. Zelaya had in the early
years of the new century actively pursued negotiations with the US over the perennial
canal treaty. Despite a certain amount of progress, such discussions were to prove
irrelevant after the US were able to develop a much more beneficial arrangement with
the new Panamanian state and the canal was built further South. Zalaya had continued
to pursue the issue (Lau, 1989:35). He had entered into negotiations with the
Japanese, secured a loan from Anglo-French sources, and gained German finance for
alternative plans to construct a railroad which would link the Pacific and Atlantic
regions of the country (Smith, 1993:78 and Schoonover, 1991:130). The nationalist
stance of Zelaya rapidly earned him the enmity of the US administration who finally
succeeded in aiding his downfall in alliance with Conservatives in 1909. US citizens
had joined forces headed by Juan Estrada, the governor of the Atlantic Coast region,
and Conservative forces led by Emiliano Chamorro and Adolfo Diaz. The revolt was
financed by US business interests and the Conservative Guatemalan president Estrada
Cabrera.32 Two of the Americans were captured by Zelaya's forces and executed.
This resulted in the severing of diplomatic relations with the regime by the US
administration. When it appeared that Zelaya's troops were on the point of regaining
control of the country the US dispatched a force of marines to Bluefields. Eventually
the new president, Jose Madriz, who Zelaya had invested in an attempt to placate his
opponents, was forced to resign and Juan Estrada was installed as the new president
with full support of the Conservatives and the backing of the US administration
(Smith, 1993:79-80).
The overthrow of Zelaya's regime undoubtedly curtailed the programme of liberal
reforms and economic expansion which had been initiated in the period following the
defeat ofWalker and then consolidated and expanded during his rule. Although the
liberal reforms instigated had been partial they had helped to create new dominant
groups within the elite sectors of Nicaraguan society and permitted the rise of new
middle sectors which had come to play larger roles in the economy, society and
government.
3.8 US Interventionism and the Sandino Episode:
3.8a The consolidation of US Influence:
With the installation of Estrada a new period of direct US control over Nicaraguan
affairs was instigated. Between 1910 and 1933 Nicaragua was virtually a colony of
the United States and was under practically continuous occupation by United States
marines. During the period the commercialization of Nicaraguan coffee production
passed into the hands of a US company, the privileges on the search for a canal route
were ceded, and, in general terms, the economy came under the increasing domination
of US capital (Lau, 1989:40-50). At the same time, the US occupation displaced the
emerging coffee fraction from power, and reinforced the position of the traditional
Conservative cattle hacendados. The actions and intentions of the US during the
period can be seen clearly in the following quote from Hazel Smith,
"US-Nicaraguan strategy would have several constituentparts. The
Nicaraguan government would be tied into a financial system where loans
would be extended to the country whether they needed than or not. Profligate
and often personal spending by whichever puppet dictator was currently in
power would be encouraged This spending would be paidfor by even more
loans. Interest rates on these loans would be hiked up in a financial process
over which US government, business and banks would retain control. To cap
32 Zelaya had earned the enmity of conservatives forces in the region through his earlier support of
liberal rebels in El Salvador.
it all, should this small republic shows signs ofdisputing the arrangements,
US governments would threaten military intervention and implement it if
necessary." (Smith, 1993:80).
The increasing economic role of the US can be seen from the issues that surrounded a
loan of $1.5million made to Nicaragua by a US bank in 1911. This loan was
guaranteed by Nicaragua's custom's revenues and the bank appointed an American as
collector general of customs as well as establishing the Nicaraguan National bank. In
1913 a new loan was made and the security this time was to include a 51% stake in the
national railroad and steamship lines as well as the national bank.
3.8b The Significance of the Period:
Some interpretations of this period (Salazar, 1987 and Biderman, 1982:56-7) suggest
that the overthrow of Zelaya seriously retarded the development of capitalism in
Nicaragua through the strengthening of semi-feudal production relations with the
return to power of the Conservatives and the weakening of the emerging Nicaraguan
state. Biderman (1982:57) claims that, in accordance with DeJanvry's (1981) model of
agrarian transformation, the removal of Zelaya represented the overthrow of what he
terms the 'Farmer' road to agricultural development (where the development of
commercial agriculture proceeds through the commodification of wage labour under a
newly emerging agrarian bourgeoisie) to a 'Junker' road (where commercialization is
carried out by the traditional landed class who combined coffee cultivation with
traditional ranching activities) which relied upon more traditional methods of ensuring
adequate labour supply and limited the transformative role of the state (see also Dore
and Weeks, 1992a). As it was, the reconsolidation of the power of the Conservatives
and the traditional extensive cattle ranches meant that Nicaragua's development was to
remain relatively backward over the next decades. Whether this can be interpreted in
the manner suggested by Biderman is open to debate. Whilst, it is certainly true that
the following years were ones of stagnation, two further factors need to be stressed.
Firstly, the stagnation of the economy, as suggested above, had more to do with the
ransacking of the state's finances by Diaz and the US administration, than the
maintenance of traditional social relations. Biderman suggests too much of a
distinction between the Conservative and Liberal sectors of the elite. Secondly, the
overthrow of Zelaya, rather than representing the consolidation of the semi-feudal
structure of Nicaraguan society, eventually led to the monopolization of political and
economic power under the Somoza dynasty, under which the development of the
forces of production and the proletarianization of certain sectors of the eonomy were to
proceed at breathtaking speed, especially after 1950.
3.8c Resistance to US Domination:
The increasing control of Nicaraguan affairs by the US during this period was not
uncontested. In 1912 an alternative government comprising dissident Conservatives
and the Liberal opposition was set up in Masaya under the leadership ofGeneral
Mena. The move was accompanied by uprisings up and down the country and
eventually culminated in the intervention of US forces who defeated the rebels and
deported Mena to Panama. Liberal forces under General Benjamin Zeledon, however,
continued to resist, retaking Masaya, Jinotepe and Leon, before their eventual defeat
and the death and defilement of Zeledon (Smith, 1993:85). In November 1912 Adolfo
Diaz, who had succeeded Estrada in 1911, was elected president on a severely limited
constituency of some 400 citizens who alone had retained voting rights.
In the following years the US control of the Nicaraguan economy and its wholesale
looting by Diaz and his cronies intensified. No accounts were presented to the
Nicaraguan assembly during Diaz's presidency. In October 1913 a further loan from
US banks was agreed which involved the passing to US control of those parts of the
National Bank and the railroads which they did not already hold, and over half of that
loan went to pay off debts in the US. The Nicaraguan economy careered into crisis, as
public services collapsed through lack of funds and inflation began to spiral when the
government reacted to the situation by printing paper money.
The presidencies of Emiliano Chamorro and his uncle Diego Manual Chamorro were
characterized by the continued presence of the US in the determination of all economic
and political matters. In 1923 Bartolomo Martinez became president on the death of the
latter Chamorro, and he instigated a somewhat more nationalistic turn to Nicaraguan
politics. The Pacific railroad was brought back under Nicaraguan control through the
repayment of debts to US bankers as was the National Bank. He then lent his support
to a unified group of disaffected Liberals and Conservatives known as the
'Transiccion Group' in the elections of 1924. The group triumphed in those elections
under the presidency of a Conservative 'Transiccion' nominee, Ramon Solorzano, and
a Liberal vice-president, Juan Bautista Sacasa. In the aftermath of the elections the
remaining US marines left the country. The attempts of the new government to
reassert Nicaraguan sovereignty were viewed with alarm by US interests and many of
the measures the new government attempted to implement were blocked by Jeremiah
Jenks, an adviser appointed by the US government to oversee the financial affairs of
the new government.
The US's anxieties seemed to be solved the following year when Conservative and
pro-US forces under Emiliano Chamorro forced Solorzano to resign and to name
Chamorro as his successor rather than the Liberal vice president Sacasa. Unfortunately
for the US they had signed a regional 'Central American' pact in 1923 which
disallowed giving recognition to governments which had attained power by military
means. This meant that they could not recognize Chamorro's government. This was
bypassed by persuading Chamorro to resign, in favour of Adolfo Diaz, who was
recognized as president of Nicaragua by the US following elections in 1926. Despite
these problems the US had still redeployed marines to Nicaragua to back up
Chamorro's government and, over the following years, there were a number of
uprisings in support of the deposed Liberal Sacasa which were met with the direct
intervention of US forces.
3.9 The Sandino Episode and the Origins of the Somoza Dynasty:
"7 made for myself the firm promise that as soon as the warfor independence
came to an end... I would... free Nicaragua from the barbarism into which
exploitation has submerged it, firstfeudal-colonial and now capitalist."
(Augusto C. Sandino in a conversation with Jose Roman, Bocay, March
1933).
By May 1927 the Liberal troops loyal to the constitutional president Sacasa were in the
ascendancy over those of Diaz. Moncada, the leader of the Liberal forces wanted,
however, to avoid open confrontation with the US and entered into negotiations with
Diaz and the US which culminated in the 'Peace of Tipitapa'. Under the terms of the
agreement the Liberals accepted the continued presidency of Diaz with the
understanding that Moncada would become president in 1928 when Diaz's term of
office expired. In addition the Liberals were offered six governerships in the North¬
west. Only one of the Liberal generals refused to accept the compromise. His name
was Augusto C. Sandino.
The agreement brought two consequences which were to have lasting significance in
the evolution of Nicaraguan history. Firstly, the US agreed to create, train, and, at
first, command a new national constabulary, the National Guard; through the control
of which Anastasio Somoza was later to come to control Nicaragua. Secondly, the
apparent betrayal of the Liberal forces to the US imposed agreement led Sandino to
embark on a renewed war of 'National Liberation' free of the factional struggles for
power of the Liberal/Conservative struggles.33
In the aftermath of the agreement, Moncada, backed by US forces set about what was
expected to be the relatively easy task of wiping out Sandino's forces which were
mainly composed of miners and peasants from the Northern part of the country
(Vargas, 1987:34), although he also attracted followers from other parts of Latin
America.34 By the close of 1927, however, Sandino still maintained control ofmost
of the Segovias and had founded Ciudad Sandino as the new capital of the liberated
zone. Having suffered a heavy defeat in a set-piece battle at Ocotal in July 1927,
Sandino had retreated to the mountains from where a more successful guerrilla
campaign against the US marines, and the newly formed National Guard, had been
mounted. Despite the fall of his stronghold at El Chipote in January 1928, Sandino's
forces continued to harry the marines and the Guard who responded by unleashing a
reign of terror upon the peasantry of the Segovias and a policy of widespread blanket
bombing. Later that year elections were held which saw Moncada returned as
president but the struggle against Sandino continued unabated. The US administration,
beginning to face rising domestic pressure to withdraw the marines, decided to
straighten the National Guard and withdraw their own forces. Thus in 1930 the
leadership of the struggle against Sandino passed to the Guard and two thirds of the
marines were withdrawn, with those remaining to leave after supervising the 1932
elections. By that time the effect of the international depression were beginning to be
felt in Nicaragua and increasing numbers of peasants and workers joined Sandino's
forces. Throughout 1931 Sandino's forces were able to operate freely in most of the
Central, Eastern and Northern parts of the country.
The elections of 1932 were to prove to be decisive. As suggested above, the last
remaining marines were to leave Nicaragua after overseeing the elections. An
agreement was reached between the Conservative candidate Adolfo Diaz and the
returned Liberal Juan Sacasa that after the elections the National Guard would become
a non-partisan force. The leader of the Guard which the political parties and the US
agreed upon was Moncada's foreign minister, Anastasio Somoza. Sacasa was
successful in the elections and days after the election he announced Somoza's
appointment to the post and the last marines left the country (Smith, 1993:97).
33 Now is not the place for a detailed discussion of the legacy of Sandino's heroic struggle. For
further discussions see Liss (1991), Dunkerley (1988), Selser (1980), IES (1985), Hodges (1986),
Serrano (1988), Ramirez (1981), Wheelock (1985) and Barahona (1983 and 1989).
34 Although Sandino's unorthodox mix of mysticism and anarchism cost him the support of the
orthodox communist parties of the region.
One of Sandino's major demands had therefore been realized, the withdrawal of the
US. Realizing the difficulty of continuing the six year struggle once that aim had been
achieved he, therefore, despite a call for non-participation in the elections, responded
favourably to peace proposals from the new government. His demands included the
creation of a new department in the North of the country where his forces would be
allowed to settle and which they would be allowed to police themselves. On the 2nd of
February Sandino signed a peace agreement with Sacasa in Managua which met most
of his demands. Twenty days later the Sandinista troops gave over their arms and set
about the organization of agricultural cooperatives in the Northern zone designated for
them. Nevertheless, they continued to suffer harassment and attacks from the
increasingly powerful National Guard. Sacasa, growing worried about the growing
power and influence of Somoza and his control of the National Guard, agreed to
demands for the reconstitution of the Guard in February 1934. On the 21st of that
month Sandino attended a presidential dinner. On leaving the meal, Sandino and two
of his generals were abducted by the National Guard and shot.
3.10 Somocismo and the Consolidation of the Agro-export
Model:
The murder of Sandino and the subsequent decimation of his followers set the
scene for the rise to power of Anastasio Somoza which was finally achieved
two years after Sandino's death. In May 1936, fearing moves by President
Sacasa to curtail his growing power, Somoza's National Guard took control of
Leon and besieged Managua. By the end of the month, Sacasa had been forced
to resign and, by the 9th of June, Somoza had installed Carlos Jarquin as an
interim president. The process was completed in December of that year when,
in the first of a long series of fraudulent elections, Somoza was returned as
president, defeating a combined candidate of the Liberals and Conservatives by
107,000 votes to just 169 (Smith, 1993:101).
The dynastic regime that was instigated by these events oversaw a profound
transformation in Nicaragua's economy, its social structure, and its political
life, and represented the end of the liberal and oligarchic periods of
Nicaragua's history. For fifty years Somoza and his two sons were to rule
Nicaragua as if it were their own possession; in the process altering the cast of
Nicaraguan politics and transforming the century old inter-elite conflicts. The
control of Nicaraguan politics by the Liberals and Conservatives was broken
and, whilst these traditional sectors continued to have stakes in the economic
development of the country, new groups associated with the Somozas, and
other sources of capital, emerged.35
Anastasio ruled, either directly as president, or through puppets, until his
assassination in 1957. During that period he handled the political problems that
he faced with some skill, forming and breaking alliances as situations
demanded. More secure in his power in the years following the Second World
War, Somoza oversaw a dramatic acceleration in the economic growth of the
country, using his control of the state to guide that process in ways which
suited his own ends and increased his monopolization of economic and
political power. Following the death of their father, neither of the two sons
who followed Anastasio into power, Luis (1957-1967) and particularly
'Tachito' (1967-1979), proved to be as politically astute as their father in
dealing with the peculiar contradictions of the Somocista state.
It is important to stress both the continuities and discontinuities with the earlier
periods, and the complex articulation that existed between the two. In too
many cases consideration of the Somoza period has tended to be somewhat
simplistic. On the one hand, some analyses have stressed the complementary
relationship between the regime and the various sectors of the elite,
commenting, for example, on the way in which,
"The state's institutional development, together with the political
alliances cemented by the regime, provided the basisfor the stability
and social peace requiredfor the full exploitation of the countries
resources, especially those associated with export production."
(Knut, 1987 :ii)
Whilst of some validity, such perspectives overlook the various contradictions
that existed between the consolidation of Somoza's power and the interests of
the traditional sectors of the elite and other commercial interests. In contrast,
other studies have tended to stress the authoritarian aspects of Somoza's rule,
missing the astute way Somoza formed and broke alliances, and utilized a
semblance of constitutionality to ensure the maintenance of his grip upon
power. Many of these problems relate to a tendency to characterize the whole
35 The consolidation of Somoza's power undermined the basis of the traditional Liberal and
Conservative ideologies as Somoza appropriated much of the ideology and apparatus of the
Liberals in his PLN. This was reinforced in the period following the Second World War as the
pursuit of economic development increasingly marginalized traditional partisan politics
(Dunkerley, 1988:229).
Somoza period through a cursory study of the degeneracy of 'Tachito'
Somoza's (the second son) excesses as the regime fell apart in the late 1970s.
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"Very few governments, let alone forty-five-year regimes, can
properly be characterized by their terminal state... for all its
anachronism, brutality, personalism and dedication to the political
economy ofplunder, this regime had not only subsistedfor nearly
halfa century, but had also been able to do so with relative facility...
Thus while in one sense it is entirely apposite that Somocismo remain
in the popular memory as a beastly enterprize doomed to extinction
through blind self-interest, this is an insufficient history."
(Dunkerley, 1988:228).
By the time of Tachito's fall in 1979, Nicaraguan society had undergone far-
reaching changes. In the economic sphere, the Post-War period had seen a
massive expansion in economic activity, as the production of various agro-
exports had been dramatically expanded. In addition, involvement in the
Central American Common Market had seen the emergence of a new industrial
sector during the 1960s which, whilst providing for a certain expansion of the
urban workforce, was limited by its capital-intensive nature. The peasantry
suffered from a continual process of marginalization, as the processes of
labour commodification and the alienation of their lands continued, although it
must be recognized that considerable debate remains as to the level of
proletarianization that occurred (see discussions in 3.10b below).
3.10a Economic Development:36
At the time of the consolidation of Somoza's grip on power, despite the
expansion of export agriculture which had occurred since the 1870s, the
Nicaraguan economy remained relatively underdeveloped. The international
depression (which had begun to hit the region at the end of the 1920s),
together with the earlier abuses by the Diaz administration and the constant US
interference in the years following Zelaya's demise, had seriously disrupted
the expansion of the coffee sector, whilst any attempts to compensate by
increasing banana exports had been plagued by problems of disease and a
serious fall in international prices. The Inter-War period, did, however, see a
36 A detailed background to the expansion of the economy during the period will be provided in
discussions of the agro-export sector in Chapters 6 and 7. Here, the major developments are briefly
summarized.
certain expansion in gold exports and the first stirrings of an incipient cotton
sector (Dunkerley, 1988:91; Weeks, 1985:53 and CEPAL, 1968:10).
With the stabilization of the regime following the end of the Second World
War rapid processes of economic expansion and modernization were initiated
in Nicaragua. From 1949 to 1970 the Nicaraguan economy grew more rapidly
than any other in Latin America, levels of GDP per capita rose past those of
most of her neighbours, and exports per head soared to one of the highest
levels in the continent (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990:340).37 Such impressive levels
of export growth were achieved, firstly, through the massive development of
cotton exports which had originated in the 1950s38 and, later, by an expansion
in the production of other marketable commodities, such as sugar, beef,
tobacco and sea foods; although the period also saw the continued
development of coffee exports.39
These developments reinforced, although also diversified, the traditional
dependence of the Nicaraguan economy upon agricultural commodities and the
enhanced dependency upon international markets saw the economy go through
a series of boom and bust cycles (Lindenberg, 1985). The dramatic expansion
in economic activity was accompanied by processes of modernization and
technification, with the development of the dominant cotton sector, in
particular, characterized by far-reaching changes in the use of machinery and
other agricultural inputs, through the widespread technification of production
which was increasingly facilitated by the state.
This expansion in the 'developmental' role of the state was another important
feature of the period as;
"The Somoza regime... (began to) act as though it believed that the
best way to consolidate its power was to further the accumulation
process."
Enriquez (1985:91)
Accordingly, in the years that followed, the state began to intervene directly in
promoting the massive expansion in economic activity which occurred. In
37 During this period (1950-1977) there was an average economic growth rate of some 6% per
year, together with a ninefold increase in agro-export production. The concentration of land into
the hands of those involved in those activities increased rapidly (Ocampo, 1991:333)
38 Nicaraguan producers took advantage of a sharp increase in the international price of cotton in
the 1950s. In 1949 Nicaragua had exported only 379 tons of cotton, by 1955 this had increased to
a level of 43,971 tons (Walker, 1991:73).
39 The area under coffee cultivation increased from 56,000 hectares in 1950 to 86,000 hectares in
1976 (Clemens and DeGroot, 1991:74).
Amaru Barahona's words (Barahona, 1987) the state became a 'permanent
propulsive agent' which tried to contain under its control all of the dimensions
of the capitalization process that it oversaw. The proportion of national income
accounted for by public spending and investment rose substantially, such that
between 1950 and 1970 the national budget increased from $12.2 million to
$98.5 million. This pursuit of 'developmentalist' economic policies was
evidenced by large-scale infrastructural projects, the offering of very generous
terms of access to public credit to those engaged in the new export activities,
the public provision of other agricultural inputs and the founding of public
agencies such as the Central Bank and the Institute ofNational Development
(Walker, T„ 1991:28).40
The 1960s and 1970s also saw the emergence of a new industrial sector under
the auspices of the Central American Common Market (CACM).41 The flow of
US investment into the region under the 'Alliance For Progress' programme
and the active role of the Nicaraguan state in promoting industrialization, led to
an increase in the proportion of total exports accounted for by the
manufacturing sector from 3.7% to 22% between 1960 and 1970 (Brundenius,
1987:89, Table 3). Nonetheless, the expansion of regional trade under the
CACM proved to be a short-lived affair. The Nicaraguan industrial sector had
been dependent upon imported inputs and had produced goods that were
incapable of competing outside the protected market of the CACM. This meant
that when the CACM faltered, and foreign exchange became scarcer, the sector
all but collapsed (Arana et al, 1988:55). Thus, despite the certain level of
diversification into industrial activities that had been achieved, when the
CACM first wavered and then collapsed, the export of agricultural
commodities still accounted for over 80% of total export revenues (figure for
1978). In fact the rapid expansion of the economy had first faltered into
recession at the end of the 1960s. There was a brief respite at the turn of the
decade, yet the recovery was marked by the beginnings of an inflationary
spiral influenced by the inflow of resources following the 1972 earthquake and
40 The state also subsidized the importation of labour-saving agricultural machinery and
established a system of subsidized cotton gins and processing facilities for other commodities
(Gibson, 1987b:29)
41 For discussions of the nature and problems of the CACM see Irvin and Holland (1989), Weeks
(1985), Bulmer-Thomas (1987), Guerra-Borges (1987), Cline and Delgado (1978), the various
periodic publications of the Secretaria Permanente del Tratado General de Integracion Economica
Centroamericana (SIECA), Rojas (1982), Fuentes (1989) and Nugent (1974).
problems of overproduction in the period 1974/75, before the slide into
economic and political crisis of the late 1970s (Barahona, 1987).
By the mid-1970s, therefore, the expansion in traditional export production
had reached its zenith, the CACM was faltering, and the economy was
struggling to find new sources ofmomentum.
3.10b Social Relations:42
"The landowners, or the fathers or grandfathers of the landowners,
had over a period ofyears gradually been stripping the campesinos of
their land. So the generation of campesinos we knew would tell us
about how their great grandfathers had owned land. And the story of
what happened was passed down from great grandfather to
grandfather to father to son. They were now a generation without
land. The landowners had appropriated their land through a process
ofviolent evictions, or through legal means." (Cabezas, 1985:209)
Despite the impressive levels of growth that the expansion in export agriculture
brought to the Nicaraguan economy the wealth that it created was distributed
extremely unevenly. Whilst the period immediately preceding Somoza's rise to
power had seen serious disruptions to the expansion of commercial
agriculture, and economic expansion had not been a priority in the early
Somoza period, the rapid growth levels of the immediate Post-War years saw
the further centralization of land holdings, the associated marginalization of
those producing foodstuffs for the domestic market or for subsistence, and the
worsening of already highly skewed income distribution patterns. During this
period (1950-1977) there was a ninefold increase in agro-export production
and the concentration of land into the hands of those involved in those
activities increased rapidly. During the same period the percentage of land
utilized for domestic agricultural purposes is estimated to have declined from
75% of the total to 50% (Goldin and Pizarro, 1988:24). The rapid
development of the Nicaraguan economy during the Post-War period therefore
had its counterpart in rising levels of poverty and inequality. For example
between 1965 and 1975 the incidence of malnutrition doubled, affecting 60%
of children under four years of age. By the end of the 1970s the illiteracy rate
was amongst the highest in the region and the death rate due to infectious
42 The evolution of social relations during the Somoza period are considered in detail in Chapter
Six with specific regard to the agro-export sector. A brief resume of the major elements will be
made here.
diseases one of the worst in Latin America (Gibson, 1987b). The Somoza
period was also characterized by dramatic increases in population growth rates
and rapid levels of urbanization.43
Despite the far-reaching transformations wrought within Nicaragua during the
years of the Somoza dynasty, the precise nature of these changes remains the
subject of some debate. Whilst all commentators recognize the dramatic
economic developments and social transformations of the Post War period,
they differ in their interpretations of the nature and significance of those
processes. With regard to the structure of land-ownership, some (e.g.,
Wheelock, 1985) have suggested that the Somoza period saw the continued
consolidation and growth of the large colonial haciendas and their
transformation into modern commercial agro-export farms. This process, they
claim, was achieved through the expropriation ofmassive numbers of
smallholders and their marginalization to semi-proletarianized or landless
workers on the large estates. In contrast, however, others have argued that
whilst every cycle of agro-export expansion in the Post-War years brought
loss of land and new forms of subordination to Nicaragua's peasantry, the
dualistic distinction often drawn between large-scale export farms and
marginalized small-scale domestic production, was undeniable, it was not
universal (Clemens and De Groot, 1991:79-81). In contrast to several of the
other Central American Republics Nicaragua's export sector in fact
demonstrated a less skewed pattern of land distribution with the existence of
many intermediate levels of farm size in addition to the latifundia and
minifundia. In particular, the coffee sector had a large presence of smallholder
production, whilst the cotton sector, although more technified in nature, had
developed on new medium scale farms, often rented from the traditional
sectors of the elite, rather than on the largest estates themselves (Mayorga,
1987).
There have also been disagreements about the nature of the productive relations
which characterized the expansion of the export sector. Some commentators
have argued that the massive expansion in economic activity of the Post-War
years greatly intensified the processes of proletarianization which had been
occurring in Nicaragua since the turn of the century, and that by the end of the
Somoza period, the dominant agro-export sector was largely dependent on
wage labour which it extracted from the great mass of the rural poor who were
43 SUAS (1987) estimate the percentage of the total population which was urbanized at 33%
1950, about 40% in 1963, and 56% in 1973.
increasingly marginalized from their lands. Others, influenced again by the
work of Alain DeJanvry (1981) referred to earlier, suggest a less complete
process of labour commodification where the majority of the rural population
retained access to a small plot of land and sold their labour during harvest
periods in order to supplement the meagre subsistence (or earnings) made from
their own land. On the other hand, it is clear that there were also important
pools of permanent labour in the more technified cotton and sugar sectors, or
at least large numbers that had no access to land. In addition in the smaller-
scale coffee sector producers also employed labour from landless and land
poor peasants, whilst labour provision on the large coffee estates was often
still maintained through personalized forms of coercion, rather than financial
necessity on the part of the labour force.
There appears, therefore, to be an emerging consensus within the literature that
the rapid expansion of the commercial sector did not effect a complete
transformation toward capitalist wage relations in Nicaragua, even in the most
technically advanced sectors, and attention has been focused upon the
articulation between wage labour and servile non-capitalist relations (Dore and
Weeks, 1992:12). Dore and Weeks (1992:13) suggest that,
"The Somoza dynasty created conditions which promoted the
development ofcapitalism at the same time as it rested on a social
fabric ofpatron-client relations which were woven into all areas of
society."
This helps to explain the maintenance of pre-capitalist social forms in the midst
of the rapid development of commercial agriculture and even industrialization,
although it may also underestimate the spread of labour commodification in
certain sectors.
All of these deliberations bear witness to the great heterogeneity of Nicaragua's
rural society, as well as the lack of firm historical documentation of the
changes which had occurred, even in the years following the Second World
War. One of the factors that underlay the heterogeneity of productive relations
in Nicaragua was the continued low population density. This had allowed
some of the peasants displaced by the cotton boom in the Pacific during the
1950s to migrate inland toward the mountainous regions of the agricultural
frontier. However, during the following years the continued expansion of
commercial agriculture and especially ranching activities also spread toward the
agricultural frontier. As a result the peasantry that had cleared, and then
occupied, these regions were forced to migrate still further into the mountains,
or were forced to submit to relations of peonage and servitude to retain access
to land (Dore, 1990:104-5).
To summarize, despite the undeniable intensification of the spread of capitalist
relations of production into the various sectors of the economy during the Post-War
Period the extent of this and its effects were extremely varied. The relations of
production, the level of capitalisation and the level of technology in use in each part
of the export sector, therefore, differed quite considerably and this variance has
been the source ofmany of the debates considered above. The dominant patterns of
landholding for each of the major export commodities is shown in Table 3.3. In
addition to the variation in the size of production units revealed in Table 3.3 each
sector was characterized by variations in the social relations affecting the supply of
labour. Some crops, such as sugar and cotton, were produced intensively through
an agricultural system that involved relatively high inputs of capital and where wage
labour was the norm; thereby enhancing the processes of rural proletarianization in
the areas where those commodities dominated. The production of other
commodities, such as coffee, and much livestock production, involved the use of
very limited levels of technology and also included a substantial sector of smaller
production units. Although large landowners were also involved in production
within these sectors, they had not tended to invest heavily and did not operate at
much higher levels of productivity than the smallholders. Due to this combination of
smallholder cultivation and the relatively backward technology employed on the
large farms in the sector, the level of productivity in the coffee sector, in particular,
was notably lower than that achieved in neighbouring countries.44
The sheer diversity of social relations in the Nicaraguan countryside during the
Somoza period proved to be important in determining the direction of the FSLN's
agrarian policy during the 1980s. These issues are returned to in Chapter Six.
3.10c The Maintenance of Power:
The economic power of the traditional elite sectors of Nicaraguan society was
not broken under the Somoza regime, although new economic sectors also
44 Although between 1950 and 1976 coffee yields did rise from 330 kg. per hectare to over 600
(Clemens and DeGroot, 1991:74).
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Table 3.3 Nicaragua: Contribution to Production of Export Crops and





















>350 78.5 42.4 7.4 2.7 - 37.1
Source: Nicaraguan Agricultural Census of 1971 reproduced byWarnken
(1975:34-36 and cited in Clemens and De Groot (1991:80)
*- In the Livestock sector the farm-size delineations used are <70, 70-350, 350-
700 and >700
appeared,45 but the way in which political control was exerted and contested,
and the nature of the state, were transformed substantially. In the consolidation
of his power Somoza had cleverly mediated the continuing disputes between
the Liberals and the Conservatives, whilst heading off any suggestions at
popular unrest. Thus, whilst the regime upheld the interests of the elite against
any attempts from the popular classes to challenge the social order, Somoza
also played off the various sectors of the elite against each other. As Dunkerley
(1988:89) argues,
"It was Anastasio Somoza's ability to negotiate the challenges that
confronted his government in the late 1940's that condemned the
rivalry between Liberal and Conservative Parties to the status ofa
purely secondary and increasingly formalistic dispute."
Somoza relied upon a number of factors for consolidating and maintaining
political power. Firstly, his control over the National Guard bestowed a
monopolization over the use of coercive force which would continue to
characterize the basis of power throughout the years of the dynasty. Despite
the importance of the 'Guardia' in Somoza's climb to power, the heavy-
handed use of their military force was not an overarching feature of his rule,
although it was constantly to remain an option and their presence always a
factor in the maintenance of control. Somoza's domination of the Guardia was
secured through astute political handling of its leadership, the provision of
economic benefits which were extended right down to its lowest levels, and
periodic changes in leadership, designed to prevent the emergence of any
organized challenge to his authority from within the Guardia's higher ranks
(Smith, 1993:102 and Walker, T„ 1991:26).
Secondly, the friendship and sponsorship of the US government, and
Somoza's manoeuvring to ensure its continuation, was crucial in consolidating
and maintaining the regime. Throughout the years of the Somoza's control of
Nicaragua they provided successive US administrations which a staunch and
loyal ally in the region which did not go unrewarded, especially during the era
of Kennedy's 'Alliance for Progress' (Walker, T„ 1991:27 and Dosal, 1985).
45 The most important of these was the economic empire built up by the Somozas themselves
but, as the discussions in the previous section outlined, there were also substantial small and
medium-scale sectors involved in certain areas of the economy.
Thirdly, a semblance of constitutionality to Somoza's rule was achieved
through the imaginative use of the state legislature and accomplished political
manoeuvring.
Fourthly, the consolidation of his political power enabled Somoza to centralise
vast tranches of the Nicaraguan economy under his control and amass a
substantial personal fortune. By 1944 his portfolio, in addition to lucrative
investments abroad, included the control of the export of catde to Panama and
Costa Rica, the ownership of mines, dairy processing facilities, farms,
plantations, newspapers and magazines, sawmills and electrical plants. He also
had controlling interests in cement production and various manufacturing
enterprizes (Selser, 1981, quoted in Smith, 1993:103)
This fortune was amassed in several ways. Control of the growing state
apparatus enabled Somoza to take advantage of infrastructural developments
by ensuring that they were designed to the benefit of his own enterprizes.
Family members were placed in key branches of the economy spreading the
reach of the dynasty into many different sectors.46 The fortune Somoza
continued to amass also enabled him to reward his supporters generously for
their support (especially those in the National Guard) through direct monetary
benefits, the granting of cuts in profits from activities such as prostitution or
gambling, or installing them in valuable posts within important sectors of the
economy.
Anastasio Somoza, despite his 'strong-arm' tactics was an astute politician
who changed the character of his regime in response to internal and external
pressures. The initial Violence of his ascension to power was accompanied by
efforts to assure a semblance of constitutional legitimacy. Measures he took
included: tarrying the 1936 elections for a month, so that, as a relative of
Sacasa, he was legally able to stand for the presidency, and briefly standing
down from the leadership of the National Guard to get around the requirement
that the leadership of the Guardia should be apolitical. Furthermore, Somoza
undertook the creation of the two new political parties, his own National
Liberal Party (PLN) and the National Conservative Party which he intended to
see evolve into a 'Loyal Opposition'.47 Somoza also formalized a series of
46 These included the National Power Company and the National Development Institute (the
supplier of unrepaid loans to the Somozas) as well as the chief of staff of the National Guard
(Smith, 1993:104)
47 Smith (1993:103) details how the PLN was financed by compulsory deductions from the
workforce of Somoza's personal businesses and all government employees.
Constituent Assemblies which were designed to legislate legal ways around
constraining aspects of the Constitution.48
Internal opposition to the regime first began to coalesce in the 1930s. The trade
union movement became more active and by 1940 the Managua Worker's
Confederation had unified some 3000 workers in the capital. In 1943 two new
political parties, the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), an offshoot of Somoza's
PLN, and the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), were constituted. The
traditional Conservative opposition also began to regroup at this time and a
new leadership emerged around the figures of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro and
Rafael Cordova (Smith, 1993:107).
This renewed opposition accelerated to a peak in the summer of 1944 when
massive demonstrations against the regime occurred. This period is perhaps
where Somoza demonstrated most his political skill. Instead of brutally
crushing the opposition Somoza out-manoeuvred them. First, in response to a
threatened general strike he threatened the bourgeois opposition with
confiscation if they joined in the stoppage. The strike never materialized. In
turn, Somoza then entered into negotiation with the labour movement, with the
intention of securing their support in return for the development of a new,
extremely liberal, labour code. Smith (1993:108) interprets this as
"A flirtation with populistpolicies (which) led him to a temporary
accommodation, albeit superficial, with labour. In the 1940s the
dictator even presided overMay Day celebrations"
Despite Smith's s depiction of Somoza's wooing of the labour movement as
transitory and partial, the dynamics of the Somocista regime cannot be
understood unless one takes into account the periodic support that he received
from broad sectors of the working classes. Jeffrey Gould convincingly
suggests that, whilst the Guardia formed one pillar underlying the basis of
Somoza's power, his courting of working class support, at least for a time,
constituted another. Thus,
"From the beginning of their dynasty in 1936, until the mid-1960s, the
Somoza's attempted to cultivate passive or active labour support not
merely as a demagogic ploy (as most scholars have suggested) but as
48 For example the first Assembly, held in 1939, allowed Somoza to extend his term of office to
1947, it also increased the length of the presidential term of office by two years and allowed the
president to legislate matters pertaining to the National Guard without reference to the government
(Smith, 1993:103)
part ofa populist-style strategy to establish hegemonic control over
Nicaraguan society... Somoza..co-opted not only individual labour
leaders but also the very language ofobrerismo, the political idiom of
the popular classes. Although Somoza did repress the labour
movement in the late 1940s when it escaped his control, he still
attempted to portray himselfas the jefe obrero, the guarantor of
labour's aspirations in the face ofConservative opposition. Similarly,
the weakness of the middle-and upper-class, anti-Somoza opposition
resided in its inability to bridge the gulf in Nicaraguan political culture
created by Somoza and his son Luis's appropriation ofobrerista
ideology and their cultivation of labour support." (Gould, 1990:15)
Thus, Somoza ensured his political survival by recourse to both coercion and
cooption, and was adept at switching between higher levels of dependence
upon one or the other, in reaction to the changing nature of the circumstances
facing him. By the late 1940s having achieved a certain 'breathing space'
through the support of the labour movement, Somoza stabilized his rule
through a series of puppet presidents following elections in 1947. One of
these, Leonardo Arguello, attempted to call Somoza's bluff, and in his first
days as president removed many of Somoza's supporters from positions of
power. He then overstretched himself by giving Somoza himself twenty four
hours to leave Nicaragua. The next night he was president no more, having
been declared mentally incompetent by the National Assembly under Somoza's
orders. By this time the onset of the cold war meant that Somoza had less need
to be wary of the US's reaction to the use of force in dealing with domestic
dissent. Accordingly he turned on his previous allies in the labour movement.
The Arguello episode was explained through the claim that he had been
working with the 'communists', the short-lived labour code was repealed, and
in August 1947 a full-scale campaign of repression was unleashed against
Anti-Somocista elements in the workers movement and other sectors of
society, which left several murdered, hundreds in prison, and some 30,000
exiled to Costa Rica (Smith, 1993:109).
The following years saw the consolidation of an alliance between Somoza and
most other sectors of the commercial elite. In 1948 and 1949 the Conservatives
and Somoza's PLN signed agreements giving certain economic guarantees to
the former and other sectors of the Non-Somoza bourgeoisie. The
Conservatives were also guaranteed a minimum of seats in the Assembly,
whatever the outcome of election results. This pact was significant It
represented the realization on the part of the major commercial sectors that
Somoza's repression of the labour movement and any other expressions of
popular discontent would aid their desire for economic expansion. Thus,
although acceptance of the Pact represented their acquiescence to Somoza's
monopolization of political power, so long as they were allowed to develop
their economic activities freely, and these were profitable, their lack of political
power would not necessarily be questioned (Garcia, 1985:21). It can be
argued, therefore, that following Somoza's firmer grip on power in the late
1940s, he managed to gain the support of a majority of the landowning and
commercial sectors. This consolidation of power behind the regime formed the
basis for the expansion of economic activity in the following years and from
this point elite opposition to the regime 'acquired an increasingly formalist
character (Dunkerley, 1988:229).
By this time, the most dynamic sectors of the traditional ruling classes and an
emerging bourgeoisie from the middle stratas of Nicaraguan society had
coalesced around three groupings. The most powerful was that associated with
Somoza himself. By the time of the revolution in 1979 the Somozas controlled
an enormous financial empire. In addition to the interests mentioned
previously, Somoza had appropriated numerous coffee and cattle haciendas
from German citizens at the outbreak of World War Two. Control of the state
apparatus also enabled the family to avoid taxes and award themselves
lucrative contracts. By the late 1970s the regime controlled around a fifth of the
agricultural land of the country, important agricultural processing facilities and
a myriad of other industrial concerns (Walker, T., 1991:77). The other major
groups were formed around the Banco Nicaraguense (BANIC) and the Banco
de America (BANAMERICA) the formation of which had been stimulated by
the financial surpluses of the incipient export boom (Bulmer-Thomas,
1990:341).
The BANAMERICA group was dominated by members of the Granadan elite
and had been founded by Silvio Pellas in 1952. During the following years it
financed expansion in the sugar, cattle and coffee sectors and played an
important role in the import-export business. It had international links with the
Wells Fargo Bank and the First National Bank of Boston. The BANIC group,
founded in 1953, was more closely identified with Leon and was mainly
comprised of cotton and coffee interests and had links to the Chase Manhattan
Bank. The earnings from the boom in cotton production of the 1950s enabled
the group to expand into industrial projects under the CACM in the 1960s
(Dosal, 1985:80).49
These three sectors controlled most of the sectors of the Nicaraguan economy,
not necessarily through their weight in productive activity (although this was
substantial in certain sectors), but rather through their control of the
institutional mechanisms of the state (in the case of Somoza), finance and
export processing facilities (Vilas, 1986:75-78 and Gilbert, 1988:105). The
emergence of the two new groupings robbed Somoza of his monopoly over
the allocation of credit as they evolved to take dominant positions in sectors
outside of the direct control of Somoza and his associates. The space given to
these other dominant groups of the elite, coupled with the ending of Somoza's
soft-handed treatment of the labour movement and the signing of the political
pact with the Conservatives, meant that the resistance of the bourgeoisie to the
consolidation of the regime on the grounds of unfair competition was
overcome (Bulmer-Thomas, 1990:341-2).
The assassination of Anastasio Somoza by Rigoberto Lopez Perez in 1957 was
a turning point in the articulation of opposition to the regime, breaking any
sense of its invincibility. Following his father's death, Luis Somoza, whilst
ordering the immediate imprisonment of 3,000 people and a strengthening of
the Guardia, attempted to play a less direct role in Nicaraguan political life than
his father had done. The role of the National Liberal Party in the political
control of the country was expanded, several other political parties were
legalized, and he chose to rule through puppet presidents, such as Rene
Schink, rather than directly as president. In this way Luis chose to respond to
the challenges of increased popular mobilization against his regime,50 and the
example of the successful Cuban Revolution of 1959, through concessions
and superficial democratic reforms, rather than the indiscriminent use of force
(although the latter was by no means outlawed especially in the years
immediately following his father's assassination). This approach also lent itself
49 Wheelock (1985:141) suggests the existence of a fourth dominant group which he terms the
Calley Dagnall Group, which whilst not as significant as the BANAMERICA and BANIC groups,
controlled large parts of the expansion of coffee production and processing in the Northern regions
of the country.
50 The 1960s saw the rebirth of the labour movement and equally important the refounding of a
guerrilla movement bearing Sandino's name; the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional. This
organization was born in Tegucigalpa in 1961 under the leadership of Carlos Fonseca (a young
former member of the PSN who had devoted himself to restoring and promulgating Sandino's
words and example), Tomas Borge and Silvio Mayorga.
to fulfilling the limited criteria for democratization inherent in John F.
Kennedy's 'Alliance for Progress' policy towards Latin America. As a result,
the 1960s saw considerable funds flow into Nicaragua from the US and the
international financial organizations in support of infrastructural projects, the
continued expansion of agro-exports and industrial developments under the
auspices of the CACM.51 The period also saw Luis attempt to deepen the
populist tone of the regime through limited programmes of public housing,
education, social security and agrarian reform (Walker, T., 1991:29).
Following Luis' death in April 1967, elections in May saw his brother
Anastasio (Tachito) Somoza elected to the presidency. As the rule of the
Somoza dynasty stretched into the 1970s the economic 'miracle' it had
presided over began to unravel and increasing levels of relative poverty fuelled
the popular discontent which the emerging guerrillas of the FSLN and other
opposition groups were already beginning to exploit. Thus, as the economic
dynamism of the agro-export-led model of development and the incipient
industrialization processes of the Central American Common Market (CACM)
petered out in the 1970s52, 'Tachito' found himself resorting more and more to
coercion and repression to maintain his political power, depending in the last
instance upon the military muscle of the Guardia. As argued by Gould
(1990:294),
"Until the last decade of the dynasty, the Somozas were able to direct
the repressive apparatus against the political opposition precisely
because, with the exception ofa briefperiod in the mid-1940s, the
Anti-Somocistas lacked a mass base within the urban and rural
working classes. As late as 1964 the regime toleratedpopular
struggles in order to defuse the threat of the growing opposition
movement. Luiz Somoza's speeches in the 1950s about the
campesinos' right to strike soundedplausible to Nicaraguans, but
Tacho (Anastasio II) Somoza's railings, in the late 1970s, against the
alliance oflos ricos and the communists sounded stupid, hollow and
fraudulent."
3.10d The Fall of the Somocista State:
"Get it together everyone, don't lose it, the big one is here, the shit has
hit the fan, hell has broken loose, we're atfever heat, fighting with
51 Smith (1993:114) details how Nicaragua received 19 loans under the Alliance for Progress
scheme which totalled over $50 million between the years 1961 and 1967
52 See discussions of this below.
nothing but a home-made arsenal against tanks, armoured cars, and
planes, so everyone get into it, from here no one ducks out, it's our war,
the real thing, ifyou don't die killing you '11 die dying, shoulder to
shoulder makes us bolder, all together now, the people is us." (Eduardo
Galeano. 1979: In all Nicaragua, from Galeano (1988:248)
In the early 1970s the evolving social, economic and political dimensions,
discussed above, coalesced to produce a challenge to the legitimacy of the
Somocista state. A challenge which 'Tachito' proved unable to meet. The two
major events that appeared to act as catalysts in his downfall were, the
response of the regime to the devastating impact of an earthquake which all but
destroyed Managua in 1972, and the assignation of the Anti-Somocista
Conservative Pedro Joaquin Chamorro in 1978. The earthquake had left
20,000 dead and around a quarter of the capital's population homeless.
International response to the crisis was relatively generous and represented
around $60 million in aid. The vast majority of this, however, went into lining
the pockets of 'Tachito' and his supporters, either directly or through the
granting of contracts for reconstruction projects, the vast majority ofwhich
were never completed.
Bourgeois opposition to the regime increased as a result of this and in response
to the increasing ways in which Somoza used his control of the economic and
political apparatus of the state to exclude other sectors of the elite from what
they saw as their proper role in economic activities and the reconstruction
effort. The inflow of moneys associated with the post-earthquake
reconstruction effort further increased Somoza's greed and led to attempts to
by-pass his rivals in the BANAMERICA and BANIC groups. In the context of
the recession which was starting to hit the nation at the time, his rivals began to
find themselves forced to compete for contracts on unequal terms with Somoza
in sectors which they had previously controlled. Tachito's greed also saw him
begin to erode the successful ways in which his father and brother had
attempted to unite their own pursuit of personal gain with the efficient running
of the economy. Luis in particular had surrounded himself with highly trained
'developmentalist' technicians who had controlled the expansion of the
industrial sector during the 1960s. Following the death of Luis, Tachito had
gradually replaced these technocrats with untrained cronies, which coupled
with his attempts to dramatically increase his own personal fortune, intensified
the economic problems which were beginning to afflict the regime (Walker,
T„ 1991:30).
In addition to growing opposition to Tachito from the traditional sectors of the
elite, various new groups, unattached to the major organizations, appeared on
the political scene, and several new political parties were formed, including an
offshoot of Somoza's own PLN. Bourgeois opposition to Somoza had grown
amongst the middle strata, who felt underrepresented by the traditional political
parties and felt more strongly their exclusion from political influence and the
limits upon their economic activity imposed by Somoza's control of the
economic arena. One organization which grew in response to the needs and
demands of this sector was COSEP (Consejo Superior de la Empresa Privada)
which was to come to prominence as the voice of the private sector in their
dealings with the Sandinistas in the 1980s. COSEP, also outraged at Somoza's
monopolization of the profits to be made from the reconstruction programme
of the 1972 earthquake (and not only for altruistic reasons) became involved in
the development of broad coalitions against the dictator during the late
seventies. The more traditional groupings of capital in BANAMERICA and
BANIC tended to 'hold themselves more aloof from efforts to depose the
dictator' (Gilbert, 1988:107)
At the same time the mobilization of the popular sectors continued to intensify
and the FSLN began to make their presence felt through a series of daring
commando type raids.
Facing growing opposition, and lacking the tactical skill of his father and
brother, "Tachito" was forced to rely more and more upon the Guardia to hold
onto political power. Between 1973 and 1977 the level of repression increased
markedly, martial law was imposed in 1974, press censorship stepped up and
the Guardia ruthlessly savaged large tracts of the Northern region in an attempt
to flush out the guerrillas of the FSLN. Smith (1993:123) suggests that as
many as 3,000 people were killed by the Guardia during this period.
The FSLN had their own problems during this period as a renewed Guardia
campaign against them had some successes and they were riven by internal
divisions over strategy. Thus, 1976 saw the deaths of several key FSLN
activists, including their founder Carlos Fonseca, whilst the organization had
split into three contending tendencies during the previous year, which were not
to regroup until 1979.53
53 The FSLN had come apart at the seams in 1975 over the most appropriate tactics to meet the
renewed assault against them by the National Guard, as well as longer-term strategic issues. The
Prolonged Popular War (GPP) faction, led by Tomas Borge (later Minister of the Interior) and
Henry Ruiz, were committed to the maintenance of the previous cautious long-term rural-based
strategy. This involved the gradual building of support from the peasantry in the more remote
Despite these successes Somoza faced another problem, Jimmy Carter's US
administration was starting to ask some awkward questions about human
rights abuses. In 1977, for example, Carter announced that $12 million of
bilateral aid to Nicaragua would be suspended until measures were undertaken
to improve the human rights situation. In response Somoza lifted the State of
Emergency under which Nicaragua had lived for the previous two and a half
years. Despite the fact that it freed the economic and military aid, the ending of
the emergency gave increasing space for the articulation of opposition to the
regime. The 'Tercerista' faction of the FSLN launched a series of attacks right
across the country in October 1977. A new group of 12 'notables' supportive
of the FSLN was formed in exile in Costa Rica during the same month, where
in a press conference, they called for the immediate resignation of Somoza and
the inclusion of the FSLN in a provisional government. As the FSLN
continued to operate and mobilize successfully Somoza made his most inept
move so far, by organizing the murder of the independent Conservative Pedro
Joaquin Chamorro.54 This event proved to be the catalyst in the mobilization
of forces against the regime.
The events of the final days of the Somoza regime have been recounted on
numerous occasions and do not need to be retold here (see Black, 1981 for
example). Suffice it to say that armed rebellion against the regime intensified
driving the Guardia to new extremes of barbarity, the three competing factions
of the FSLN finally regrouped and the Nicaraguan people eventually cast out
the dictator on July 19th 1979 at the cost of thousands of Nicaraguan lives.
3.10e Interpreting the Somoza Period:
areas of the country from which a successful military campaign against the regime could
eventually be fought. In 1975 this strategy had been challenged by Jaime Wheelock (later Minister
of Agriculture) a renowned sociologist who had recently returned from exile. He argued that the
most promising basis for articulating opposition to the Somoza regime was to be found in the
newly emerging industrial proletariat of the cities which he claimed the GPP had ignored. He
therefore suggested the most appropriate strategy for the FSLN was to concentrate attention upon
the urban and rural wage workers. These suggestions were met with Wheelock and his followers'
expulsion from the party. In the wake of this split a third faction emerged, the Terceristas' or
'Insurrectional Tendency,' led by Daniel Ortega (later to be Nicaraguan President) and his brother
Humberto Ortega (later head of the armed forces). They argued that the excesses of Tachito Somoza
had fundamentally shifted the balance of forces against him and that conditions were right for a
widely-based insurrection. Eventually their pragmatic position was to win out as broad sectors of
Nicaraguan society were drawn under an FSLN-headed military challenge to the regime (Gilbert,
1988:8).
54 His widow Violeta is the current president of Nicaragua.
The success of the Nicaraguan revolution opens many questions as to the
conditions necessary for a successful social revolution, or at least the
overthrow of the previous order. It lies beyond the scope of this chapter, and
indeed this thesis, to attempt to answer this question through reference to the
Nicaraguan experience. Not least because the focus of this work is upon the
factors affecting the outcome of such a revolutionary process. Nonetheless, to
properly understand the context of the Nicaraguan revolution one needs to
have some understanding of such debates and how they relate to the success of
the 1979 insurrection in Nicaragua.
There can be little doubt that, at least in part, the success of the Nicaraguan
revolution (and the relative failure of the Salvadoran revolutionary forces to
overthrow the Salvadoran oligarchy), related to temporally determined
'openings' within the international system and international politics (Foran and
Goodwin, 1993:209). If it had not been for the sensitivity of the Carter
administration to the human rights abuses of the Somoza regime, and their
cutting of military aid, the outcome of the July 19th victory could have been
very different. It would be foolhardy, however, to see the success of the
Nicaraguan revolution as primarily externally determined.
Some interpretations emphasize the origins of the Nicaraguan Revolution as
having arisen from the accumulated contradictions and eventual structural crisis
of the regional model of agro-export led development. There is, nonetheless,
considerable debate as to what extent the structural crisis of the Central
American model of development (if such a thing existed) underlay the political
uprisings that characterized at least three of the countries of the region from the
late 1970s. These controversies relate to ongoing theoretical debates about the
relationships between economic structures and political processes; with those
arguing that the struggles in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua
represented the rupturing of the model of accumulation being influenced by the
traditional Marxist conception of the 'last instance determinacy' of economic
structures; and those arguing that, although affected by economic factors,
events represented relatively autonomous political processes, more influenced
by the post-marxism of authors such as Nicos Mouzelis and David Slater.55
Thus, Arana et al (1987a) point to the political and economic crisis of the
Somocista model of development as being decisive in the articulation of
opposition to the regime, whilst the argument is contested by Vilas (1987) who
55 These issues were explored in detail in Chapter Two.
suggests that the success of the revolution owed more to the forms of political
struggle engaged in rather than any structural features of the Nicaraguan
economy. Indeed, at their most extreme, the more economic arguments seem
to suggest a direct relationship between increasing levels of poverty and
revolutionary action. Instead, as Booth and Walker (1992:9) suggest, if there
is a structural cause behind political action, then it must relate to changes in the
level of poverty rather than its absolute level. Thus, in Nicaragua the 1970s
had seen large sections of the poor and middle classes becoming worse off,
which those organizing against the regime were able to take advantage of.
Drawing upon Vilas' ideas, Dunkerley (1988:246) suggests that the revolution
owed much more to a crisis of political legitimacy than to any escalation in
direct economic exploitation and economically-based struggles. Backing up
such assertions other authors refer to the lack of involvement of workplace
conflict in the period leading up to the insurrection; i.e. the lack of strikes and
the poor level of trade union organization (Gould, 1990:296).
The debates about these issues have been explored in detail by Jeffrey Gould
in the conclusion to his excellent study of the social history of Chinandega
during the Somoza years. He argues that traditional interpretations of the
success of the Nicaraguan Revolution have rested upon three main elements.
First, the changes in social relations and increases in poverty and alienation
caused by the rapid capitalist development which occurred in Nicaragua after
the 1950s. Second, the reaction of the excluded classes to the growing
repression of the Somoza regime in the context of the growing economic crisis
of the agro-export model during the 1970s, combined with the failures of the
regime in reconciling its interests with those of the other sectors of the
bourgeoisie. And third, the political organization and growth of the FSLN and
their success in uniting the various anti-Somoza sectors of Nicaraguan society
against the Somoza regime (Gould, 1993:292).
He suggests that such arguments, whilst important, overgeneralize the
processes which led to the fall of Somoza. In particular, he argues that studies
of the third component, the gradual consolidation of a widespread movement
around the FSLN, is not adequately explored in the literature. Thus, although
the way the FSLN incorporated the dissatisfied sectors of the bourgeoisie into
the struggle are extensively documented the relationship of the FSLN to the
peasantry, the labouring classes and the urban informal population are left
unexplored, as if they were the natural constituency of the FSLN waiting for
the vanguard to lead them against the dictatorship.
There is not sufficient space to explore all of these issues as fully as they deserve.
For our purposes the important fact is that, for whatever reasons, the Nicaraguan
people finally united to overthrow the Somoza regime and the FSLN found
themselves (or placed themselves) at the head of the alliance of forces which took
over the reigns of political power following the flight of the dictator and his
cronies. The following chapters detail the attempts which the FSLN made in the
ensuing years to overcome the legacies of the past which have been detailed in this
chapter.
Chapter Four
The Nicaraguan Economy and Sandinismo:
4.1 Introduction:
The preceding chapter outlined in some detail the evolution of Nicaragua's productive
structure, the dominant social relations governing the relationship between capital and
labour, and the political culture and institutions of the nation over the centuries since
the first arrival of the Spanish in the sixteenth century. This provides an historical
context to the circumstances inherited by the FSLN following the July revolution of
1979. The Sandinistas saw themselves as the representatives of the broad mass of
Nicaraguans who had been excluded from the benefits of the rapid economic growth
and 'modernization' which had occurred in the preceding decades. Whilst in office
they attempted to implement an economic programme designed to transform the basis
of Nicaraguan society to the advantage of that broad constituency. This chapter details
the evolution of that economic programme, its intentions, and the specific policies
which were implemented toward the meeting of its objectives. In particular it details
the descent into economic crisis which characterized the 1980s and explores the
evolution of economic policy as the FSLN reacted to the deteriorating economic
situation.
4.2 Nicaragua's Economy during the 1980s:
When the Somoza dictatorship was finally toppled in July 1979 the Nicaraguan people
looked forward to a new period of political freedom and economic well-being. Having
succeeded in toppling the entrenched Somoza regime there were enthusiastic
expectations about how far the new government would be able to transform
Nicaraguan society to the Advantage of the 'popular' sectors. As well as struggling to
overcome the political repression and social differentiation ingrained into Nicaraguan
society during the preceding centuries, the FSLN also saw the handling of the
economy under Somoza as having been wasteful and uncoordinated and thought that it
would be relatively easy to direct the enthusiasm of the masses into a new more
egalitarian and more dynamic economic system.
The FSLN's response to the economic and social structures that they inherited from
the Somoza regime was the formulation of a mixed economic strategy that was in
essence a long term adjustment programme. Within the context of a model of
accumulation that allowed for the development of a new state sector (The Area of
Peoples' Property), as well as the reproduction of the large private sector and the
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peasant sector, this strategy combined the search for a more advantageous re-insertion
into the international economic system with the redistribution of income and political
power (including agrarian reform, the expansion of social services and the
subsidization of selected basic consumer goods). The intention was to expand
economic activity via heavy investment in large-scale projects of long term maturation
(in agro-industry and industrial and energy import substitution), whilst maintaining
food self-sufficiency, largely through the development of an agrarian reform
programme. Control over the direction of the economy was realized through the
nationalization of the banking sector and foreign trade, enabling the state to control the
macro-economic arena without dominating the productive structure of the economy.1
The sustainability of such a scheme was to be based on a search for productivity
improvements and increases in the value added in the production process, rather than
on what was seen as the traditional dynamic of the over-exploitation of labour in the
export sector. Within this scheme, however, traditional agro-export production was
still to be maintained as the key sector in the transformation process; with the newly-
formed state-sector envisaged as increasingly providing the fundamental motor of the
accumulation process and the financial means to deepen the social and economic
transformations towards the eventual socialization of Nicaraguan society (although a
large proportion of total production was to remain indefinitely in private hands, see
Chapter 2 regarding the underlying ideology to this strategy).
This model of development was spelt out explicitly in 1981 (MIPLAN, 1981) and had
been preceded by much internal debate within the FSLN (see Cabieses, 1986 and
Cuenca, 1992). The model represented the dominance of a technocratic 'modernizing'
vision which placed the key productive role in the hands of the state through the
development of the state farms and a wide interventionist role for the state in the
running of the economy, together with the substantial state-led agro-industrial
investment programme. There were, however, other voices in the discussion, and
concerns were raised over the role of the market, the capacity of the state to meet its
greatly extended role, and the relationship with the peasant sector (see Cabieses,
1986:84). These voices were to come to greater prominence during the 1980s, as the
revolution was forced to confront internal political problems as well as the military and
economic aggression of the US.
By the time the Sandinistas confronted the 1990 election campaign, the early idealistic
1 This was made easier by the fact that this had also been the means whereby Somoza and the other
major groups of Nicaraguan capital (BAN1C and BANAMERICA) had exerted their control over the
processes of accumulation. Thus, the expropriation of the interests of the most important of these
groups (Somoza and his associates), coupled with the nationalizations indicated, gave the FSLN a
substantial degree of control over the macroeconomic arena.
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visions of the future were long gone, as Nicaragua struggled to survive through, what
Carlos Vilas describes, as the worst economic panorama in its history (Vilas,
1990a: 12). By that time the economy had experienced seven years of negative growth-
rates and the living standards of the vast majority of Nicaraguans were far below what
they had been immediately prior to the revolution. The extent of the economic
deterioration reached by the end of the 1980s and its devastating effects upon the
Nicaraguan people and upon the viability of the revolutionary government can be seen
from the following key indicators.
4.3 The Developing Economic Crisis:
By the end of 1989 the standard of living ofmost Nicaraguans was well below what it
had been in 1979. In fact CAHI (the Central American Historical Institute) estimates
that the real value of wages had fallen by 92% since 1981 (Envio no.97). The
particularly dramatic decline in purchasing power towards the end of the decade
(important in relation to the economic situation immediately prior to the elections) is
strikingly shown by the following figures quoted by Vilas:





Source: Vilas (1990a: 12)
ii) The retrenchment of government workers, the collapse of domestic industrial
production, and the general economic malaise, meant that by 1988 nearly 35% of the
population was unemployed or under-employed (Vilas, 1990a: 12).2 Furthermore the
economy was marked by a pronounced transfer from productive to unproductive
activities. The total of those formally employed declined, as individuals migrated from
2 Data from Perez and Somarriba (1989) puts the level of unemployment for 1980, 1984 and 1987
at 18.3%, 20.6% and 25.1% respectively. These figures, although not directly comparable with
Vilas' for 1988, do, however, show a significant upward trend over the period. These figures should
be treated with a certain amount of scepticism because of the difficulties in estimating
unemployment levels in a country such as Nicaragua and in the particular conditions of the late
1980s. Despite this it can be argued convincingly that unemployment levels rose to a significant
degree toward the end of the decade.
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productive activities in the countryside, to the informal and commercial sectors of the
towns (especially Managua) (Cabieses, 1986:22).
iii) In addition to the continued fall in the purchasing power of wages, and the
increasing difficulties faced by the population in finding employment, the other major
economic problem was inflation. In 1989, for example, the spiral of price increases,
although far lower than it had been in 1988 (estimated at between 1689% & 3500% as
compared to 33,600% in 1988) still represented an unacceptable hyper-inflationary
situation that continually eroded the purchasing power of the populace and confidence
in the FSLN's economic competence (Ubau, 1990).
iv) The striking successes of government programmes in the spheres of education,
health and other forms of social welfare which had been achieved during the early
years of the revolution had began to suffer serious erosion and reversal by the end of
the decade.3 Furthermore, the differential impact of the stringent austerity programmes
carried out in the later years of the decade were serving to increase income inequality
and social differentiation.
"During 1988, milk consumption fell by 50% Tuberculosis and
malaria spread widely and during the first trimester of1989 infantmortality
due to diarrhoea was double that a year earlier. According to estimates made
by officials of the Ministry ofEducation the illiteracy rate in
Managua (had increased to) 30% among the adultpopulation at the end of
1988."
(Vilas, 1990:12).
4.4 Sandinista Economic Policy 1979-1990: An Overview:
What then had lead to the inability of the FSLN to meet the economic demands of the
Nicaraguan people over the decade during which it held state power? The present
section of this chapter details the evolution of the economic crisis during the years of
FSLN rule.
It had, in fact, been apparent from as early as 1983 that the FSLN's economic model
was facing serious difficulties. Following a brief period of economic recovery
immediately after the insurrection, in every year since 1983, GNP not only failed to
exhibit growth, but actually fell. Furthermore, as the decade progressed, the deficits in
the external trade balance became increasingly alarming, as the FSLN's programmes
of productive transformation, and a continuous expansion in overall demand,
3 The 1981 literacy crusade had been recognized for its far-reaching successes with a UNESCO
award, the development of the health sector was also internationally recognized as a successful
example of the combination of preventative and interventionary medicine (for more details on these
and other social programmes see, for example, Williams, 1991)
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necessitated an ever increasing element of external financial resources. At the same
time, however, export production failed to respond to incentives and production levels
progressively fell. Exports of goods and services fell from $690 million in 1979 to a
level of $274.8 million in 1988, whilst imports rose from $601.5 million to $1009.1
million over the same time period (INEC, 1989) 4
Within the domestic economy there gradually evolved a debilitating distortion of
relative prices (exchange rates, consumer and producer prices, interest rates, tariffs,
and wages in the formal and informal sectors); with serious repercussions on overall
economic efficiency, and over time the state began to lose control over the general
direction of economic processes. The imbalances created irrationality in the
distribution of resources, acted against productive activity, and encouraged
speculation, contraband and the informlization of the economy (Cabieses, 1986:30).
This is expressed succinctly by Ricciardi (1991:257);
"..The combination of the financial distortions associated with printing money
to cover burgeoning state spending and the system ofprice and exchange rate
controls designed to meet the redistributive planning objectives of the state
proved to be an explosive mix. Black markets in goods andforeign exchange
appeared alongside controlledmarkets, promoting a growing class of
speculators who pursued windfallprofits by arbitraging across the widening
price differentials between those markets."
The above quote also highlights another of the major ongoing financial problems of
the period, that of the consistently high ratio of fiscal deficit to GNP. This reflected the
post-revolutionary expansion of state activity in the economy to meet the government's
transformative, redistributive and defence commitments. As export earnings dwindled
(see above) and access to external resources stagnated (see Barraclough et al, 1988)
this deficit had to be financed increasingly by recourse to the printing of domestic
currency; with a resulting increase in monetary circulation which, over time, drew the
economy into the observed spiral of inflationary pressures.
4.5 The Causes Underlying the Economic Crisis:
What factors then underlay the descent of the economy into such chaos? Throughout
the decade, the US and the majority of Nicaraguan opposition groups placed the
responsibility for the development of the economic crisis firmly in the hands of FSLN
mismanagement and indefinition. The latter was expressed chiefly in terms of the type
of role envisaged for the private sector within the Sandinista concept of the mixed
4 It should be noted that the decline in export earnings reflects not only declining levels of
production (volume effects) but also the collapse of the international prices ofNicaragua's major
agro-export commodities (price effects), which also affected the other countries of the isthmus.
economy (see Fernandez, 1990 and the contributions by Enrique Bolanos (COSEP),
Emilio Alvarez (Nicaraguan Conservative Party) and Eduardo Corenado (Independent
Liberal Party) to CINASE, 1986). The FSLN, for their part, stressed the negative
influence of the structural deformations within the economy inherited in 1979 which
they claimed had exposed the economy catastrophically to the international recession
of the early-to-mid 1980s, the imperialist military and economic aggression of the US,
and the lack of participation by large sectors of the bourgeoisie in the struggle to
rebuild and adjust the economy. As has been pointed out by Medal (1988) amongst
others, the reality of the crisis was more complicated than either of these positions
suggests, and can only be understood when the structural factors, socio-political and
strategic factors, and the nature of the revolutionary transition process itself are taken
into account together.
This section proceeds by discussing the various factors at play in the development of
the crisis under four inter-related headings: The inherited economic structure, the
transition process and the mixed economy, the effects of the aggression, and issues of
government policy.
4.5a The Inherited Economic Structure:
The imbalances that developed within the Nicaraguan economy during the 1980's did
not simply originate with the triumph of the revolution in 1979, as can be seen from
the discussions in the previous chapter. The FSLN's economic model had to be
designed within the constraints of a pre-existing economic base that already faced
severe structural problems (Gutierrez, 1989b) and this inherited structure continued to
exert a strong influence on the determination of the possibilities open to the
government within the economic sphere during the revolutionary years.
As revealed in the preceding chapter, the structure of the Nicaraguan economy at the
end of the Somoza period still remained of a particularly open nature, dependent on the
export of a limited number of primary products, mainly for direct rather than
productive consumption, and with little value added in the production process or
strategic weight (the most important crops were cotton, coffee, bananas, beef and
sugar)5. In addition, the domestic market was very weakly developed and the
economy suffered from a high vulnerability to the fluctuation of international prices.
This meant that the Nicaragua economy was profoundly affected by the changes in the
international Financial and commodity markets that took place during the 1980's,
5 This dependence on primary produce increased during the last decade due to the collapse of the
Central American Common Market; amajor source of demand for Nicaraguan industrial production
(see Medal, 1988 and discussions in Chapters 3 and 6).
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facing the full force of the world recession of that period, principally via a worsening
in the terms of trade.6 Medal (1988:20) for example shows how the purchasing
power of Nicaragua's exports fell by 20% between 1981 and 1984.
The other major structural problem of the economy concerned the lack of articulation
that existed between the industrial sector and the primary sector. The industrial sector
has been dependent instead on imported inputs and capital goods, and acted therefore
as a net consumer of exchange, being dependent on the primary export sector to
generate the exchange needed to guarantee its existence7 (see Medal, 1988).
By the triumph of the revolution in 1979 these structural factors, together with the
barbaric excesses of the Somoza regime, had helped to produce a situation where the
Nicaraguan economy had the highest foreign debt burden in the whole of Latin
America, in terms of the ratio of total debt to GDP (See Stahler-Sholk, 1987).
Furthermore, the insurrection had in large part crippled the economy which, coupled
with the accompanying decapitalization, served to produce a particularly adverse
economic situation for the triumphant revolutionary forces in 1979. This negative
situation was then intensified by the onset of the international recession in the early
eighties as outlined above.
4.5b The Transition Process and the Mixed Economy:
As Arana et al (1987b) point out, the establishment of the political legitimacy of the
revolutionary state, via changes in the social relations of production and strong
redistributive policies, advanced much more rapidly in the early years of the revolution
than those structural changes in the forces of production that were intended to lead to
the recuperation of economic viability. This combination greatly influenced the
development of the macro-economic deficits discussed above, not least through
dramatic increases in overall demand, without the productive response to achieve its
satisfaction.
It should be pointed out here that this experience is typical of countries undergoing a
process of politico-economic transition (see Griffith-Jones, 1981). This stems from
the fact that the processes of social transformation themselves are inherently
destabilizing to the economy. The distortions that are produced may include: the
multiplication of the tasks of the state within a context of the flight of capital and
trained personnel, rapid growth in overall levels of demand (see above), lack of
incentive for private investment due to the inherent uncertainty, and the decreased
6 Although see the arguments about this presented in Chapter 6.
7 The classic problem of import substitution in small dependent economies.
productivity of labour (what Ricciardi terms labour's "historic vacation", see
Ricciardi, 1991:252). Nonetheless, as Wuyts (1989) points out, in a process of
profound productive transformation, such as that carried out in Nicaragua, economic
disequilibria can be acceptable (since it is in many cases also unavoidable) if the
direction of the economy towards the desired structural change can be maintained.
This will be dependent to a large degree upon the availability of external financing (see
Vilas (1989a).
However, in the Nicaraguan case the socio-political dynamics of the model of
transformation embarked upon, the decline in non-tied external assistance, the
international economic crisis, and the accumulating effects of the military and
economic aggression of the US, combined to produce such a degree of economic
disequilibria that by 1985 the direction of the transformation process could no longer
be maintained, and it was apparent that some form of stabilizing action would have to
be taken (see discussions below).
4.5c The Effects of the Aggression:
The negative effects on economic performance occasioned by the transition process
itself, distortions in the inherited economic structure, and the international recession,
were intensely magnified by the incidence of the military and economic aggression of
the US. The decline in the terms of trade of the major Nicaraguan export crops in the
early 1980's was amplified by the imposition of the US trade embargo in 1985, and
the consequent need to search for new markets for Nicaraguan exports. Other
debilitating effects caused by the aggression included: the constant drain on resources
imposed by the necessities of massive military spending (the largest single element in
the growth of the fiscal deficit), the physical damage caused by the war, the disruption
to agricultural production, the destruction of social services, the psychological war-
weariness of the population, population displacement, the blocking of international
financing, and the adverse climate for private investment.
Various attempts have been made to evaluate financially the negative effects of the
aggression upon the Nicaraguan economy. Monterray (1989:2), for example, quotes a
figure of $17.8 thousand million (see also Fitzgerald, 1987, Mayorga, 1986,
Marchetti and Jerez, 1988 or figures produced by the Nicaraguan government for the
World Court case brought against the US administration). The figures produced by
this type of exercise should, however, be treated with some scepticism; not because
the effects of the aggression are to be doubted, but rather because it is impossible to
differentiate the negative effects of the aggression from other factors affecting
economic performance. What it is possible to say, though, is that the aggression has
made a critical evaluation of the original project of the FSLN far more complicated. It
is practically impossible to separate Nicaragua's economic trajectory during the
revolutionary period from the effects of the external aggression, since, in the face of
the intensification of the war, the logic of the revolutionary project had to change from
that of social and economic transformation and political sustainability, to simple
material survival. However, what can be examined is the response of the FSLN to the
deepening of the contradictions exploited by the aggression, and the various
alternatives that lay open to policy-makers in such a context.
4.5d Policy Issues:
Following on from the preceding sections, it must be recognized that not all of the
blame for the growth of the economic crisis can be apportioned to US imperialism or
the international economic crisis. Behind the macro-economic disequilibria, in addition
to the effects of the external aggression and the structural crisis of an economy based
upon traditional agro-exportation and the Central American Common Market promoted
industrialization, there also lay the accumulated effects of the FSLN's policy
formulation. It has already been noted above, that the transition process itself brings
economic instability, but the nature and extent of the imbalances caused by this are
dependent upon how the transition is conceived and implemented.
In the Nicaraguan case the broad nature of the alliance which overthrew Somoza,
together with geopolitical considerations and the structure of the Nicaraguan economy,
led the FSLN to sustain the principle of a mixed economy, where the logic of private
capitalist accumulation was legitimated within the transition process described above.
The dynamics of this mixed economy find expression in the contradictory relationship
that exists between the needs of private capital accumulation and the priorities central
to the FSLN's socialist transformation project. This relationship must be understood,
not only as the percentage composition of different forms of production within the
economy, but also as a search for convergence between two opposed but legitimate
economic criteria (the logic of planning for the needs of the majority and the logic of
private accumulation, see Semillan, 1988). Victor Tirado (one of the nine members of
the FSLN's National Directorate) interprets the struggle between these two elements,
for control over the direction of the economy, as giving the Nicaraguan transition an
inherent instability due to the contradictory nature of such a struggle. Within this
conception the long term direction of the revolutionary process will depend upon the
political alliances and the material conditions that sustain the two elements (Tirado,
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1988).8
However, from as early as 1981 the effects of the intensification of external
aggression, began to conceal the tensions that existed in the handling of this unstable
relationship between transformation and private accumulation. Relatively early on the
government had developed a political doctrine of national unity, designed to unite the
different groups within Nicaraguan society against the increasing challenge of the
aggression. The economic strategies that stemmed from such a doctrine were
employed with the intention of ensuring the widest possible participation in the
processes of economic reactivation and transformation, via policies of widespread
subsidization and incentives (Semillan, 1988). Fitzgerald (1988:20) argues that,
inherent within this doctrine was an attempt to separate economic decision making
from politics. In effect, negotiations between the state and private producers were
therefore conducted at the level of prices and credits, which were both provided at
extremely generous rates. What this actually represented in practice was the automatic
guarantee of profit margins at the expense of productive efficiency.
These policies were intended to unite the nation's various social groups against the
common aggressor via a scheme of income distribution that protected popular living
standards and the profits of capitalist producers; whilst at the same time a rapid
process of productive transformation was embarked upon within an effort to ensure
the scheme's sustainability. This then necessitated a level of compatibility between:
A) An improvement in the income of salaried workers.
B) An improvement in the economic position of the peasantry.
C) A stimulating level of profitability for the bourgeoisie.
D) An ambitious investment programme geared towards the
productive transformation of the country (Barahona, 1988a)
The problem with this scheme was that it was not economically viable in the longer
term. Its initial viability was based upon the availability of sufficient foreign resources
to cover the macro-economic deficits incurred. However, as time went by, the
elements that would permit the re-insertion of the economy into the international
8 In fact there has been considerable debate about the nature of the mixed economy in Nicaragua.
Much of this centres upon the possibilities for the reproduction of the different sectors of property
under the hegemony of the Sandinista state. Weeks (1986), Ruccio (1986) and Fitzgerald (1988)
provide interesting alternative perspectives on this. Another strand of the debate related to whether
the strategy of the mixed economy was an intrinsic part of the Sandinista project or simply a
pragmatic short term tactic. See also the various perspectives on the mixed economy put forward
by representatives from six opposition political parties, COSEP, and researchers from various
Nicaraguan institutions in CINASE (1986)
system (the continued generation of exchange and productive returns on the
investment projects), and thus the recuperation of economic viability could not be
developed. This was due to the interaction of several factors, which included: the
intensification of the aggression, the rapidly dwindling access to un-tied external
resources, the inefficient performance of the state sector, and the failure of the large
private producers to respond to the incentives offered them. This meant that the budget
deficits involved in the subsidization policy had to be financed increasingly by
recourse to Central Bank monetary emission, adding to the spiral of inflationary
pressures (Barahona, 1988a).
In this way it can be seen that the FSLN's pursuit of national unity, via the
subsidization of a broad range of sectors, was not economically viable under the
conditions outlined above. As expressed by Barahona (1988a:27),
"The indiscriminate distribution ofsubsidies supposes not only stable flows
of external resources but also that some sector produces with profitability."
With the marked decline of the first, and the disappointing performance of the second,
the continued employment of this widely based subsidization policy rapidly accelerated
the destabilizing pressures that the economy was experiencing. To explore these issues
fully requires a detailed examination of the evolution of economic policy. The
following section does so by charting the development of the FSLN's Economic
Policy through a number of different stages.
4.6 1979-1981: Reconstruction, Idealism and Consolidation:
The first couple of years following the revolution saw the FSLN begin to implement
the programme of economic transformation, described in the first section of this
chapter, and also saw the consolidation of their political power. Amongst the first
actions carried out by the new government, toward the implementation of the strategy,
included;
i) The appropriation of the property of Somoza, his close family and associates who
had fled the country [this amounted to around 20% of the agricultural land of the
country (although it was originally thought to represent a much greater proportion than
this) and some of the most efficient large farms and businesses.]
ii) The formation of the state productive enterprizes of the APP,
ii) The nationalization of the banking system, natural resources (including mining) and
foreign trade.
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The state was therefore seen to have a key productive role but not the only important
one. Instead the ability of the state to direct its chosen economic strategy lay in its
control of the macro-policy arena (as in the majority ofWestern mixed economies.)
Thus, as expressed by Arana et al (1988:57);
"State control offoreign trade and the financial system wouldpermit the
channelling ofsurpluses towards state investments and increase consumption
patterns in the poor and working sectors of the Nicaraguan population."
Political control was to rest not on overt coercion but on the concept of hegemony,
where state intentions were to be achieved through the maintenance of a broad
hegemonic alliance of 'patriotic' groups. This mixed economy "would guarantee a
placefor all, regardless of ideological orpoliticalpreferences, as long as a
commitment to production was maintained." (Norsworthy, 1990:65). In order to
consolidate the hegemony of the revolutionary project, the FSLN were faced with a
twin problematic; Firstly they needed to begin to implement profound structural
transformations to meet the demands of the popular sectors for improved living
standards, land and participation, but at the same time they were faced with an
economy which had been severely damaged by the insurrection against Somoza. Vilas
(1986:153) outlines the situation succinctly;
"The war against Somoza provoked enormous human and material losses,
and the complete disarticulation of the economy around 35,000 people
died, between 80,000 and 110,000 were wounded. and 1 million people
requiredfood assistance to survive Material losses totalled some US$480
million, and more than US$1.5 billion had been sent abroad: this total of
almost US$2 billion was equivalent to the value ofgross domestic product.
Furthermore, the final stage of the struggle coincided with the season for
preparing the land and sowing both export crops and those for the internal
market. The internal displacement of the population, the emigration.... of
many capitalists and their capital, the disruption of the financial system, the
blockade of roads, the rustling ofpart of the cattle herd to Honduras, all of
this seriously affected the agricultural sector andpresented the spectre of
hunger to the young revolution."
Given the terrible economic situation which was inherited, the performance of the
Nicaraguan economy in the first years following the insurrection was impressive. The
annual growth in GDP reached 11% in 1980 and 5.3 % in 1981. These were
particularly impressive figures given the descent into regional recession that
characterized the period (Bulmer-Thomas (1990:355). Economic policy was geared
toward the recovery of the agro-export sector (consistent with the emphasis upon this
sector as the key to diversification and transformation noted above). Wage increases
were limited to come below the level of inflation, although they did show an increase
in reality. However, improvements in the living standards of the majority of
Nicaraguans in this period owed less to any monetary wage increases and more to
improvements in 'the social wage.' Such measures included: the expansion of public
services, the imposition of rent controls (for land and housing), controlled prices and
subsidized basic goods, and, in the case of those in the agricultural sector in particular,
the rapid expansion of credit provision at low if not negative rates of interest.9
In part, as argued by Ricciardi (1990:250), the successes of this period were
deceptive. The initial two years of the revolution saw a liberal supply of foreign
assistance10 (including the US until 1980), but during the following years such
assistance was harder to come by, and the expansion in public spending it had assisted
would thereafter have to be financed increasingly by internal means. Thus, in the first
period, the expansion of popular consumption, and improvements in the living
standards of the 'popular' sectors, could progress without substantial effects upon the
interests of the propertied sectors with whom the government needed to remain on
good terms. This was also helped by the fact that it was possible to form the emerging
state sector from the expropriated lands and businesses of Somoza, again without
encroaching on the lands of larger landowners.
"In such an environment, national unity did not involve immediate tangible
economic sacrifices, nor were the financial limits to the state's welfare goals
apparent." (Ricciardi, 19991:250).
Some attempts at stabilizing the economy were made in this period (see
Gibson,1987a:32-34). The coupling of structural transformations with a commitment
to the recovery of agro-export production was intended to cover the costs of the
Sandinista's strategies . As noted above, wages were controlled within an effort to
avoid the inflationary effects of increased expectations. In addition, in an effort to
control the balance of payments deficits, a ban on the import of luxuries was imposed,
together with the rationing of petrol, and by mid-1980 the provision of credit was also
brought to within stricter limitations. Gibson (1987a:33) argues that in fact during this
period there was little excess demand pressure on the economy, due mainly to the
abundant foreign loans, and the money supply increased by less than 30% in both
9 Total credit grew by 46.7% from 1979 to 1980 (with another 22.9% increase in 1981) the
majority of this went to the agricultural sector. (Ruccio, 1989:228)
10 In the second half of 1979 alone US$83 million was given in official grants and US$272
million in loans.
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1980 and 1981. This is reflected in the fact that during the period inflation was
brought down from 70% in 1979 to 23% in 1981 (Stahler-Sholk, 1990:60).
4.7 1982-1984: Large-scale Investment, Growing disequilibria and the
Increasing impact of the War:
This period saw the end of the initial euphoric phase, the implementation of the large-
scale investments implicit in the FSLN's rationale for economic restructuring, and the
gradual move towards a war economy as the struggle against the Contra intensified.
Reflecting this last factor, government expenditure on defence grew from 13% of the
total budget in 1981 to 25% in 1983. Between 1983 and 1984 the US attempts at
destabilization increased markedly, leading to the necessity of a military draft and
further increases in defence spending.
The period also saw the constant growth of monetary problems, as soaring demand
outstripped declining production levels, and the economic gains made in 1980 and
1981 gave way to decline. This was reflected, for example, in the negative growth of
GDP in 1982. By 1985 the productive recovery of the first few years had largely been
eroded, as industrial production collapsed, along with mining, fishing and the
production of maize. Whilst the production of the staple food-crops of beans and rice,
and the two major export commodities, cotton and coffee, stagnated, failing to register
the hoped for levels of growth and predicted earnings (Cabieses, 1986:122).
Despite an adjustment carried out in 1982 (which cut imports by 26%, provided a
series of incentives to the export sector, reduced the flow of credit to the private
sector, and saw a reduction in real wages), the budget deficit continued to grow, as
defence spending soared, the country was hit by severe flooding in May 1982, and the
substantial programme of productive investment continued to be implemented (Stahler-
Sholk, 1990:60-61). The increasing pressures resulted in the development of a serious
demand-induced inflationary problem (partly hidden by the price controls in use within
the economy), and the rapid development of a second informal economy based upon
speculation.
Many of the problems resulted from the conflicting economic and political pressures
operating upon the government. First, there was the growing problem of the
burgeoning needs of defence spending, and, secondly, the need to maintain productive
activity in the context of markedly declining terms of trade and an intensifying foreign
exchange shortage (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, due to the weight of the large private
sector's involvement in the production of the major agro-export commodities, their
participation had to be maintained. This was attempted through the development of an
export incentive programme favourable to that sector. This programme consisted of a
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multiple exchange-rate system coupled with the use of guaranteed prices.11 Such
measures represented an exchange-rate subsidy for the sector which was a significant
drain on government expenditure and yet appears to have had little success in its
intention of encouraging private sector investment or increasing production levels. As
argued by Gibson (1987a:34), under less uncertain political conditions, the level of
government expenditure should have provided a very favourable climate for private
investment but, in the context of the war, even negative interest rates on freely
available credit and the package of export incentives had little impact, and the state was
forced to take over the bulk of accumulation in the economy.
In addition to this, as well as needing to provide incentives to the export sector, it was
neither politically feasible, nor desirable, for the government to attempt to stabilize the
economy via either a decline in the attempts at social transformation or a reduction in
the level of basic consumption. Thus, although the 1982 adjustment was recessionary,
the government tried to ensure that cuts were made that affected non-basic
consumption rather than basic consumption (Stahler-Sholk, 1990:61).
Moving on to other policy considerations it can be noted that the long term investment
projects that were to sustain the original transformation strategy, did not begin to be
widely implemented by the government until this stage (From 1983 to 1985, 60% of
net external payments were dedicated to the investment programme).12 Arana et al
(1987b) argue that, under more favourable circumstances, this immense undertaking
of investment in profound structural transformation could have questioned the
exclusive importance often attached to monetary equilibrium by the international
financial agencies. They suggest that given different circumstances, i.e. access to
continued applicable financing and the absence of the necessity of such high levels of
defence spending, the original project of long-term structural transformation could
have represented an innovative alternative model of recovery to the monetary
stabilization programmes favoured by the International Monetary Fund.
However, by the time the investment programme began to be implemented in 1983,
the extent of the developing economic disequilibria and the growing limits on access to
un-tied external resources had already been realized. Implemented at this juncture,
these projects became a mill-stone around the neck of the economy, as they demanded
growing proportions of increasingly limited resources, without affecting concurrent
production levels. Bulmer-Thomas (1987) points out that it was precisely when
11 The system provided favourable rates for agro-exports but severely penalized all non-essential
imports.
12 In the first two years of the revolution the massive inflow of resources, in aid of the
reconstruction programme, had mainly been used for social spending and infrastructural
replacement. Productive investment accounted for less than 30%.
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Nicaragua was engineering this public sector 'boom' in 1983, that external
circumstances were such that the rest of Central America was entering a stringent, IMF
conditioned, austerity phase. Perhaps if the inflow of resources in the first two years
of the revolution had been used for these productive purposes this ambitious
programme might have been sustainable but under the rapidly deteriorating external
conditions it only served to intensify the growing economic instability (for a well
informed discussion of investment strategy see Kleiterp, 1989).
The actual composition of the investment programme has also been the subject of
much debate and critique. In particular, the capital intensive nature of the projects
initiated and the lack of job creation which this represented have been severely
criticized (see Ricciardi, 1991:256 or Kleiterp, 1989:86-91). Furthermore, the vast
majority of the investment programme was geared toward the development of
completely new projects rather than the redevelopment of existing capacity, which,
during the course of the 1980s, suffered serious deterioration. The size ofmany of the
projects also meant that they made no contribution to productive totals until they were
completed, which in several cases, was a matter of several years. This meant that the
investment programme continued to demand increasingly scarce resources without
significantly contributing to production levels (Cabieses, 1986:118).
Another retrospective criticism of the FSLN's economic policy formulation in the early
post-revolutionary years is that it seems to have been a fundamental error (within an
economy still under the domination of private forms of production and dangerously
open to the destabilizing effects of international market fluctuations) to have attempted
to substitute the system of relative prices in the economy, i.e. that produced by the law
of value, for a system largely dominated by state regulation. In reality the weakness of
the state's capacity to regulate markets meant that the law of value continued to operate
in the many instances that the weak state regulation left open. This then lead to the
growth of an informal economy that, over time, appropriated an increasing part of the
surplus from the formal (see Arana, 1990; Spoor et al, 1989 and the earlier quote from
Ricciardi, 1991), therefore operating against the government's redistributive aims and
imposing new mechanisms of income concentration as speculation became more
lucrative than production.
Thus, the transformation strategy implemented in the first years of the revolution was
characterized by a form of centralized control, based on the administration of prices
and resources. A series of economic reforms instigated in 1985 implicitly recognized
this strategy as an error of judgement and, furthermore, that a policy of national unity
need not have implied the creation of subsidies to all and sundry, and saw the
reintroduction of certain market mechanisms.
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In concluding this discussion of the evolution of economic policy up to 1985, it can be
seen that the disequilibria within the economy evolved from the interplay of a number
of different factors. Their understanding of the economic structures they had inherited
suggested to the FSLN that the restoration of a manageable equilibrium in the balance
of payments and the pursuit of a politically and economically sustainable model of
development could only be achieved through a process of profound structural change.
The implementation of which, in itself, could perfectly well result in important internal
and external disequilibria in the short and medium term, especially given the political
necessity of income redistribution.
These underlying tensions were exacerbated and amplified by the economic and
military aggression of the US, and it has become difficult to evaluate the development
of the FSLN's economic thought, as policy formation gradually became a matter of
economic survival rather than productive transformation. In addition, these
disequilibria were demonstrably worsened via mistakes in policy formulation,
especially in the overstretching of the financial and administrative capacity of the state.
The interaction of these factors, therefore, combined to produce a situation in 1985
where, regardless of the causes perceived to underlay the problems, it was starkly
apparent that direction of the economic process was being lost, and that some radical
changes would have to be made.
The above discussion raises some important questions, both for Nicaragua specifically
and in some general areas. The development of the economic crisis presents several
areas for consideration: firstly, it opens up debates as to the applicability of the model
of transformation employed by the FSLN in the first few years following the
insurrection (this can broadly be characterized as state-centred in terms of the
theoretical discussion entered into earlier). Two of the factors considered, the inherited
economic structure and the external aggression, lie beyond the realms of control via
internal policy decisions and have to be considered as 'given' in the transition process
(although the severity of the effects of the international recession of the early 1980's
should not be underplayed). What £an be examined, however, is the applicability of
the chosen model of development and the policies formulated from that model, within
the external constraints imposed upon the transition process.
What has been assessed thus far essentially concerns the factors at play within the
development of the economic crisis, rather than the various alternatives that were
open, in terms of the formulation of overall economic strategy or policy-making at
specific junctures. The types of questions left open are many: how can a revolutionary
government meet the demands of its people without producing debilitating economic
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imbalances? What is the most productive relationship between planning and market
forces in a transitional economy, where the preservation of a large private sector is
necessary or desired? Can a productive transformation be carried out with decreasing
access to external resources? A second area concerns the types ofmeasures that
needed to be taken to regain control and install direction to the economic process,
whilst bearing in mind their applicability to the social base of the revolution. It is to
this area that this discussion now turns.
4.8 1985-1987: The Search for Stabilization
By 1985 the need for the Nicaraguan government to regain control and restore a form
of equilibrium to the economy had been established. The questions that remained
concerned the form that any such actions should take. In common with all
stabilization and adjustment programmes, the measures employed would have to have
as their objective, the recuperation of control over the economy and the achievement of
a manageable equilibrium in the national accounts. In the case of revolutionary
Nicaragua, however, any such programme of measures would also have to
consolidate the socio-economic transformations realized thus far and also be able to
ensure the preservation of the hegemonic political alliance. That is the programme had
to be reconcilable with the objectives of transformation and redistribution inherent in
the revolutionary project, objectives not normally given priority within the formulation
of stabilization and adjustment programmes!
The first dramatic change in economic policy was introduced in 1985 and ostensibly
froze any further pursuit of economic transformation. The series of measures
introduced was based upon recognition of the limited possibilities of securing future
external co-operation,13 the deepening of the military and economic onslaught of the
Contra-war, and a consequent decline in government expectations for productive
transformation. The measures could not, however, really be characterized as a full¬
blown IMF-style stabilization programme, since their primary objective was not to
close the Fiscal deficit, or to defeat inflation in the short term. Instead, the main thrust
of the programme was the intention to regain control of the direction of the economy,
and, in particular, to strengthen the position of the formal economy in relation to the
informal sector.
The specific objectives were to restore state incomes, to redimension the investment
programme to come within more realistic limits, to increase basic food supply (via an
13 The decline in multi-lateral financing was offset for a while by support from the Soviet Block,
which peaked in 1985, but by 1986/7 Nicaragua was left relatively starved of foreign assistance.
See discussions in chapter six.
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improvement in the rural/urban terms of trade and a widening of the agrarian
reform),14 and to increase the real value of wages. Towards this end more flexible
administrative controls were adopted, the variable exchange rates devalued, and the
system of subsidies more closely related to the state's economic capacity. This
represented a basic re-evaluation of the functioning of the mixed economy, via a
freeing of the possibilities for private capital accumulation, whilst still promoting the
protection of popular living standards. In many ways this involved a recognition of the
administrative and financial limits that had been encountered by the state in its use of
selective planning instruments, and the consequent partial re-introduction ofmore
traditional mechanisms of economic management (this also implied a recognition of the
real importance market laws had continued to exert in the economy between 1979 and
1984).
This package of reforms was fundamentally defeated via the continued intensification
of the war and the consequent budgetary necessities of what was rapidly becoming a
survival economy. In addition, the private sector did not respond to new incentives
which were offered to them. The result was that the initial measures were in many
cases not followed through and aborted attempts to correct the distortion of relative
prices only served to intensify inflationary tendencies. Another major problem was
that the effects of the reforms upon the population, through the ending of subsidies
and the cutting back of social programmes, as well as the inflationary pressures which
they released, lead to an increasing questioning of the economic competence of the
government and the specific effects of the reforms upon the poor. As argued in Envio
(September 1986:18)
"A whole series ofproblems were crumbling the foundations of the economy
without the population realizing it. In particular, it was sagging under the
weight ofstrong subsidies to both consumers andproducers. When the
government eliminated the subsidies and devalued the currency the problems
provoked by an increasing external deficitfellfullforce on the population."
Policy decisions over the next couple of years could basically be characterized as a
search for a way of living with this inflation. Attempts were made to counteract some
of its distorting effects, whilst, at the same time, attempting its gradual reduction.
Such a process was dependent upon government policy instruments not getting left
14 In fact the changes in the relationship between the state and the peasantry went deeper than
merely reflecting the government's desire to increase food supply. It is suggested by authors such as
Kaimowitz (1988) that the FSLN's economic strategy shifted, from this point onwards, away from
the large-scale state centred model towards the incorporation of the peasant sector as the key to the
accumulation process. However, in many ways such a shift in policy is difficult to evaluate due to
the worsening economic crisis and the later imposition of the 1988/89 reform programmes which
have since dictated economic priorities. See the discussions in Chapters 6 and 7.
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behind by the inflationary spiral which, however, in the context of the worsening
military situation, was what increasingly tended to occur.15 One example of this
comes from the efforts the government made to try and protect the position of the
formal workforce in the context of the expansion of speculation in the increasingly
inflated economy. The government tried to raise salaries in the productive sectors but
were forced to expand such increases to the non-productive sectors as well. This
increased the money in circulation in the economy, which was chasing an increasingly
limited supply of goods, thereby further fuelling the inflationary spirals and making
the salary increases worthless (Envio. September 1986:19-22)
In fact the basic rationale of the 1985 reforms was frequently abandoned in this period
and the programme never fully implemented (for more detail see Arana, 1989, Vilas,
1990 or Medal, 1988) As the inability of the Sandinista state to control the economic
crisis became more apparent, the population shifted from its earlier view of the
revolutionary state as an 'inexhaustible fountain of benefits' to search for ways to
survive the crisis on their own encouraging more and more people to leave the formal
economy (Envio. September 1986: pp. 23). The continued and intensifying economic
crisis eventually culminated in the adoption of a full-blown stabilization programme,
initiated in February 1988, and continued in the Taylor Plan of 1989.16
4.9 1988-1990: Austerity, Hyper-inflation and Market Reforms:
The final decision to embark upon a programme of stringent economic stabilization
and austerity had been preceded by much internal debate within the government,
chiefly between the monetarist inclined Banco Central and the more structuralist
leaning agricultural ministry (MIDINRA). The imposition of the programme
represented the dominance of the monetarist position, although the programme of
measures implemented in February 1988, with the twin objectives of breaking
inflation and realigning relative prices, had in the first instance, a strong 'heterodox'
element in its approach towards inflation. The basic tenets of the measures were as
follows:
i) The introduction of a new currency, set at the level of 1,000 old cordobas to one
15 Ricciardi (1991) shows how the dramatic increases in inflation outstripped attempts at monetary
stabilization via devaluation, leading to farcical price distortions. For example at certain points in
time a gallon of imported gasoline was cheaper than a slice of domestically produced water melon.
Inflation also caused problems in relation to bank interest rates producing situations where with
inflation at over 1,000% and interest rates at less than 50% it was credible to buy a new truck on
state credit one year and pay it off during the following year by selling the spare tyre (Ricciardi,
1991:261).
16 Named after its chief architect the economist Lance Taylor.
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new cordoba (a certain proportion of any individual's money, over a certain limit, was
retained out of circulation when they exchanged their old currency for the new).
ii) Devaluation of the new cordoba in relation to the dollar, coupled with the
elimination of the multiple exchange rate system.
iii) Increases in the tariffs for electricity, fuel and water.
iv) Decreases in state spending, compacting of the state's administrative apparatus and
increases in taxation levels. (Acevedo, 1989:19)
The heterodox element was given by the fact that an attempt was made to overcome the
inertial elements of inflation (i.e.. the inflationary expectations) via the fixing and
control of prices in a campaign of 'popular' price control and the introduction of the
new currency. This intention was contradicted by a number of factors. Firstly, as
soon as the new currency was introduced it was devalued, which meant that the hoped
for anti-inflationary impression of a 'new start' was lost. Furthermore, according to
Acevedo (1989), the inflationary impact of the measures (that is of the currency
devaluation and the increase in the prices of public utilities) was under-estimated and
hence fixed prices were set at an unrealistic level, leading to the necessity of their swift
modification. As the new currency was devalued, and fixed prices altered, the
impression of a 'new start' was lost, and public confidence in the new measures fell,
once again fuelling inflationary expectations and eventually leading to the
abandonment of the programme of popular price control.
In response to the failure of the February measures, a more orthodox style of
stabilization programme was initiated in June 1988. The February measures had at
least tried to attach some importance to attempts to accelerate income redistribution and
to the protection of the real value of wages within the fight against inflation. This
intention was now abandoned as the overriding imperative became seen as the control
of the money supply. The measures that were introduced in June included a further
series of devaluations, the almost total elimination of any remaining forms of price
control or subsidization, much stronger intervention in the parallel foreign exchange
market, a further series of incentives to exporters, and a complete rethinking of credit
and its repayment. (Ricciardi, 1991:264 and CAHI Update July 12th 1988: 1)
Once again the attempt to control inflation was contradicted by the need to reformulate
relative prices. It was recognized that the struggle against inflation could only
gradually be assumed once the correction of relative prices had been achieved. The
adjustment programme was therefore reformulated to follow the logic of the following
stages:
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A) the correction of relative prices,
B) the control of inflation, and
C) economic reactivation.
During 1988 the relative completion of the first of these stages was achieved, through
a more realistic alignment of relative prices which began to reflect real production costs
and the relative scarcity of goods and services. However, the openness of the
Nicaraguan economy ensured a strong correlation between devaluation and inflation
which continued in its spiral upwards and reached the incredible level of 36,000% in
1988 (Ubau, 1990).
The impact of such severe inflation, credit restrictions, and the imposition of positive
interest rates, brought about profound recessionary effects. The value of exports in
1988 decreased markedly ($236 million compared with $295 million in 1987),
demand in the domestic economy collapsed, and GNP fell by 8%. In addition the
ratio of fiscal deficit to GNP, which it had been hoped to reduce substantially, instead
reached the level of 25.8% (the incidence of Hurricane Joan had some effect upon
this).
However, in 1989 the anti-inflationary stage was entered into fully. There was a
drastic series of further spending and personnel cuts in the central administration,
which, together with other measures, led to significant cuts in the fiscal deficit.
Economic consultation and cooperation with the private sector was expanded via the
pursuit of what was called 'concertacion'. This involved the frank exchange of
opinions between the government and large private capital, and to a lesser degree the
workforce and smaller producers. As a result, national commissions, committed to the
expansion of particular commodities were set up, and the government expanded the
provision of production incentives (INIES, 1989:27). In addition, the stabilization of
the parallel exchange rate was facilitated, via the availability of liquid reserves made
possible through cooperation with the Swedish government. A significant
improvement in the inflationary situation was achieved although at 3,500% it was still
at a dangerously high level. Finally, in combination with the stabilization of relative
prices, the incentives offered to export producers at last began to induce increases in
the production of certain agricultural products (see discussions in Chapter Six).
4.10 The Economic And Political Costs Of Stabilization:
4.10a. The Economy
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In purely economic terms the programme had some success. By the end of 1989
inflation was under some semblance of control and the destabilizing effects of a
severely distorted system of relative prices had been righted to a large degree. A slight
reduction in the fiscal deficit had been achieved, and the beginnings of an
improvement in the commercial deficit could be seen as exporters finally seemed to
respond to the incentives provided to stimulate production (See Ubau, 1990).
However, there was also a high cost involved, even in purely economic terms. The
improvement in the position of exporters had its counterpart in the collapse of basic
grain production and the mainly internally oriented industrial production (INIES, 1989
and Lucas, 1989:12). This sector was faced with a contraction in internal demand and
the escalation of its replacement costs due to the effects of exchange policy.17 This fall
in domestic production led to increases in idle capacity and a fall in state taxation
incomes, representative of the general decline into recession that characterized the
whole domestic economy.
In addition, the oligopolistic nature ofmany sectors meant that the contraction of
demand was not met by the desired increase in productivity, or the reduction of costs,
but was passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Also the drastic effects
on real wages meant that the already severely pressurized reproduction capacity of the
workforce was further eroded, leading to migration to the informal sector.
One major area of concern that developed with the implementation of the adjustment
programme was the need for greater clarification of the changed attitude of the
government towards the relationship between the market and the use of instruments of
planning. Although the limitations of state regulation had been recognized there was a
rather incoherent position towards what, if any, the future role of planning in the
accumulation process was envisaged to be.
The state's intention appears to have been to ameliorate the worst negative effects of
price liberalization and demand contraction via the use of selective interventions. The
problem was that it was never really made clear what the role of those policies should
be (especially after June 1988). In effect government intervention seems to have been
limited to the giving out of subsidized food packages, the cancellation of some
campesino debts and the exemption of some small farmers from taxes (see Envio no.
104). Stahler-Sholk (1990) argued that this lack of coordinated action possibly
represented an over-dimensioned reaction on the part of the government to the
17 The evolution of the exchange rate implicitly implied the devaluation of goods linked to the
internal market in favour of export production. This lead Acevedo (1989) to describe the reform
package as 'export cannibalism' as the weaker parts of the economy (salaried labour, industrial
producers and basic grain producers) were effectively subsidizing the export sector to assure its
profitability.
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uncertain nature of state planning; suggesting the development of a somewhat uneasy
relationship between an emerging faith in the 'magic of the market' and the political
objectives of the revolution. Greater clarification was needed as to which areas of the
economy should be run by market forces and which could still be subject to a modified
state regulation.
Various commentators have suggested that a more appropriate strategy of stabilization
and economic recovery should have emerged from the fact that state control still
persisted over certain macro-economic instruments. The idea was put forward that
these instruments could be used, with a class-based bias, to restore direction to the
economic process and ameliorate the effects of price and salary liberalization, in
accordance with the political commitments of the revolution. Thus, for example, the
state control of commerce could permit the continued capture of exchange to support
modified social spending and the prioritization of imports in pursuit of strategic
objectives (for further discussion of these issues see Semillan, 1988, Lopez, 1988,
Pilarte et al, 1988, Arana, 1989, Barahona, 1988a and Stahler-Sholk, 1990).
Intrinsically connected to this debate was a further criticism made of the programme;
its lack of consideration to any long term development strategy. In common with all
orthodox stabilization schemes the Nicaraguan programme was geared specifically to
short-term stabilization. In contrast it has already been noted that the restoration of
longer-term manageability to the external balance of the economy is dependent upon
the processes of long term structural adjustment.
The recognition of the disequilibriating effects of state price regulation and the poorly
organized expansionism of the first years of the revolution, (implicit in the rationale of
all the reforms attempted since 1985), has tended to overshadow the role of the
aggression, and particularly the structural problems of the economy, in propagating
those same imbalances. As expressed by Barahona (1988a), the adjustment of relative
prices and the short-term stabilization of the economy was a necessary, but not a
sufficient, condition for overcoming the economic crisis and adjusting the external
balance of the economy. He proposed the adoption of selective planning instruments
to give priority to the revitalization of specific export crops as part of a longer-term
strategy within the adjustment.18 This adds weight to criticisms developed of
stabilization programmes elsewhere that question the sometimes exclusive importance
attached to the attainment of short-term monetary equilibrium; which although
achieving a level of economic stability, have done so at dangerously low levels of
18 He suggested commodities that embodied higher labour to capital ratios, with stable
international prices and a greater concentration of smaller producers. The policies proposed included
preferential credit treatment, attractive producer prices and the need to defend the minimum
reproduction level of the workforce.
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economic activity (reduced levels of GDP, reduced investment, increased
unemployment and reduced capital utilization.)
The longer term implications of the 1989 measures can also be criticized for supplying
incentives to the producers of traditional export commodities, without encouraging the
shift towards products which might, in the medium and long term, provide better
prospects for stable growth. Vilas (1989b) make the specific suggestion that attention
could have been concentrated upon such commodities as wood, marine products and
mining. These commodities embody a more traditional use of technology and have
important forward and backward linkages to the domestic economy which could also
be developed in the medium term. This would not involve the neglect of the
production of traditional exports but rather its redimensioning. These discussions are
seen by Vilas, however, as longer term and he does not question the necessity of the
prior stabilization of relative prices and the priority given to the anti-inflationary
struggle before a phase of reactivation can begin.
Stahler-Sholk (1990), on the other hand, stressed the need for a coherent strategy for
the re-insertion of the economy into the world market-place, within the stabilization
programme and not in a separate reactivation stage afterwards. In addition he
particularly stressed that this productive strategy must be congruent with the
necessities of preserving the dominant social alliance within the revolutionary forces, a
requirement that attempts to stimulate production by private capitalist producers within
the traditional agro-export sector did not fulfil.
Varela (1989) argued further that, in addition to promoting alternative export sectors
more suited to the dynamics of the revolutionary process and with more attractive long
term perspectives, the protection of domestic production was needed in order to help
to cushion the negative effects on the labour force. He showed how the lack of a
long-term strategy and the preoccupation with stimulating exports via progressive
exchange-rate devaluation was putting the already severely disarticulated economy
under even more intense pressure due to its negative impact on the domestic market.
Along the lines of the same argument Acevedo (1989) pointed out that although short
term policies are necessary to improve general efficiency they can have a severe effect
on those productive sectors which for structural reasons cannot respond rapidly. He
therefore urged for the definition of state intervention to be clarified (see above) and to
include the formulation of medium-term sectoral policies dependent upon the
structural, technical and social particulars of each sector. This leads onto a more
specific discussion of the social impact of the reform package.
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4.10b Socio-political concerns:
The negative social effects of orthodox stabilization programmes are renowned and the
Nicaraguan experience has not been any exception. The implementation of the
programme led to a pronounced deterioration in the quality and width of coverage of
social services, 17,000 state workers were laid off (Monterey, 1989:1), there was a
marked decrease in the value of real wages, an increase in the level of overt poverty
and, in general, a pronounced downturn in the level of popular consumption (see
Vilas, 1989a). The combination of which represented a serious attack on the
fundamental social achievements of the revolution.
However, not all social groups were equally affected. This is explained by the fact that
a policy of intense demand contraction signifies the transfer of resources from some
sectors to others and hence a rapid process of negative income distribution (see
Barahona, 1988a). This was viewed by the FSLN as an unavoidable cost of the
programme, unavoidable due to the over-riding need to restore a viable equilibrium to
the economy.
"The fact that there is an economic policy of incentives to the exporter, to the
producer, can, with every justification be resented by the salaried worker who
will ask himself how is itpossible that they give incentives to the producer
but to the worker only a plea for conscientiousness and ideology? But the
reality is that there is no otherform ofstimulating the producer whose actions
are dependent upon economic incentives."
(From a speech by President Daniel Ortega on the announcement
of the June 1988 economic reforms, quoted in Pilarte
et al, 1988).
" This is a revolution ofworkers and campesinos and obviously the burden-
primarily the problems and hardships will fall on them " (Cmdte. Victor
Tirado, quoted in CAHI Update July 12th 1988)
This appeal for further sacrifices on the part of the workers and peasants and the
pursuit of the confidence of the capitalist class did not go unopposed within the party.
Sofia Montenegro wrote in a Barricada editorial;
'"Lets not just talk about the private sector having confidence.... If there's a
crisis of confidence here,... its what the workers feel toward the producers.'
In the last ten years, Montenegro reminded readers, it is the workers who
have shouldered the burden while the large producers have received subsidies
in terms of low interest credit and low cost imports, but have failed to return
the favours. 'Where is their efficiency? Where is their reinvestment?"'
(Envio. October 31st, 1988)
It could be suggested that the programme represented a final (temporary?) reversal to a
traditional agro-export system, based upon the exploitation of the only comparative
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advantage enjoyed by the economy, that of the cheap cost of labour. At least in the
short term, the FSLN could not find a viable economic alternative that did not involve
the high social costs of what effectively amounted to subsidizing the export sector via
a sustained devaluation in the real value of wages.
Semillan's (1988) formulation of these issues in terms of the struggle between the
competing forces of private accumulation and transformation, for control of the
direction and nature of the mixed economy, provides a useful tool for understanding
the political nature of the mixed economy in the transition process and the effects upon
it of the adjustment programme. He characterized the adjustment programme as
representing the reformulation of the original model of transformation, via the limiting
of its transformatory actions to come within the margins of the 'competitive parameters
of the market'. Although designed to give better conditions of profitability to the
productive sector, the intention was not to reverse the structural changes that had been
made in the economy. The state continued to control the macro-economic arena under
which the new context of price and salary liberalization was to be defined. Thus, in
this conception, the adjustment programme had a double intention, not only the
administration and control of the crisis but also its utilization to renew the processes of
transformation, growth and development.
As already indicated above, however, the immediate effects of the programme led to
decreases in the level of popular consumption, increasing unemployment and the
erosion of living standards, thereby eroding the political base and legitimacy of the
forces of transformation. Despite this, the very same adjustment programme could
have provided for the long term strengthening of the transformation process, via the
righting of the debilitating imbalances that had grown in the original transformation
project and the reformulation of a more viable model of long-term structural
transformation. Nevertheless, that is not an automatic process and depends upon the
correlation of strength of the two tendencies and the material conditions that sustain
them.
In this context the accentuation of social differentiation inherent in the adjustment was
part of a political gamble. The FSLN assumed that it could depend on the cooperation
of the popular forces in the adjustment programme despite the costs involved.
However, to ensure the cooperation of the large exporters in the private sector and the
economic success of the programme, economic incentives would have to be provided.
Thus the gamble had two parts: a) that the programme would not involve the
significant loss of popular support, and b) that the productive sector would respond
favourably.
From the above it can be seen that the possibilities of sustaining the programme were
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dependent not only on its socio-political impact but also on the perception that the
different economic agents had of the scheme and its effects on their continued
participation in the revolutionary process. The former was dependent on the adequate
communication of the necessity for and objectives of the campaign. It was unfortunate
for the FSLN that the 1988 measures were presented to the populace as an anti-
inflationary and pro-export production package; when eventually it would be realized
that before these two aims could be achieved it would be necessary to correct relative
prices with heavily contradictory effects on both of the other objectives. This had the
effect of leading the various economic actors to lose confidence in the possibilities of
government policy achieving its objectives; and in those most adversely affected by the
measures, a resentment of their suffering for the sake of a policy that had not met its
objectives. This clearly had an important affect on the areas of traditional support for
the FSLN. The poorest sectors of society, and above all the salaried workforce, found
themselves suffering the brunt of the recessive effects of the programme with little
offered by the government in terms of concrete results or selective actions to relieve
the intensifying effects.
The result of this was that the accentuation of social differentiation began to deepen the
questioning of the popular hegemony of the revolutionary project. Popular opposition
began to grow against the attempts to constrain demand in the face of price
liberalization and the lagging of salaries.
This discussion of the social costs and the criticisms made of the adjustment
programme must lead us to question the viability of an inherently orthodox
stabilization campaign within a revolutionary transition process. As expressed by
Mark Wuyts (1989),
"Financialpolicies should be assessed in terms of their contribution (positive
or negative) to the achievement ofthe political strategypursued by the
revolutionaryforces
This criterion can be used to question the state-led expansionist policies which,
stemming from the political concept of national unity employed by the FSLN in the
early years of the revolution, influenced the development of severely debilitating
economic imbalances. However, it can also serve to cast doubt upon the policies of
the stabilization programme that served to intensify the alienation of the popular
sectors from the revolutionary process. The short-term stabilization of the economy
should have been accompanied by a clearer reformulation of the long-term
transformation strategy and the implementation of selective policies to both facilitate
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those reformulated strategies and ameliorate the negative effects of stabilization. This
implies a stabilization in the context of growth and not recession, and an adjustment
that does not necessarily imply the generalized liberalization of the economy or at least
makes the role of the macro-economic instruments maintained in the hands of the state
a little clearer.
4.11 Concluding Remarks:
This discussion of the successes and failures of the adjustment campaign raises a
number of questions. Was the high social cost of the programme the chief factor
underlying the loss of confidence of the popular sectors in the revolutionary process?
If so the questions to be addressed revolve around the economic and political measures
that could have been employed to ameliorate the social effects of the adjustment and
preserve the hegemony of the dominant social block, e.g.. heterodox anti-inflationary
measures, selective policies targeting specific social sectors, reactivation of domestic
production and more apparent medium-term sectoral economic planning. Wider
questions also emerge concerning the nature of, and necessity for, stabilization and
adjustment, the search for less recessive alternatives and the significance ofmonetary
imbalances for socialist economies.
However, it has also been suggested that the alienation of the popular sectors lay
deeper than this and that the problems stemmed from within the formulation of the
original transformation strategy and the nature of the political alliances involved in the
functioning of the mixed economy and the strategy of national unity. Gonzalez (1990)
suggests that the alienation of the popular sectors arises from the fact that the dominant
alliance, within the state, was made by the state bureaucracy with the bourgeoisie
rather than with the salaried workforce and the peasantry. To support this
interpretation one only has to outline the series of incentives offered to the bourgeoisie
throughout the FSLN's period of office.
IHCA also suggest that misplaced alliances with the large private exporters lay behind
the increasing alienation of the popular sectors (see Envio no. 104) In particular that
this led to a more capital intensive strategy of transformation, with its associated
dependence on imports, than was feasible, given the existant productive structure and
employment needs. IHCA suggest that, given the external constraints imposed, when
the limitations of the original model of transformation had been recognized it should
have led to a more self-supporting transformation strategy. This could have been
based upon promoting smaller-scale agro-export production and the participation of
the smaller-scale industrial sectors in contrast to the eventual development of the
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stabilization programme and the system of incentives to the large agro-export
bourgeoisie.
In fact there had been a re-orientation of policy in favour of the small and medium
agricultural producers in the years between 1985 and the implementation of the
adjustment programme (see note. 10) This sector had been one of the most adversely
affected by the original transformation strategy and responded favourably to selected
agricultural liberalization and the deepening of the agrarian reform. This response was,
however, in the production of staples; the challenge was as suggested by Baumeister
(1991:240) to transfer some of the dynamism of this productive response into agro-
export production. As argued above, however, after the implementation of the
adjustment programme in 1988, government policy sought accommodation with the
traditional export bourgeoisie within the context of liberalization and incentives and the
smaller producers found themselves facing an increasingly bleak future (see Stahler-
Sholk, 1990).
As it stood then, the costs of the stabilization programme were too high. Coupled
with the problems and errors of policy formulation that had exacerbated the growth of
imbalances in the early years of the revolution, the acceleration of social differentiation
caused by the programme finally broke the link between the FSLN and the sectors that
it had traditionally represented.19
This discussion has highlighted many of the general issues concerning the recent
problems of 'Peripheral' socialism which were discussed in Chapter Two. Although
history has repeatedly shown the absolute necessity for 'financial responsibility'
within socialist experiments in the periphery (see the introduction by Dudley Seers to
Griffith-Jones, 1981), and more recently the debilitating imbalances induced by an
over-stretching of the administrative capacity of the state, any programmes of
liberalization will entail differential social impacts and problematicize the nature of less
state-centred socialist strategies. A new 'leaner' or 'fitter' socialist state, representing
the changing interests of different social sectors and directly accountable to them, must
still act to install direction to economic processes if it is to retain any credibility. How
it is to do so represents the chief challenge for those still committed to socialism to
19 A fact that finally had to be recognized by the FSLN in the aftermath of the electoral defeat. It is
also interesting to note that in Gould's (1990:295) reassessment of the reasons behind the success
of the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979 he points to the role of the 'trade-people' (petty commodity
producers and merchants) in the revolutionary coalition. These same sectors were those most
adversely affected by the economic crisis of the 1980s and once again were pivotal in the
articulation of opposition to a government they saw as inimical to their interests. Thus, in the
1980s the Contra were able to draw support from the peasant sector; whilst during the time that I
spent in Managua the most vocal groups in opposition to the FSLN were the vast array of small
traders found peddling whatever they could in the Mercado Oriental and the other markets of the
capital.
address in the formulation of any challenge to the neo-liberal ideologues entrenching
themselves in the comfort of 'the end of history'.
It would, however, be wrong to leave these issues at this point. This discussion of the
costs involved in Nicaragua's stabilization programme, and the alternatives to it, has
thus far treated the external aggression as 'given'. It goes without saying that the war
waged against Sandinista Nicaragua by the US immeasurably accentuated the
economic imbalances that had developed from the problems of policy formulation in
the early years. The social costs of the stabilization programme were also intensely
magnified by the continued drain of military spending and the lack of external
resources that might have funded any attempts at ameliorating the negative effects of
liberalization or investment in productive reorientation. This reinforces the earlier
contention that it is impossible to separate any discussion of the Nicaraguan economy
in the 1980s from the incidence upon it of the illegal military and economic aggression
of the United States; which was a constant and debilitating factor over the whole
period.
The discussions in this chapter have repeatedly stressed the problems caused to the
FSLN by the heavy dependence of the economy upon the income from the agro-export
sector and the political problems caused by the necessity of providing incentives to the
capitalist producers in the sector. The following three chapters, therefore, build upon
the general characterization of Nicaraguan economic policy detailed here, and the
various interpretations which have been posited, to consider in more detail the specific
case of the key agricultural export sector and the transformations which occurred
within it during the course of the revolutionary period.
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Chapter Five:
Agro-Exports, Industrialization and Development
This chapter, and the two chapters which follow, build upon the characterization of
Nicaraguan economic policy detailed in Chapter Four to consider in more detail the
specific case of the key agro-export sector. The present chapter sets discussions of
Nicaragua's experiences in that sector within a theoretical and regional context,
through a consideration of the wide-ranging literature concerning the particular
problems brought by agro-export dependence in general terms, and a brief
characterization of Central America's agro-export-led model of development, its
specific problems, and future prospects. This then provides a framework for the
detailed analysis of the evolution of agrarian policy toward, and the social and
political transformations that occurred within, Nicaragua's agro-export sector during
the revolutionary years, which is detailed in Chapters Six and Seven.
5.1 Central America's productive structure:1
Nicaragua and the other countries of the Central American region can be
characterized, within World Bank classifications, as lower-middle-income oil-
importing economies (World Bank, 1990). However, they also share a particularly
'open' nature. This openness means that each country of the region exhibits a
particularly acute degree of dependence upon trade per se (in terms of the ratio of
exports to GDP). Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show figures for this export dependence ratio
for Central America and compares them with World Bank averages in the former
case and the other Latin American economies in the latter.
The tables show that the degree of export dependence in Central America increased
markedly in the two decades following 1960, despite the high levels of economic
growth in the 1960s and the continued processes of urbanization and the CACM
(Central American Common Market) sponsored industrialization initiated during that
period. More importantly, the figures also show that the Central American
economies' reliance upon trade has been (except in the case of Guatemala) at a level
significantly above the average figures for low-income countries, or oil-importing
middle-income countries, in general and the individual Latin American economies
'Since this chapter is concerned with the factors underlying the development of the regional crisis of
the 1980's this brief discussion of the economic structure of the Central American Republics will, in
most cases, utilize figures for the years before 1979, in order to avoid any distorting influences from
the onset of the international recession during those years.
Table 5.1 Central America: Percentage Ratio of exports to GDP
(in dollars at current prices)
Country 1960 1979
Costa Rica 21 27






(except China) 14 20
Oil Importing Middle
Income Counties 14 18
Source: World Development Report 1981, Table 5, pp.142.
Table 5.2 Latin America: Percentage Ratio of Exports to GDP (in dollars at
constant 1970 prices.)
Country 1960 1970 1979
Argentina 6.9 6.6 8.4
Bolivia 14.5 15.3 13.6
Brazil 6.1 6.1 6.1
Colombia 9.2 8.2 8.7
Costa Rica 17.3 21.9 20.9
Chile 16.0 14.0 25.6
Ecuador 10.7 10.5 11.6
El Salvador 14.2 17.0 21.0
Guatemala 10.5 14.9 15.4
Haiti 12.6 9.4 7.2
Honduras 18.5 23.8 28.0
Mexico 7.3 6.1 8.2
Nicaragua 21.3 25.2 30.9
Panama 22.5 27.8 26.9
Paraguay 9.2 10.2 10.7
Peru 15.8 14.1 15.4
Dominican Republic 24.4 15.1 15.1
Uruguay 7.9 9.4 13.0
Venezuela 29.0 21.0 9.7
Average 10.0 9.0 9.3
Source: CEPAL, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America, 1980, Table 49, Page
116.
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shown. Such economic openness has meant that the economic development of the
region has been, "not only export-led, (but)... also export determined" (Bulmer-
Thomas, 1988:122) to all intents and purposes, and strongly susceptible to the
effects of changes in the international terms of trade and other fluctuations induced
by the nature of international markets.
Alongside the accentuated importance of the export sector, the economies of the
region are also particularly dependent, within their overall exports, upon a limited
number of agricultural primary commodities. Table 5.3 shows the percentage
structure of trade in 1988 for each of the Central American Economies. In none of
the republics does the contribution of the primary sector to total exports fall below
60% and, of particular importance to our discussion, in the case of Nicaragua it is as
high as 91% (Table 5.3). As will be seen below, it is this continued concentration of
economic activity within the primary sector that has had a major effect upon the
Central American experience of the international recession of the 1980s.
Probably of greater importance than the overall weight of the primary sector in total
Central American exports is the concentration of production within a very limited
number of products. Table 5.4 shows the contribution of the single most important
export crop to overall exports for each of the Central American nations (as well as
the combined weight of the two most important crops) for the years 1950, 1970 and
1977. These figures reveal that, despite some degree of diversification away from
the traditional exports of coffee and bananas that had characterized each economy
(except for Panama) before the Second World War, the dependence upon a limited
number of primary products has remained high. The different percentage make-up
of each country's exports (shown in Table 5.5) goes some way towards explaining
their differential economic performance at different junctures within the region's
history.
An overview of the economic experiences of the region in the present century
supports this view, and emphasizes the effects of external 'shocks' (e.g. rapid
changes in international commodity markets) upon the economic performance of the
region. Periods of sustained and impressive economic growth, especially in the first
decades after the Second World War, can be contrasted with periods of severe
recession or stagnation. Although an analysis of external shocks and stimuli does
provide an insight into the temporal variations in the region's economic performance,
there are also a number of paradoxes. For example, one of the periods ofmost
intense export growth in the region, the 1950's and 1960's, coincided not with a
boom in the international prices of the most important commodities, but rather a
sustained fall. Thus as expressed by Mark Lindenberg (1988:161);
Table 5.3: Structure of Merchandise Exports in 1960,
1988 (percentage of total exports)
1978 and
Fuels/Minerals Other Commodities Manufactures
Country 1960 1978 1988 1960 1978 1988 1960 1978 1988
Honduras 5 <1 10 93 90 79 21 0 11
Guatemala 2 l 3 95 78 59 3 21 38
EI Salvador 0 3 3 94 63 68 6 34 29
Costa Rica 0 <1 1 95 71 59 5 29 40
Panama nd 24 13 nd 64 66 nd 12 26
Nicaragua 2 17 2 95 82 89 2 17 9
Low-income 15 49 44 79 40 29 6 11 25
countries (a)
Lower-middle 16 11 24 67 37 30 17 52 46
income (b)
Colombia 19 5 26 79 78 49 2 17 31
Bolivia nd 88 89 nd 10 8 nd 2 4
Mexico 24 39 38 64 31 7 12 30 57
Uruguay nd 1 1 71 56 52 29 43 47
Argentina 1 2 5 95 72 70 4 26 28
Venezuela 74 97 90 26 1 6 <1 2 9
(a) except China and India
(b) Figures for 1960 and 1978 are for middle-income countries as a whole rather than lower-
middle income countries.
Source: World Bank, World Development Reportl990, p.208 and World
Bank, World Development Report 1981.
Table 5.4: Relative Importance of Central America's Principal
Export Crops (percentage of total exports)













Costa Rica 58.7 91.8 36.1 52.1 45.5 61.0
El Salvador 90.4 92.5 52.9 63.1 62.8 71.4
Guatemala 66.9 76.6 34.7 44.0 43.6 55.9
Honduras 68.5 73.6 40.1 55.4 33.8 59.1
Nicaragua 50.3 55.5 19.1 37.1 32.6 56.9
Panama nd nd 57.6 80.2 21.3 30.7a
(a) Figures for Panama are for the year 1975.
Sources: Torres-Rivas and Aguilera (1986), p.37, DEC(1972), "Panama en
Ciffas 1967-1971," p.218 and DEC(1978), "Panama en Cifras 1973-1977,"
Table 5.5: Percentage Contribution of Central America's Major
Primary Products to each Country's Total Exports
1961 1965 1970 1975 1961 1965 1970 1975
Country Meat Sugar
Guatemala 1 2 4 3 1 2 3 24
El Salvador - - - - 1 1 3 15
Honduras 6 4 1 6 - 1 2
Nicaragua 8 5 15 2 4 4 6 11
Costa Rica 6 7 8 8 4 5 4 10
Panama - - 1 <1 - 5 18
Country Coffee Bananas
Guatemala 59 49 35 26 12 1 7 5
El Salvador 61 51 50 36 - - -
Honduras 12 17 15 19 53 42 43 21
Nicaragua 25 17 18 13 <1 1 <1 2
Costa Rica 51 42 32 20 24 26 29 29
Panama - - - - 62 44 58 18
Country Cotton Oil derived produce
Guatemala 9 18 9 12 - - -
El Salvador 18 20 10 14 - - -
Honduras <1 5 1 2 - - -
Nicaragua 26 44 19 26 - - -
Costa Rica - - - - - - -
Panama - - - - - 34 23 46
Source: Authors own calculations based upon figures from Gallardo and
Lopez (1986), p.90-92, BID/INTAL (1973), Vol.2 (Annexl), p.40-42, DEC
(1972), p.218 and DEC (1978), p 8.
"While the CentralAmerican economies are highly sensitive to fluctuations
in the world economy, they are hardly prisoners whose future is totally
determined by that economy. In fact they have demonstrated a considerable
resilience in the selection ofproducts and strategies to respond to
opportunities presented by the world economy. Their pace ofgrowth has
often exceeded the overall pace of the world economy."
Lindenberg is right to suggest that the Central American economies do have some
leeway in making domestic policy decisions, but it cannot be doubted that
economies so severely dependent on the export sector, and a few chiefly agricultural
products in particular, face some particularly acute developmental problems. There
is in fact a well developed theoretical literature in the field of development
economics dealing with precisely these problems. This literature is discussed below
through a consideration of the challenges and constraints imposed upon developing
countries by their historical insertion into the international economy via the
development of primary commodity exports and the effects of the continued
dependence of many such countries upon the fruits of such trade.
5.2 Agro-exports, Industrialization and Development:
In common with many other regions of the developing world Central America's
insertion into the international economic system as suppliers of agricultural raw
materials came about with the rapid expansion of world trade at the end of the last
century. Despite efforts to diversify production into other economic sectors and
embark upon processes of industrialization, many developing countries remain
economically dependent on their involvement in the primary commodity trade.
5.2a Theoretical Debates about Agro-Export-Led Development
Strategies:
Academic debate concerning this orientation toward agro-export production can be
characterized at its most simple level as a polarized struggle between two opposing
positions;
Firstly, there is the traditional 'orthodox' argument for free trade which historically
has endorsed those economic strategies designed to rapidly expand agro-export
production. The rationale behind this position is that pro-export strategies are said to
represent the most advantageous way for small peripheral economies to involve
themselves in international trade and exploit any comparative advantages that they
may possess (Meier, 1980:chapter2). This argument is particularly cogent for
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relatively small economies with severely restricted domestic markets (such as the
Central American Republics) within which the capacity for realizing the advantages
of scale and scope are severely constrained. Such countries must acquire many of
the capital goods and key inputs needed for economic development through
importing; this requires substantial foreign exchange (Helleiner. 1992:62). Under
such conditions the most appropriate strategy for successful economic development,
it is argued, will reflect the most advantageous engagement in international trade
(that is, in the case of the majority of poorer developing countries, agro-export
production).
On the other hand, an alternative position (largely reflecting 'structuralist'
perspectives on economic development and the importance of foreign exchange
constraints) represents the view that export-led development strategies, dictated by
perceived international comparative advantages, have distorted the possibilities open
for balanced economic growth, and laid developing countries dangerously open to
the dictates of a volatile and largely disadvantageous international economic system.
Such generalized characterizations as these obviously simplify what are complex
and inter-related debates, but they do provide a useful starting point from which to
assess the most important issues.
5.2b The Case for Agro-Export-Led Models:
The defence of agro-export-led models of economic development largely rests upon
the international elements of neoclassical economic theory. Within such theory
international markets are modelled as if they were perfectly competitive and the
exploitation of comparative advantages then associated with the achievement of
optimum levels of resource allocation, and hence the best opportunities for
economic growth. Thus, it is argued that, the most effective route to a sustained
process of economic growth can be said to occur through specialization in the
production of those commodities for which each country's costs are comparatively
lowest (in the case of small peripheral economies such as the Central American
Republics this means the exploitation of cheap labour, abundant or cheap land,
and/or high quality soils). It is argued further that agro-export-led growth brings
other advantages such as; the creation of economic returns through the "venting of
surplus" from trade, that is the development of previously under- or un-utilized
production factors (see Meier, 1980:297), the dynamic effects of specialization,
economies of scale, the maximization of investible surplus and the attraction of
foreign factors of production (See Maxwell and Fernando, 1989:1679).
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In particular it is claimed that a dominant agro-export sector contributes to national
growth levels through its production and consumption-related linkages to other
areas of the economy, where it has a dynamizing reaction in the linked sectors,
which then presents opportunities for diversification in the export sector itself.
Defenders of this case for outward-oriented development strategies point to evidence
from analyses of the experiences of developing countries which suggest that those
countries which have pursued export-led development strategies have performed
significantly more favourably than those that have not. Myint (1984:222) for
example states that
"countries that expanded their exports have also tended to enjoy rapid
economic development, and significant correlations have been found
between the growth ofexports and the growth ofnational income among
the underdeveloped countries, by cross-section studies; by time-series
studies; or by a combination ofboth methods. "2
In summary, the basic arguments for specialization in agro-export production can be
outlined through the following points (modified from Todaro, 1989:383-384):
a) It is argued that the pursuit of economic policies designed to expand export
production according to comparative advantages (in the case of developing
countries- agro-exports) enlarges each nation's consumption capacities,
increases world output, and provides access to scarce resources and worldwide
markets, without which 'poorer countries' would be unable to develop their
economies.
b) The Neo-Classical theory of trade also suggests that specialization in agro-
export production and increasing engagement in international trade by
developing countries promotes greater international and domestic equality
because it tends to equalize international factor prices, raise real incomes and
makes the most efficient use of each country's resource endowments.3
c) Specialization in agro-export production is also said to aid the development
process by promoting and rewarding those sectors of the economy which enjoy
2This finding relates to countries that have developed exports per se and not just the development of
agricultural exports. Evidence in fact suggests that the most successful developing countries exhibit
both relatively open and relatively closed trade policies and have specialized production in many
different areas. However, it cannot be doubted that models of agro-export-led development have proved
in the past to be at least one valid path to development (Taylor, 1986:31). The pertinent questions
would appear to be how have some developing countries escaped from their dependence on agricultural
exports to enter other markets and are such experiences replicable? These issues are considered below.
3It is argued for example that engagement in free trade will contribute towards international equity and
the diversification of developing country production into more 'lucrative' sectors, through the raising
of relative wages in their relatively labour abundant economies and the lowering of them in richer
relatively labour-scarce countries (see Meier, 1980:36).
international comparative advantages. Thus, it is argued that any individual
country's welfare will be maximized by allowing international prices and relative
costs of production to determine the relative product mix within the economy.
The dictates of this neoclassical advocation of free trade played a crucial role in the
development of academic thought and economic policies regarding trade and
development, and encouraged developing countries to pursue economic growth
strategies through the development of labour- (and/or land-) intensive primary
commodities for export to the West. The growing earnings from these endeavours,
it was argued, could then be exchanged for the manufactured goods that 'developed'
countries were "more suited" to produce. However, it should not be forgotten that
the postulated benefits of free trade for developing countries also corresponded
closely to the needs of the industrial powers for cheap primary commodities to fuel
their drive to industrialization and the opening of new markets for that industrial
production.4
5.2c The Case Against Agro-Export-Led Models:
The experiences of developing countries under agriculturally based export-led
strategies has cast doubt on some of the tenets of the arguments for such models
outlined above, not least due to the social and political implications of such policies.
In some cases, nigh on one hundred years of engagement in various cycles of agro-
export expansion appears to have produced very little in the way of diversification
into other activities, nor the basis for sustainable economic growth and social
development. After the Latin American experiences of the World Depression of the
1930's, economists from the region began to lay the foundations of a critique of
export-led development strategies and, within the development of the structuralist
school of economic thought, to formulate alternative premises for the types of
economic policy likely to lead to long-term sustainable economic development.
The case against the traditional comparative advantage-based models of export-led
growth rests on a number of propositions. Firstly, it is pointed out that comparative
advantages are not simply 'given,' but are created as the historical legacy of
previous investment (often colonial) in such areas as infrastructure and research,
4These markets invariably consisted of those elite sectors in a position to exploit the natural resource
base of the country and consolidate their dominant position, see Todaro, 1989:380). Using the Central
American experience as a case in point it cannot be doubted that the rapid expansion in production of a
handful of agro-export commodities during the twentieth century has at times been a lucrative activity.
Whether it has provided a viable base for the development of a sustainable economic system, however,
remains open to question.
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and also reflect current and constantly changing incentives and wage rates (Maxwell
and Fernando, 1989:1679).5 Thus, comparative advantages are not set in stone but
are changeable and malleable and their exploitation is dependent upon the
development of productive capacities, which in themselves may involve substantial
costs, thereby reducing potential benefits.
Furthermore, agro-export markets and hence comparative advantages, are
notoriously volatile and it is suggested that their price instability is increasing both
relative to that of manufactured goods and overall (Maizels, 1992).6 It can also be
argued that the orientation of developing economies towards the primary sector
entails significant opportunity costs. This is because primary commodity production
offers much less in the way of economies of scale, specialization and learning, than
a similar concentration of economic activity in alternative sectors. In terms of
international trade theory it is argued that, in effect, relative factor endowments and
comparative costs are often
"determined by, rather than themselves determining, the nature and
character of international specialization this means that any unequal
resource endowments will tend to be reinforced and exacerbated by the
very trade that these differing resource endowments were supposed to
justify." (Todaro, 1989:385).
Thus, once inserted into the international economy as a supplier of primary
commodities, a nation may find that, rather than the creation of a suitable
environment for enhanced economic growth, they have perpetuated a comparative
advantage in economic activities which have unfavourable long-term prospects.
Doubts have also been raised over whether the surpluses earned from agro-export
production have, in reality, contributed to increasing levels of domestic investment,
or whether linkages have developed to stimulate balanced growth in other sectors of
the economy. Surpluses earned in the export sector can of course be transferred
abroad via the operations of the international corporations active in the sector,7 used
to finance luxury consumption by elites, or public consumption by governments.
Whether surpluses would be put to more productive use if development were to be
centred on alternative economic sectors is nonetheless open to question. It is,
generally thought, however, that agricultural production demonstrates fewer
5Although it should also be noted that the development ofmore dynamic models of neo-classical trade
theory do attempt to take this into account.
6The problems of price instability are dealt with excellently by Maizels (1992)
7Maxwell and Fernando (1989) for example refer to an UNCTAD study on the oligopolistic structure
of many agricultural markets. In 1980 between 3 and 6 of the largest international corporations
controlled; 85-90% of global trade in coffee, cotton and tobacco, 85% of cocoa and 70-75% of
bananas.
172
linkages than alternative types of productive activity (although export crops may
exhibit more production links than domestic-use agriculture).
A further problem alluded to in much of the literature is that over-concentration of
production in the export sector is said to have had a negative effect on domestic food
production which has often found itself discriminated against.8 This is the central
concern of the 'Food First' school (see Lappe and Collins, 1977 or 1986) who have
launched a trenchant assault on agro-export production; seeing such strategies as a
key enemy of food security and hence a major contributor to poverty and hunger.
They point to the unequal competition for access to the best agricultural land and for
labour power between the modernizing export sector (and the political and economic
power associated with it) and predominantly peasant-based basic food production.
Under the influence of this school, the agro-export model has been contrasted with a
hypothetical pro-peasant and largely self-sufficient development strategy. Such a
strategy, it is argued, would embody desirable employment creation, national self-
sufficiency, and a reduction in external openness, as well as a more equitable
distribution of resources. As Fitzgerald (1989:3) points out, however, any such
model of accumulation geared toward improving the provision of basic needs,
would still require foreign exchange to finance itself, and the only viable means that
many developing countries have of earning this exchange continues to be through
the further modernization of the agro-export sector.
Probably the most well-known argument against the viability of agro-export
development strategies, however, is the claim that the prices of agricultural
commodities have exhibited a sustained decline, relative to those for the
manufactured and capital goods for which they must be exchanged. This implies
that industrial nations are able to retain the whole benefit of the technological
development of their industries, whilst those poorer countries, attempting to develop
their economies through specialization in agro-export production, are basically
transferring a proportion of the fruits of their economic progress to the industrial
nations, because of the steady decline in the relative prices of agricultural and
industrial goods (Edwards, 1985:55).9 Such an argument underlay the ECLA's
8Although as pointed out by Maxwell and Fernando (1989:1680) export crops themselves have often
faced price discrimination when governments have protected food prices in order to gain self-
sufficiency.
9Other authors, chiefly in the dependency school, have taken this argument a stage further. Rather
than arguing (like Prebisch and the ECLA) that the reason for declining terms of trade and the
appropriation of economic surplus from the periphery by the industrialized core nations lies in the
relative income elasticity of demand for agricultural and manufactured goods, they suggest that
underdevelopment is perpetuated in the periphery by the differential costs of labour between it and the
core. Thus, for Emmanuel (1972), notably amongst others, the periphery suffers from 'unequal
exchange' due to the weak bargaining position of all of its workers (not just those in the primary
sector). Wage costs are therefore considered always to be lower in the periphery (even after taking into
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(Economic Commission for Latin America) adoption of an alternative policy to agro-
export specialization, namely, industrialization via import substitution (ISI). This
reflected the view that resources would need to be transferred out of agriculture and
into industrialization if economic growth was to be viable (see Bernal et al, 1980,
Villarreal, 1986: 127-180 or Rojas, 1991). ECLA, and in particular Raul Prebisch,
argued, therefore, that Latin American economies needed to industrialize (in those
sectors where demand was previously met through imports) behind high protective
barriers, which would enable their emerging industries to achieve competitiveness.
Great stress was also laid upon the directive role of the state within such a strategy
and the need for regional integration to enable the necessary economies of scale for
such Inward-Oriented strategies to be viable (O'Brien, 1985:10). Since the classic
works on this issue by Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer the Terms of Trade'
argument has been the subject of intense controversy with claim and counter-claim
regarding its validity and significance (see Edwards, 1985: chapter 4).10
5.3 The International Commodity Markets:
Many of the debates about agro-export specialization have centred upon the exact
nature of those factors affecting demand and supply in the international primary
commodity markets. First of all, it can be argued convincingly that both the income
elasticity of demand and the price elasticity of demand for most agricultural food
products and raw materials are relatively low in comparison with manufactured
goods and fuels. This means, in the former case, that even sustained growth in per
capita income levels in Western markets will not lead to more than a modest increase
in world demand, and in the latter case, that sustained falls in the relative prices of
agricultural commodities are not likely to significantly enhance world demand. This
last factor has played a key role in producing sustained losses of revenue for
primary commodity exporters under the depressed market conditions which existed
account lower productivity) with the resultant decline in the gains to be made from engagement in
trade. The question then arises as to whether the relative underdevelopment of the periphery is in fact
due to the unequal operations of free trade or is instead due to either the core's monopolization of trade
or factor immobility.
10As well as developing policies geared to diversify developing economies out of their dependence
upon primary production, structuralists also headed attempts to improve the situation of exporters in
the primary commodity markets through North-South negotiations. These were mostly handled
through UNCTAD (The UN Conference on Trade and Development) of which Prebisch was the first
general-secretary. These attempts largely failed, not least due to growing Western interests in the
agricultural sector. No agreement, for instance, was reached on how to develop buffer stocks as a
measure against price fluctuations in the sector. Internal differences of opinion amongst exporters
meant that Commodity Agreements also failed to substantially improve the position of agricultural
exporters.
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in the 1980's (Singer, 1950 and Todaro, 1989:431-432). In addition, in recent
decades, particular commodities have faced declining demand curves, due to the
development of synthetic substitutes and new technologies embodying declining
consumption of agricultural raw materials per unit of industrial production. Such
factors suggest that the international market for primary commodities does not offer
substantial grounds for the neo-classicals' claims regarding the economic gains to be
made from specialization.
Other arguments have been raised which, rather than questioning the validity of neo¬
classical theories of international trade, instead argue from within such perspectives
that developing countries have in fact, during recent years, been losing their
traditional comparative advantage in the primary sector.
"Some Third World countries are losing their traditional comparative
advantage in primaryproduction mainly because of rapid technological
advances in, and subsidies to, the developed countries agriculture. World
trade in agricultural commodities is increasingly dominated by developed
countries to the extent that some underdeveloped countries who used to be
net exporters offood have now become net importers." (Kay, 1989:215-
216).
Thus, those developing countries still intensely dependent on primary commodity
trade, find themselves heavily committed to economic activities which, in certain
cases, are rapidly becoming unviable, whilst there is an emerging group of countries
that have been able to develop comparative advantages in the production of goods in
certain manufacturing sectors.
5.4 Commodity Production and Industrialization Strategies:
The arguments associated with the declining terms of trade theory have taken a
particular beating over the last two decades, mainly due to the apparent collapse of
ISI as a viable policy framework. This does not necessarily mean that the terms of
trade phenomenon is any less valid, simply that it may not logically lead to the
necessity of the adoption of ISI policies, rather than those encouraging a more
outward looking orientation. Nonetheless, as argued in Kay (1989:222-223), the
debate sparked by the terms of trade controversy and ECLA's advocation of ISI as a
policy alternative, did at least lead to the reformulation of the debate over policy and
economic growth. When the case for ISI was first developed, debate had been
centred around an apparently simple choice between continued specialization in
primary commodity production according to comparative advantages or state-led
industrialization. The arguments for industrialization won that debate, although the
advocates of agro-export specialization always claimed that their export-led
strategies would form the foundations for future growth and diversification. Today
the nature of the debate has changed fundamentally with arguments now centring
upon whether developing countries' strategies for industrialization should be
'liberal' and export-oriented or follow a more state-led ISI strategy. It is to such
issues that we now turn.
Evidence suggests that the experiences of the handful of successfully industrializing
developing countries (The South-East Asian Tigers) appear to owe more to
aggressive engagement in international trade than to the development of their
domestic markets through any engagement in ISI. However, it should be noted that
their experiences differ markedly, some having based their development of
manufactured exports upon a previously completed ISI stage and most, moreover,
exhibiting a large degree of, admittedly selective and flexible, state intervention.
Thus, their example does not necessarily offer a carte blanche for economic
liberalization and free trade (see Schmitz, 1984:1-20). More importantly, moreover,
market conditions in the early 1990s do not look particularly favourable for a large-
scale replication of that particular miracle, despite the recently agreed world trade
deal. In any event, the problem with export-oriented industrialization strategies is
that, if they were to be actively embraced by most developing countries at the same
time, the likely results would be a sustained fall in the prices of goods in the sectors
entered, and a further expansion of protectionist measures against such exports from
the West.
Despite such qualifications, and the claims by some that the prescriptions for ISI
were never followed to the extent that they could have been said to have been tried
and found wanting (see Villarreal, 1986:169-177), even the ECLA itself now states
that"changing production patterns with equity must be achieved within the context
ofgreater economic competitiveness," and it generally has little notable
disagreement with the IMF and World Bank sponsored programmes of trade
liberalization (quoted in Zuvekas, 1992:137). Advocates of purely inward-oriented
development strategies are few and far between in the early 1990's.
5.5 Commodities in Crisis: The Collapse of the 1980s:
Whatever the evidence for the relative terms of trade between agricultural exports
and manufactured exports, or between developing and developed countries, during
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the twentieth century,11 there can be little doubt that the 1980's has seen a severe
collapse in the prices ofmany agricultural commodities. It should, however, be
noted that some commodides have been affected much more severely than others
(see discussions on Nicaragua's major commodities in Chapters 6 and 7). Maizels
(1992:9-13) shows how a gentle downward trend in the prices of non-oil
commodities during the decades leading up to the late 1970's accelerated markedly
during the 1980's, except for a brief recovery in the 1983-4 and 1988-89 periods
(see Table 5.6). Using the three most widely consulted price indices (UNCTAD, the
World Bank and the IMF) he records a fall of some 35% in real terms between
1979-80 and 1986-88, and notes that the 1980's commodity price collapse was even
more severe and prolonged than that of the great depression of the 1930's. The
magnitude of the price collapse of the 1980's has, therefore, intensely magnified the
problems faced by those countries still dependent upon primary exports and was a
major contributory factor to the acceleration of the debt crisis.12
In response to the increasing crisis facing developing economies in the 1980's and
under the influence of a resurgence of neoliberal approaches to development and the
reassertion of neoclassical economics (see the discussions with regard to Latin
America in Chapter Two as well as Toye, 1987 and Colclough and Manor, 1991)
the international financial institutions have devoted their attention to the pursuit of
policies designed to enhance free trade and increase the efficiency of developing
countries' engagement in international markets. The problem with the advocation of
such policies under the market conditions of the 1980's is that they have simply
added to the downward pressure on commodity prices, as developing countries,
seeking to capitalize on their comparative advantages, have increased world supply.
This argument is summarized by Maizels (1992:16-17);
"In most developing countries, the primeforce behind the expansion in
commodity output and exports since the early 1980's has been the severe
foreign exchange squeeze they suffered as a result (in part) of the collapse
in commodity export prices The stabilization and
adjustment policies of the majority ofdeveloping countries- mostly as
conditions for IMF and World Bank support- have almost always included
a depreciation ofthe currency, among other measures, to promote exports
11 Spraos (1983), quoted in Maxwell and Fernando (1989:1681), calculates "employment corrected
double factorial terms of trade" and concludes that the terms of trade of developing country agricultural
exports do show a declining secular trend of between 2% and 3.5% when calculated for different
definitions and time periods. The whole debate between Prebisch and Singer and their neo-classical
critics, as well as the development of the Unequal exchange school are covered in Hunt (1989:chapter
5), Edwards (1985) and Evans (1987).
12Although as noted by Lai Jayawardena, in the introduction to Maizels book, the role played by the
collapse of commodity prices in the propagation of economic crises in large parts of the developing
world has often been overlooked or downplayed (Maizels, 1992:v).
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TABLE 5.6 : TRENDS IN THE COMMODITY TERMS OF TRADE
1958-60 TO 1986-883 (indices: 1958-60 equals 100)
1958-60 1968-70 1978-80 1986-88
Non-Oil
Commodities
a) UNCTAD 100 93 92 62
(b,f)
b) World 100 97 90 58
Bank (c'0
c) IMF (d£> 100 95 91 61





e) Average OPEC price (World Bank index).
f) Weighted by value of exports from developing countries in 1979-81.
C) Weighted bv value of world exports in 1980.
SOURCE: Maizels (1992), Table 1.1, page 10.
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and contract domestic demand. However, while this type ofstabilization
package may improve the balance ofpayments position ofan individual
country, whose expansion of commodity exports is too small to influence
the worldprice, similar policies applied to a wide range ofcountries
simultaneously- as was the case formany commodities in the 1980's- are
likely to result in an export increase which will only add to the depressive
forces in world commodity markets."
Maizels backs up this argument against IMF policy by quoting from an empirical
study in Gilbert (1989:773-84) where a regression analysis revealed a statistically
significant relationship between the size of the debt burden of producer countries
and changes in commodity prices.
Overall, then, the outlook for commodity market trends is not encouraging. A
World Bank projection carried out in 1988 estimated a decline in real commodity
prices of 23% between 1985 and 1990, followed by a 5% rise to 1995, and further
stagnation at that level to the turn of the century. These estimates would mean that
commodity prices in the year 2000 would be at around 60% of their 1980 level
(Maizels, 1992:20-21).
5.6 Socio-Political Factors:
The discussion up to this point has concentrated mainly upon the market conditions
facing primary commodity exporters. There are also a number of other arguments
concerning the problems created by agro-export-led strategies which are less
'market'-related and more concerned with their effects upon socio-economic
structures. In particular, it has been suggested that, historically, the growth of the
agro-export sector under colonial domination, or externally-supported elites,
according to the dictates of the international market, has tended to "fix" the
economic structures ofmany developing nations into a particular mould. The
specialization of production within a few traditional commodities entails the
development of particular social formations, political systems and physical
infrastructure. When the external conditions change, and the traditional agricultural
exports are no longer so profitable, such structural factors inhibit a rapid shift of
production to either offset losses or exploit changing comparative advantages. This
type of problem is most likely to occur where linkages with the rest of the economy
are low and where export production is superimposed upon a pre-existing
subsistence economy. Maxwell and Fernando (1989:1681) argue that this could be
combated by state intervention to deliberately create linkages to the rest of the
economy and the use of the surpluses generated by the agro-export sector to
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encourage diversification.
Connected to this argument is one alluded to earlier, namely that the pursuit of agro-
export production as a route to growth has tended to be associated with rising
income inequality, the abuse of political and military power, and the monopoly of
economic opportunities by a small elite. The argument, however, should not be that
export-led development causes initial maldistribution, but rather that "(it acts) as a
mechanism whereby initial disparities are worsened" (Maxwell and Fernando,
1989:1683). Thus, agro-export dominance is associated not only with the fact that
only those already well favoured can take advantage of the opportunities it is said to
embody, but also that it enhances processes of social differentiation. Continued
growth in agro-export production is said to have tended to reinforce inequitable
political and economic structures. Overall, therefore, the majority view in the
literature appears to suggest an association between maldistribution and agro-export-
led development strategies. On occasion such strategies can benefit poorer groups in
society,13 but there is sufficient evidence to suggest that, on the whole, the
development of agro-export-led development strategies can be seen as mechanisms
whereby inequalities are exacerbated. Such contentions, however, should more
correctly be seen as relating to questions of the mode of production and not the
composition of production. Other forms of development strategy, given inherited
social structures, could also lead to similar increases in income inequality and
concentrations of property ownership. Thus, Brenner's argument in relation to Latin
America is that it was the class structure through which export production was
carried out (based on ultra-exploitation/methods of absolute surplus labour) which
determined that increasing export production would lead to underdevelopment rather
than development rather then the pursuit of export-based strategies per se (from
Kay, 1989:205-206).14
The foregoing discussion highlights what is probably the major problem facing
commodity-dependent developing economies. This is that, even in purely economic
terms, there are many obstacles to the likelihood of engagement in commodity trade
continuing to provide a sustainable route to economic development, and yet there
13Maxwell and Fernando (1989:1685) point to a growing body of literature at the household level
which claims that the development of agro-export production, especially via contract-farming, has
brought benefits to disadvantaged groups.
14Discussions of the historical development of the export sector in Nicaragua appear to back up this
argument, through the different dynamics of the evolution of the coffee, cotton and sugar sectors.
Whilst the coffee sector was characterized by its evolution on the large pre-capitalist haciendas and
other commercial farms it has also allowed for the development of important smallholder production.
In contrast the cotton, and especially the sugar, sectors have been characterized by greater levels of
proletarianization and much larger average farm size.
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appears to be a debilitating shortage of alternative models that could be pursued.
Faced with declining or stagnant demand for their traditional exports those countries
still heavily dependent upon agro-export production need, in the long-term, to
diversify their productive structure into the processing of commodities and industrial
sectors. However, as has been shown above, such a transformation entails many
problems. These include; the structural orientation of economies and social
formations around the traditional export activities, the obstacles to industrialization,
the effects and control of technological change and the problems of protectionist
barriers. In addition, any attempts to adjust the economic structure away from the
agro-export sector will be dependent on continued earnings from that sector for at
least some of the necessary financing of adjustment processes. This must take place
in the context of "a foreign exchange squeeze" imposed by erratic export earnings
from the commodity sector and continued high debt repayments. It is therefore
crucial that the means to enhance commodity earnings in the short- and medium-
term are found, if any adjustment processes are to be viable (see Jayawardena in
Maizels, 1992:v-vi). Unfortunately, however,
"Successful export diversification is unlikely to arise in conditions of
severe andprolonged external paymen ts difficulties without appropriate
and adequate supportfrom national policies andfrom the international
economic environment- which implies that the developed countries and the
international financial agencies also have a major role to play." (Maizels,
1992:241).
5.7 Some Concluding remarks:
Returning to our original dichotomy between pro- and anti-agro-export-led
strategies it is clear that neither is satisfactory. The apparent association between
agro-exports and irreversible shifts in distribution, the possible long-term costs
incurred in the pursuit of short-term comparative advantage, the bleak long-term
future for many traditional commodity markets, and the depressed nature ofmost
commodity markets in the 1980s, question the desirability of unchecked growth in
agro-export production. On the other hand, however, for many small developing
countries the agro-export sector will continue to be the only viable means to
maximize income in the short-term and generate economic surpluses in the long-
term.
One particular point stressed by Maxwell and Fernando (1989) is that it is a fallacy
to associate agro-export based strategies necessarily with large-scale and capital
intensive production forms, as has often been the case in the 'Food First* literature.
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strategic economic aim of encouraging diversification into industry and creating the
foundations for sustained economic growth, or the pursuit of equality and social
development.
In Central America the insertion of the countries of the region into the international
division of labour as primary exporters evolved through the inherited colonial
structures and pre-existing systems of political power (see the discussions of the
evolution of the agro-export model in Nicaragua outlined in Chapter Three). The
heavily skewed nature of the society that has evolved under the agro-export system
has effectively ruled out the medium-term development of the domestic markets of
the region and condemned the majority of the region's population to economic
marginalization. The question, therefore, arises as to whether the dominance of
agro-exports is intrinsically counter-productive to the pursuit of equitable or
balanced development in the region? If so, then the future for the region appears to
be bleak, since one of the few areas of consensus amongst the diverse
commentators upon the economic prospects for the region, is that the agro-export
sectorwill continue to dominate the economies of the region for more than the
foreseeable future (see Bulmer-Thomas, 1987 and 1992, Pelupessey and Weeks,
1993, Pelupessey, 1991, Irvin and Holland, 1988, Gallardo, 1993, ISS, 1988,
Zuvekas, 1992, De La Ossa and Alonso, 1990, Lopez, 1989, Irvin, 1991, Diaz-
Bonilla, 1990, Paus, 1989, Kaimowitz, 1992 and Vuskovic, 1992).
However, as was suggested in the general discussion above, it is not really correct
to assign the causal power for the economic problems of the region to the activity of
exporting primary commodities in itself. It is rather the social organization of
production embodied in the model of the agro-export economy that has evolved in
the Central American region and the distribution of the surplus generated that must
be examined. As expressed by Zuvekas (1992:144);
"Export-led growth per se does not inherently produce an inequitable
pattern ofeconomic growth. The distribution ofincome is determinedmore
by who controls the levers ofexport-led growth, or ofany other growth
strategy. In this regard, a strategy ofexport diversification is attractive
because it broadens not only the range ofproducts but also the range of
Bulmer-Thomas (1987:267) provides a succinct summary of the nature of the agro-
export model of development which has been pursued in Central America;
"Central America has pursued since 1920 (and even earlier) an export-led
model but the latter has passed through five phases each ofwhich has
carried different implications for economic and social relations. The theory
ofexport-led growth is based on a number ofassumptions, which have not
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been generally applicable to CentralAmerica; thus the non-export economy
has failed to match the sometimes spectacular performance of the export
sector, leaving the region with an overemphasis on external trade and very
vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity and capital markets. In
addition, the weakness of the non-export sector has left the pressure
groups associated with the export sector in a dominantposition and capable
ofaffecting policies in a way which reinforces the export-ledmodel."
He also suggests, however, that the differing historical experiences of the Republics
provides for the hope that, within a redefinition of this agro-export model, there is
scope for social reform and diversification, especially if new non-traditional staple
products, embodying less perverse productive relations and new interest groups, are
allowed to develop (Fitzgerald, 1989:3-4). It is interesting to note, therefore, that
the experiences of the economic crisis have begun to see a diversification in the
economic trajectories of the countries of the region as they have responded to the
challenges they face in different ways. As argued by Gallardo (1993:143).
"The five Central American Republics have shared historically not only the
links derivedfrom their geographicalproximity, but a similarpattern of
economic developmen t: an export-led growth model in its differen t phases
and variants, Although the model was not identically implemented in the five
countries, the crisis at the beginning of the eighties proved damaging to all.
In the aftermath of the crisis and the implementation ofadjustment
programmes designed to confront major balance ofpayments problems, the
five countries presented increasingly differentprofiles."
Other commentators are less sanguine regarding the possibilities for transforming
the model. Weeks (1985:32) for example, argues that the inadequacies and
contradictions of the agro-export economy in Central America stem from the fact
that agricultural modernization and economic development have been carried out
within a social system still largely dominated by non-capitalist social relations of
production. He argues that it is due to this that the state has continually had to resort
to the repression of labour to ensure the profitability of the agro-export sector and
that any changes in the products exported would, given the political systems
dominant in the region, be founded upon the same basis.15
The major issue to be confronted is that the agro-export model has failed to provide
adequate living standards for the vast majority of Central Americans throughout its
15 The discussion of the development of capitalism in Nicaragua in Chapter Three questions the
overall validity ofWeeks's analysis in that whilst certain parts of the export sector can be characterized
as having been developed on the basis of the maintenance of pre-capitalist relations on the large
estates, others, sugar, bananas and cotton in particular, have induced a relatively rapid
commodification of labour, whilst others, notably coffee, have included large numbers of small and
medium-scale producers.
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history, but has managed to monopolize its hold on political power. By the end of
the 1970's this was no longer the case, as decades of the consecutive expansion of
different commodities gave way to the crisis of the 1980's. This crisis had both
economic and political dimensions. The international recession of that period
severely exposed the fragility of the agro-export led model and the region
degenerated into sustained economic decline; whilst the previously excluded classes
of the region began to articulate demands for political change in several of the
Republics, of which the successful Nicaraguan revolution was one part.
The evolution of the economic crisis related to the worldwide collapse in demand for
the major traditional commodities of the region (the composition of which were
outlined earlier in this chapter in Table 5.5) as well as the increasing protectionism
of the majorWestern markets. The nature of the Central American economies meant
that it proved difficult to diversify into other commodities to assuage the demand-
induced problems and, in general terms, the dependency upon the afflicted
traditional commodities actually increased in the early years of the decade (see Table
5.4). Throughout the 1980s, economic growth stagnated, and per capita income
levels for the region fell from $1,126 in 1980 to $950 in 1989 (1980 prices). During
the same period, the region's trade deficit increased by 70%, representing declines
in the terms of trade (losses amounted to roughly $6 billion) and falls in the
production totals of the major export commodities (Vuskovic, 1992:108-9).
Pelupessey and Weeks (1993b:7) also suggest that, given the increasing debt
burden faced by each of the countries and its combination with a declining ability to
generate foreign exchange, the region also suffered from the depression of internal
demand levels, with the effect of further intensifying the skewed patterns of income
distribution characteristic of the region. As each country faced up to their declining
ability to earn foreign exchange, public spending for social spending on health,
education and housing programmes began to be cut back. The combination of which
worked to accentuate the ongoing processes of income concentration (Vuskovic,
1992:109).
There is a consensus in the literature that the agro-export model must be transformed
if there is to be sustainable economic growth in the region. However, neither a form
of regional autarchy, even one based upon peasant food production, or a rapid shift
to industrial exports, appears at all feasible in the near future; therefore the agro-
export model must survive in some form. The nature of such change has been the
locus of political struggle in the region in the last decade or so. Lindenberg
(1985:173-176) charts a number of alternatives for the future direction of economic
policy in the region;
A) The Continuation of Past Strategies
1) Continued Export Monoculture: This represents the continued reliance on
traditional export commodities, the likely fortunes of which do not appear
promising. It would also involve continued wide fluctuations in export earnings
and unresolved political tensions. Product and market diversification which
enabled (from 1954-1961) the counterbalancing of sharply deteriorating export
prices and terms of trade) seems unlikely to offer even a medium-term solution.
2) The Mixed Strategy: This involves continued market and product
diversification for the traditional sector, coupled with the development of the
domestic market via regional ISI in the CACM. This strategy is reliant upon the
income earned from the export sector to finance the industrialization process and
the relaunching of the CACM; it therefore does not seem likely to be successful
given the state of traditional markets at present (although it did provide the basis
for the most consistent period of high growth rates in the region's history).
B1 Suggested Alternatives:
1) Traditional and Non-Traditional agro-export diversification: This strategy
suggests that, given the region's expertise in the agricultural sector, the
development of new products and new markets within this sector represents the
best opportunity for renewed growth in the region. It is generally based upon
the exploitation of the market opportunities for speciality agricultural products
and as such requires rapid responses to market conditions. In addition, as
suggested by Maizels (1992:242-243) individual countries could seek to
stabilize their earnings by looking for "more predictable institutional forms of
export for its traditional commodities." Such arrangements might include longer-
term contracts or bi-lateral inter-governmental arrangements. There are
obviously many political constraints involved in the search for such agreements.
2) Multi-Sectoral Export Strategy: This represents the combination of traditional
and non-traditional primary exports, industrial exports, and market
diversification, and owes much to the South East Asia experience. The strategy
prizes flexibility. The problem is that the region has very little experience with
non-agricultural production and is unlikely to be able to compete favourably
with more experienced competitors. A problem which has been explored in
more general terms in the discussions above.
3) The New Mixed Strategy: This combines the export diversification
envisioned in B2 with concentration on the domestic market and the
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redevelopment of the CACM. Quite how such a strategy should be managed is
open to much debate.
The feasibility of each of the strategies is dependent upon one's perspective of the
reasons underlying the descent into economic crisis in the region. Prescriptions for
the future development of the region based on assessments that see the basic tenets
of the export-led model as sound, and only fallible in terms of the execution of
'correct' economic policies or the maintenance of illegitimate and archaic social
relations and political systems, will differ markedly from those analyses which
stress the structural inadequacies of the agro-export led model of development
Supporting the first position, the World Bank has repeatedly stressed the role of
misguided economic policies in the gestation and continuation of the crisis. They
have focused their attention in particular upon the region's maintenance of what they
see as over-valued exchange rates. This neoliberal view therefore locates the major
cause of the economic crisis in the growing lack of financial discipline in the region
which originated in 1973 and became more widespread in the period since 1979,
encouraging the escalation of capital flight which occurred in the region during the
1980s (Irvin, 1991:99).16 The World Bank has therefore repeatedly stressed the
importance of combating the 'over-valued' exchange rates of the region, which they
claim to be the major factors affecting the poor export performance of the region.
The problem with such a perspective is spelt out clearly in the following quote from
Pelupessey and Weeks (1993:9-10);
"There is a definitional sense in which exchange rates are always
overvalued when a country suffers from balance ofpayments pressures,
just as one can say that the price ofapples is too high when there are
apples unsold. Even were it the case that depreciation of the exchange
rate would equilibriate the external sector, it does notfollow that the
resulting equilibrium exchange rate would represent an efficientprice in
terms of resource allocation. Consider the case in which a small
economy is in general equilibrium, all markets cleared and resources
optimally allocated between tradables and non-tradables. Assume that
the country's major trading parmer, a much larger country, embarks on
a severely restrictive monetary policy that depresses its domestic
demand and, therefore, the demandfor the exports from the smaller
country. The small economy will experience a trade deficit in
consequence. With a floating exchange rat, a real depreciation will
result, restoring the external sector to balance. The resulting exchange
rate, even though it achieves external equilibrium, would be inefficient,
distorted by the monetary policy of the large country and misallocating
resources toward exports."
16 A factor more realistically attributable to the skewed patterns of land ownership and excessive
accrual of rents which meant that there was too much domestic capital facing too few profitable
domestic investment opportunities (Pelupessey and Weeks, 1993:9).
Pelupessay and Weeks go on to suggest that the scenario described in the above
quote was precisely what happened to the countries of the region during the
international recession of the 1980s and that any simplistic calls for more 'realistic'
exchange policy are both misguided and unhelpful. Furthermore, to my mind the
World Bank perspective on this seems fundamentally misguided, given the long
history of stable exchange rates and liberal financial attitudes which have
characterized the region (see Bulmer-Thomas, 1987: Chapter One).
The possibilities for the recuperation of traditional commodities remain thin. The
only exception to this rule is the success of the Costa Rican economy in moving into
new product markets (see Reuben, 1987 &1988 on the evolution of the crisis in
Costa Rica and, on the relative successes of recent years, see the most recent
editions of the annually published Consejo Monetario Centroamericano, Situacion
Economica de los paises Centroamericanos) It must not be forgotten also that the
experiences of the past decade have seen the progressive increase of regional
inequality, with the Costa Ricans enjoying per capita income levels in 1989 which
were around 220% of the regional average (in 1975 they had represented much less
than twice the regional average; Pelupessay and Weeks, 1993:14).
The relative success of Costa Rica has been interpreted by the ideologues of the
international institutions as representing the benefits received by the country which
has most closely approximated to their policy prescriptions. Another interpretation
would, however, point to the preferential treatment which Costa Rica has received,
in terms of market access and concessional financing, in relation to the other
countries of the region. Their very success may prove to be inimical to the
successful pursuit of similar externally-oriented strategies in the other countries of
the region.
A study carried out by the Institute of Social Studies (ISS, 1988) suggested that if
all of the external factors outside of the control of the Central American governments
remained on similar trajectories, then economic recovery for the region as a whole
would be unlikely. Even the achievement of the per capita consumption levels of the
late 1970s (a period when external credits were still more freely and cheaply
available and export levels were continuing to grow), would require considerable
changes in the access of the countries of the region to external financial assistance
and markets, and improvements in the market conditions of the traditional export
commodities. Even if a regionally-oriented export strategy were to be successfully
implemented the region would still require substantial external assistance during the
long transition period which the development of non-traditional export commodities
188
would entail (Gallardo, 1993:129-31).
5.9 Final Comments:
In summary, there is now a widespread consensus that the prospects for the
traditional agro-exports of the region in the 1990s are far from good. This suggests
that any pro-export strategy must rely on the development of new non-traditional
products and the pursuit of new markets, or the expansion of intra-regional trade.
Despite recent pessimistic predictions of the fate of any future steps toward
economic integration in Central America (see Irvin and Holland, 1989), the
development of the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) appears to
have rekindled the desire for economic integration in the Central American region,
with a view to eventually gaining admission to the NAFTA itself. This rejuvenated
integration process, however, has stressed the need to open the region up to
international market forces as quickly as possible in order to encourage inward
investment in extra-regional and intra-regional exports, rather than the development
of a protected internal market as had been the case under the CACM (see Chapter
Three). Thus in November 1993 Costa Rica and Panama joined Nicaragua,
Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala in signing a General Central American
Economic Integration Treaty (the latter four countries were already joined by the
"Central America Four" (CA-4) trade pact).17
This regional, but externally-oriented, model has been embraced by an emerging
'centrist' sector committed to a neoliberal model of development, rather than the
archaic political systems of the old agro-export oligarchic state (see discussions in
Chapter Two and the series of articles in Envio over the past couple of years). The
feasibility of such a strategy is dependent upon a number of factors. The model is
dependent upon attracting external capital, First of all for investment in productive
activities for serving the regional market and, secondly, for investment in non-
traditional extra-regional exports. The incentives which this would be based on
would rely primarily on the low wages of the region, the increasingly deregulated
markets, and the lack of import and export restrictions.
How likely is this new model of rapid liberalization and the development of new and
17 The eagerness of the governments of the region to join in the perceived benefits of Free Trade and
closer integration are revealed in the following quote from Rafael Rodriguez, Secretary General of the
Central American Economic Integration System (SIECA); "What we want is to create a common
market that includes the free trade of goods and services, labour and capital in the framework of
economic and monetary integration." Source: "Central American Presidents Advance Integration
Scheme," NICARAGUA NETWORK HOTLINE, November 1, 1993; "El CA-4 Paso al CA-6,"
SUCESOS de la Integracion, October 29, 1993.
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mainly extra-regional exports to prove successful? Gallardo (1993:139-140)
suggests that for a return, within ten years, to the consumption levels of the late
1970s, such a strategy would require that, over the period, non-traditional exports
to the rest of the world grow to between 40 and 60 percent of total exports. This
would require the massive transformation of the region's economic base and rapid
and profound changes in the dominant policy measures in the region. For such a
strategy to prove successful in overcoming the balance of payments problems which
it was designed to assuage would also assume that imports would not increase to the
same extent over the period, that domestic sectors of the economy would not be
overrun by those imports, and that the new exports would not be met by renewed
protectionist measures in the targeted markets (especially important with regard to
the EC, see Brown, 1993).18
The foregoing discussions have detailed the constraints operating upon the
economic recovery of the Central American region due to the structural dependence
upon agro-exports. The economic crisis that beset Nicaragua during the 1980s
(outlined in Chapter Four) cannot be seen in isolation from these issues, but neither
should they be seen as determining the trajectory of the economy during that period.
The dependence upon agro-exports is particularly constraining for a small peripheral
economy attempting a transition toward an economic model based upon different
dynamics and with a greater commitment to equity. To the problems inherent in
such economies which have been discussed in this chapter (the structural rigidities,
irresponsiveness to market changes, and openness to market disequilibria) must be
added, the specific problems faced by Revolutionary Nicaragua with regard to:
access to liquid financial resources, changing political priorities, and the desire to
transform the bases of comparative advantages away from the over-exploitation of
labour. This chapter has also placed the economic decisions facing the FSLN during
the 1980s into a regional context, by placing their attempts to overcome the
structural dependence upon agro-exports within the context of discussions taking
place at the regional level regarding the future economic trajectory of the region as a
whole.
18Gallardo (1993:141) goes on to suggest that, for Guatemala, El Salvador and Costa Rica in
particular, a regional model of import substitution would perhaps be more appropriate. He estimates
that the target consumption levels detailed above with regard to an export-led model could be achieved
in those countries with a growth rate in intra-regional trade of only 3 to 5%.18. Whether such a
strategy would be viable as a an exclusive model of development, is however, open to question
especially given the protectionist measures it would involve, the amount of political cooperation
needed for its success and the mistrust with which it would be viewed by the major international
lenders (For further consideration of the feasibility of such a strategy see Gallardo, 1993:141-143 and
the various contributions to Irvin and Holland, 1989).
Chapter Six:
Agro-Exports and Sandinismo: The Agro-Export Sector
in The Nicaraguan Transition
6.1 Introduction:
The general trajectory of the Nicaraguan economy during the 1980s was outlined in
some detail in Chapter Four where some of the explanations for the trends described
and their political significance were also considered. These discussions were placed in
a wider theoretical and regional context in Chapter Five through an analysis of the
major theoretical issues surrounding the problems of agro-export dependence and the
dynamics of Central America's agro-export-led model of economic development and
its descent into crisis at the end of the 1970s. The present chapter extends the analysis
of economic policy outlined in Chapter Four through a consideration of the
performance and dynamics of the Nicaraguan agro-export sector during the
revolutionary years which is placed in the context of the theoretical and regional
issues explored in Chapter Five.
The study of Nicaragua's external sector, and of agro-export production specifically,
offers particular insights into the problems that small, peripheral, and most
importantly, 'open,' economies face, in attempting to instigate 'alternative' paths of
socio-economic development and changes in the position of the national economy in
the international capitalist system (Conroy, 1987:170). In such economies, the
performance of the export sector dictates, in large measure, the resources available for
the development of social programmes and the deepening of economic
transformation. It is also a major determinant of overall economic growth levels and
can, therefore, act as a major constraint on all aspects of development. Under such
conditions, therefore, any revolutionary regime faces the challenge of reactivating
export production, in order to provide the foreign exchange needed to facilitate the
process of social transformation it wishes to instigate. At the same time, however, the
previous profitability of the export sector has often been realized on the basis of the
over-exploitation of labour. Thus, if the maintenance of an important group of large-
scale capitalist exporters is seen as necessary to economic survival (as it was in the
Nicaraguan case) the government is faced with a contradiction in which it recognizes
the need to provide incentives to a sector whose profitability has traditionally been
built upon the very over-exploitation of labour which the government is committed to
reversing. Similarly, even if the productive structure of the sector is transformed in
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the post-revolutionary period through the expropriation of the large private sector (and
its replacement by state farms, production cooperatives or individual smallholders),
the maintenance of profitability in international markets will continue to be heavily
dependent upon the control of labour costs; at least until the processes of productive
transformation can effect a modification in comparative advantages, through
improvements in productivity, the diversification of product structure, or technical
advances.
The performance of the agro-export sector was, therefore, of crucial importance to the
economic survival of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua, both for the reasons
noted and a number of factors specific to the Nicaraguan situation.
Firstly, the centrality of the export sector was even more apparent in the Nicaraguan
case because of its all-encompassing role in the development of Nicaragua's social
formations and political culture, both through its weight in productive activity, and the
political power of the groups controlling production of the different commodities.
Secondly, no understanding of the Sandinista revolution and its dynamics could be
possible without an understanding of the reasons underlying the political and
economic crisis of the regional export-led model (see discussions in the previous
chapter), and the ways in which the inadequacies of its structural legacy, and its
continued influence, limited the options open to the Sandinista leadership in the
economic sphere.
Thirdly, the new model of development embarked upon by the Sandinistas
themselves was particularly resource hungry and, therefore, especially dependent
upon the continued access to income earned from the export sector. This reflected the
FSLN's commitment to the expansionary programme of investments in agro-
industrial development, coupled with the political necessity of satisfying the
expanding consumptive demands of the population (see the discussions of overall
economic trends in Chapter Four). Furthermore, the FSLN also had a particularly
technocratic view of the nature of the sector, over-estimating the role of the larger
private producers, and under-playing the productive weight of the peasant sector
(Giannotten and De Wit, 1987). All of these factors meant that the generation of
foreign exchange continued to be of as great, if not greater, importance in
revolutionary Nicaragua than it had been in the past.
6.2 The Nature of Nicaragua's Agricultural Sector:
By 1979, despite having experienced two decades of expanding industrial activity and
a dramatic increase in the relative size of the urban population,1 Nicaragua was still
fundamentally an agrarian economy. In that year, agriculture still contributed nearly
33% of total GDP, about half of the economically active population were engaged in
agricultural activity of some kind2, and agricultural commodities continued to play the
dominant role in the export sector (Gallardo and Lopez, 1986). In addition, these
figures do not suggest the strategic importance of the agricultural sector, evident in the
fact that agricultural activity still earned the vast majority of foreign exchange, and up
to a fourth of the value added through industrial production corresponded to the
processing of agricultural commodities (Gibson, 1987a:35). As argued by James
Dunkerley, in relation to Central America as a whole;
"Although the configuration ofboth economy and settlement has altered
significantly, it has not amounted to a qualitative erosion of the isthmus'
historic role in the worldmarket or traditional internal structure; the
countryside remains the keyfactor in the political economy of the region."
(Dunkerley, 1988:179)
Throughout its history the most striking feature of Nicaragua's agricultural sector has
been the low population density and the consequent lack of pressure of human
numbers upon land utilization. In contrast to an average Central American population
density of 45 persons per square kilometre, Nicaragua has a figure of only just over
20. Despite this, the demand for land has been an emotive political issue throughout
Nicaraguan history; reflecting the progressive displacement of the smallholding
peasantry and indian communities from the most fertile lands through the expansion
and consolidation of the large latifundios and the development of the export sector.
Before considering in more detail the economic structures and social relations which
characterized the sector at the time of the revolution, a brief description of the physical
geography of the country should be noted. Map 3 provides a stylised view of
Nicaraguan topography, whilst Nicaragua's bioregions are given a regional context in
Map 4. Nicaragua has three basic physical regions each with their own ecological
dynamics and interaction with the human population. These are as follows:3
1 Between 1950 and 1980 the urban population of Nicaragua is estimated to have expanded from
19% to 54% of the total population; Dunkerley, 1988:172, Table 4a.
2 Between 1950 and 1975 the proportion of the economically active population engaged in
agricultural activities in Central America as a whole had fallen from 67% to 52%, Dunkerley,
1988:179.
3 This description is largely adapted from SUAS (1987:3-6). Each of the administrative Regions of
the country (see Map 2) can be loosely located within one of these three broad physical regions. The
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1. The area of the most fertile soils, and hence Nicaragua's most important
agricultural zone, is the Pacific or Western region. This area is basically a large
coastal plain marked by a series of relatively young volcanoes from which the richly
fertile soils have evolved. This plain is dissected by a low depression or rift valley in
which are located the two largest freshwater lakes in Central America, Lake Managua
and Lake Nicaragua. Located in the shadow of the Central Highlands the region has
the lowest annual rainfall of the three regions which is seasonally distributed and the
source of dry season water resource problems. Most of the land of the region is
under agricultural production (including the most important areas of sugar, banana
and cotton cultivation, the more technified coffee estates, as well as irrigated rice
production for the domestic market) or urban settlement, with only pockets of forest
remaining. The three major Nicaraguan cities (Managua, Leon and Granada) are all
located within this region.
2. The Central Highland region is an area of mountains interspersed with deep
valleys that drain primarily towards the Atlantic. The Northern part of the region is
still quite heavily forested, although much of the country's coffee cultivation now
takes place in the more fertile valleys, whilst the flatter areas, the hills and plains of
Boaco and Chontales to the South, have been given over to various agricultural
activities, and especially ranching. The temperature and soils vary quite considerably
in relation to the relief; although the soils are generally poorer than the volcanic soils
of the Pacific Plain (yet still well suited to cultivation), and the temperatures temperate
rather then tropical.
3. The largest part of Nicaragua's land mass is the Atlantic region which is also the
least densely populated. It is a hot and humid area composed of large heavily forested
regions, swamps and savana land. Once the forest cover is removed, the soils tend to
be thin and easily eroded. The area is relatively isolated from the rest of the country,
ethnically distinct, and located far from the administrative centres of the country.
Indeed, although there are road links between the Pacific and the Atlantic, these are so
poorly developed that the majority of travel between the Atlantic and the other two
regions is still carried out by river, or more recently by plane.
A summary of land use in Nicaragua is given in Table 6.1. As the table shows, land
utilization is still dominated by pasture which represents nearly half of the total land
area; whilst there is also still a sizeable proportion of land under forest cover. What








(Permanent Crops) ( 173,000)
Pasture Land 5,400,000
Forestry and Woodland 3,380,000
Other 1,822,000
Source: FAO Production Yearbook (1991)
197
this 'snap shot' of land use fails to reveal, however, is the rapid encroachment of
pasture upon the remaining forested areas which has occurred in recent decades.4
At this juncture it would be useful to outline some of the environmental ramifications
of the export-led model.
6.3 Environmental Conditions:
Much has been written about the detrimental ecological impact of the Spanish
conquest on the Americas (see for example the series of articles in the special edition
of the NACLA Report on the Americas entitled The Conquest of Nature', vol.XXV,
no.2) and Nicaragua did not escape this legacy. The most densely populated area (the
Pacific Coast) was the worst affected with, by the end of the colonial period, almost
complete deforestation, the supplanting of traditional indian agricultural practices for
less suitable European ones, and the turning over of large tracts of land to pasture (for
more detailed discussions of the Spanish ecological legacy in Nicaragua see Faber,
1993; Weinberg, 1991 or various editions of the Environmental Network for
Nicaragua Newsletter).
For our purposes, however, the ecological effects of the development of the
agricultural export sector in the late nineteenth century, and its expansion after the
Second World War are more important to assess. In particular, the rapid growth of
export production under the Somoza dynasty had a devastating ecological impact. By
1979 vast areas of tropical rainforest in the Atlantic region had been cleared through
the granting of logging concessions to transnational companies (30% of Nicaragua's
rainforest disappeared in the 1970s). The forests of the Central Highlands and the few
remaining forested areas of the Pacific were not safe either. Here, however, the
destruction was more often carried out by peasants, dispossessed of their lands by the
expansion of commercial export agriculture and ranching activities and forced to clear
areas of forest for cultivation as they moved toward the agricultural frontier. As the
numbers forced from their lands increased, so the agricultural frontier moved further
inland (Faber, 1993; 152 and Weinberg, 1991:76). This meant that the evolving
pattern of land use in Nicaragua was highly irrational, as much of the nation's basic
grain production occurred in the poor soils of the mountainous regions, whilst there
were large tracts of the best agricultural land turned over to pasture CBarricada.
December 5th 1983).
Furthermore, the incipient industrial development of the 1960s and 1970s, and the
4 Studies have shown that the destruction of Nicaragua's tropical and temperate forests is continuing
at an alarming pace (see authors cited below in Section 6.3).
dumping of untreated sewerage from the growing urban population, saw the two
major Nicaraguan lakes seriously contaminated by industrial pollution by the time of
the revolution. However, the most damaging factor of all was probably the rapid
development of the highly technified cotton sector on the Pacific Coast. Here, the
intensive cultivation of the crop and the abuse of pesticides (including chemicals
banned in the West and the testing of new varieties) have led to irreparable damage to
the top soil and serious problems of human contamination, with nearly 400 pesticide-
related deaths reported annually (Faber, 1993; 152, Weinberg, 1991:76 and
Norsworthy, 1989:144).
On assuming power, the FSLN expressed a commitment to the righting of the
environmental damages wrought by the Somocista development model. However, the
onset of war and the intensifying economic crisis of the ensuing years led to a certain
weakening of this commitment. This was linked to the stark economic decisions that
the FSLN had to face in the context of austerity and hardship. Hard choices had to be
taken regarding the balances between: prioritizing large scale or small scale
agricultural sectors; the export sector or the domestic sector; the state or the private
sector; or to improving agricultural techniques in ways that were environmentally
friendly or through large-scale green-revolution type projects that were heavily
dependent upon inputs and machinery. These issues are returned to below.5
6.4 The Structure of the Agroexport sector:
By the time of the revolution the external sector of the Nicaraguan economy, in
common with the other countries of the region (see Chapter Five), still remained the
fundamental motor of the accumulation process, despite the achievement of a certain
level of industrialization. More importantly, notwithstanding a certain degree of
diversification during the Post-War years, the sector continued to be dominated by the
production of a limited number of agricultural commodities. These trends are revealed
in Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4. The figures in Table 6.2 clearly show the intensifying
dependence of the Nicaraguan economy upon the export sector throughout the export-
boom of the Post-War period; with exports having grown to represent over 30% of
GDP by 1979. The continued dominance of agricultural commodities within the
overall composition of the sector was such that the share of total exports accounted
for by non-oil primary commodities only fell by 6% between 1960 and 1988 (Table
6.3). In a similar way, by 1977 the two most important export crops (coffee and
5 For more detailed accounts of the FSLN's environmental programmes see; various editions of the
Environmental Network for Nicaragua Newsletter. Faber (1993), Weinberg (1991), Norsworthy
(1989), Barzatti and Rovinski (1992), Wieberdink & Van Ketel (1988) and Sweezy and Faber (1988).
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Table 6.2 Nicaragua: Percentage Ratio of Exports to GDP (in




Source: CEPAL, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America, 1980,
Table 49, Page 116.
Table 6.3 Nicaragua: Structure of Merchandise Exports in 1960,
1978 and 1988 (percentage of total value of exports)
Fuels/Minerals Other Commodities Manufactures
1960 1978 1988 1960 1978 1988 1960 1978 1988
1 95 82 89 17
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1990, p.208 and World
Bank, World Development Report 1981.
Table 6.4 Relative Importance of Nicaragua's Principal Export
Crops (percentage of total exports)
1950 1970 1977
major 2 major major 2 major major 2 major
export exports export exports export exports
50.3 55.5 19.2 37.2 31.2 54.9
Source: Torres-Rivas and Aguilera (1986), p.37 and Appendix 2
cotton in that year) still accounted for over 50% of total Nicaraguan exports. This
figure, as shown in Table 6.4, was within one percentage point of that for 1950.
Such generalized figures, however, hide the fact that the relative importance of the
various commodities has oscillated considerably. As outlined in Chapter 5, in relation
to the Central American region as a whole, the fortunes of the major crops have
waxed and waned according to the opportunities on the international market and
domestic conditions. The varying percentage contribution of the most important
crops to total exports over time are shown in Figure 6.1. The major trends
demonstrated there include, the growing importance of cotton exports since 1950, the
reinstatement of coffee (as opposed to cotton) as the most important commodity from
the late 1970s, the periodic booms in meat and sugar exports in the 1960s and 1970s,
and the relative expansion in the importance of banana exports towards the end of the
1980s.
6.4a The Agro-Export Sector under the Somozas:6
Despite the expansion of export production that had occurred since the late nineteenth
century and its practical determination of the level of commerce and services (as well
as the provision of the bulk of government revenue through customs duties and
surcharges), at the time of the consolidation of Somoza's grip on power the
Nicaraguan economy was still relatively underdeveloped and practically stagnant
Even by the outset of the SecondWorld War the economy was still relatively
backward in comparison with the other Central American republics.7 Of the two
commodities which dominated the economies of the region at the time, Nicaraguan
coffee exports represented only 10% of the regional total, whilst banana production,
despite periodic booms, had never managed to establish itself successfully in the
country (Torres-Rivas, 1969: 177-178).
The onset of the international depression in the 1920s seriously disrupted and
reversed the prior expansion of coffee production, as prices collapsed by 30%
between 1924 and 1935. This represented a serious erosion of national earnings, and
it was to be twenty years before per capita GDP in Nicaragua reattained its 1929 level
(Dunkerley, 1988:90-91). In an attempt to gain exchange from other sources, the
following years saw a significant expansion in the export of minerals and in particular
6 See also the discussions in Chapter 3 about the evolution of the Nicaraguan economy and Chapter
Five concerning the regional crisis at the end of the 1970s.
7 Bulmer-Thomas (1990:317,323,339), for example, explains that Nicaraguan exports earned only
around $10 million a year in the early 1930s, levels ofGDP per head at the time of the Second
World War were the second lowest in the whole of Latin America and export totals were far below

























that of gold. 8 Despite this, gold exports were, by and large, unable to compensate
sufficiently for the collapse in coffee earnings. The major reason for this was that the
major Nicaraguan gold deposits, whilst of reasonable size, were located far from the
political and economic centres of the country and suffered from appalling
infrastructural connections. This meant that neither private investors, nor the state,
could expand the commercial exploitation of gold profitably. Expansion in the scale of
banana exports could not be relied upon either as international banana prices had also
experienced a price crash during the depression, although not to the same extent as
that suffered by coffee. In addition, Nicaraguan banana plantations were experiencing
serious disease-related problems which eventually led to the almost complete
abandonment of the crop (Dunkerley, 1988:91; Weeks, 1985:53 and CEPAL,
1968:10).
After the stagnation that had characterized the inter-war years, the Nicaraguan
economy, fuelled by a massive expansion agro-export production, and the partial
industrialization promoted by the CACM (Central American Common Market), grew
at an unprecedented rate in the Post-War period, an average of some 6% per year
(Ocampo, 1991:333). The existence of gold exports, together with the rapid
development of cotton, meant that, for the first decades after the Second World War,
Nicaragua was less dependent upon the two traditional commodities of coffee and
bananas than the other countries of the region (just over 50% of exports were
comprised of coffee and bananas in 1954; as opposed to around 80% in the other
republics; see Bulmer-Thomas, 1987). During the following years, however, the
importance of gold exports declined9 and there was a rapid expansion and
modernization of the agricultural sector. During this period coffee production was
expanded once again but the most significant development was the massive escalation
of cotton exports. Later decades also saw the expansion of other marketable
commodities such as sugar, beef, tobacco and sea foods (see Figure 6.1).
The new industrial sector which emerged under the auspices of the CACM in the
1960s, also made its presence felt in the in the figures for total exports, mainly
through the export of manufactures to the other countries of the region.10 Thus,
between 1960 and 1970 the proportion of total exports accounted for by the
8 Gold had in fact been of periodic importance during the Colonial period and at various times in
the years following independence. From 1930 onwards, however, it began to be exploited and exported
in earnest, in response to Somoza's easing of regulations on foreign investment. Production increased
seven-fold between 1928 and 1940 with gold exports representing fully 60% of total exports in 1940
(Bulmer-Thomas, 1990: 335 and Wheelock, 1985:115, Table 1).
9 Although in 1960 they still accounted for 11% of total exports (Wheelock, 1985:115, Table 1)
10 Although, as Weeks (1985:66) points out, 32% of Nicaraguan trade with the CACM in the
Mid-1970s represented food exports (for the most part these were processed food items based on
imported inputs).
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manufacturing sector increased from 3.7% to 22% reflecting, in particular, the local
production and export of chemicals (chiefly fertilisers, pesticides and caustic soda),
plastics, and metal products for the construction industry in the other countries of the
CACM (Weeks, 1985:88 and Brundenius, 1987:89, Table 3). The industrial
expansion brought by the development of the CACM proved to be short-lived, and
despite the certain level of diversification into industrial activities that had been
achieved, by 1978 the export of agricultural commodities still accounted for over 80%
of export revenues. This continued dependency upon agricultural exports was to
intensify into the 1980s, as the industrial sector collapsed under the final
disintegration of the CACM and the onslaught of war, economic crisis and the trade
embargo. Table 6.5 gives a more detailed breakdown of the composition of
Nicaraguan exports in 1977.
6.4b Markets:
The expansion of Nicaragua's export sector at the turn of the last century had been
primarily geared toward the United States' market. Even in 1913, over 50% of all
Nicaraguan exports had gone to the US, although the British and German markets
also accounted for over 30% between them. The proportion of exports going to the
US market intensified during the Second World War (accounting for 84% of total
Nicaraguan exports in 1940) but, thereafter, with an increase in the range of products
exported, so the markets Nicaraguan exporters traded in diversified (Bulmer-Thomas,
1987:9&92). The US share of Nicaragua's export market, therefore, fell from 70.6%
at the end of the war, to 65.1% in 1950, 52.7% in 1960 and to only 36.5% in 1970.
In addition to the successful procurement of new markets in other industrial countries,
the main factor underlying this diversification, was the rise of the CACM. Between
1960 and 1970 the share of Nicaraguan exports going to the other countries of the
isthmus increased from 4.5% to 26.3% (Bulmer-Thomas, 1988:).
The combination of these factors meant that by the time of the revolution Nicaragua's
trading relations were somewhat more diversified than those of the other countries of
the isthmus. In short there were four principal export markets for Nicaraguan produce
in 1977, Western Europe (31.2%), the US (23.6%), the CACM (21.2%) and Japan
(11.1%); whilst imports came primarily from the US (28.9%), the CACM (21.6%)
and Western Europe (19.3%), with Japan also accounting for 10.1% . These import
figures, however, hide a more generalized level of dependence upon trade with the
US. This is because, although the figures are less reliable, it appears that a large
majority of trade in services (mainly imports, Nicaragua's deficit in services averaged
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Table 6.5.
Commodity Composition of Nicaraguan Exports in 1977 (in thousands of US$)
Category Value (in thousands of
US$)
Percentage
Meat and Preparations 38,983 6.16 |
Fish and Preparations 23,584 3.73
Cereals and Preparations 5,056 0.8
Fruits and Vegetables 5,896 0.93
Sugar and Preparations 31,171 4.92
Coffee, Tea, Cocoa etc. 200,797 31.72
Animal Feeds etc. 11,533 1.82
Beverages and Tobacco 7,470 1.18
Cotton Fibre 153,094 24.19
Other Crude Materials 27,348 4.32
Mineral Fuels 1,204 0.19
Fats and Oils 5,460 1.86
Chamicals 50,968 8.05
Wood, Cork etc. 3,517 0.56
Textiles, Yarn and Fabric 11,951 1.89




Metal Manufactures 1,274 0.2




Misc. Manufactures 16,826 2.66
Other Misc. Exports 15,078 2.38
Source: UN Commodity Trade Statistics, 1977, 226-255, cited in Conroy
(1987:174, Table2)
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$50 million between 1976 and 1978) was carried out with the United States (all
figures from Conroy, 1987:174-5).
6.4c The External Sector as a Whole: National Debt and the Pitfalls of
Agro-Export Development:
Despite the boom and bust style of development imposed by the agro-export model,
the conscious application of 'liberal' exchange policies and conservative control of the
money supply, ensured that the value of imports and exports remained roughly
balanced throughout the Post-War years, and the debt service ratio was kept within
manageable levels at least until the early 1970s (a range of between 5 and 17%
between 1958 and 1972; Gibson, 1987:29 and Bulmer-Thomas, 1990). By the mid-
1970s, however, the expansion in traditional export production had reached its zenith,
the CACM was faltering and the economy struggled to find new momentum. By this
time, Nicaragua had a surplus in its commodity trade relations with only two of its
major trading partners; the People's Republic of China (representing the export of
cotton) and Western Europe and the total trade deficit in 1977 was $129 million,
which represented 20.4% of that year's total exports (Conroy, 1987:175).
The major turning point with regard to the financial stability of the regime appears to
have occurred in 1972. In that year, resources had flooded into the country in
response to the destruction ofManagua by the earthquake, private capital inflows had
increased, and the impending collapse of the CACM had a serious effect on the
balance of payments, as imports of capital equipment and productive inputs continued
to increase without any concomitant increase in export production.
Naturally the marketing of exports was not the only source of external financial
resources and the expansion of agro-export production itself had been facilitated by
considerable levels of international financing; largely through loans from the
international financial institutions rather then direct private productive investment
(although see discussions below on private investment in the 1970s). International
loans had helped to finance the expansion and technification of agro-export
production, the development of the industrial sector under the CACM in the 1960s,
and had also supported infrastructural developments. The extent of this involvement
can be seen in the fact that Nicaragua's external public debt grew forty one fold
between 1950 and 1977 (Stahler-Sholk, 1987:152-3). Although, as noted above, for
most of that period the growth in export production had been at such a rate so as to
make the debt burden manageable.
The period from 1972, however, had seen successive increases in the interest rates on
the national debt which, together with the increases in oil prices and all petroleum-
206
based inputs of the period, added to the growing disequilibria, despite improvements
in the prices of some of Nicaragua's principal export commodities (Arana et al,
1988:66). By the time of the revolution the relative size of Nicaragua's total debt, at
74% ofGDP, was the highest in Latin America.
Other factors had also added to the evolving debt burden and the economic collapse at
the end of the seventies. Firstly, during the expansionary phases, the successes of
the export sector had supported expensive consumption patterns in the elite sectors,
which relied heavily on the importation of luxury items. These same sectors, panicked
by the events of the months preceding the revolution, were responsible for capital
flight to the value of $535 million in the last eighteenth months of the regime
(Ocampo, 1991:334). Secondly, the months following the earthquake of 1972 had
further revealed the unsavoury nature of the Somoza regime, as large parts of the
incoming funding for reconstruction work in the quake's aftermath were
misappropriated by the regime and its allies. Ugarteche, cited in Arana et al (1988),
suggests that many of the loans made by the Ultramar Banking Corporation (the most
important creditor- an investment bank controlled by Somoza) were
"made forfictitious enterprizes orfor the purpose ofgarnering the banking
commissions and assigning the loans to Somoza's other businesses" (Arana
etal, 1988:56-7).
Finally, the US support for the regime and Nicaragua's recent history of relative
political stability meant that the country had been seen as a good financial risk by
those seeking to recycle petrodollars after the 1973 oil price rise. During that period,
therefore, considerable funds found their way into Nicaragua through private banking
corporations.
By 1978, the confluence of all these factors, together with the disincentive to
production caused by the growing political unrest, meant that the Nicaraguan
economy was eventuality unable to meet its debt servicing commitments. Despite a
$65 million stand-by package approved by the IMF in 1979, Somoza was still
embroiled in negotiations to restructure the national debt to private banks at the time of
the revolutionary triumph in July (Stahler-Sholk, 1987:152-154).
The overall economic situation inherited by the FSLN is expressed succinctly in the
following quote from Stahler-Sholk (1987:155);
" When the Sandinista Revolution ousted the Somoza dictatorship in July
1979, Nicaragua's needforfinancing was already substantial. Foreign debt
(public andprivate, including short term debt) stood at about $1.6
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billion....andforeign reserves covered only two days' worth of imports
(because Somoza had stolen all available dollars before he leftfor Miami).
6.5 The External Sector Under the Sandinistas: An Overview
The preceding discussions have suggested the centrality of the performance of the
export sector to the success of the FSLN's attempts at social transformation and the
fragility of that sector at the time of the revolutionary triumph. The FSLN faced the
sharp necessity of earning exchange in order to finance their attempts to increase the
provision of social services (imported foodstuffs, medicines, more freely available
credit etc.), the necessary economic equipment and inputs (fuels, machinery etc.) for
economic reactivation, and also to finance the massive state investment programme in
productive activity and infrastructural improvements. For all of these reasons, the
agroexport sector was to retain, and even increase, its centrality to the Nicaraguan
economy during the revolutionary period, despite the contradictory historical
association of the sector with the imposition of exploitative labour systems and the
exposure to the vagaries of the international system that the continued dependence
upon export earnings represented (Goldin and Pizarro, 1988:24).
As outlined in Chapter Four, however, the 1980s saw the development of severe
economic disequilibria and the disappointing performance of the export sector was a
central component in the evolution of these problems By the end of the decade the
total foreign debt stood at $9,741 million, which represented a staggering 33 times the
value of exports in that year and over four times GDP (Ocampo, 1991:331). The
inherited levels of indebtedness were burdensome enough, but, during the 1980s,
they continued to rise as the volume and value of total exports consistently failed to
reach their pre-revolutionary levels, and import levels, although constrained,
constantly outstripped exports.
The outstanding debts inherited from the Somoza period were rescheduled relatively
early on and new financing was, at least at first, readily available from both
multilateral and bilateral sources (Weinert, 1981 and Ocampo, 1991:341-342).
Financial problems intensified, however, as investment failed to produce productive
improvements, especially in terms of export values, and the commercial and public
debt gaps widened. In addition, although access to new lines of credit did not fall
below $200 million throughout the decade, the main sources shifted from the
international financial institutions and commercial banks to individual bilateral donors
and in particular Eastern Europe. This caused additional problems because most of the
existing capital stock had originated in Western Europe or the US, and it was difficult
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to find compatible equipment from the new suppliers. This made the effects of the US
trade embargo more serious than might at first appear from total import figures (see
SIDA, 1989:43 and the discussion on the effects of US aggression below). In
addition, during the pre-revolutionary period, liquid credit-lines had provided
financing for up to 80% of Nicaragua's foreign imports, by 1986, however, less then
a quarter of imports were paid for in convertible currency and the government had to
increasingly rely on pre-financing and bilateral and counter-trade arrangements
(Goldin and Pizarro, 1988:26). Thus, although the government continued to find
alternative sources of finance to cover the burgeoning debt crisis, it found itself
increasingly constrained by the inflexibility of those sources.
In addition, the Nicaraguan economy was severely affected by the severity of the
international recession of the early and mid 1980s, suffering terms of trade losses
crippling to such an export dependent economy. By 1988, the value of exports was
only just over a quarter of the value of imports which represented a massive increase
in the dependency of the economy upon external financing at a time when access to
those resources was declining. The burden of Nicaragua's external imbalances was
such that in 1988 more than 70% of imports were pre-determined, through ties to
donor suppliers and specific destinations, and over half of projected exports for 1989
were precommitted to secure loans to pay for imports, together with substantial
interest charges (SIDA, 1989:9).
6.6 Export Performance:
The trajectory of the major Nicaraguan export crops throughout the 1980s (in terms of
the volume of production, the average prices received on the international market, and
hence the value of production for each year) are provided in Appendix One. The
figures shown there start from the year 1979 which, for comparative purposes (in a
pre and post-revolutionary sense), is not ideal. This is because agricultural and
industrial production in that year was substantially affected by the devastation of the
war and the general insecurity of the situation in the country. In most cases this
produced very low levels of agricultural activity, and hence production levels, in
comparison with previous years, although in a few cases the general uncertainty led
to a massive process of decapitalization which, in the case of the beef sector, actually
led to record production levels.
Figure 6.2 shows the general trajectory of the income earned in the export sector
during the revolutionary period. From the starting point of a total export value of over
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million by 1988, before rising slightly in the final years of the decade (although the
downward trend had been arrested by slight improvements in 1981, 1983 and 1987).
In order to put this negative trend into more of an historical context, Figure 6.3 shows
the overall growth in exports since 1961, as well as the relationship of export growth
to the growth of imports. As the graph shows, up until the 1980s, although import
growth had tended to outstrip the growth of exports, they had remained on relatively
similar trajectories. This trend continued in the 1980s, although import growth did
remain greater than export growth throughout the period. This suggests that the
increasing debt burden of the period reflects the collapse of export production rather
than any undisciplined expansion in import levels (Goldin and Pizarro, 1988:26).
As can be seen from the two graphs, the 1980s far from a success in terms of total
export revenues or the overall rates of export growth. In sum, despite improved
performances in 1981 and 1983, and again at the end of the decade in 1989 and 1990,
the general picture is one of sustained decline. Furthermore, the traditional
dependence upon agricultural commodities had intensified to an alarming degree by
the end of the decade to the extent that in 1988 non-traditional exports (chiefly relating
to the industrial sector) stood at only 16% of the peak value that they had reached in
1977-78 (SIDA, 1989:37).
The factors that underlay the development of this crisis within the export sector were
many and varied and are analysed in detail in Chapter Seven with regard to each of the
major export commodities. Here the basic factors at work can briefly be identified as:
the detrimental changes in the international terms of trade facing the Nicaraguan
economy; the collapse of the Central American Common Market; the devastation
caused by the military and economic aggression of the US against Nicaragua, via the
physical devastation and disruption of the war against the Contra, the necessity of
devoting resources (human and financial) to the armed forces, and the imposition of
the trade embargo; the inherent dislocations of any process of profound structural
transformation; the difficult policy decisions that had to be made concerning the
prioritization of the export or domestic agricultural sectors and between consumption
or productive investment; government pricing policies towards the sector (producer
prices, exchange rates, incentives and credit supply); and finally the articulation of the
various classes of producer involved in each sector (the state sector, large private
producers, cooperatives, small and medium scale private farmers and the more
marginal peasant sectors) and the labour force that they depend upon. For clarity of
explanation, and recognizing the problems involved in such a distinction, the major




6.7a The International Recession and the Collapse in International
Commodity Markets:
Nicaragua's dismal export performance during the 1980s must be seen in the light of
the international recession and the collapse in commodity prices described in the last
chapter. The first half of the 1980s were a dismal period for the economies of the
Central American region. They had to contend with a severe collapse in international
demand for their traditional export crops (evidenced by the fall in international
commodity prices), massive increases in international interest rates, and high rates of
inflation in the industrialized nations which led to increases in the cost of extra-
regional imports and added to the already burgeoning regional trade deficit.
Figure 6.4 shows the evolution of the overall terms of trade of the Nicaraguan
economy using figures from Ocampo (1990) (based on those of CEPAL). Ocampo
suggests that, whilst the overall terms of trade moved against the Nicaraguan
economy during the period since 1980, the trend was not that pronounced, with
greater relative falls occurring in the late seventies due to the extremely high
commodity prices of the mid-seventies. In fact, the overall terms of trade and their
effects have been the subject of some dispute in the literature; often relating to the
index year which different authors have used for their calculations. For the period
from 1978 to 1984, Bulmer-Thomas provides a contrasting picture, with the terms of
trade falling, from an index value for 1978 that was virtually equivalent to the base
year of 1970, to a value of only 67.5 in 1984, reflecting a very strong fall in the
purchasing power of Nicaraguan exports (Bulmer-Thomas, 1987:335, Table A. 14).
Other figures, quoted by Conroy (1987:178), appear to back Bulmer-Thomas'
position, showing how the purchasing power of Nicaragua's exports fell by 49% in
the first year of the revolution, and a further 18% from 1981 to 1984. Whilst the
terms of trade turned against Nicaragua by 19.6% from the start of 1979 to the end of
1980 and a further 26.6% from 1981 to 1984. What these figures imply is that in
order to import the same quantity of goods that had been imported in 1979 the
Nicaraguan economy had to export 45% more in 1984 (Conroy, 1987:178). Goldin
and Pizarro (1988:26) estimate that the terms of trade declined by 31.6% between
1980 and 1986. They go on to suggest that, since the growth in the trade deficit over
the same period is roughly equivalent, the adverse movements of international prices
are largely behind the growth of the trade deficit, rather than any growing imbalance
between the volume of imports and exports.
What the foregoing discussion reveals is whatever the overall terms of trade for the
Sandinista period as a whole, if one looks at the trends for the period 1977 to 1985,
Figure 6.4
Nicaragua: Terms of Trade (1980 =100)
Source: Ocampo (1990: Table 10.3)
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in particular, the decline was catastrophic, even given the fact that the starting year
was particularly favourable to the economy (see the figures provided by Cabieses,
1986:149:Table 70). Table 6.6 shows figures that, as well as demonstrating the
continued fall in export purchasing power from 1984 to 1988 (reflecting absolute
volume declines as well as price movements), also compare the decline in export
purchasing power in Nicaragua with the experiences of the other countries of the
isthmus. The figures reveal strikingly the greater scale of Nicaragua's collapse in
export earnings. The most important figures to consider, however, relate to the
evolution of the international prices for Nicaragua's major traditional export
commodities. Table 6.7 shows the evolution of these prices over the period since
1970, whilst Figure 6.5 presents the trends revealed by those statistics in graphic
form. These suggest particularly severe price falls for sugar and cotton, less severe
falls in the case of beef and (excepting a peak in 1986) coffee, and relatively high
prices for bananas.
6,7b The Imposition of the US Trade Embargo:
The economic problems caused by the international factors considered thus far were
considerably compounded by the imposition of the trade embargo placed upon
Nicaragua by the Reagan Administration in 1985 and the cumulative effects of the war
against the Contra.11 The effects of the latter were painfully obvious. It has been
estimated, for example, that around 16% of agricultural land in the three Interior
regions (the zones of major conflict) had been abandoned by the Mid 1980s. During
several agricultural cycles the supply of labour during the harvest months became
problematic due to the number of individuals employed in military rather than
productive activities. In addition, the widespread destruction of the nation's
infrastructure in the major zones of conflict seriously disrupted the circuits of internal
commerce as the ability of private merchants, and the arms of the state, to reach the
11 F.nvin (September 1985:36) offers the following breakdown of the effects of the war on the
agro-export sector in the years preceding the imposition of the embargo;
DISRIJPTION OF EXPORT PRODI JCTION IN MILLIONS OF IJSS"
YEAR 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 TOTAL
TOTAL 0.9 3.5 6.1 65.3 102.8 178.6
COFFEE - - - 32.1 37.0 69.1
TOBACCO - - - 1.9 1.6 3.5
LIVESTOCK - 0.1 0.2 1.0 3.3 4.6
TIMBER - - - 25.0 52.2 77.2
FISHING 0.9 1.2 2.8 4.0 6.6 15.5
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areas of the interior were constrained (Utting, 1992:203).12
Whilst Nicaragua had enjoyed relatively diverse trading patterns at the end of the
seventies, the US was still a major market for Nicaraguan exports and the source of
many industrial and other economic necessities for the Nicaraguan economy. The loss
of those export markets and import suppliers following the imposition of the embargo
obviously had negative ramifications upon the performance of the export sector. New
markets had to be sought, and quickly, requiring the presence of experienced
international salesmen (this was problematic in the context of trained personnel flight
of the period), information on market opportunities, and the utilization of new
shipping routes, as well as new suppliers of industrial and agricultural inputs, spare
parts and services.
Some of the effects of the embargo were painfully direct the significance of the loss
of the US market differed from crop to crop, but in some cases (for example, beef,
sugar, bananas, shellfish and tobacco) it represented the loss of a considerable share
of their traditional marketplace (in some cases up to 95% of total exports). However,
even in sectors where the US market was of relatively little significance (e.g. cotton
or coffee), the domestic processing of those commodities was heavily dependent
upon US machinery, spare parts and maintenance; as well as for the supply of
agricultural inputs and services.13 In addition, the necessity of selling in markets
further afield heavily increased transportation costs and, in some cases, the level of
processing required to ensure that perishable goods arrived in markets in a saleable
condition; both of which effectively eroded the overall value of export sales to the
Nicaraguan economy. At the same time, the need to rely on alternative sources of
imports often inflated import values for the same reasons (Goldin and Pizarro,
1988:28). The changes in the composition of imports and exports during the period
are provided in Table 6.8. The most important factors shown include, the loss of the
US market (this fell from representing 28.4% of Nicaraguan exports in 1981 to less
than 1% in 1987) and the collapse of the CACM (between 1980 and 1985 the
proportion of Nicaraguan exports sold in the CACM fell from 15% to just over 6%).
The share of exports going to the EC and to Japan were maintained (and reached
higher levels in individual years), whilst new markets were found in Canada and the
Eastern Block (between 1981 and 1987 the percentage share of each increased from
less than 1% to 9% in the former case, and from 6% to 13% in the latter).14
12 For further discussions of the wider effects of the war see Chapter Four.
13 In particular this affected the supply of fertilizer, pesticides and irrigation equipment (Envio,
October 31, 1988:14)
14 The expansion of trade with the former socialist block allowed for a certain development of non-
traditional exports under the auspices of ENIPREX (Empresa Nicaraguense de la Promoccion de Las
Exportaciones), although the non-traditional sector remained depressed for most of the revolutionary
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Table 6.8 Nicaragua: Exports According To Destination (Percentage
Of Total Exports)
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
CACM 14.9 14.1 8.4 8.6 7.0 6.8 9.0
Panama 1.1 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
USA 28.4 22.2 23.0 14.6 15.0 0.3 0.5
Canada 0.5 0.4 5.3 8.3 6.3 8.2 8.9
Japan 11.7 11.5 15.4 22.3 18.1 12.9 10.9
EC 32.1 32.7 24.3 26.6 32.7 42.9 37.3
Asia 7.2 5.3 2.2 0.3 1.1 1.8 0.8
Middle East 0.2 0.1 - - 0.0 0.0 0.0
CAME 6.0 6.5 5.6 6.2 9.2 9.7 13.1
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Various
Years.
period. The successes which were achieved included various industrial products (eg. tinned tomato
concentrate, fruit juices, banana puree, metal goods, formol), liquor and several, mainly wooden,
artesanal products (Rosario, 1990). Despite efforts to expand the production of non-traditional exports,
especially in the agricultural sector, there were relatively few successes. As expressed by Ramon
Cabrales, the Vice Minister ofMEIC (Ministry of Economy, Industry and Trade; "In this country...
there is no exportable supply ofnon-traditional convnodities. We have mangoes all over the place but
they dont reach export quality.. We believe that first it is necessary to construct this supply."
(interview in Revista del Campo. 11th August 1989:6-7)
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The economic aggression also had other aspects. From the earliest years of the
revolution, the US administration had pressurized the international financial
institutions, and individual aid donors, to refrain from lending or donating resources
to the Nicaraguan economy. Arana et al (1988) outline succinctly the overall results of
such policies.
"In the same way, the US-backedfinancial blockade has affected
Nicaragua's capacity to obtain multilateral loans, thereby making Nicaragua
more dependent on bilateral sources ofcredit (Conroy, 1985). Lines ofcredit
tend to be tied to the exportpolicies of the countries granting credit and are
linkedfrequently to the purchase ofcertain products that are not always
adapted to the needs of the receiving country. In Nicaragua's case, this
phenomenon has affectedproductive efficiency in that the country has had to
adapt to a myriadmix ofnew imported technologies. (Arana et al, 1988:56)
In some ways, however, the new markets that were found, despite the continued
efforts of the US to get other countries to support the embargo, represented
considerable mini-triumphs for the Sandinista government and the achievement of a
desired diversification of economic relations even at a considerable economic cost. As
expressed by Alejandro Martinez Cuenca, the former Nicaraguan Minister of Planning
under the Sandinistas;
"The companies which had been set up abroad allowed us to penetrate new
markets in Western Europe and Canada. Back when we could still export to
the US market, marketing structures were being developed in the United
States that allowed us to make contact with other suppliers ofmeat and
seafoods operating from the United States. When the embargo was imposed,
what we did was transfer our marketing operation from the United States to
Canada. And later, we penetrated the European market by way ofanother
company that we had set up previously. In that way, new sources of
financing opened up which were very important from 1985 on." (Martinez
Cuenca, 1992:42).
To summarize, the combination of the international recession and the growing
intensification of the economic and military aggression of the US, meant that the
FSLN were faced with severe external disequilibria which were crippling to such a
trade-dependent economy. Despite the disagreements over the magnitude of the
effects discussed above, it can be argued convincingly that the Nicaraguan economy
was severely hit by the collapse of commodity prices and the international recession
of the early 1980s, which had a strong negative impact upon total export earnings and
commercial balances. The downward trend in commodity prices was accompanied,
after 1985, by the loss ofmany of the economy's traditional markets and suppliers
through the imposition of the United States trade embargo.
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6.8 The Domestic Policy Arena:
The changing terms of trade and fluctuations in the international markets for
Nicaragua's major commodities were only one aspect of the problems faced by the
FSLN in the reactivation of the agroexport sector during the revolutionary years. The
overall volumes of production, the utilization of land, and the yields achieved in the
sector during the revolutionary period were also, of course, of extreme importance. In
this final section of the Chapter the wide-ranging debates that occurred within the
FSLN regarding the direction of agrarian policy are explored through a consideration
of the contradictory dynamics of the intended prioritization of the export sector and the
concurrent desire to improve national self-sufficiency in basic grains and a detailed
account of how those debates informed the evolution of economic policy and its
consequent effects.
6.8a Overall Production Levels:
The productive performance of the export and domestic agricultural sectors during the
decade of FSLN rule are displayed in Table 6.9 and Figure 6.6. The final
insurrectionary phase of the revolution had coincided with months when ordinarily
the planting for the agricultural season would have occurred, and the 1979-80
agricultural cycle was therefore heavily disrupted by the devastation of the conflict,
and the decapitalization which had accompanied it. Thus, the level of total agricultural
production for 1979/80, as shown in Table 6.9, declined sharply from that of the
previous year, with the fall equally severe in both the export and domestic sectors.
The physical damage to the economy had also seriously affected the transportation of
produce, and the supply of inputs, and it had been difficult to attract sufficient
workers for the harvest that year (Enriquez, 1991:85). During the years that followed
there was a certain degree of recovery until around 1985; although the performance of
the various commodities varied and different classes of producers had distinct
experiences. By 1990, however, after five years of almost constant productive
decline, due to the intensification of the war against the Contra and the effects of the
growing economic crisis, total agricultural production levels were only three quarters
of their pre-revolutionary levels and production in the export sector had fallen by fully
40% (SIDA, 1989:70).
Focusing attention specifically upon the traditional export sector, the evolution of total
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Table 6.9 Nicaragua: Area harvested for the agricultural cycles 1974/75 to
1988/89 (thousands of manzanas)
Cycle Total Agro-Export Domestic
74/75 1064.3 434.5 629.8
75/76 941.8 399.2 542.6
76/77 1097.4 471.7 625.7
77/78 999.7 509.8 489.9
78/79 1089.9 458.2 631.7
79/80 712.8 273.1 439.7
80/81 783.2 359.2 424.0
81/82 885.4 345.6 539.8
82/83 789.2 337.4 451.8
83/84 906.6 384.1 522.5
84/85 892.9 377.4 515.5
85/86 771.1 321.6 449.4
86/87 804.6 263.8 540.8
87/88 774.4 252.3 522.1
88/89 866.3 234.2 632.1
Source: CIERA (1989), Volume 9:73
800-|
Figure6.6 Nicaragua:EvolutionfT alM nzan s CultivatedofExportanD mesticCrops (1978/79toS9/90) IDomestic 0Exports Source:Figur sinTabl6.9
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production levels are given in Appendix 1; whilst the total area harvested of each of
the main crops is displayed graphically in Figure 6.7. The trends revealed in Figure
6.7 suggest that sugar cane, sesame and cotton production all experienced positive
growth rates between 1980 and 1985 (although cotton production was still far below
the levels achieved in the pre-revolutionary years), coffee, tobacco and banana's
fortunes were more mixed, whilst beef exports declined, reflecting herd losses and
misplaced government pricing policies. In the years following 1985, with a few
exceptions, the picture was bleaker, as the economic and military crisis took hold of
the country and production of any kind became more and more difficult (Wheelock in
El Nuevo Diario 28/04/1989).
To consider in more detail the various explanations for the poor productive
performance of the export sector during the 1980s the evolution of the FSLN's
agrarian policy is considered in detail below through a discussion of the stages of
economic policy and agrarian transformation which occurred through the 1980s.
6.8b The Revolution and Social Relations in the Agro-Export Sector:
6.8b(i) Introduction
One of the major problems that faced the FSLN in meeting the simultaneous goals
of economic recovery and social transformation was that the growth of the export
sector (the key provider of the resources needed to develop the social programmes
and subsidize the period of dislocations occasioned by changes in the relations of
production) could no longer be based on its traditional mechanisms of the
subordination of the peasantry and the extraction of cheap seasonal labour power
(Clemens and De Groot, 1987:10). The fundamental quandary for the FSLN was
the search for a strategy which could reactivate a sector, which had previously
expressed the overarching domination of private capital and the dependence upon
international market forces, in a way which would serve the interests of the majority
of Nicaraguans.
Central to revolutionary efforts toward this end was the attempt to reduce economic
exploitation through the radical transformation of the social relations that
characterized agrarian class structure. For such processes to be directed in the
intended way would
"depend, in part, on the availability ofdata to analyse the nature of
existing class structure, as well as the revolutionary leadership's definition
of 'exploitation'. These factors (and long-run transformation policies) also
Figure6.7






















affect the design and results ofshort-run agricultural policy." (Zalkin,
1989b:575)
The final section of this chapter, therefore, details the debates that took place within
the FSLN (and the research institutions associated with, or at least supportive of,
them, during the course of the 1980s).about the nature of the social relations which
characterized the agricultural sector.
6.8b(ii) Theoretical Debates about Agrarian Structure:
There has been a great deal of debate about the social formations which the
Sandinistas inherited in the rural economy and different opinions held sway within
MIDINRA (the agricultural ministry) at different stages during the 1980s. The
consensus now appears to be that at first the FSLN severely over-estimated the
weight of the large capitalist sector in the functioning of the rural economy, and, in
particular, the level of semi-proletarianization of the workforce. At the same time,
the importance of large sectors of small capitalist farmers, rich peasants and the
poorer and middle peasantry to the production of export crops was underestimated,
with consequent effects upon the direction and results of agrarian policy
(Baumeister, 1985a; Zalkin, 1989a and b; Kaimowitz, 1988; although see Enriquez,
1991). Many of the controversies over the interpretation of agrarian social structure
can be outlined from debates about how a major survey into the agricultural sector
carried out by CIERA in 1980 and 1981 was undertaken, how the results have been
interpreted, and what inferences have been drawn about the nature of social
relations in the agricultural sector at the time of the revolution. Although the
revolutionary process itself significantly affected those inherited social relations,
these discussions are still important to understand because they underlay the various
schools of thought that influenced the evolution of agrarian policy during the course
of the 1980s.
Zalkin (1989a and b) argues that when the results of the survey were first examined
in 1980/81, the methods of analysis used over-emphasized the degree of
capitalization and differentiation in the rural population and under-estimated the
complexity of social relations. Thus, he claims that, the initial interpretation of the
survey (CIERA, 1980 and 1981 and other studies such as Deere and Marchetti,
1981), influenced by the model of 'agro-export capitalism' developed in the work
of Jaime Wheelock (the FSLN's Minister of Agriculture, Wheelock, 1985), and
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Orlando Nunez (the Director ofCIERA itself, nd),15 suggested relatively high
levels of capitalization in the rural economy and a relatively (semi-) proletarianized
workforce. In other words, the vast majority of Nicaragua's rural population were
seen to be 'strongly and directly connected to capitalist production.'16 The model
suggested that the Post-War growth of the export sector had instigated a dualistic
agricultural system, with a dominant landowning class that produced export crops
and owned the vastmajority of land, a relatively small proletarianized permanent
workforce, and a large sector of, largely semi-proletarianized, peasantry that
laboured on the large estates periodically and also grew the majority of food for the
domestic market (Zalkin, 1989b:575). From this model, the agricultural economy
could be characterized as fundamentally capitalist in nature, and involving a direct
productive relationship between the export and domestic sectors.
The most important facets of social relations in the rural economy were, therefore,
seen to be those that related to the conditions of wage labour. It was suggested that
the repression of labour organisation during the Somoza period had enabled the
payment of very low wages in the export sector (the source of the economy's
comparative advantage), whilst the partial preservation of various forms of pre¬
capitalist social relations had also enabled the landowners to demand labour from
those renting land from them, or in debt to them through other means.17
As time went on, however, other researchers working in CIERA and elsewhere
began to question this dominant characterization of the rural economy through their
own research. Whilst noting the massive transformations wrought by the expansion
of export agriculture, and the partial capitalization of social relations it was
accompanied by, it was suggested that the Capitalist Agro-Export Model generalized
the experiences of the most technified sectors of the economy into an economy-wide
model, which hid the wide diversity of social forms that characterized social
relations. Thus Baumeister (1985a) argues that, although it was certain that the large
capitalist farms and the semi-proletarianized workforce they relied upon, were
15 This model depicted Nicaragua's agricultural sector as having been dramatically altered by the
influence of the capitalist transformation of agriculture, most essentially through increasing levels of
social differentiation. Their studies were influenced by their detailed case studies of the larger coffee
latifundia in Matagalpa and Jinotega (Wheelock) and the Pacific cotton farms (Nunez).
16 It was argued in the CIERA study that as much as 40% of the rural economically active
population were fully proletarianized and another 37% engaged in wage labour part-time as semi-
proletarians (Martinez, 1993:475)
17 These conceptions were heavily influenced by DeJanvry's concept of functional dualism
(DeJanvry, 1981) whereby the continued access of a semi-proletarianized peasantry to a small plot of
land (which is, however, insufficient to meet their subsistence needs) is seen as functional to the
operation of the model of accumulation. Thus, individuals are forced to seek wage labour for part of
the year, due to the inability of the land to which they are allowed access to meet their subsistence
needs. The continued peasant access to that land, however, means that wages, in turn, do not have to
be set at a subsistence level to ensure the reproduction of the labour force.
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important to the functioning of the economy (especially in the more technical cotton
and sugar sectors and the coffee haciendas of the Pacific), there were also wide-
ranging relatively independent (at least in terms of direct productive relations)
middle sectors (rich peasants and the lower strata of the bourgeoisie) that were of
greater importance in both export and domestic agriculture than had hitherto been
recognized (Zalkin, 1989b:593).18
Kaimowitz (1987) formalized Baumeister's work into an alternative Peasant
Capitalist model'. However, he also took Baumeister's ideas a stage further in that,
in addition to suggesting the existence and importance of Baumeister's middle
sectors, he also argued that the poorest sectors of the peasantry (the semi-
proletarianized) were less functional to the export sector, claiming that more than
half of those harvesting cotton and coffee had no access to their own land. This
suggested that the semi-proletarianized had a much more marginal position in the
national economy than had previously been thought and that the level of
proletarianization was considerably higher.19 This suggested a much less direct
relationship between the export and domestic sectors than had previously been
assumed (Zalkin, 1989c:618).
Zalkin himself suggests that the situation is more complex than either of the models
allows for; with the export sector being characterized by such diverse producers as;
capitalist landowners with access to both permanent and semi-proletarianized
workers, rich peasants who also periodically hired labour from the semi-
proletarianized, and a large group of poor and middle peasant export producers who
neither hire nor sell labour. He argues that the poor peasants are, therefore, more
functional to the export economy than envisaged by Kaimowitz, providing around
half of the labour hired (although admittedly they may have had a less functional
role in the large scale farms and a greater presence in the functioning of the rich
peasants and small agrarian capitalists). In this way, Zalkin stresses that a relatively
high percentage of the agrarian population do participate in capitalist relations of
production, but also argues for the importance of 'simple merchant small-scale
production' for various strata (in particular medium-scale peasants who have little
involvement in the hiring and selling of labour). Furthermore, he also argues that
the penetration of capitalism has varied widely around the country, with the highest
levels of proletarianization existing in the Pacific (with over 70% of the peasantry
engaged in some form of wage labour) then falling progressively through the
18 In particular it was argued that the initial CIERA study had classified as at least semi-
proletarianized, any family engagement in wage labour, even if the vast majority of family labour
time was involved in petty commodity production.
19 This position was also backed up by Vilas (1986).
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mountainous areas of the interior to a level of proletarianization of less than 40% at
the agricultural frontier. A resume of the different models of agrarian structure is
provided in Table 6.10
It might be suggested that the Capitalist Agroexport model, whilst
underrepresenting the role of smallholder production in the agricultural sector as a
whole, does provide an effective framework for understanding the social relations
specific to the most important parts of the export sector. There is a certain amount of
truth in this. Nunez (nd) and Wheelock (1985) carried out their initial studies in the
areas ofmost intensive export activity in the Pacific and the Central Highlands, and
the model that evolved from their studies accurately represents the agrarian structure
of the sector in those regions. However, coffee production and livestock rearing in
particular, also include large sectors of smaller scale producers that engage in export
activities, suggesting the relevance of the alternative conceptualizations outlined
above.
In effect, what these discussions reveal, is the sheer heterogeneity of the export
sector and its different nature in the various regions of the country (Bendana,
1991:40). A particularly useful local-scale example of the differential level of
proletarianization in the various regions is provided by a study ofMasaya published
in Envio (September 1985). Even accepting the limitations of the national figures
against which Masaya is contrasted (which were based upon the CIERA
interpretations discussed above), the level of proletarianization of the peasantry of
Masaya is clearly demonstrated by the comparative figures in Table 6.11. These
figures reveal a level of proletarianization or semi-proletarianization of over 75% for
Masaya as compared to a national average of only just over 66%. Accordingly,
reflecting the greater level of landlessness suggested by the higher levels of
proletarianization, the demands for land of the Masayan peasantry were particularly
strong throughout the first years of the revolution, and the general fears of the
Sandinista leadership about the effects of a deepening of the land reform process
upon labour supply to the large estates, were heavily influenced by the particularly
proletarianized nature of this area and the exceptionally vocal demands for land
which were articulated by that region's peasantry. It is important to stress,
however, that the lack of access to land in Masaya, whilst indicative of higher levels
of proletarianization, hides the poverty of the Masayan landless classes. Thus whilst
the Masayan peasantry had very limited access to land, by no means all could find
employment on the local farms and the Envio article, referred to above, suggests
that many were forced to travel into Managua and beyond in search of employment.
The controversies which have surrounded the interpretation of Nicaragua's agrarian
























Agricultural Proletariat 24.7 30.7 16.8
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Adapted from CIERA (1989), Volume 4, Table 1, pp.15 and Utting
(1992), Table 7.11, pp. 219
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Table 6.11 Class Structure ofMasaya in Comparison with the National Average
Class Masaya Nicaragua
Large Scale Producers 0.3 0.8












Rural Proletariat 33.5 30.5
Source: Envio 11985. September: pp.5c)
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structure are important to grasp since those structures, in large part, determined the
effectiveness of the thrust of agrarian policy and social transformation during the
revolutionary years.
In summary, the arguments outlined in this section suggest that social relations in
rural Nicaragua in general (and the agroexport sector in particular) are extremely
complex and diverse. As well as the broad range of different sectors and the
different forms of production engaged in, and the different dynamics of the various
regions of the country, analysis is also complicated by the fact that any individual
may participate in more than one form of production (capitalist or subsistence
production) or in more than one position in the same social relation (for example as
both a buyer and seller of wage labour, see Zalkin, 1989b:579).
These issues are returned to below with regard to the changes in agrarian structure
that occurred during the 1980s. The following discussion places those debates
within the context of the evolution of the FSLN's agrarian policy and the changes
(intended and unintended; see Dore and Weeks, 1992a&b) that occurred in rural
class structure during the course of the 1980s.
6.8b(iii) Debates about Agrarian Reform:
In years to come, one of the most enduring features of the transformations wrought
in revolutionary Nicaragua will probably be seen as the changes in rural society
occasioned by the wide-ranging agrarian reform programme instigated during the
course of the 1980s. By the end of the decade, approximately 2,024,000 hectares of
land had been distributed to 120,000 families (Martinez, 1993:475). The prevalence
of the large haciendas which had dominated Nicaragua's rural sector, at least in the
Pacific and the coffee producing and ranching areas of the interior, was dramatically
reduced. Table 6.12 shows how between 1980 and 1988 the agricultural land under
the control of the largest private landholders decreased from 36% to 6.4% of the
national total. Regionally the transformations oscillated between areas where by
1988 the largest farms (those of over 500 manzanas) represented only 4 or 5% of
total agricultural land (in Rio San Juan and the Pacific for example) to those where,
for example in the case of Region V, they still represented as much as 18%
(representing the importance of the large ranches of that region; Wheelock, 1989:6).
A new state farm sector was also created and, more importantly, an important sector
of cooperatives. Furthermore, a large number of small individual peasants received
new or improved access to land through redistribution or the establishment of
official titles to lands already farmed by individuals and the indigenous
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communities. The changes in land tenure that occurred between 1978 and 1988 are
revealed in Table 6.12.20
This reform process was designed to meet the demands of the peasantry for land
(although see discussions below), guarantee the self-sufficiency of the nation in
basic foodstuffs, but also to rapidly develop the efficiency of resource utilization in
Nicaraguan agriculture.21 Along with their commitment to the maintenance of
agricultural production, then, the Sandinistas were also committed to the expansion
of basic grain production and an improvement in the living conditions of the
peasants that made up the bulk of such production. The FSLN, however, faced the
dilemma of how to effect an improvement in the position of the peasant producers
without completely undermining the basis of the relations of production which
sustained the export sector. Enriquez (1991:chapter 4), therefore, arguing in a line
strongly supportive of initial government perspectives, suggests that the political
necessity of agrarian reform stood in contradiction to the government's efforts to
reactivate and modernize agro-export production, through its negative effects upon
the supply of seasonal labour to the large capitalist export producers and the state
farms. The transformation of economic structures and the provision of basic
consumption were dependent on the income earned in the export sector, and the
expansion of export production, at least in the short term, was seen as still being
dependent on the supply of cheap labour from the peasant sector.
The FSLN's adherence to the capitalist agro-export model of agrarian structure
during the early years of the revolutionary period, accentuated the importance
attached to these contradictions in the evolution of agrarian policy. Firstly, the
model suggested that, since the production of export commodities was largely the
preserve of the capitalist sector, and dependent for the supply of labour on the need
for the semi-proletarianized masses to sell their labour power, then any extended
20 It should be noted that, by the end of the decade, the size of the state sector had been much
reduced from the level it had reached in the mid-1980s. In 1989 it represented around 12% of
agricultural land, although during the Mid 1980s it had peaked at around 24%.
21 The rationale for the reform process was to be found in the marginalization of the nation's
peasant producers throughout the consolidation of the agro-export model. The rapid development of
the export sector in the period after the SecondWorld War had induced a stagnation in the production
of basic food commodities in Nicaragua. Before that time, the country had been largely self-sufficient
in basic grain production, but the lack of attention paid to the needs of the peasantry during the boom
years of the export sector, meant that per capita levels of basic grain production fell over the
following decades (despite increases in some regions). Of particular importance was the transformation
of the Pacific Region away from the previous dominance of basic grain production, and towards the
concentration of land in the sugar and cotton estates and the accompanying dispersal of the small
peasant producers to the poorer soils of the agricultural frontier. With each expansion in export
production the average size of peasant farms decreased and the numbers without land rose. Thus
between 1963 and 1972 the proportion of farms smaller than ten manzanas rose from 35% to 50%,
whilst the number of middle sized peasant farms (those between ten and fifty manzanas) decreased from
37.4% to 28% (Enriquez, 1991:46-47).
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PRIVATE 8073 100 3708 45.9
> 500 manzanas 2920 36.2 514 6.4
200-500 manzanas 1311 16.2 725 9.0
50-200 manzanas 2431 30.1 1401 17.4
10-50 manzanas 1241 15.4 929 11.5
< 10 manzanas 170 2.1 137 1.7






i - CSM 37 0.5
Land distributed to
individuals 209 2.6
- Special Titling 1459 18.1
- Titling of Communal
Indigenous lands 170 2.1
Abandoned Areas 459 5.7
TOTAL 8073 100 8073 100
Key:
CAS = Sandinista Agricultural Production Cooperatives
CCS = Credit and Service Cooperatives
CT = Work Collectives
CSM = 'Dead Furrow' Cooperatives (land held in common but farmed individually)
Source: CIERA (1989), Volume 9: 39
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process of land redistribution would be likely to disrupt the supply of labour
(Kaimowitz, 1987:150 and Garcia. 1990b). Individuals with new, or expanded
access, to their own land were seen as less likely to desire or need to sell their
labour power. This problem is clearly spelt out in the following quote from
Enriquez (1991:57)22
"This effect was particularlyfelt during the critical months of the harvest.
FIDA (1980:146) characterized this dilemma in a discussion of the limited
options open to revolutionary policy makers in their efforts to achieve
economic reactivation and transformation: "The policy ofstrengthening and
reorganizing the campesino sector tends to break one of the fundamental
givens on which the functioning of the agroexport sector is based: the
existence ofa reserve labour supply whose low level of income and
absence ofalternative sources ofemployment has left them at this
disposition of this sectorfor use during the agroexport harvests, without
causing the sector additional costs during the rest of the year." Thus
surfaced the contradiction between harvest labour requirements, which
were essential to maintaining agroexportproduction, and the needfor basic
structural changes in the agrarian sector to bring about a more equitable
distribution of the nation's resources."
Such fears underlay the FSLN's initial mistrust of any widespread programme of
expropriations and, more importantly, the granting of land to individuals. Secondly,
because the model suggested that the level of semi-proletarianization was relatively
high, then it could be argued that improvements in the position of the rural poor
could best be achieved through improvements in the conditions of paid
employment. This could be achieved through the development of state productive
activities, the freeing of labour organization and the provision of services to
agricultural workers, rather then the redistribution of land.23 The dominance of this
perspective was also made apparent in the forms of popular organization
encouraged in rural areas by the FSLN, who attempted to organize rural proletarians
and smallholders together in the same organization, the ATC (the agricultural
worker's union), despite their often contradictory interests (Kaimowitz, 1987:151,
Deere et al, 1985:82-89, and Garcia, 1990b).24
22 The FIDA Report referred to in the following quote had taken place during the initial agricultural
cycles of the revolutionary period and had been directed by the internationally renowned agricultural
specialist Solon Barraclough. The findings of the Report lent international institutional support to the
dominant view of the semi-proletarianized nature ofNicaragua's rural economy and, possibly more
importantly, the importance of the agrarian reform and other pro-peasant strategies in reducing the
supply of labour to the export sector (Buitelaar et al, 1986:8).
23 It was also argued that the improvement in working conditions could not be achieved through
increasing the level of wages offered in the harvest because any such increases would have to reflect
similar increases in the production of wage goods if they were not to lead to higher levels of inflation
(Kaimowitz, 1987:149).
24 One of these conflicts revolved around the decision of the ATC in November 1980 to pursue a
campaign for more of the land of the state sector to be turned over to cooperatives. The medium-scale
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As has already been noted above, however, the Sandinistas over-estimated the
dependence of the sector upon the labour of smallholders, which made the
contradictions appear considerably worse than they were. Thus Havens and
Baumeister (1982) and Vilas (1986) argue that the harvest labour force was mainly
composed of proletarians not semi-proletarianized peasants and, further, that pro-
peasant strategies would not necessarily have a negative impact upon export levels,
because of the weight of peasant production in certain sectors (particularly beef and
coffee). They recognized the existence of labour supply problems but suggested that
they primarily related to falling labour productivity rather than any processes of
'peasantization'. In particular, it was suggested that the lessening of the degree of
exploitation of the rural labour force in the immediate post-revolutionary years
meant that there evolved a less intensive use of the available labour supply. It was
also argued that the priority given the mechanization of agricultural production
within the investment programme would mean that any labour shortages would be
only a short term problem.
Despite these arguments, the export sector, whilst not totally dependent upon semi-
proletarianized labour, was certainly heavily dependent upon it in certain regions. In
addition, Enriquez argues that even if harvest labour was primarily dependent on
proletarianized sectors who had no access to land, this would not necessarily reduce
the possibilities of labour supply problems, because those sectors would also be
likely to return to simple commodity production if offered improved access to land
or other measures beneficial to peasant production. Whatever the true nature of
harvest labour shortages, they did continue to be a problem in subsequent harvest
periods; a fact evidenced by the need for the state to encourage voluntary brigades
of harvesters from the cities.
The debates over the level of proletarianization, the weight of small and medium
production and, even more importantly, the incidence of those factors upon the
likelihood of, and reasons behind, labour shortages in the export sector still remains
far from concluded (for further debate see the sections on coffee and cotton
production in Chapter Seven, an excellent article by Max Spoor (Spoor, 1990) and
the previously cited works by Laura Enriquez, Michael Zalkin, David Kaimowitz
and Eduardo Baumeister). The themes are returned to below in a detailed discussion
of the major stages of agrarian policy during the 1980s and their effects upon the
landholders saw this as threat to the supply of harvest labour and a significant minority began to see
the large capitalist sector organizations (such as UPANIC) as potential allies. To counteract this in
April 1981 UNAG (the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers) was formed in an effort to unite the
countries small and medium producers (Smith, 1993:170). See also the following discussions in this
chapter about the role ofUNAG in the later direction of the agrarian reform.
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various strata of the export sector.
6.8b(iv) 1979-1985: State-led Accumulation and Initial Agrarian
Transformation:
6.8b(iv)a The Role of the State:
In this initial period the most important aspect to agrarian policy was the attempt to
improve labour conditions on the large private farms and the newly-formed state
sector. One of the first acts of the revolutionary government had been the
expropriation of the properties of Somoza and his associates. Initial estimates,
based upon the importance attached to the large farms in Wheelock's analysis of the
agricultural sector, suggested that these properties represented nearly 50% of the
agricultural land of the country (in reality they constituted about 20%). Thus, it was
assumed that their transformation into state farms would provide employment for a
significant proportion of the semi-proletarianized workforce of the export sector
(Kaimowitz, 1987:146-7).25 As suggested above, arguments from within the
party, and the demands of the peasantry, for the individual or collective
redistribution of land, were strongly resisted due to a number of factors. These
included, fears about the supply of labour during the harvest periods, concern that
the individual distribution of land would make the later development ofmore
cooperative forms of production impossible, and worries that any process of
redistribution would lead to a deluge of land invasions, threatening national unity
and the fragile alliance with the private section (see Chapter Four and Envio.
September 1985, 8-10c). The government's position is clearly spelt out in the
following quote from the Minister of Agriculture, Jaime Wheelock;
"Ifwe distribute too much land, there will be a disequilibrium between
agroexports andproduction for domestic consumption, between individual
peasant property and state and large-scale private production
We wouldprefer to maintain control over land and begin to drain the
peasantry toward export production or modern plantation agriculture, with
the peasant becoming a worker in the process. It is preferable for socio¬
economic and historic reasons that the land belong to the state." (Speech by
JaimeWheelock, May 1980, quoted in Kaimowitz, 1987:147-148)26
25 In fact the constitution of the state farms did increase employment opportunities and agro-
industrial employment in particular rose 25% between 1979 and 1980. However, as Kaimowitz
(1987:157-8) argues, the growth in employment did not benefit the majority of the rural poor. For
example, one of the main groups benefited were sugar workers. This group already enjoyed more
secure semi-permanent working conditions and higher wages than many of their counterparts in other
sectors and in the initial revolutionary period many became permanent workers on the state farms.
Furthermore, over the following years, although state farm production levels rose, this reflected
increased acreage and mechanization rather than increasing employment levels, by 1982 large capitalist
producers generated more employment per manzana than the state farms (Kaimowitz, 1987:179-80).
26 Marchetti (1989b) contrasts the technocratic state-led strategy ofWheelock andMIDINRA with
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In essence, the period to 1985 was characterized by the implementation of a
technocratic state-led accumulation strategy. This was based upon the expansion and
modernization of agro-export production in the newly-formed state sector and the
large capitalist farms (and to a lesser extent production cooperatives) as a means of
financing a mid-to-long-term process of economic restructuring through agro-
industrial development and the expansion of popular consumption. As outlined again
by Jaime Wheelock;
"The economic strength of the country must be based upon the industrial
transformation ofnatural resources. Ifwe persevere with this we shall be
able to overcome the agroexport model.
The new role of the Nicaraguan economy within the international division of
labour must overcome its traditional characterization as a supplier of raw
materials on the basis ofcheap labour, in order to initiate the development of
industrialproducts with greater value-added and which make better use of the
comparative advantages which arise from our natural economic
environment
Economic reactivation must be founded on modernization, principally of
agriculture through irrigation, mechanization, genetic improvement and the
rational management of the productive process." (Wheelock, 1989:7)
The nationalization of external commerce saw the state assume control of the
commercialization of virtually all imports and exports, a sizeable and prioiritized state
productive sector was established, the APP (the Area of People's Property), and state
control was exerted over the most important policy instruments, through which the
access of the different types of producer in the sector to credit was controlled,
exchange rates, interest rates and producer prices set, and the relations between
employers and employees regulated. Within this strategy the state organizations of the
APP were prioritized in the provision of credit from the national financial system
(although there was also a dramatic expansion of credit to the peasant sector) and they
were also the site of by far the largest proportion of investment projects.
The underlying model of accumulation initiated during this period was therefore
dualistic, with the modern technologically advanced state and capitalist sectors leading
the accumulation process and eventually absorbing the traditional peasant-based
sector. Changes in productive structure and the rapid development of the forces of
the alternative pro-peasant strategy later articulated by UNAG, and authors such as Eduardo Baumeister
and David Kaimowitz (see discussions below). He also presents an interesting parallel with the debates
between Bukharin and Preobrazhenski about the New Economic Policy in Russia during the 1920s.
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production were then to be complemented by the expansion of the administrative role
of the state. This would be achieved through the gradual elimination of private
commerce and the establishment of a state monopoly over the capture and marketing
of domestic foodstuffs and export revenues, and the control of wages (which was
made politically feasible through the imposition of official price controls and rationing
to ensure the cheap supply of basic necessities; Fitzgerald, 1988:20). The lynch pin of
this strategy was the attempt to restructure the insertion of the economy into the
international system, through a large-scale programme of investments in agro-
industrial production and the technification of agricultural production. To finance this,
given the lack of private sector accumulation and investment, state current expenditure
had to rise and, to a large degree, this had to be financed out of the projected future
growth levels of the programmed investments themselves, although in the first years
foreign aid flows had also been significant. (Irvin and Croes, 1988:33).
As argued in Chapter 4.7, for an initial period (1979-1982), the investment
programme was largely limited to the reconstruction of the social and economic
infrastructure and providing support for the short-term recovery of production. The
following three to four year period, however, saw the implementation of an extensive
programme of productive investment centred upon the newly formed state sector (and
to a lesser extent, production cooperatives) where land was to be much more
intensively cultivated through the doubling of the area of irrigated land, the large-scale
mechanization of production, and the use of new seed varieties. At the same time the
capacity for the processing of the major export commodities was to be greatly
expanded and modernized (Kleiterp, 1988:7 and Irvin and Croes, 1988:34). The
greatest weight of investment in the agricultural sector was given to the development
of large projects in the cattle and sugar sectors; although there were also substantial
investments in integrated rural development projects, tobacco, vegetable oils and basic
grain production (Barricada 5th December 1983). Several of the largest projects had
costs of more than $100 million each, including the Tipitapa sugarmill and the
Chiltepe dairy plant. One of the major disappointments of the Sandinista period was
the failure of this imaginative and far-reaching programme of productive investment to
stimulate to any great degree the performance of the economy.
Kleiterp (1988:3) points out an historical parallel in the Soviet case;
"Bukharin in the debate over industrialization in the Soviet Union in the
1920s argued that an overextension ofcapital expenditure will not be
paralleled by construction activity ofa corresponding size; will inevitably
cause, after a lapse ofsome time, an interruption of the projects already
started, will exert, in many directions, unfavourable effects on other lines
ofproduction; will exacerbate the goods famine all around; and will
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eventually retard the tempo ofdevelopment. Bukharin warned that with
higher capital costs the completion time ofprojects would be longer and
the productive effects offactories would to be much lower in the short-
term." Kleiterp (1988:3)
All of these factors were to prove relevant in the Nicaraguan case. The large
investment projects demanded a large portion of dwindling resources, without having
a significant effect on concurrent production levels (the projects being geared toward
new projects rather than the replacement or modernization of existing capital stock,
Kleiterp, 1988:27). One of the problems was that donor countries preferred to finance
completely new projects rather than invest in the modernization of existing stock.
Also many of the projects had to have been on the verge of completion before any
production could begin. Alternative smaller projects, with more immediate productive
responses, were often abandoned as access to resources dwindled. In addition the
performance of the prioritised state sector was far from successful, which represented
a serious misuse of scarce resources. In fact the disappointing performance of the
state sector and the problems the state faced in directing the process of accumulation
more generally produced a number of major problem in the implementation of this
initial strategy.
Firstly, the scale of state productive activities seriously over-stretched its
administrative capacity.27 Most top level economic administrators had fled the country
after the revolution, which had led to problems of inexperience in the administration
of the newly expanded state sector and the need for on the job training. The properties
which were transferred to the state through the nationalization of the farms, industries
and other business concerns of Somoza and his associates, were extremely diverse
with different structures and forms of operation and their management required
considerable skill and flexibility. All of this led to a higher level of centralization in the
organizational structure and decision making processes of the productive activities of
the state than would originally have been desired (Kruegar and Austin, 1983:3-6).
Thus, although production levels on the state farms rose in this initial period,
relatively little attention seems to have been paid to questions of efficiency, and with
the control of budgets, investment decisions, and even wage levels, determined
centrally it was often difficult to even approximate the level of production costs
(Kaimowitz, 1988:123). The combination of these factors meant that the state sector
failed to achieve the dynamic level of accumulation intended.
Secondly, the attempt to intervene widely in the day to day running of the economy
27 For a more general discussion of the productive and managerial role of the state during the
1980s see Chapter Four.
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introduced all sorts of disequilibria.28 The FSLN had hoped that its usurption and
extension of the Somoza's monopoly over finance and commerce would enable them
to control the accumulation process without necessarily directly controlling the
majority of productive activities (Kaimowitz, 1988:121). The administrative
limitations of the state, however, meant that its attempts to control markets ultimately
failed. Basically the attempts by the FSLN to eliminate the exploitative aspects of
market relations through direct intervention in the setting of prices and exchange
levels and so forth also destroyed the allocative role played by the market without the
provision of efficient alternative mechanisms. The institutional organization of the
state also impeded the efficiency of planning, with a lack of inter-ministry
coordination leading to the relatively independent operation of the key ministries and
their occasional pursuit of directly contradictory policies. This produced the massive
distortions in relative prices described in Chapter Four which had serious impacts
upon overall economic efficiency (Spoor, 1992:17).
Thirdly, the central role of the state in the accumulation process created a lack of
definition in the role of the other sectors. The case of the peasant sector is considered
below, but the issue is important in relation to the private sector overall. Given the
decision to legitimise the participation of the private sector in the transition process,
the means of reproduction of that sector are important to consider. If too much
surplus is extracted from private producers, and the availability of luxury
consumption items is constrained, then the private sector has little incentive to
produce efficiently (Kleiterp, 1988:3). One of the major problems for the FSLN,
throughout the revolutionary period was, therefore, how to effect the participation of
the large capitalist sector.
6.8b(iv)b Relations with the Capitalist Sector:
Given their initial understanding of the agrarian economy, the FSLN also placed
great emphasis on maintaining production levels on the large private capitalist
farms, recognizing the need to offer sufficient incentives to such producers if their
continued production in the dramatically altered situation of the post-revolutionary
era was to be assured. Initially, in recognition of the importance of private sector
technical and managerial skills, many of the high ranking positions within the
national financial system, and other economic posts were occupied by reformist-
28 Relatively few figures on the profitability of the state farms are available. However, those studies
that do exist suggest that in 1980 the state farms made considerable losses which do not appear to
have been substantially improved upon in later years.
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minded individuals of the private sector.29 However, it was also recognized that the
private sector would be unlikely to risk their own capital under conditions dictated
by the FSLN. Therefore, the provision of state credit to these producers was
expanded at extremely favourable terms, and it was hoped that, through the use of
these capital flows, private producers would continue to participate in the economy,
even if only in a managerial role (Kaimowitz, 1987:148).
How to provide conditions for the profitable reproduction of the capitalist sector
was a major dilemma for the FSLN. They were faced with the need to design
policies which would provide suitable conditions for private sector production and
reinvestment, in a context where many large producers were politically opposed to
the revolution, would be unlikely to respond to the incentives offered, and more
likely to search for means to destabilize the government and engage in
decapitalization, whilst exploiting any economic incentives offered to them. As
Colburn (1985:45) argues;
"Tension and uncertainty between the state and the private sector are further
compounded by the difficult task ofevaluating private sector compliance
with state expectations and state-set norms. Private producers, confronting
a cohesive andmilitant state, most often respond to ill-regardedpolicies not
with open-confrontation tactics but with passive non-compliance, evasion,
deception, flight and even subtle sabotage."
As the revolutionary period progressed private producers felt threatened by the
emerging organization of labour, the expropriation of property, and the Marxist-
Leninist rhetoric of the FSLN. The FSLN had to try to convince those large
producers remaining in the country that, if they were to continue to produce
efficiently, then their property would be respected. Colburn offers an interesting
insight into the fears of the private sector toward their changing circumstances and
the worsening relationship between such groups and the FSLN which evolved
through to the mid-1980s;
"With the consolidation of the Sandinistas power, cotton growers and
other members of the bourgeoisie began to fearfor their futures. They
increasingly felt that they were only accommodated because of their
29 As the revolutionary era progressed, however, the participation of representatives of the private
sector in economic administration declined. Nonetheless, the technocratic bias of the FSLN's
economic strategy ensured the evolution of an expanded managerial beaurocracy, at least until the
widespread rationalization of the administrative structure of the state in the economic reforms of the
late 1980s
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contribution to the economy, and once they could be dispensed with, they
would be finished. Asked what the government wantedfrom the private
sector, an entrepreneur replied, "Obey. Produce as long as I want you to.
I'll cut your throat when I want. Be my servant. Do as I say until I'm
ready to dispose ofyou." Such an attitude is common among Nicaragua's
large agricultural producers." (Colbum, 1986:56)
To assuage these worries, and to try to stimulate export production, a series of
incentives were offered to private exporters, especially following the ratification of
the mixed economy strategy by the second Sandinista Assembly in 1982 (Vilas,
1986:160. Exchange policy was geared toward the provision of low cost imports,
credit was made available extremely easily and relatively cheaply as interest rates
were kept at levels below inflation, a system of guaranteed prices was introduced,
and the continued presence of large numbers of harvest workers encouraged
through the limiting of the agrarian reform process (Frenkel, 1991:163). Given the
importance they attached to the rural labour force, the government also placed a
strong emphasis upon the level of wages in the sector, both in terms of improving
working conditions and the limitation of production costs. Thus although the
minimum wage level enacted by the Ministry of Labour in the first year of the
revolution effectively raised wages in the export sector by 30% in comparison with
pre-revolutionary minimum levels.30 In general terms, the government sought to
control wage levels to avoid inflation and provide added incentives to the large
capitalist producers. Thus greater attention was paid to improving working
conditions rather than increasing monetary rewards. The minimum wage levels for
the temporary harvest workers were, therefore, set and maintained at relatively low
levels which some have argued served to further undermine the desirability of
selling labour at a time when the possibilities for smallholders to survive through
simple commodity production were improving (Enriquez, 1991:103).31
Despite the measures outlined, the policies developed toward the sector did not
necessarily provide private producers with the necessary incentives. Private sector
representatives consistently argued that the exchange rate was over-valued, which
coupled with their lack of access to liquid exchange, acted as a disincentive to
exporters. This disincentive was made more serious by the lack of security large
30 Given the feeble nature of pre-revolutionary enactment of minimum wage levels, this actually
represented increases of a much greatermagnitude.
31 Agricultural workers did, however, gain from measures taken to improve working conditions.
These included the provision of child care facilities and medical facilities in the harvest seasons, the
improvement of workplace food and efforts made to reduce the abuse of pesticides. Many of these
changes reflected the growing organizational skill of the ATC (Kaimowitz, 1987:160-66 and Garcia,
1990b).
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private landowners had in their property status and the growing demands of the
peasantry for land redistribution, the declining productivity and growing strength of
labour organization, and the relative prioritization of the state and cooperative
sectors in the distribution of credit, as well as the series of measures passed to
control land rents.32
One problem was the provision of inadequate producer prices for agricultural
products, which do not seem to have been sufficiently offset by the easy and cheap
availability of credit and the low price of imports. The use of guaranteed prices had
been intended to protect producers from the vagaries of international market
movements, but often proved too inflexible to provide sufficient incentive to the
private sector to produce an increase in production levels.
Preferential exchange rates for exporters had first been systematically developed in
February 1982, and were introduced at a level which was intended to cover the costs
of production and a suitable rate of profit. Prices were fixed in accordance with
international prices and were paid, one part at the official exchange rate, and one part
at a less attractive level (Barricada 12th September 1983). In July of the same year
special import rates were also introduced in favour of exporters, who enjoyed a rate
of 15 cordobas to the dollar which lay between the 10:1 official rate of the
government and the 28:1 offered on the parallel market (Cabieses, 1986:85-86).
In summary, therefore, despite the incentives offered, the productive response of the
private sector was not great and, in particular, private investment retracted
considerably in comparison with the pre-revolutionary period. Large producers
certainly did face problems during this period but, in many cases, their sluggish
performance reflected the conscious political decisions of individuals to limit
production seriously questioning their prioritization within government policy.
6.8b(iv)c Relations With The Peasantry 1: 1979-82
"It will always be seen as one of the major cruelties ofhistory that the
government that most wanted to act in favour of the peasantry, was that
which had to confront a bloody war, entering into conflict with the same
historical subject that the Sandinista revolution claimed to represent."
(Bendana, 1991:13)
The attention paid to the state and large capitalist sectors meant that the thrust of
32 Between 1981 and 1986, for example, the proportion of agricultural credit which went to the
large private sector fell from 43.9% to 27%; although this of course also represented the declining size
of the sector due to the effects of the agrarian reform- see discussions below (Barahona et al, 1988:59).
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initial agrarian policy, whilst involving the re-distribution of a certain amount of
land, was primarily oriented toward the transformation of credit and marketing
arrangements and the encouragement of peasant cooperatives and labour
organization. Despite the evolution of these more favourable policies, the access of
small and medium producers to capital goods and consumer products remained
relatively depressed given the priority attached to the other sectors (Utting, 1988:40-
41 and Kaimowitz, 1988:125). Support for the peasant sector during this period
was basically limited to a series of ad-hoc measures such as, decreases in the level
of land rents, the elimination of exploitative commercial intermediaries (through the
nationalization of the export sector and the establishment of ENABAS, the state
basic grain procurement agency) and, in particular, an attempt to improve and
expand the provision of credit to the peasant sector (Kaimowitz, 1987:151).
Throughout the Somoza period the peasant sector had received, on average, less
than 10% of total disbursed credits in the agricultural sector. During the 1979/80
cycle the total credit offered peasant producers through the Rural Credit Programme
expanded practically fivefold, and over 65% of the peasants registered in that cycle
were receiving credit for the first time (Enriquez, 1991:94 and Barahona et al,
1988:54). Much of this expansion was directed toward the cooperative sector. The
expansion was not, however, followed up during the following cycle. The
recuperation in production did not match the resources offered to the extent hoped
for and it became clear that repayment rates were extremely limited. The
administration of such an expansion of the nation's financial system into areas of
poor infrastructure caused all sorts of problems for the state. This meant that the
supply of credit to peasant producers remained at a level which was proportionally
less than the weight of the contribution of that sector to the value of production
(Baumeister and Cuadra, 1986:181).
The lack of consistent access to inputs and services meant that the expansion of
credit often rather than acting to increase production ended up as a consumption
subsidy, increasing the level of inflation in rural areas (Enriquez, 1991:95). Their
improved access to credit did, however, have the indirect effect of allowing small
producers greater independence from the monopolistic financial sectors they had
previously been dominated by (Kaimowitz, 1987:162).
Peasant producers were also able to take advantage of the state subsidization of
agricultural inputs through the overvaluation of the exchange rate (Kaimowitz,
1987:166). They also gained from the new rent ceilings imposed by the government
especially after the Spring of 1980 (Deere et al, 1985:83). This was particularly
important in the most intensively farmed areas of export production where access to
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land was at a premium and, therefore, rent levels had been particularly high. Rental
ceilings were thus established which varied according to the crops to be produced
and the region (MIDINRA, 1984:18). The measures affected a reduction in the non¬
monetary forms of land rental but were also problematic because it was difficult for
the state to enforce the rental ceilings and the refusal of landlords to rent lands to
small producers at the official rates (Enriquez, 1991:96-97 and Colbum, 1986:87-
8).
Despite the transformations wrought in favour of the peasant sector and the worries
which the government expressed over their effects upon the supply of labour to the
export sector, the needs of the large groups of small and medium producers were
often not met. The prioritized state sector had very limited links to the other
productive sectors, despite the assumption of the government that the expansion of
the role of the state, and its lead role in productive activities, would provide
increasing jobs for the semi-proletarianized masses. As Utting (1988:42) argues,
the attack on the exploitative role of the large private producers and various classes
of unproductive intermediaries had the side effect of also affecting the reproduction
of some sectors of the peasantry. Under Somoza, whilst the peasantry had been
exploited and subordinated by those sectors, they had also been partially dependent
upon them for their reproduction through the provision of credit, transport,
foodstuffs, other consumption goods, and certain agricultural inputs. The relative
failure of the state to substitute these functions, and the complicated nature of those
state institutions which were set up, made life difficult for these producers and
affected their access to essential goods and services.
"In fact on some state farms, where during Somoza's time workers
received land to plant a subsistence garden, the state administrators had
stopped this practice because they saw it as a backward andpaternalistic
form ofexploitation.... (this) gave the state sector a very bad image to the
peasants and left it open to anti-Sandinista propaganda attacks." (Envio.
September 1985: pp.8c)
Despite the continuing debates within the FSLN about the negative effects of the
agrarian reform upon labour supply, a certain level of land the redistribution of land
had occurred relatively early on through the development of a new cooperative
sector. By mid-1980 just over 2500 cooperatives had been formed (although the
majority rented lands from the state and large capitalist farms). These were mainly
of two types. Just over half were Sandinista Agricultural Cooperatives (CAS),
where land was pooled between the members, and production carried out
collectively. About a third of these were situated on state lands. The majority of the
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other cooperatives were of the Credit and Service variety (CCS), where land was
owned individually but members cooperated in order to receive collective access to
credit and technical assistance (Enriquez, 1991:88-89).
On August 21st 1981, in response to the mounting dissatisfaction of the peasantry
at the pace of land redistribution, The Agrarian Reform Law was passed.33 This
law legalized the expropriation of land from large estates if it was being used
unproductively. This stipulation was again intended to limit any negative effects that
land redistribution might have upon the level of export production on the large
estates. The definition of 'unproductive,' central to the Law, was conceived of as
land that was idle or under-utilized. This was defined as any farm which had not
been farmed for two years, or on which less than 75% of its total acreage was
cultivated. The law only applied to those units with more than 500 manzanas in the
Western regions, Matagalpa and Jinotega, and 1000 manzanas elsewhere. Although
some of the land expropriated passed into the hands of the growing state sector,
because the Law was intended to meet some of the demands of the peasantry for
land, the pace of redistribution to cooperatives and even individuals expanded after
the Law was passed. However, the pace of expropriations enacted under the law
was slow, and the redistribution of the affected properties even slower reflecting the
continued prioritization of the APP, and debate over the appropriate form of
productive organization of the expropriated land (Deere et al, 1985:94). In the first
nine months of its existence only just over 230,000 manzanas were confiscated and
only 20% of that land was redistributed to the peasant sector during the same period
(Enriquez, 1991:89-90). Furthermore, the two years from 1981, saw the partial
erosion of some of the improvements of the preceding years. Relative wages in the
harvest decreased, as did the provision of basic goods to the rural areas. Access to
credit also fell, as did the access of cooperatives to the rental of state lands (the
original cooperatives lost 30% of their members during this period, Kaimowitz,
1987:181-186). Efforts were made to offset the effects of these changes through the
provision of more favourable producer prices but generally such prices remained
below the level of the other countries of the region (Martinez, 1993:478).
6.8b(iv)d Relations With The Peasantry 2: 1983-84
In 1983 there was something of a sea change in agrarian policy as confiscated
33 One of the key moments in the articulation of demands for land came on February 17th 1980
when around 30,000 peasants and rural labourers from up and down the country converged upon the
Plaza of the Revolution in Managua to demand the intensification of the expropriation and
redistribution of land (Ruchwarger, 1988:230).
properties began to be distributed to cooperatives and the number of expropriations
carried out under the auspices of the 1981 agrarian reform law was expanded. By
the end of that year over 425,000 manzanas had been redistributed. Kaimowitz
(1988:49) argues that in the preceding years the government had seen the existing
cooperatives as competing with the state sector for resources and undermining the
requirements of the export sector. As worries about the latter receded and the war
intensified, policy toward the cooperative and peasant sectors began to be rethought
and the CAS cooperatives in particular began to be given greater priority. Between
1982 and 1984 the proportion of agricultural land under the control of the CAS
cooperatives increased form 2 to 10%, whilst between 1981 and 1983 their share of
the total disbursement of rural credit increased from 6 to 23% (Kaimowitz,
1987:208-9).
In addition, attempts to consolidate the land holdings of individual peasants in the
Northern Interior was massively expanded through the granting of official land titles
in an effort to discourage the drift of certain sectors into the ranks of the Contra. By
the end of 1983 nearly 200,000 manzanas had been titled in this way, and by the
end of 1984, 30,000 families had received land. However, as argued in Envio 1985
(September: pp.11-12c), many of the plots which the peasants were given title to
were not even large enough for subsistence purposes. In response to the escalation
of the ContraWar over the following months the government prioritized and
expanded the level of individual redistribution and titling. By December 1984 nearly
2 million manzanas had been either redistributed or titled (66% of this total
represented the latter). In essence, however, as Martinez (1993:480) argues in
opposition to others, such as Kaimowitz (1987), the shifts in policy toward the
peasant sector of this period did not really represent a re-evaluation of the role of
peasant production in the economy writ-large. Rather, the provision of individual
titles was still seen as a transitory step toward more cooperative forms of production
and priority continued to be given to the large agro-industrial projects and the state
farms in the distribution of investment.
In summary, the initial five to six years of the revolutionary period saw the
implementation of a technocratic model of accumulation within the agricultural
sector. The new enterprizes of the state sector were prioritzed in the distribution of
credit and resources and also were the site of the major part of the substantial
investment programme. At the same time a series of incentives were offered to the
large-scale private exporters (including the cheap availability of credit, guaranteed
prices and low cost imports) whilst improvements in the position of the salaried
workforce were limited to improving working conditions and other non-monetary
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benefits rather than any widespread improvements in wage levels. At the same time,
the state attempted to intervene within the economy to control the direction of
economic processes through the setting of exchange rates and other prices. The
peasant sectors benefited from their improved access to credit, inputs and services
(especially if they were organized into cooperatives) and the establishment of
controls upon the level of land rents, but a lack of progress in the redistribution of
land, the somewhat heavy-handed approach of the state toward the cooperativization
of the sector and the adverse effects of its attempts to regulate markets (and the
evolution of a cheap food policy which depressed domestic agricultural prices) all
impinged negatively upon peasant producers and were factors in the slow drift of
certain sectors of the peasantry into the arms of the Contra (Bendana, 1991:40).
6.8b(v) 1985-1990: The Strategic Alliance with the Peasantry and
Economic Stabilization
The final five years of the Revolution were initially characterized by a re-evaluation of
the role of the peasantry within the revolutionary process and a radical deepening of
agrarian transformation. This, however, proved to be short lived, and following a
series of economic reforms initiated in 1988, attention shifted toward the wholesale
liberalization of the national economy and prioritization was given to ensuring the
profitability and participation of the large capitalist sector.
6.8b(v)a The Turn Toward the Peasantry:
In 1985 there was a major turning point in FSLN policy toward the agricultural
sector on two inter-related fronts. Firstly, as explored in detail in Chapter Four, that
year saw major reforms in overall economic policy, with the government turning
away from the policies of large scale intervention in the running of the economy
toward policies which represented the partial reintroduction ofmarket forces.
Secondly, there was a reappraisal of overall agrarian strategies, and a movement
away from the priority given to increasing accumulation in the state sector, toward a
strategy based upon the expansion of the peasant sector, through a deepening of the
agrarian reform and the reorientation of economic policies to give advantages to
peasant producers. Investment priorities shifted from the large agro-industrial
projects to the maintenance of existing capacity and providing support for the
peasant and cooperative sectors (Kaimowitz, 1988:131). Both strategies represented
the limiting of state intervention and were accompanied by processes of
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decentralization and an attempt to give greater regional autonomy to the regional
offices of government ministries and popular organizations (Kaimowitz, 1989).
The economic reforms of 1985 were explicitly designed to transform the rural-urban
terms of trade in favour of the peasantry.34 Credit to small and medium agricultural
producers was expanded and consumer subsidies on basic foods slashed. The
number of privately owned rural retail outlets was expanded and the role of UNAG
(the independent rural producers union) in the distribution of inputs and consumer
goods expanded (Utting, 1988:44). The prices of these inputs were more closely
monitored and the prices of the major peasant produced agricultural commodities
increased and their marketing partially liberalized. Furthermore, the position of the
more proletarianized sectors of the rural poor were also prioritized through
improvements in harvest wages levels and an expansion in the supply of goods to
the stores operated on the larger coffee and cotton farms. Utting (1988:44-45) also
suggests that the wider role of state enterprizes was extended during this period to
encompass the provision of inputs, capital goods, technical and other forms of
assistance (marketing and repair services for example) to all of the different property
sectors in their locality.
The combination of these factors meant that the logic of the model of accumulation
shifted in an attempt to improve the conditions of the peasantry, encourage their
participation in the revolutionary project, and halt the drift of certain sectors toward
the Contra. The shifts in policy reflected the emergence of a more flexible approach
toward agrarian transformation and economic planning on the part of the
government. The limited ability of the state to control the accumulation process in
the desired way was recognized as well as the poor productive performance of the
APP and the lack of responsiveness of the larger private producers to the incentives
which had been offered to them. This was combined with an acknowledgement of
the criticisms which had been made of the 'Capitalist agro-export model' which led
to a greater recognition of the importance of smallholders to export production and
the damage which the subsidization of food prices had done to basic grain
production, this was reflected in a greater tolerance to a wider range of tenure forms
within the reform sector and the partial economic liberalization noted above
(Baumeister, 1991:235).
The changes in policy of this period also reflected the growing importance of
34 As suggested in the previous section, peasant producers, whilst gaining from improved access to
credit, inputs and services in the first revolutionary years, had still been left relatively starved of
resources. They had also had to face markets with artificially low prices because of the government's
commitment to the subsidization of basic food consumption (again reflecting the FSLN's overall bias
toward the improvement of working conditions rather than the widening of opportunities for peasant
production).
UNAG and their influence upon the government One of the ways in which this
influence was seen lay in the fact that UNAG's arguments against the FSLN's bias
towards the most collective forms of cooperatives (the CAS cooperatives) were
responded to, and the other non-state mediated forms of cooperatives (the CCS,
CSM and CT cooperatives) were given greater priority in the following years
(Martinez, 1993:480).
In addition to the changes in economic policy outlined, from 1985 the government
began distributing land to individuals to a much greater degree than it had done
previously. With 6,204 families receiving land in 1985, which represented more
than the combined total of the previous years. Nearly ten thousand more received
land as members of cooperatives. The same year also saw improvements in the level
of harvest wages and further improvements in the supply of basic goods to the rural
areas (Kaimowitz, 1987:228-230).
In 1986 The New Agrarian Reform Law was passed. Under this law the area that
could be subject to expropriation was expanded, so that any farm, if underutilized,
could be expropriated, regardless of the size limits which had been stipulated in the
1981 law. In addition, if it could be proved that the lack of production was not due
to factors beyond the control of the landowner, then the expropriation would no
longer be compensated. Two factors underlay the extension of this reform process.
Firstly, the escalation of the ContraWar had led to the displacement of considerable
numbers of campesinos. In 1985, therefore, a resettlement programme had been put
into operation and, in that year, over 200,000 manzanas were distributed to
relocated peasants organized into nearly 230 cooperatives. The New Law was, at
least in part, designed to facilitate the availability of more land to distribute to these
groups. Secondly, analyses of the 1984 election results, had revealed that support
for the FSLN had been particularly low in areas where there were still sizeable
groups of campesinos without access to land. Finally, the deterioration in the
relationship between sectors of the large capitalist class and the government meant
that the new law was seen as a way of confiscating the lands of those who
supported the Contra (Enriquez, 1991:157-9).
Following the extension of the reform process in 1986, there was a further
consolidation of the cooperative movement in 1987. Nevertheless, in overall terms,
during the period between 1985 and 1988, there was an expansion in the proportion
of redistributed land which went to individual producers rather then cooperatives.
Between 1982 and 1984 the average land distributed to individuals annually had
been 11,000 hectares. This increased to an average of 99,000 between 1985 and
1986 (Utting, 1988:43). The evolution of the cooperative sector throughout the
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revolutionary period is detailed in Table 6.13 (for more detailed treatments of the
Cooperative movement throughout the revolutionary period see the various articles
in Encuentro. nos 30 and 37/38, Ortega, 1990 and Ruchwarger, 1988).
During the 1986/87 agricultural cycle there were certain indicators that suggested the
success of the new pro-peasant policy orientation. The area sown to maize and
beans rose considerably over the period, although climatic factors and the war
meant that production levels did not increase to the same degree. Between 1985 and
1988 the peasant and cooperative sectors increased their acreage by some 100,000
manzanas, during a period when both the state and large private sectors either
maintained or reduced the total land under cultivation (Baumeister, 1991:240).
Furthermore the 1986/87 coffee harvest saw the return of large numbers of coffee
pickers, in response to the higher wages offered (although it could be argued that
this could have reflected the declining possibilities of subsistence from other means;
Utting, 1988:45).
The changes in strategy of this period were, however, partial and possibly came too
late. By 1988 the Nicaraguan economy had descended to the brink of collapse and
the reconstituted policies toward the peasantry were not sufficient to reverse the
slide in to economic misery of large sectors of the rural population as the availability
of resources declined and inflation repeatedly undercut the intentions of government
policy (Plantinga, 1988:5). By 1989 the government had declared the end of the
agrarian reform process as attention shifted toward the attempt to regain control of
the national economy and the prioritization of the provision of incentives to the
largest agro-export producers.
6.8b(v)b Austerity, Stabilization and the End of the Agrarian Reform:
The economic reforms initiated in the period from 1985, whilst representing an
attempt to improve the relative position of the peasantry and link them more directly
into the revolutionary process, also continued to try to stimulate export production
principally through the establishment of a multi-tier exchange rate system (Ricardo,
1989:58). The February 1985 measures gave credit advances which covered 100%
of the production costs of cotton producers and 80% of those for coffee and sugar
producers. Quite how far these were used for the purposes intended and how much
went to buy exchange on the black market is open to question and over the
following years such concerns underlay the government's worries about providing
further incentives and a continued worsening of relations with the private sector.
During the following couple of years, as the economic crisis really began to take
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hold, large producers found their access to credit increasingly restricted, especially
in contrast to the newly prioritized peasant sector. In addition, as the land reform
intensified so many larger (and some medium-sized) landowners were less certain
of the security of their property and consequendy less likely to risk their own capital
in production (Frenkel, 1991:163).
The economic reforms of 1988 and 1989 represented the continued intensification
of the pro-market changes in government policy which had been initiated in the
period since 1985, and their combination with severe mechanisms of economic
austerity. The effects of these policies seriously weakened the consolidation of the
peasant based strategy, as the limited resources to which the government had access
were channelled into the provision of incentives for the export sector (and especially
the large private producers within that sector). The state productive sector was also
slimmed and reorganized, with the remaining state farms given much greater relative
financial autonomy. Land was distributed from the state to cooperatives and
individual peasants, and many of the 'showpiece' investment projects of the state
were rationalized or abandoned. This process of rationalization involved the
amalgamation of state enterprizes into vertically integrated corporations, organized
by product-type, and the slimming down of the role that state enterprizes had
previously played in meeting the needs of other producers in their locality, through
the OTPI (the Territorial Organization of Production and Exchange). To compensate
the peasant sector for the losses involved in the abandonment of the OTPI in 1988,
the government established a system of CDCs (Peasant Development Centres)
which attempted to establish services for local producers. Unfortunately, these
centres were never sufficiently funded to compensate for the loss of the OTPI and
never achieved the amount of cooperation from local producers in their organization
which had been envisioned (Utting, 1992:186).
Attempts had been made to more rigorously adjust exchange rates in the economic
reforms of 1985, and were combined with the expansion of dollar incentives to the
export sector. Nevertheless, over the following years exporters continued to face
increasing economic difficulties. The Reforms of the late 1980s recognized the
damages which had been done to productive efficiency by the multiple exchange rate
system and were designed to be preferential to the export sector, if only to those
producing efficiently. The incredibly cheap access to imports had been an enormous
disincentive to the efficiency of production, producing such farces as the fact that in
1987 it had been cheaper to buy a new tractor than to repair it (CAHI Update. Vol.
7(9), March 30th 1988: pp. 2). The multiple exchange rate system meant that in 1987
a cotton or sugar producer paid an average of 310 cordobas for a dollar of imported
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goods and then exported their production at an average rate of 4000 cordobas per
dollar providing a massive profit incentive but little challenge for efficiency. It also
encouraged the replacement of labour costs with import costs, with consequent effects
upon employment levels (Envio Feb. 23 1988).
The provision of cheap imported inputs had been intended to compensate for the ways
in which the overvalued exchange rate offered little incentive for export activity,
especially given the state's control of the distribution of the exchange which was
earned. In fact SIDA (1989:37), the report of Lance Taylor and the other assessors
behind the design of the austerity measures, went as far as to suggest that the policy
effectively favoured domestic agricultural production over agroexports (ignoring the
preferential treatment afforded to exporters in the other ways described above). As
outlined in Chapter Four, the SIDA report was in essence a classical pro-export model
built around a series of devaluations, and its success was dependent upon the large
private producers making use of the new incentives offered (Weeks, 1993:35).
Following the June 1988 reforms, the exchange rate was readjusted to reflect inflation
levels and was thereafter adjusted periodically (in an effort to avoid 'shocks'). At the
same time producer prices were increased to try to cushion the export sector from the
loss of the subsidised imports.35 The biggest problem was the need to find a price
level that provided an incentive, without encouraging inefficient production.36
The reforms also attempted to restore a form of financial discipline to the provision of
credit to all sectors of the economy. Before the revolution about a third of all
agricultural production had received financing from the various sources of credit that
existed. By the time of the economic reforms of the late eighties this had increased to
the point where fully three quarters of production was facilitated by the national
financial system. The investment programme and the supply of cheap imported inputs
meant that the Nicaraguan agricultural sector had become the greatest consumer of
capital goods in Central America and absorbed a much higher level of inputs
(Baumeister, 1988:224). With the attempt to regain control of the provision of credit
in the 1988 reforms, a major problem was how to ensure that the cultivation levels
could be maintained. For the 1988/89 productive season the Central Bank announced
35 Dollar incentives were expanded and their distribution was related to the quality of the crop offered
for sale to the state plus an additional 25% of value in cordobas if an individual producer's exported
volume surpassed the average volume of the previous three years (Pilarte et al, 1988:4)
36 The February devaluation because of its abandonment of the multiple tiered system reflected a fall
of between 2,700 and 14,285% and unified the exchange rate at a level of 10 cordobas to the dollar.
Given the misunderstandings of the extent of the chaos in relative prices this still did not guarantee
the profitability of exporters and eventually four months later a further devaluation was carried out that
set a level of 80 cordobas to the dollar. The problem was that this new rate was introduced two
months too late to have an effect upon improving the prospects for that agricultural cycle's planting
which had occurred in April. The lack of incentive to export production which existed at that time was
reflected in the disappointing export levels in that year (see Chapter Four and Pilarte et al, 1988a:4).
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that credit would be available to farmers, but that it would only cover 80% of
production costs, with the producers themselves having to cover the remaining
20% ;37 whilst concurrently, producers were faced with the massive rises in the costs
of imported inputs caused by the devaluation. Gustavo Toruno (National Director of
UNAG) explained at the time how such a contribution would be beyond the
capabilities of all but the largest producers. Furthermore, the state farm administrators
and large private producers were in a much stronger position to negotiate
compromises from the Bank (CAHI Update June 7th 1988: 2-3). This meant that the
credit restrictions of the period effectively broke the class logic of the financial
system, hitting small farmers particularly hard. Eventually, in response to a proposal
from UNAG, and some hard political campaigning on their part, the Central Bank
agreed to retain 100% financing for the provision of agro-chemicals for coffee and
cattle raising. Whilst cotton producers, who retained average productivity, would also
receive 100% financing (Envio Oct. 31 1988).38
In sum, the initial effect of the reform programme was to plunge the economy into
severe recession (especially in those sectors producing for the domestic market and
above all the industrial sector, see SPP, 1990), until the stability of relative prices was
eventually achieved. A contemporary edition ofCAHI Update. (Vol. 7(9), March
30th 1988: pp. 2), explains why the pro-export nature of the February reforms did
not produce an immediate productive response from exporters;
"The changes mean that the cordoba part an exporter's earnings has doubled.
But the cost of imported goods, e.g. machinery andpesticides, has increased
thirty three times. Wages and local costsforfuel have risen fivefold. Thus a
coffee grower who might have been making a 75% return on his or her crop
(excluding any personal wage) would now only be earning halfof the current
production costs. For coffee growers, whose investment in their trees
requires them to maintain some production, the challenge will be to produce
more and be more efficient."
Similar perspectives were expressed by exporters in meetings with the government;
"The Vice Presiden t of the Association ofMatagalpan Coffee producers,
Jaime Castillo, said to Barricada that atpresent the measures do stimulate
production, but he thought that in a few days things would not be the same,
because costs would suffer disproportionate increases....Francisco Javier
Saenz, said, however, that the problem is not with the price of coffee, but of
37 Cuenca (1989:23) suggests credit to the productive sector had fallen by 48% by the end of 1989,
although when further restrictions were announced in January 1989, interest rates had been maintained
below 20% for four months to avoid complete agricultural collapse (Analisis. no. 0,1989:17)
38 For a detailed discussion of the proposals made by UNAG for mediating the effects of the
economic reforms upon the peasantry in the production of basic grains see Bluklan (1989).
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the modification in the policies which lead to the deterioration ofcosts. "The
problem, he said, is that we sell our coffee at prices with official parity with
the dollar, but we must buy more expansively, according to the rhythm of the
black market, that is not just." The Segovian rancher, Ulises Torres, said that
the measure that benefited them came from the opportunity to sell their crop
atparity with the dollar, but that the costs of transport andfuel seriously
affected them," (Barricada 06/01/89)
The pro-export orientation of the reform packages finally produced a productive
response in 1989 and 1990. Whilst 1988 had seen a collapse in export earnings (due
to climatic factors as well as the effects of the economic reforms), in 1989 the area
sown of some major agro-exports increased (except for a decline in cotton of
-11.1%), export earnings rose in the same year by 25%, whilst yields were also up
due to the good conditions that winter (Monterray, 1989:4, SPP, 1990:10 and
Catalan, 1993:43). This reflected the capitalist sector's increasing sense of security,
given the FSLN's announcement of the end of the agrarian reform process and the
return of some confiscated properties, more realistic exchange levels, continued falls
in the level of real wages, and the promise that the marketing of prioritized non-
traditional exports would not be centralized under the state. As argued in Chapter
Four, all of this represented a strengthening of the alliance between the state
beaurocracy and the large private producers and a reduction in the amount of
resources oriented toward the peasantry, coupled with an attack on the living
conditions of the salaried workforce CEnvio. May 1990, pp.30).
6.8c Conclusions:
This chapter has explored the productive performance of the export sector during the
years of Sandinista rule within the context of the changes in the agricultural sector
instigated by the wider evolution of FSLN agrarian policy. The discussion suggests
the importance of both internal domestic factors and external forces and the articulation
of the two in the generation of a profound crisis within the sector. The Sandinistas had
inherited an economy severely dependent upon the income earned in the traditional
export sector and a rural class structure which was built around the inequalities that
had been generated by the historical expansion of that sector. Initial government
policies, designed on the basis of a model which over-estimated the level of
capitalization of productive relations within Nicaraguan society as a whole, looked to
the development of state-centred accumulation strategy, where the prioritization of the
state farms and large private export producers was seen as the means whereby
exchange could be generated in order to finance a series of profound structural
transformations that would eventually overcome the legacy of the agro-export model.
As the Nicaraguan economy came under increasing pressure over the following years,
due to the depression of international markets and the onslaught of the ContraWar, a
group of other researchers began to question the government's strategies on the basis
of an alternative understanding of the functioning of the economy which gave greater
emphasis to smallholders and suggested lower levels of capitalization. The
combination of these two factors, with the administrative problems and contradictions
which had accompanied the initial state-led model, eventually produced a reassessment
of government strategy and a brief re-orientation of agrarian policy toward the
expansion and incorporation of peasant production under a deepening and widening of
the agrarian reform process, as well as partial process of economic liberalization. The
intensifying economic crisis eventually led to a further change in direction and an
attempt to regain control of the economy through a severe series of economic reforms,
designed primarily to savagely prune government intervention and expenditure and
provide incentives to the traditional export sector.
The various explanations for the poor productive performance of the export sector
during the 1980s are considered in detail in relation to each of the traditional
commodities in the following chapter.
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Chapter Seven
Case Studies of Individual Commodities:
Building upon the general issues outlined in the previous chapter, the present
chapter examines, in more specific detail, the evolution of the FSLN's
economic and agrarian policy in the agro-export sector during the 1980s. The
performance of four of the major commodities produced in Nicaragua (cotton,
coffee, sugar and beef, which together accounted for 74% of Total Nicaraguan
exports in 1985, see Appendix Two) are examined in turn, in order to illustrate
the different problems facing the Sandinistas in each sub-sector, the effects of
the revolution upon the social relations within each, the evolving overall levels
of production, the balance between export and domestic production, and the
differential impact of external factors.
7.1 The Coffee Sector:
7.1a Introductory Comments:
Despite periodic fluctuations, coffee exports have formed the backbone of the
Nicaraguan economy since the end of the last century. The commercial
cultivation of coffee had, however, developed much more slowly, and later, in
Nicaragua than it had done in the other countries of the isthmus. Squier, for
example, writing in 1849, refers to the backward nature of Nicaraguan coffee
cultivation in relation to the rest of the region (quoted in Wheelock, 1985: 15-
16, also see discussions in Chapter Three). During the following decades,
however, coffee production began to gain momentum, in response to high
prices in European markets, although never to such a scale as occurred in El
Salvador or Costa Rica.
By the Mid 1890s, 25,000 manzanas of coffee were being cultivated in the
country, of which 80% were in the Pacific region. Over the next 15 years,
however, there followed a rapid expansion into the North Central region, which
is now where the majority of coffee is produced in the republic.1 After the First
World War there followed a marked downturn followed, in turn, by slow
recovery until the great depression of the 1930s. At that time, the decline in
international coffee prices led to a severe stagnation in Nicaraguan production.
1 Historical sources are unclear on precisely why this shift occured, some suggest that climatic
problems in the Pacific region led to the relocation of many of those producers to the North Central
region, whilst others argue that the growth in the North Central region reflected the entry of new
groups of producers (Gariazzo, 1983).
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Investment plummeted and producers tried to compensate for their declining
earnings by increasing the quantity and quality of the coffee grown, through
continued expansion onto new lands and intensification of the exploitation of
labour (via such measures as increasing the length of the working day, paying
wages in food, and the manipulation of food prices in the estate shops).
These factors meant that, whilst in 1926 Nicaragua had exported 17,000 tons of
coffee, the revenue from which had represented over 60% of total Nicaraguan
exports, by the end of the Second World War the total amount of coffee
exported had fallen to a low point of just over 10,000 tons, which represented
only just over 25% of total exports.
Production levels recovered in the Post War period, although the expansion of
the crop lacked the dynamism of the newly emerging cotton sector. Thus,
although by 1950 exports had recovered to a level of nearly 21,000 tons
(representing fully 50% of the export total), during the 1960s and 1970s whilst
the value of coffee exports continued to grow, the percentage that the crop
represented of total Nicaraguan exports declined, as the level of cotton exports
expanded much more rapidly and there was a diversification of production into
the export of beef and sugar (see figures in Appendix 2). Nonetheless, between
1960 and 1978 the area planted in coffee still increased by 49% and production
by 148% (Colburn, 1986:64). During the 1980s, as the fortunes of the other
major export crops generally waned, coffee was once again to become
Nicaragua's major export crop and the Republic's major source of foreign
exchange, (the percentage contribution of coffee to total exports during the
period 1961-1990 is included in Appendix 2; the figures for the earlier years
quoted above are from Wheelock, 1985:234-235, Tables 6 and 8).
7.1b Coffee Producing Regions:
At the time of the revolution, coffee production in Nicaragua was still centred
upon Region VI in the Northern Region which represented 35% of the total area
cultivated in 1979, with regions I, III and IV providing 15, 12 and 15%
respectively. The three major coffee cultivating regions (for locations see Map
2) can be considered as;
1. The Pacific Central region (comprising Regions III and IV): This
region is characterized by medium and large sized farms. Producers in this area
enjoy some of the best soils of the country, display the greatest specialization in
coffee production, employ the highest level of technification, and can make use
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of a more developed infrastructure than coffee producers in the other regions.
Due to these factors, coffee cultivation in this Pacific Region has consistently
been the most productive in Nicaragua and occurs mainly in the regions
surrounding Managua and on the Carazo plateau. In 1980/81 the region
represented just over 20% of national production.
2. Matagalpa and Jinotega (comprising Region VI): This region is
dominated by large traditional haciendas (but not exclusively, there is also a
reasonable number of smaller-scale producers), where coffee cultivation is
combined with the rearing of livestock. Nevertheless, despite the larger overall
size of landholdings, coffee production has tended to occur in smaller units than
on the specialist coffee farms of the Pacific because of the wider range of
agricultural activities the landowners engage in. Production in this region is
more problematic than in the Pacific, due to the existence of a longer rainy
season; but is the most important region in terms of production totals
(representing nearly 60% of national production in the 1980/81 cycle).
3. The Northern Interior (comprising region I): Coffee production in this
region is characterized by small and medium scale peasant producers and
represented about 18% of national production in 1980/81.
(All figures from Table 7.6 and Clemens and De Groot, 1987:14).
7.1c Characterization of the Nicaraguan Coffee Sector:
At the time of the revolution, although coffee cultivation had been an important,
and, at times, the most important, economic activity within the Republic for
many decades, production continued to be somewhat underdeveloped with
relatively low levels of mechanization and low yields. The location of much
production in the mountainous regions of the interior precluded mechanization
beyond very rudimentary levels, and technological developments were
ostensibly limited to the application of fertilisers, and the use of some higher
yielding, newly developed, varieties. Nevertheless, in general terms, even the
larger coffee estates had continued to grow traditional varieties of coffee (such
as Burbon or Arabica) rather than more modern varieties such as Catuna
(Plantinga, 1988:4).
During the revolutionary period great store was placed on modernizing the
agricultural sector and the coffee sub-sector was no exception to this trend.
Unfortunately, given the productive structure of the coffee sector (see below),
the large numbers of small and medium sized farmers were often unwilling to
adopt new varieties (because of the greater use of inputs that they require to
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improve or even maintain yields) or did not have the resources to risk the
possibility that new productive strategies or varieties would not increase yields
sufficiently to meet their additional costs. Because of this, and the inability of
the government to finance further investment in the state sector, coffee
production in Nicaragua has remained relatively backward, despite several
grandiose modernization schemes during the revolutionary years. Monserrat
(1989:87) suggests, that of the land turned over to coffee production, only 30%
could be considered as 'technified' and 14% 'semi-technified,' with the
remaining 56% characterized as still using mainly traditional methods of
cultivation. Even the coffee processing facilities in Nicaragua are largely of a
rudimentary nature. This argument, however, does hide the way in which
production in the Pacific (and some of the large estates of the interior) had
intensified during the expansion of the Post-War years, and a particular strata of
producers had tcchnificd their production to the extent where they had managed
to obtain yields up to six times higher than those of most traditional producers.
A more complete evaluation of the level of technology of the various strata is
shown in Table 7.1. Despite the partial technification indicated, the table shows
that the sector remained dominated by smallholders (with 85% farming ten
manzanas or less) with low levels of technological development and
consequently relatively low yields. Colbum (1986:66) suggests that 63% of the
area planted in the Pacific region, and 50% in the Central region, maintained
yields of less than seven quintals per manzana. Due to all of these factors, and
their combination with climatic problems in the Northern Pacific and Northern
Interior regions, coffee cultivation in Nicaragua has continued to operate at very
low levels of productivity when compared to the other countries of the region
(see Table 7.2). The modernizing impulses of the initial revolutionary years
saw some improvement in the average yields attained, but these were to be
short lived, given the limits imposed on further modernization by the economic
crisis and the disruption to production occasioned by the Contra War.
7.Id Inherited Social Relations in the Sector:
As outlined in Chapter Three, the expansion of coffee cultivation at the turn of
the last century introduced fundamental changes to Nicaragua's rural economy.
The period of Conservative hegemony following the Walker debacle, and the
Liberal regime of Zelaya which followed at the turn of the century, had
encouraged and facilitated the development of coffee production, through
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measures which initiated the commodification of land and labour in the areas
where coffee cultivation was developed. This occurred through the
consolidation and expansion of the traditional large estates in Matagalpa and
Jinotega in the Northern-Central Region. This process occurred through the
dispossession of the indigenous communities and other small peasant producers
who were forced to become at least partially dependent upon the sale of their
labour power to the estates if they wished to remain in the region. The process
of labour commodification initiated in this way was, however, only partial, and
many peasants retained a limited access to land (although, in general, this was
not sufficient to provide for their subsistence, ensuring the necessity of their
seasonal participation in the coffee harvest as wage labourers). Even those who
migrated out of the area, toward the agricultural frontier, often returned to the
large estates to work in the harvest periods.
This depiction of agrarian structure is familiar from the discussions of national
agrarian structure in Chapter Six. The majority of the initial studies of the
evolution of Nicaraguan coffee production drew heavily upon the experiences
of this Northern Central region. These often stressed the dominance of the large
traditional haciendas in the sector and the continuation ofmany non-monetary
mechanisms for ensuring labour supply on the haciendas of the region, and
some, for example Enriquez (1991), have generalized these observations to
suggest that coffee production on the national scale is also largely dependent
upon the continued existence of pre-capitalist social relations and a semi-
proletarianized peasant workforce. The dualistic distinction thus drawn between
large landowners and a largely semi-proletarianized peasantry is certainly
characteristic of coffee production in this region. Nonetheless, although this
region constitutes the largest proportion of Nicaraguan coffee production it
should be stressed that the expansion of the commodity in other areas of the
country had somewhat different dynamics (DeGroot and Clemens, 1991:86-
87).
Thus, others commentators (such as Kaimowitz, Baumeister and Zalkin
referred to in the preceding chapter) have, as seen in Chapter Six, argued
against the generalization of the dualistic model as an explanatory framework
for the evolution of the sector in the nation as a whole. In particular, they point
to the fact that in the more technically advanced medium-sized farms of the
Pacific, the workforce tend to be more proletarianized (enjoying considerably
less access to land and much more heavily dependent on the sale of wage labour
than the semi-proletarianized peasants of Region VI) than allowed for in the
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dualistic model. They also stress the existence of an important sector of small
and medium producers in the Northern Interior, mainly dependent on familial or
small amounts of wage labour (see Table 7.3). This more heterogeneous
characterization of the Nicaraguan coffee sector is reinforced by the observation
that large-scale coffee production is of lesser importance in Nicaragua in
comparison to the other countries of the region. For example, in 1976/77 those
Guatemalan farmers producing over 1800 Quintales of coffee represented 72%
of national production, in El Salvador the equivalent figure was 60%, whilst in
Nicaragua it was only 30% (Baumeister, 1985b:4)
The main point to be made, therefore, is that Nicaraguan coffee production has
never been homogenous and, indeed, the crop is produced under a wider range
of conditions than any other in Nicaragua (Colburn, 1986:62). The size of the
land holdings of those cultivating the crop differs considerably, as does their
utilization of labour, and the class status of those undertaking that labour. The
figures in Table 7.4 suggest that the intensity of cultivation in the Pacific has
ensured the greatest level of proletarianization in that region, whilst semi-
proletarian labour is more important in the Northern Interior and the
Matagalpa/Jinotega region. In the former case this represents the use of the
labour of other peasants (mainly basic grain producers) by small-scale coffee
producers, and in the latter the use of semi-proletarianized labour by the
traditional livestock-coffee haciendas (DeGroot and Clemens, 1991:86-87).
7.1e The Wider Economy and Coffee Production:
Social relations in the sector also reflected the processing and marketing of the
coffee produced, with many of the smaller and medium-scale producers tied
into exploitative relations with intermediaries, financiers and processors. After
harvest coffee is taken to a local processing plant for washing and drying. At
the time of the revolution there were around 112 of these 'beneficios,' as they
are known, and these were often owned by those who controlled the export
agencies. There were fifteen of these agencies, but the largest five monopolized
two thirds of all the coffee exported (Enriquez, 1991:62 and Gariazzo et al,
1983:20). The more technified Pacific Region demonstrated the most direct
relationships between the producer and the processor, where the owners of the
latter were mainly the producers themselves, hence, here there were really no
intermediaries, and nearly 90% of producers sold their unprocessed coffee
directly to those producers that owned the beneficios. In the Central and the
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Table 7.3 Nicaragua: Land Holdings and Coffee Production in 1979
Strata Average number of
manzanas
cultivated






Rich Peasants 7.85 6,308 25.6
Medium Peasants 3.7 10,154 41.3
Poor Peasants 2.1 3,565 14.5
Total 24,600 100
Source: CIERA (1980) 'Las Clases Sociales en el Agro'; quoted in Gariazzo et al
(1983:5)
Table 7.4 Class Characteristics of the Labour Force in Coffee
Production 1980-81 (Percentages
Social Class Central Pacific Matagalpa/Jinotega Northern Interior







Semi-Proletarians are defined as devoting at least 10% of family labour time to their own
cultivation (be it coffee, other export crops or basic grains) and less than 50% to wage work. The
Agricultural Proletariat dedicate more than 50% of their family labour time to agricultural wage




Northern regions, however, there was traditionally a greater role for
intermediaries who, at times, also financed production. For example, one single
firm commercialized over 50% of coffee production in Matagalpa and Jinotega
and its interests ranged from financing, through processing and the provision of
inputs and machinery, to purchasing and commercialization (Vilas, 1986:77).
Theirmonopoly control over commercialization and finance meant that the
dominant commercial sectors of the elite and some of the larger-scale producers
could pass on losses made in years of low international prices to the small and
medium producers. This was carried out through manipulation of the interest
rates on the supply of credit which they monopolized, the provision of
extremely low prices for the coffee bought from the small and medium
producers, and increases in the tariffs charged at the processing plants
(Monserrat, 1989:84).
The Somoza state intervened little in the Coffee sector, especially in relation to
its policies toward the development of cotton production (see below) and its
role was limited to the collection of taxes, negotiating with the International
Coffee Organization over Nicaraguan quotas of the world market, and a certain
effort toward the control of diseases (Colburn, 1986:68).
7.1f The Coffee Sector Under the Sandinistas:
7.1f(i) Generalities:
During the revolutionary period the total area of coffee cultivation showed a
general decline. This did not necessarily respond, however, to a decline in the
total amount of coffee production, due to improvements in the yields attained in
the earliest years. Indeed, the 1982-83 coffee cycle produced the highest
production figures Nicaragua had ever seen, although such a level was never
attained again, despite the series of incentives offered the sector by the
government. In fact as Figure 7.1 reveals, from the peak attained in the 1982-
83 season, production, despite periodic improvements, showed a general
decline until the last two cycles of the 1980s.
Although the coffee harvest had not been directly affected by the insurrection,
production during the first post-revolutionary cycle (1979/80) was seriously
disrupted. There were serious deficiencies in labour supply during the harvest
months and many producers had not been able to carry out maintenance
activities in the months leading up to the insurrection. This had a negative
impact upon yields, through the lack of attention paid to measures needed to
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limit the detrimental effects of the 'la roya' disease, which seriously affected the
crop if it was left untreated.
In the following three cycles there was something of a recovery in total
production. In particular, with the improved conditions offered to peasant
producers (through relatively high guaranteed prices and the expansion in the
supply of credit; Barahona et al, 1988:42), there was considerable expansion in
peasant coffee production, especially in Region VI. This growth was, however,
reversed by the early onset of the Contra war in those zones (Grigsby,
1988:204). Thus, as suggested above, from the peak in production levels of the
1982/83 cycle, production totals show a general downward trend (excepting
relative improvements in the 1984/85 and 1986/87 cycles) until the growth of
the 1988/89 and 1989/90 cycles. The decline in production levels after the early
years can be clearly seen in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 which detail the evolution of
production totals and the total area cultivated during the revolutionary years.
The reasons behind these disappointing production totals included the following
factors.
First and foremost, it must be remembered that the escalation of the war against
the Contra took place in important areas of coffee cultivation. This severely
disrupted production, through the physical destruction of crops and
infrastructure, the flight of peasant producers, and the drafting of producers and
labourers into military service, precluding them from productive activities. In
addition, the most impressive increases in production totals and yields during
the early years had been attained amongst the most marginal producers of the
North, who were those most affected by the intensification of the armed
struggle against the Contra.
Secondly, production was periodically affected by a number of climatic
problems. For example, in some areas, the 1985-6 agricultural cycle was
severely affected by excessive rains, and irregular rainfalls continued to plague
the sector in the following seasons. Furthermore, the 1988/1989 season was
affected by successive droughts in the Pacific and the incidence of Hurricane
Joan in Regions V and VI, which led to the early dropping of beans and the
onset of diseases (Wheelock in El Nuevo Diario 29/04/89 and CIERA, 1989:
Volume 4:98).
Thirdly, the economic crisis of the mid-1980s ensured that the far-ranging plans
for the modernization of the sector were never fully implemented, and the lack
of availability of inputs and the worsening climate for private investment
ensured the gradual deterioration ofmost coffee plantations, through a lack of
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investment, which produced consequent falls in the yields obtained. The same
economic crisis and the major imbalances in relative prices also saw an
expansion in the opportunities for marketing coffee on the black market,
thereby reducing the totals accounted for by official statistics and limiting the
resources available to the state through its control of the domestic and external
marketing of the commodity.
7.1f(ii) Export Performance:
The dependence of the Nicaraguan economy upon coffee exports intensified
during the revolutionary period, as the crops percentage share of total exports
soared (see Appendix 2 and discussions in Chapter 6). Furthermore, due to the
low level of technological development in the sector, coffee production
represented an import-cheap activity and, therefore, a high net generator of
exchange (Plantinga, 1988:4). Despite the enhanced importance of coffee
exports to the survival of the national economy that this suggested, and some
improvements in yields and overall export production levels in the early years,
for the 1980s as a whole, the value and volume of total coffee exports show a
marked downward trend as Figure 7.3 clearly demonstrates.
The graph demonstrates that both the volume and the value of total coffee
exports experienced an almost continual decline during the revolutionary years,
with volumes falling to a low-point in 1986 and earnings entering into
particularly serious decline after 1987. Obviously, the total value of exports
was not simply a function of productive totals or the ability of the state to
procure that production; it also depended upon the international market price
each year. The evolution of international coffee prices during the period are
illustrated in Figure 7.4. In the years leading up to the revolution, international
prices had risen substantially between 1975 and 1977, before falling in the
following two cycles. However, during the years from 1981 to 1988, with the
exception of 1986, prices were to remain at a level well below that of 1980.
The differential performance of export volumes and values shown in Figure 7.3
demonstrates the complicated relationship between international prices and
production in an export dependent economy such as Nicaragua's. Two features
stand out in particular. Firstly, the relatively high prices in 1986, caused by the
Brazilian drought of that year and the subsequent speculation on the
international market, helped to limit the damage caused by the climatic and war-
related damages to production in that year (Micarelli, 1991:43). Whilst,
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Fieure 7.3
Nicaraeuan Coffee Exports 1979-1990
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Figure 7.4
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secondly, the impressive production totals for 1983 were not matched by such a
substantial increase in earnings, due to the relatively low international prices
received. Furthermore, not shown in Figure 7.4, is the severe fall in
international coffee prices which occurred in 1989, induced by the collapse of
the international coffee convention. Nicaragua's reliance upon the future's
market at this point meant that the effects of the price fall were not as severe as
they were in the other countries of the region, but the damage was to be more
severely felt in the following cycle (Estrada, 1989:16). Figure 7.3 illustrates
this well. The relatively high value of exports in 1989 can be compared to the
stagnant volume of production, whilst the collapse in the value of production in
1990 coincided with an increase in the total volume of production.
One further factor that affected the level of coffee exports was the growing
amount of coffee which was sold in the domestic market, reflecting the growing
dislocation between internal prices and guaranteed export prices. Grigsby
(1988:208) suggests that as much as 100,000 Quintales of coffee were sold on
the domestic market in 1986 in response to the way in which rising inflation
produced much better prices in the internal market than those offered by the
government to exporters.
7.lf(iii) The Evolution of Government Policy toward the Coffee
Sector:
The greatest policy challenge facing the FSLN within the coffee sector was to
find a combination of measures which would enable the reorganization of
production along more rational lines, thereby improving the ability of the sector
to generate exchange; whilst at the same time ensuring improvements in the
working conditions of those labouring in the harvest months on the large
private estates and state farms, and the position of the important sectors of small
and medium-sized coffee producers. Essentially this represented four
challenges;
1. The development of a successful and dynamic state sector;
2. The provision of sufficient incentives for the continued reproduction and
further development of the larger capitalist farms;
3. An improvement in the conditions of the most marginal producers through
the extension of agricultural services and credit;
4. An improvement in the conditions of labour for those working in both the
state and the private sectors (Sepulveda, 1984:73).
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In line with these criteria, the development of state productive capacity was
limited to those properties confiscated from Somoza and his associates. Thus
by 1983 only 19% of coffee cultivation had passed into the hands of the state
and was carried out on the state farms of the APP.2 This meant that at least
80% of coffee production was maintained in private hands during the
revolutionary period, although there was a growing level of cooperativization,
and profound changes in the productive structure of the sector through the
agrarian reform (see discussions below). Some 34% of the nation's processing
capacity also passed into the hands of the state.
In line with the 'modernizing' ideology dominant within MIDINRA, the
government also embarked upon an ambitious programme of modernization in
the sector. This was organized under the Comision Nacional de Renovacion de
Cafetales (CONARCA). The role of this organization was to encourage the
spread of the newer higher yielding coffee varieties and halt the spread of
diseases, such as la Roya. The programme was designed to improve overall
productivity and proceeded through the complete modernization and renovation
of the targeted farms, rather than through the spread of improved cultivation
practices or the increased use of fertilizers (Colburn, 1986:69 and Plantinga,
1988:6).
The implementation of the programme was confined to the Carazo Plateau in
Region IV and, despite advances made there,3 the programme made little impact
on the sector at a national level (Enriquez, 1991:60). Furthermore, Colburn
(1986:70) argues that, although it was the state's intention to provide extended
technical assistance to all of the nation's coffee exporters, the limited capacity of
the state to provide such services meant that, in general, they were concentrated
upon the state farms and the areas that came under the CONARCA
programme.4 Thus, coffee producers in Region VI, already operating at a lower
level of technification, lacked a similar programme of modernization, which
was reflected in the greater falls in productivity that affected the region
(although the greater disruption caused by the war in that area was also
responsible for this).
2 For example, there were 91 production units in Region One (organized into four enterprizes- only
one of these was uniquely a coffee producer; the other three also produced other crops).
3 The programme achieving the renovation of 3,625 manzanas in 1980 and a further 1,870 in the
following year (Monserraf 1989;85).
4 Plantinga (1988:7) also refers to the ecological damage wrought by the CONARCA programme
through the effects of increased deforestation, the problems of insect plagues and a decrease in micro¬
climatic humidity caused by the technification of production.
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In addition to the attempts to modernize the productive structure of the sector,
the state also extended its role through the elimination of the private export
agencies which had dominated the sector in the Somoza years. This was
achieved through the nationalization of foreign trade, and three months after the
revolutionary triumph, a new state organization, ENCAFE, became the only
export agent for the sector, with all producers required to sell to them.
Producers could, however, choose at which stage of the production cycle they
wished to sell, with the larger producers often choosing to carry out their own
processing. ENCAFE set up sixty five centres throughout the coffee growing
regions to receive the coffee harvested by the nation's producers. The new
arrangements represented a substantial shift in the dynamics of the sector with,
"The nationalization of the marketing ofcoffee andpartially ofits
processing... (producing) as a fundamental consequence, the virtual
disappearance ofexport capital as a principal concentrating agent of
coffee surpluses (Sepulveda, 1984:73)
For the first two years ENCAFE paid producers the international market price
for coffee (as stipulated by the International Coffee Organization) although this
was paid to producers in cordobas, at the official rate of exchange, allowing the
state to monopolise the acquisition of the exchange generated in the sector. The
problem with this was that the price fluctuated widely even on a day to day
level. Therefore, subsequently, a guaranteed price was fixed, at a relatively low
level, although this was allowed to fluctuate according to the quality of the
coffee. ENCAFE also fixed the price for processing (Monserrat, 1989:85). In
1981 a drastic fall in international prices, coupled with the rising costs of
production, falling productivity, and the low prices received from the state, all
negatively affected the sector. Only those producers who could make use of the
very liberal credit policies to increase their productivity could hope to maintain
their profitability. Due to the nature of coffee production (the need to maintain
production given the capital outlay in initiating production), despite the
increasing costs and declining earnings of the sector most producers continued
to produce, but tried to restrict costs to a minimum. In 1982, however, the
government established a single guaranteed price, unrelated to quality, in an
effort to sustain the profitability of those producers that could not use the freely
available credit to improve yields in the short term.
As suggested above, the aim of the government in seeking to control the
marketing of coffee reflected both a desire to replace the activities of
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exploitative intermediaries and, in particular, the need to capture foreign
exchange in order to finance the processes of social transformation designed to
help the poorest sectors in society. However, initial policies represented
considerable falls in the income of many coffee producers which affected all
property sectors and led to certain feelings of resentment, even amongst the
smallest coffee growers.
"A small coffee grower in Matagalpa, queried about how the
revolution had affected him, replied, "The revolution has treated me
badly; before I could sell my coffee to anyone I liked." The INCAE
survey ofcoffee producersfound that small growers are more
dissatisfied than large producers with government monopsony of
coffee. Part of the small producers' dissatisfaction stems from their
living in remote areas (thus being furtherfrom urban centres, where
ENCAFE offices are located), but the central dissatisfaction is with
ENCAFEpricing." (Colburn, 1986:77)
Thus, in many ways, whilst credit and pricing policies were able to provide
growers with an income they provided little incentive for efficiency in
production, producing a somewhat passive attitude on the part of producers
who were able to maintain a certain level of income without investing their own
funds. In such circumstances incentives tended to be used to supplement
income rather than for the productive purposes for which they were intended,
adding to the tendency toward stagnation outlined above (Plantinga, 1988:19)
Throughout the revolutionary years, as well as being the most important earner
of foreign exchange in the Nicaraguan economy, coffee production continued to
be an important employer. In fact, coffee cultivation is the greatest single
generator of employment in Nicaragua, and is especially significant during the
harvest period. Monserrat (1989) suggests figures of 100,000 employed during
the harvest and 50,000 throughout the year, reflecting both the hiring of labour
on the largest farms and the employment of labour by the rich and middle
peasant sectors. In addition, coffee processing gives work to hundreds more
individuals, either through primary export processing or the production of
instant coffee for consumption in the domestic market (there are 21 coffee
toasting plants producing coffee for the internal market). Nevertheless, one of
the constant problems afflicting the sector during the 1980s was the shortage of
labour for the harvest period. Enriquez (1991:85), for example, details an
INCAE survey which revealed that in the initial post-revolutionary agricultural
cycle over 55% of medium and large-scale coffee producers experienced labour
275
supply problems in the harvest months. These shortages were due to a number
of factors. Firstly, as outlined in the preceding chapter, the development of the
agrarian reform programme meant that many individuals who would previously
have sought work during the harvest periods now did not necessarily need to
do so. As expressed in Envio (September 1985:36);
"The agrarian reform has not been free of internal costs either. The
transformation ofseasonal wage labourers into landowners has
reduced the manual labourforce available to the big producers. This
has been the principal criticism (of the deepening of the agrarian
reform) ofboth the large private producers and the state farm
administrators."
Nevertheless, it can be argued quite convincingly that authors such as Enriquez
somewhat exaggerate the importance of the agrarian reform in producing these
problems. As argued in relation to the export sector as a whole in Chapter Six,
a more important factor underlying the continuation of the labour shortages in
the ensuing years appears to have been the escalation of the Contra war. Many
young men and women were drafted into the struggle against the Contra, others
joined the ranks of the Contra themselves, and in both cases it meant that they
were unable to take part in productive activities. The war also saw many
peasants displaced from their farms in the areas of highest semi-
proletarianization in the sector; the Northern Interior. In addition, it could also
be argued that the declining supply of labour to the sector had less to do with
the agrarian reform process, and more with the declining productivity of labour
and the depressed salaries which characterized the sector for much of the decade
(Vilas, 1984:102). Despite these disagreements, whatever the underlying
causes, the state farms and large private growers continued to suffer from
labour shortages, to which the government responded by constituting a series
of emergency coffee harvest committees and organizing brigades of student and
government employee harvest brigades.5 The use of the less skilled volunteer
pickers limited the quality of the coffee harvested as it took longer for the crop
to be picked and the beans were often left too long on the bushes. The labour
shortages were to remain a problem (despite attempts on the state farms to
guarantee labour supply through the provision of small plots of land for basic
grain production) until the Final years of the revolutionary period when the
onslaught of the economic crisis once again increased the supply of labour
5 These brigades picked 12% of total coffee production in the 1985/86 cycle for example (De Groot
and Clemens, 1991:94).
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7. lf(iv) The Performance of the Different Sectors:
It has already been established that overall coffee production levels fell after
reaching a peak in 1983. However, the different types of producer within the
sub-sector performed in different ways during the decade. Figure 7.5 shows in
graphic form the production totals for the state, large private, and small and
medium sectors; whilst Table 7.5 shows the yields achieved in each sector and
Table 7.6 breaks the total production figures down to a regional level to show
the contribution of each sector in the different regions of production for the
agricultural cycles 1980/81 and 1987/88 in order to give an idea of how these
changed during the revolutionary period. The figures displayed stress again the
generalized decline that characterized the sector.
7.1f(iv)a The Capitalist Sector:
The most emphatic decline in production levels occurred within the large private
sector, especially following the 1982/83 cycle. Between the 1980/81 and
1987/88 cycles the proportion of coffee produced by these larger producers fell
from 38.7% to 33.6%. Obviously this, to a certain extent, reflected the
declining size of that sector but, as shown in Table 7.5, it also reflected the
declining productivity of the sector (due to the lack of investment, problems in
labour supply etc.). From a peak of 15.5 tons per manzana in the 1982/83 cycle
yields fell progressively in the following cycles, declining to a low-point of 6.1
tons per manzana in the 1985/86 cycle
Nonetheless, the large private producers (and the state farms) obviously
operated at a much higher level of technology than their smaller competitors
and, therefore, on the whole, continued to achieve higher yields (see Table 7.5
and an interview with Jaime Wheelock in Barricada 17/07/89). In addition, the
fact that the large private coffee farmers already operated at a higher level of
technification meant that it would be easier (in comparison with their smaller
scale counterparts) for those farms to increase productivity through the
application of the improved technologies and mechanization which were central
to the FSLN's strategy in the sector. Despite this, the largest producers, and
those who had been most closely linked to the commercial and financial sectors
which had controlled the sector during the pre-revolutionary era, also faced the
fact that traditionally much of the profit which they made from coffee had come
from their ownership of processing facilities and the marketing of production in
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Table 7.5 Nicaragua: Coffee Yields Achieved per Manzana in Tons (1980/81 to 1987/88)
Agricultural
Cycle




1980/81 11.0 8.9 10.0 9.6
1981/82 10.5 9.5 12.1 10.6
1982/83 15.0 9.7 15.5 12.5
1983/84 10.4 7.4 8.9 8.4
1984/85 16.7 7.0 8.2 8.9
1985/86 12.0 5.1 6.1 6.3
1986/87 13.6 8.5 8.3 9.1
1987/88 12.0 8.7 6.4 8.1
Source: CIERA (1989), Volume 9, pp.96-103: Tables 41-48
Table 7.6 Nicaragua: Regional and Sectoral Composition of Coffee Production
during the 1980s
1980/81 1987/88
Production State Small + Large TOTAL State Small + Large TOTAL
(in 000's Medium Medium
Quintales)
Region I 44.5 125.2 58.2 228.0 13.6 80.9 25.0 119.5
Region II 0.3 7.6 - 7.9 - 4.9 - 4.9
Region III 14.7 - 100.5 115.2 13.2 2.4 42.5 58.1
Region IV 9.8 123.7 13.8 147.0 10.0 27.6 97.4 135.0
Region V 4.6 30.0 - 34.6 2.6 10.5 - 13.1
Region V] 108.4 317.5 325.6 751.6 111.7 279.7 117.7 509.1
National 182.3 604.8 497.9 1284.9 151.2 406.0 282.6 839.7
Percentage State Small + Large TOTAL State Small + Large TOTAL
figures Medium (as % of Medium (as % of
national) national)
Region I 19.5 54.9 25.5 17.7 11.4 67.7 20.9 14.2
Region II 3.8 96.2 0 0.1 0 100 0 0.6
Region III 12.8 0 87.2 9.0 22.7 4.1 73.1 6.9
Region IV 6.7 84.1 9.4 11.4 7.4 20.4 72.1 16.0
Region V 13.3 86.7 0 2.7 19.8 80.2 0 1.6
Region V] 14.4 42.2 43.3 58.5 21.9 54.9 23.1 60.6
National 14.2 47.1 38.7 100 18.0 48.4 33.6 100
Source: CERA (1989), Volume 9, pp. 96, 103: Tables 41, 48.
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the exterior, both of which were now largely controlled by the state. This meant
that whatever incentives were offered such producers they were unlikely to
invest in production or pay great attention to efficiency because of the loss of
their traditional means of profitability. At the same time, they also faced the
previously mentioned decline in labour supply and the declining productivity of
that labour which remained. The new circumstances, had, however also offered
the possibility that those sectors previously exploited under the old system
might find themselves in an improved position. This would of course depend
upon how far the control of processing and commercialization by the state
offered them the opportunity to improve their profitability (Plantinga, 1988:5-8)
In overall terms, however, this sector exhibited a particularly sustained decline
in productive totals and yields, representing, according to different
perspectives, an unwillingness to invest in production or improve efficiency, or
the disincentives of misplaced government pricing policies.
7.1f(iv)b The State:
Despite their continued prioritization in the supply of credit and the
disproportionately high level of investment which they enjoyed, the state farms
were unable to provide the drive to improved productivity and efficiency which
was hoped for, as the yields they attained remained relatively low and the farms
suffered severe management problems. The state farms did, however, retain a
relatively constant level of production, and even increased production levels in
the 1982/83 and 1984/85 cycles. Furthermore, yields were maintained at a
higher level than those of the private sector; never falling below about 10.5 tons
per manzana throughout the decade. The sector did, however, face the same
labour supply problems which beset the large private producers and, despite the
relatively higher yields achieved and the maintenance of production levels the
state farms often operated at a loss and failed to produce at a level which
justified the level of prioritization which they had enjoyed.
7.1f(iv)c Small and Medium Producers:6
6 For each of the four commodities described in this chapter, the term 'small and medium producers'
is used to distinguish peasant and cooperative production from the large private sector. This definition
is taken from CIERA (1989, Volume 1:13-14), where the use of the term in the presentation of the
national and regional statistics provided in the ninth volume of that series is explained. The rationale
provided there stems form the Banco Nacional de Desarrollo's definition of the sector in relation to the
provision of rural credit. This definition, based on such specific characterisitics as, income level, fixed
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Production levels on small and medium farms were relatively constant in the
early cycles, but then fell between the 1983/84 and 1985/86 cycles (although
not to quite the extent of the large private producers). Thereafter, these
producers performed relatively well and, as shown in Table 7.5, yields actually
surpassed those of the large private producers in the 1986/87 and 1987/88
cycles. Much of this improvement reflected the growing realization by the
government of the importance of smallholder production in the sector and the
increasing prioritization of such producers following the shifts in government
policy from 1985, as well as the increasing absolute weight of the sector given
the processes of land redistribution. By the end of the decade, for example, the
new cooperative sector was producing about a third of all coffee produced in
Nicaragua (Wattel et al, 1989:188).
Another aspect to the improved performance in the latter part of the decade (and
the relatively stable yields attained on the state farms) reflected the
implementation of 'The New Coffee Strategy' in 1985. This was a massive
exercise designed to rationalize the production of coffee in the country through
reducing and compacting the area of coffee cultivation. The intention was to
eliminate around 20,000 hectares in the most marginal zones. The underlying
rationale for this was that it had proved impossible to guarantee the harvest,
transportation and processing of a considerable quantity of coffee due to the
inaccessibility of the more marginal producers. It was intended that by the end
of the century all coffee production would either be in the Pacific region or the
North Western region where the best soils, the most suitable climate and the
most developed infrastructure are located (Monserrat, 1989:85). At the same
time MIDINRA initiated a Programme designed to renovate a large proportion
of all coffee plantations which, it was hoped, would affect over 60% of coffee
producers by the turn of the century.
Although the incidence of the new plans of 1985 were felt in the improved
productivity attained in the 1986-87 agricultural cycle, coffee producers
continued to be hard hit by the war, and overall production levels continued to
disappoint. These years represented the most intensive period of the war against
the Contra and their eventual strategic defeat by the EPS (Ejercito Popular
Sandinista) during that period represented an intensification to disruptions in the
major coffee producing regions of the North. Furthermore, although the period
saw a greater priority given to the needs of smaller producers nationally, by and
capital stock and the size of the land owned or rented, whilst not ideal, since it still proves difficult to
ditinguish between poor capitalists and rich peasants, does at least provide a workable distinction.
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large, this was geared toward the production of basic food crops rather than the
provision of support to smallholder production of export commodities,
although, as suggested above, this was also expanded. As argued in the
preceding chapter, however, such changes in direction occurred too late to
reverse the alienation of many small and medium scale coffee producers and the
continued economic malaise meant that any measures which were developed
suffered from a lack of resources, given the competing demands on the limited
resources the government had at its disposal.
7.1f(v) The Effects of Economic Reform in the Late 1980s:
Coffee production appeared to respond favourably to the pro-export packages
of 1988 and 1989. The 1988/1989 cycle saw an increase in the area harvested,
although not to the degree hoped for because of the incidence ofHurricane Joan
and the associated flooding. These problems meant that the quality of coffee for
that cycle was poor and this, in combination with low international prices,
meant that export values fell; although they were to recuperate in the following
cycle. Considerable improvements followed in the 1989/1990 cycle when
despite major outbreaks of disease in Regions IV and VI, total production levels
and yields rose. There is some suggestion, though, that this related more to a
favourable natural cycle and good climatic conditions (although there were
severe climatic problems in Region IV; Stahler-Sholk, 1990:82) rather than the
incidence of government policy. Nonetheless, it is true to say that producers
were able to take advantage of the changes in relative prices, especially through
the evolution of the exchange rate to more realistic levels, although, as Stahler-
Sholk (1990:80) suggests, devaluations do not always provide an incentive for
all groups of producers because, despite the fact that devaluation may improve
the earnings of exporters, it also affects an increase in the costs of imported
inputs.
Such arguments suggest that the incidence of the economic reforms affected
different groups of coffee producers in quite distinct ways. Thus, whilst the
evolution of a more realistic exchange rate would in the medium-term aid all
coffee producers, theoretically it could also have a progressive social impact, in
that the level of benefits gained were inversely proportional to the level of
technification of production. This was because the increase in the costs of
imports, produced by the devaluation, most affected those most heavily
dependent upon imported inputs. Estrada (1989:17) quotes a Banco Nacional
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de Desarrollo study which indicated that all groups had in fact suffered a
decrease in profitability due to the incidence of the reforms, but that those
which made greatest use of imported components were the worst affected. Thus
whilst the equilibrium point for technified coffee production increased from 8.3
to 11.5 Quintales of coffee per manzana, and that of semi-technified production
increased from 5.25 to 7.2, that of traditional production only increased from
1.07 to 1.5.
In a study of coffee producers in the 1988/89 cycle, Stahler-Sholk (1990:83)
shows that the use of imported inputs showed a marked decline, with producers
tending to replace the use of inputs with increased labour time, which was
obviously beneficial to those looking for work. However, he argues that since
the use of inputs was highest in Region IV, given the prioritization of that
region in the modernization programme, the reforms instigated a less efficient
use of resources. He, therefore, suggests tentatively that the economic reform
process tended to benefit those producers in Regions I and VI over those in
Region IV. In the words of one large producer of Region IV
"I am efficient, I have my coffee production highly technified and
with good yields. This new economic policy is penalizing the most
efficientproducers." (Quoted in Stahler-Sholk, 1990:83)
For the 1989/1990 cycle the government made what later proved to be an
excessively favourable agreement with the country's coffee growers through a
series of extra incentive payments which represented the exchange differential
between the moment when the coffee was sold to ENCAFE and the period of
exportation. However, in June the government had to renege on the deal
because of the inflationary pressures which the first payments under the system
had caused. In January 920 million cordobas had been released to coffee
producers and a further 750,000 million in March. The government hoped that
growers would use these incentives to reinvest in the following cycle, but it
soon became apparent that the payments were pressurizing the black market and
forced a further devaluation upon the government. In June, in an effort to avoid
further inflationary problems, the government placed the remainder of the funds
earmarked for coffee producers in a special fund, from which growers could
only withdraw to cover their production costs. On June 18th the nation's coffee
growers met in Matagalpa in order to assess their reaction to the government's
move. COSEP tried to encourage the growers to leave the newly formed
CONCAFE (Corporation National del Cafe), a forum which had been created
as part of the economic reforms to encourage the exchange of opinions between
the government, the various strata of private producers in the sector and the
unions. This was not agreed to, and in July the government, after pressure
from UNAG, agreed to pay the incentives in full to those producers under a
certain size and those who could demonstrate clearly that they were reinvesting.
(Estrada, 1989:15 and Envio. August 1989: 10-16.).7
Producers also suffered from credit restrictions to a certain degree, although
they were more worried about the increased level of interest rates involved in
the economic reforms, which had a great impact on their total costs, as the
liberal, and basically negative, rates of interest charged on their access to credit
in previous years were rationalised.
Nonetheless, despite the problems noted above, the pro-export exchange policy
and the extended provision of incentives involved in the new economic policies,
did serve to improve the medium-term profitability of coffee production. It
should be stressed, however, that despite the greater impact upon them of the
escalation of import costs, the larger producers were those most able to take
advantage of the improved profitability of coffee production. Many were able to
cancel their credits with the national financial system and depend upon the
income earned in the present and previous cycles. Furthermore, they were also
able to take advantage of the constant decline in the real value of wages which
occurred at the time. In contrast, a lack of coordinated policies meant that there
were few institutional mechanisms whereby incentives could be channelled to
the poorest coffee producers (Marchetti, 1989:3-4). One proposal put forward
by Daniel Nunez (the president of UNAG) was that the government should
permit coffee producers to sell their production to ENCAFE in the moment in
which they estimated conditions were most favourable. This, he argued, would
overcome the inflationary problems caused by the general payments to the
sector noted above, producers themselves would assume the risks of waiting on
the evolution of international prices and the comportment of exchange policy.
Once again the major impediment to the adoption of such a strategy was the
need for a sufficient system of information for small and medium producers to
be able to make informed decisions (Estrada, 1989:16).
7,lg Conclusions:
7 COSEP's politicking earnt the expropriation of three of their leaders' properties
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The performance of the coffee sector was a key determinant in the overall
performance of the national economy throughout the revolutionary years, as the
proportion of total exports accounted for by the crop increased and international
prices, whilst generally falling over the decade, did not do so to the extent of
cotton or sugar prices. In addition, improvements in the position facing coffee
producers would carry greater weight in the transformation of rural society in
Nicaragua, because of the large numbers of peasant farmers who produce the
crop and the weight of the sector in the generation of employment.
Unfortunately production levels and export values, whilst recovering to a
certain degree in the initial revolutionary cycles remained depressed for most of
the period. As has been argued above, this reflected a number of factors.
Firstly, the incidence of the relatively depressed prices on the international
market led to a fall in export levels for the region as a whole. For example,
between 1982 and 1988 regional export totals fell from nearly 630,000 tons to
just over 560,000 tons (see Table 7.7). Nonetheless, most of the fall can be
explained by the collapse of production in Nicaragua and the even more severe
falls in El Salvador. In fact production totals in the three other republics, whilst
fluctuating, show an overall improvement. The worse performance of the
Nicaraguan and Salvadoran producers reflect the military situation facing each
of those two countries. In the Nicaraguan case the advances made in terms of
improved yields in the early revolutionary years (especially on the smaller-scale
farms) were wiped out by the onset of the war in several of the major coffee
growing regions of the country. In addition, the state production of coffee on
the farms of the APP failed to boost production to the extent hoped for despite
substantial investments in modernization. The largest private producers also
failed to expand production, reflecting both conscious decisions to limit the
risks to their capital under the changed internal political situation and the failure
of the state administration of the key economic policy instruments in the sector
to provide sufficient incentives for them to wish to expand production. As
suggested above, the initial years had seen some successes in terms of the small
and medium producers of the sector, who continued to out perform the large
private sector, even surpassing them in terms of yields by the end of the
decade. Despite this, the smaller producers were still not prioritized in the
distribution of resources within the sector in comparison with the APP and the
larger producers, even during the shift in policy toward the peasantry that
occurred in the mid eighties
Table 7.7
Central America: Area Harvested, Production, and
Productivity of Coffee
Area Harvested (Thousands ofHectares)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988a/
Central America 731.3 741.7 754.4 743.6 721.5 709.1 711.3 712.2
Costa Rica 82.5 82.5 83.2 87.0 103.0 103.0 111.0 110.0 ND
El Salvador 185.6 185.6 186.1 175.7 172.3 167.4 163.9 163.9 163.9
Guatemala 243.7 263.5 272.4 266.7 231.7 229.5 236.4 236.6 ND
Honduras 120.9 122.1 123.0 124.2 122.5 124.3 122.9 124.7 126.4
Nicaragua 98.6 88.0 89.7 90.0 92.0 84.9 77.1 77.0 ND
Production (Thousands Of Tons)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988a;
Central America 601.2 622.1 629.5 604.1 601.9 576.6 572.9 628.6 562.2
Costa Rica 106.4 113.1 115.1 124.0 136.9 123.9 120.2 145.3 155.0
El Salvador 188.3 176.0 174.6 154.5 149.3 148.8 142.6 153.2 87.4
Guatemala 177.4 193.8 189.3 183.0 196.6 181.6 196.6 189.5 186.2
Honduras 72.5 80.9 86.6 77.2 72.4 75.0 76.1 98.8 94.0
Nicaragua 56.6 58.3 63.9 65.4 46.7 47.3 37.4 41.8 39.6
Productivity (Tons per Hectare)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988a;
Central America 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9
Costa Rica 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.7 1.1 1.3 ND
El Salvador 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.5
Guatemala 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 ND
Honduras 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7
Nicaragua 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 ND
Source: Figures supplied by FLACSO (Faculted Latinoamericano
de Ciencias Sociales)
7.2 The Cotton Sector:
7.2a Introductory Comments:
On the whole, despite certain linkages to domestic industries, the majority of
cotton grown in Nicaragua is exported (Enriquez, 1991:73 suggests a figure of
over 90% in the early 1980s)8 and, at the time of the revolution, the export of
cotton still remained one of the country's major sources of foreign revenues.
Despite the fact that cultivation of the crop had expanded dramatically
throughout the decades following the SecondWorld War (see discussions in
Chapter Three), the fortunes of the sector have followed a particularly volatile
trajectory throughout the period, reflecting, in particular, the risks imposed by
relatively high capital outlays (in relation to the area sown) and the constant
fluctuation of international prices. These trends are shown clearly in the
changing importance of cotton exports to national export totals which are
detailed in Table 7.8.
7.2b Nicaragua's Cotton Growing Regions:
Throughout the expansion of the Post-War years, Nicaraguan cotton cultivation
was concentrated in medium to large sized production units within the
Departments of Leon and Chinandega in Region II, where they made use of the
excellent soils and good climatic conditions of the Pacific Plain (see Map 2).9 In
the 1980/81 agricultural cycle, 89.5% of national production occurred in that
region and that concentration had intensified to 97.3% by the end of the 1980s
(CIERA, 1989: vol. 9:104). The small amount of production that took place
outside of Region II occurred on larger farms in Regions HI and IV. By the end
of the seventies there were around 4500 cotton producers in Nicaragua with an
average farm size of around 40 hectares (Monserrat, 1989:94).
7.2c Cotton Cultivation under the Somozas:
'King Cotton' was the key to the dramatic economic growth of Nicaragua's
post war period. Before the 1950s, cotton had featured in the export totals of
the Republic, but never at any great scale. During that decade, however, cotton
8 It should, however, be noted that upwards of 80% of cotton seed production is sold on the
domestic market (Baumeister et al, 1983:99).
9 There was also a certain amount of cotton production on smaller farms in the region which in the
1980/81 cycle for example, accounted for nearly 16% of regional production (CIERA, 1989: volume
9, pp.104: Table 49).
Table 7.8 Nicaragua: Cotton Exports as a
Percentage of Total Exports
1970 1975 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988
19.2 25.5 6.7 30.2 18.1 15.3 24.9
Source: Consejo Monetario Centroamericano, Boletin Estadistico, Various Years.
production escalated incredibly, to the extent that, between the years of 1950
and 1954 alone, the acreage devoted to cotton production increased from
23,000 to 123,000 manzanas (see Thielen, 1991:102). This growth largely
occurred in response to the rapidly increasing international prices of the period;
although the fact that production had already shown expansionary tendencies
before then suggests that a one to one correlation between rising prices and
increasing production levels would be somewhat simplistic (Belli, 1969:2). By
the end of the 1950s, however, the coincidence of climatic problems and
depressed international prices had temporarily reduced production levels leading
to conflicts between producers and the export companies that sold cotton on the
world market over the distribution of the losses incurred (Baumeister et al,
1983:65). This crisis saw the intervention of the Somocista state which
unfolded plans to rapidly modernize the sector, in the hope that productivity
increases would be able to overcome the climatic problems and the fluctuations
of international prices.
Over the following years, therefore, the sector evolved to become one of the
most technified areas of agricultural activity in the republic, and one where
capitalist relations of production were at their most advanced. This reflected
widespread expansion in the use of mechanical techniques for sowing, spraying
and harvesting, and the extensive use of modern inputs such as fertilizers and
pesticides. During the 1960s, yields rose accordingly, to a point where they
were 45% higher than they had been in the pervious decade and, by 1967/68,
they were also 200% higher than average international yields. The technical
nature of cotton production also meant, however, that the crop was heavily
import dependent, reflected in the fact that, by the early 1970s, the cotton sector
absorbed an estimated 85% of total imported agricultural inputs (Colburn,
1986:46, Belli, 1969:57 and Baumeister et al, 1983:66).
The 1970s were another volatile period for Nicaraguan cotton producers with
both massive fluctuations in international prices and the impact of international
recession.10 The agricultural cycles 1975-76 and 76-77 produced the greatest
area sown to cotton which had ever been achieved in Nicaragua, largely in
response to incredibly high international prices. Nevertheless, at the same time,
rising inflation in Western industrial countries was increasingly affecting the
10 Baumeister et al (1983:67) suggest that in 1975/76 the difference between the maximum and
minimum average monthly prices was so extreme that, if a producer (of 500 manzanas) sold his
production in the month with the lowest price, he would have lost US$200,000 in comparison with
the month with the highest price. These differences led to the intensification of the struggles between
productive and financial capital over the distribution of the surplus generated in the sector.
289
costs of the inputs upon which the sector was so dependent. When the
international cotton price began to fall in the following years, producers were
left with severely inflated production costs and, consequently, marked falls in
the profitability of production (Monserrat, 1989:94). This meant that, by the
time of the revolution, the sector was entering another period of decline, as
producers began to decrease the area sown to cotton and investment in their
farms, in response to their declining profitability (Evans, 1988:53).
As suggested above, cotton, along with sugar, was the most technologically
advanced of the export crops produced in Nicaragua, and the areas of highest
concentration in cotton production, thus, also demonstrated higher levels of
land concentration and a greater degree of proletarianization than the national
average. In this way, the expansion of cotton cultivation differed in significant
measure from that which had occurred under the growth of coffee fifty years
earlier; as the technified nature of production affected a fundamental
transformation in the traditional haciendas of the regions where the crop
dominated. Pre-capitalist forms of land ownership rapidly disappeared, and the
smallholders of the region found their access to land dependent upon their
ownership of legal titles (rare) and/or rent in cash from landlords. This meant
that the level of proletarianization in these regions increased much more rapidly
than it had in the major areas of coffee expansion. Much of the increasing
urbanization of the Post-War period reflected this process of proletarianization
and the growing landlessness of the rural poor in the Pacific. Relatively few of
the small farmers who had previously grown basic grains in the region could
find permanent work on the emerging cotton farms and were thus compelled to
seek new lands toward the agricultural frontier or employment in the urban
areas of the region.11
The existence of a significant number ofmedium-sized, as opposed to large,
farms meant that Nicaraguan cotton production was not so heavily concentrated
as it was in other countries of the region. In 1970, for example, there were only
161 cotton producers in Guatemala cultivating an average of some 463 hectares
of cotton. Whereas, in the same year, there were some 2670 Nicaraguan cotton
producers with an average farm size of only 36 hectares (Baumeister, 1985b:4).
For a breakdown of the size of cotton farms in 1977-78 see Table 7.9. Overall,
despite the domiance of medium-sized producers in the sector, the figures
11 The rapid growth of the cotton sector can be seen from the fact that between 1952 and 1964, in
the three departments ofManagua, Leon and Chinandega, there had been an increase in the total area
cultivated of 16.8%, whilst, over the same period, the expansion in the area sown to cotton was
around 430% (Belli, 1969:39).
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Table 7.9 Nicaragua: The Structure of Cotton Production in 1977-78
Size of Producer (in
Manzanas)









Total 136,300 Manzanas 6442 Producers
Source: Thielen (1991:107
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suggest the key importance of farms of over 100 manzanas to total production
levels. Such farms accounted for 70% of the total area turned over to cotton
production but only represented something like 14% of the total number of
producers. Furthermore, the importance of such farms to national production
levels was of even greater importance than suggested by those figures, because
of the greater level of technification employed on such farms, and the higher
yields they consequently maintained.
Despite the relatively large number of cotton farmers, control of the
commercialization and processing of cotton was heavily concentrated during the
Somoza period. Individual producers either sold their cotton unginned (en
rama) to exporters, or to the owners of the cotton ginneries who then sold the
cotton on to the exporters (there were 28 of these ginneries and they were
mainly owned by the larger producers themselves). By the mid 1960s, the
external commercialization of cotton was largely controlled by four export
companies (although there were eight in all), who together accounted for 56%
of exported production. Private financial capital, on the other hand, had a less
important role than in other sectors, due to the more interventionary role of the
state in the support of the crop. As much as 50% of national production was,
however, carried out on rented lands (characterized by particularly high rent
levels) which added another dimension to the nature of social relations in the
sector (Vilas, 1986:77-78).
In summary, cotton production under the Somozas was one of the most
dynamic areas of accumulation in the Nicaraguan economy. Production was
dominated by relatively technified medium and large-sized capitalist producers,
although many of the less powerful were locked into exploitative relations with
landowners and those who controlled the export companies and processing
facilities (particularly the Somoza group itself).
7.2d The Cotton Sector Under the Sandinistas:
7.2d(i) Overall Production Levels:
Throughout the revolutionary period, the average acreage of cotton cultivated in
Nicaragua was maintained at substantially lower levels than it had been in the
1970s. Thus, whilst in the 1970s, the average cotton acreage had been at a level
of around 220,000 manzanas (peaking at a high point of nearly 300,000
manzanas in the 1977/78 cycle), during the early revolutionary years the figure
osscilated around 130,000 manzanas. This temporarily increased to nearly
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165,000 manzanas in the mid-eighties, before crashing to a low point of only
50,000 manzanas in the 1988/89 season (Gomez, 1989:16).
The evolution of total cotton production levels is shown in Figure 7.6, whilst
Figure 7.7 shows the evolution of the area of cotton cultivated annually. The
sector was significantly affected by the war of liberation and, as shown in
Figure 7.6, cotton production levels for the agricultural cycle 1979-1980 were
disastrous. During the following years, the reactivation of the sector was given
a relatively high priority and, through the easy availability of credit, higher
yields were achieved, although total production levels and the area cultivated
remained low. Indeed, throughout the revolutionary period, production totals,
despite relative improvements in the early 1980s, never approached pre-
revolutionary levels. Overall, between the 1980/81 and 1987/88 cycles, total
cotton production fell by around 2.5 million Quintales, with the decline
particularly dramatic after 1985 (Barahona et al, 1988:45-48).12
7.2d(ii) Export Values:
The annual value and volume of exported cotton also exhibited a marked decline
during the 1980s. It should be pointed out, however, that the collapse of
Nicaraguan cotton production was mirrored in the experiences of the other
Central American Republics, to the extent that total cotton exports for the region
in 1984 only represented around 50% of their 1979 value (see Table 7.13
below). This was due to a number of factors. Firstly, overproduction by
several producers, and the entry of new suppliers onto the market, had led to a
glut of cotton on the international market (China, for example, had doubled
production between 1982 and 1985, becoming a net exporter in the process,
Monserrat, 1989:96). Secondly, international demand for cotton has suffered a
relative decline in recent years, both because of the continued development of
synthetic substitutes (related to falling international energy prices) and growing
international concern about the amount of chemicals in use in the production of
the crop and their detrimental ecological effects. Indeed, the particularly severe
environmental impact of the expansion of cotton production in Central America
has been extensively documented (see Weinberg, 1991 or Faber, 1993).
12 Weather conditions in particular cycles did not help the sector, although climatic effects were
often localized. For example, in the 1988/1989 season the effects of Hurrican Joan brought excessive
humidity to some areas, which produced sharp differences in productivity across the sector, with some
farms only achieving 12-15 Quintales per manzana and others achieving as much as 50-55 Quintales
(Wheelock in F,1 Nuevo Diario 05/03/89 and 29/04/89).
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Demand has also been further depressed by increases in the stocks of cotton
held by the major importing countries.
However, there were also a number of factors at play that were peculiar to
Nicaragua. Whilst the imposition of the US trade blockade did not lead to the
direct loss of markets as it had in other sectors (during the revolutionary period
the major markets for Nicaraguan cotton remained Japan and Western Europe),
it did intensify problems in the supply of certain inputs vital to the sector
(insecticides, spare parts for machinery etc.). When this was coupled with
increasing shortages of foreign exchange, as the economic crisis took hold, the
embargo imposed serious restrictions upon the highly input-dependent
Nicaraguan cotton producers.
The overall evolution of the volume and value of cotton exports during the
revolutionary period are shown in Figure 7.8. A number of features shown by
the graph are of particular interest. Firstly, there is the previously mentioned
collapse of production in 1979, followed by improvements between 1980 and
1981, and again between 1982 and 1984. The latter were also periods of
relatively high prices, so the value of exports was able to increase beyond the
simple expansion in productive totals. In a similar way, the decline in export
values of the mid-to-late 1980s (with the exception of 1988) reflected the impact
of declining prices, as well as falling production levels; whilst the increase in
export values of 1988 actually coincided with a fall in the volume exported. All
of which suggests the key role played by international price movements in the
sector. The fluctuations of the international price of cotton are shown in Figure
7.9, which reveals the particularly dramatic falls between 1985 and 1986 and
1988 and 1989.
Furthermore, given the import-dependent nature of the sector, one of the most
important factors determining the profitability of cotton production was the
relationship between the earnings gained from the commercialization of cotton
on the international market and the cost of the imported inputs necessary for
production. Until 1984/85 earnings had at least managed to outstrip the costs of
imports, although government attempts to control the balance of payments
meant that the quantity of those imports had been substantially reduced, with
consequent effects upon productivity. Thereafter, however, the combination of
falling international prices, the distorted evolution of relative prices, and the
declining productivity of all sectors, meant that cotton production became
increasingly unviable. The outlook was so bad by the end of the decade that
Jaime Wheelock, in an interview in El Nuevo Diario on the 5th ofMarch 1989,
Figure 7.8









Volume (thousands of quintales)
Value (milions of US$)




—T 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1—| 1 1 1 1 1 |—













Evolution of International Prices received
for Nicaraeuan Cotton at current prices
(1979-1990)





1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Year
296
claimed that there was simply no way that cotton exports could be profitable
that year, and that production during the following cycle would only be
maintained through a series of incentives. These would only be sufficient to
generate enough production to cover the needs of the domestic industries reliant
on cotton for raw materials and those export contracts which the government
had already committed themselves to.
This suggests that, by the end of the decade, an increasing proportion of total
cotton production was being utilized by the country's beleaguered industrial
sector, rather than exported. Indeed, Trevor Evans suggests that the increasing
utilization of Nicaraguan cotton in the textile and cooking oil sectors did at least
save the national economy the costs of importing cotton from external sources
for use in those activities (Evans, 1988 and Jenkins, 1988). However, in a
personal interview carried out in 1990, Admundo Pineda of ENAL, suggested
that, whilst the proportion of cotton sold on the internal market did show an
increase during the revolutionary period (from about 5% to 10%), this actually
reflected the fall in total cotton production, rather than any increase in sales
within the domestic market, suggesting the continued dependence of the sector
upon internadonal market movements.
7.2d(iii) The Role of the State:
As outlined above, prior to the revolution, cotton cultivation had been
dominated by medium and large-sized capitalist farmers. During the
revolutionary era, state production was established on the farms of the APP,
and the cultivation of cotton by cooperatives and smaller scale peasant
producers was also expanded. These changes are reflected in Table 7.10 which
suggests that the relative importance of small and medium-scale production of
the crop (including the cooperative sector) increased during the 1980s, despite
falls in their overall production levels.13 Nonetheless, throughout the decade,
the capitalist sector continued to provide the bulk of the cotton produced. In
1986, for example, just over 45% of the area sown to cotton was on the land of
large and medium sized producers, 26% on cooperatives or the land of
smallholders, and just under 30% on the state owned land of the APP (source:
MIDINRA cited by Monserrat, 1989:96).
13 Baumeister et al (1983:72) suggest that the initial expropriation of the Somoza properties and
that of further expropriations, enacted under the 1981 Agrarian Reform Law, had, by 1983, produced a
state sector of nearly 300,000 manzanas and a smallholder sector of about 100,000 manzanas
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Table 7.10 Nicaragua: Regional and Sectoral Composition of
Cotton Production during the 1980s
1980/81 1987/88
Productior








II 867.6 691.2 2799.0 4367.8 635.4 433.3 1071.1 2139.8
Region
III 7.2 - 133.1 140.3 - - 10.5 10.5
Region
IV - - 374.2 374.2 45.1 - 4.5 49.6
Region
V - 1.2 - 1.2 - - - -
National 874.8 697.3 3306.4 4878.6 680.5 433.3 1086.2 2200.0
Percentage State Small + Large TOTAL State Small + Large TOTAL
Medium (as % of Medium (as % of
national) national)
Region I 0 100 0 0.1 _ _ _
Region
II 19.9 15.8 64.1 89.5 29.7 20.2 50.1 97.3
Region
ni 5.1 0 94.9 2.8 0 0 100 0.5
Region
IV 0 0 100 7.6 90.9 0 9.1 2.3
Region
V - 100 - 0.0 - - - -
National 17.9 14.3 67.8 100 30.9 19.7 49.4 100
Source: CIERA (1989), Volume 9, pp.104-111: Tables 49-56.
This level of productive activity on the part of the new state sector was only one
aspect of the expanded role of the state in the facilitation of cotton production.
Under the Somozas, as noted above, the cotton sector had been one of the few
spheres in which there had been substantial state involvement. This was
expanded upon during the revolutionary epoch. For example, the state farms,
the growing number of cooperative and small peasant producers cultivating
cotton, and the capitalist sector, all received access to imported inputs through
PROAGRO, although some private merchants still imported several inputs
under the regulation ofMIDINRA. Through this system (and low official
exchange rates and regulated internal prices) the state attempted to provide
inputs at low prices to all producers. In this way, cheap access to imported
tractors, fumigation planes and harvesters was guaranteed; whilst the pricing
system was designed to provide cheap access for producers to rent machinery if
they could not afford to buy it.14 Furthermore, cotton producers could get
access to credit from the state for up to 100% of production costs, as opposed
to only 80% in other sectors, with interest rates set at levels which were, in
reality, negative (Monserrat, 1989:95). At the same time, given the high level of
cotton production that occured on rented lands (especially smallholder
production), the state attempted to significantly lower the rental per manzana for
lands used for cotton production (Baumeister et al, 1983:73).15
To summarize, state activity in the sector encompassed an attempt to provide
effective leadership through the highly technified production of the state farms,
to improve the position of those renting lands for cotton production and the
working conditions of the temporary and permanent workforce, along with
sufficient price incentives to the capitalist sector. In addition, as was the case
with all traditional export commodities, the external commercialization of cotton
was nationalized in the first year of the revolution, with all exports marketed
under the auspices of the new state agency, ENAL.16 With the nationalization
of Somoza's holdings, 32% of the country's ginning facilities also passed into
government hands (Enriquez, 1991:72-73). Despite the fact that by the 1981-82
14 The cheap costs of imports also meant that the use of imported inputs in the sector expanded
massively during the revolutionary years, further straining the delicate commercial balance. Grigsby
(1988:206) suggests that before the revolution the costs of imported inputs had represented just over
50% of the total costs of producers and, as a consequence, despite the high level of technification in
the sector, producers had tried to use these resources as sparingly as possible. By 1988, he argues, that
applications of insecticides were up to twenty times greater than in the pre-revolutionary period, as
their cost (relative to wages, for example) fell (Grigsby, 1988:206).
15 Although, at times, the government's attempts to control rent levels simply meant that landlords
either ignored the new rates or refused to offer their lands for rental.
16 ENAL were also responsible for the external commercialization of sesame and peanuts (Pineda,
1990).
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cycle, of the 25 ginneries operating, 17 were still privately owned, the
willingness of ENAL to buy unginned cotton at a reasonable price from small
producers largely broke the privileged position enjoyed by the owners of the
processing plants and merchants in the pre-revolutionary period. The question
remains, however, as to the effects of the changes instigated in the sector upon
the opportunities open to, and the performance of, the different property
sectors.
7.2d(iv) The Evolution of Economic Policy and the Performance
of the Different Property Sectors:
Figure 7.10 examines the total production figures for each agricultural cycle in
terms of the different performance of the state, capitalist (large) and peasant
(small and medium) sectors. The graph reveals steady growth in state
production levels in the cycles to 1983/84 and, despite subsequent falls in
productive totals, the continued enhancement of its relative weight in the sector.
Thus, whilst in 1980/81 total state production of 867.6 thousand Quintales had
represented only around 18% of national production, by the 1987/88 cycle, its
production of 680.5 thousand Quintales composed over 30% of the national
total (Table 7.10). However, in overall terms, whilst capturing the majority of
resources and the attention of the state institutions (at the expense of the
cooperative and peasant sector) the state farms did not provide the efficient
leadership of cotton production which was envisioned and, in the years prior to
1985, even operated at an overall loss.17
More serious than this, however, given its weight in the sector, was the
collapse in production levels of the capitalist sector that occurred in the years
following the 1983/84 cycle. Table 7.10 shows how, in the 1980/81 cycle, that
sector had accounted for nearly 70% of national production but by the 1987/88
cycle this had fallen to under 50%. In terms of the actual level of production,
this reflected a fall of around 2,300 thousand Quintales. The production levels
of the small and medium-scale sector also peaked in the 1983/84 cycle, but their
decline in latter years was nowhere near as severe as it was in the capitalist
sector and, proportionally, their contribution to national production, over the
same period, increased from just over 14% in the 1980/81 cycle to just under
20% in the 1987/88 cycle.
17 Nonetheless,not all of the state farms produced cotton inefficiently. For example the Ricardo
Morales Aviles complex achieved consistently high yields. For example in 1988/89 yields were at a
level of 38.9 Quintales per manzana when the national average was 27 Quintales (interview with



















































































The increasing levels of production on the small farms and cooperatives can
also be seen from figures on the evolution of the total cultivated area which are
provided in Table 7.11. Expansion was particularly marked in the earliest
years, with the total area of cotton cultivated by those sectors increasing from
12,500 to 45,500 manzanas between 1980 and 1984. Furthermore, within that
increase it was the cooperatives which showed the greatest expansion. Of the
figure quoted above for 1984, 38% represented production on CAS
cooperatives, 49% CCS cooperatives, and only 14% that of individuals
(Clemens, 1991:109-110).
Evans (1988:54) provides a useful rationale for the differential performance of
the various strata. In general peasant producers were prepared to cultivate
cotton so long as the guaranteed price received provided them with a basic
wage. This is reflected in the intial successes in the development of smallholder
production of the crop under the more favourable conditions of the period to
1984. The FSLN hoped that, despite the increased presence of smaller-scale
producers in the sector, who they feared would not produce as effectively as the
state and large private sectors, yields could be maintained through the provision
of cheap inputs, services and technical assistance. In response to the incentives
offered, between 1980 and 1984 both the state and the small and medium
producers managed to increase overall cotton production, with small and
medium producers also quadrupling the area sown to cotton in that period
(Barricada 12th September 1983). Overall levels did not fare so well, however,
because of the poor performance of the dominant larger producers.
As Evans (1988:54) argues, this fall occurred because capitalist producers
required the added incentive of profitability beyond subsistence, which the
heavily depressed cotton sector was unable to provide. In fact, the need to offer
considerable incentives to facilitate the continued production of cotton by large
and medium-scale producers was more pressing than was the case in the coffee
sector. This was because, engagement in cotton production, it being an annual
crop, is relatively mobile and if producers think that there is insufficient return
to be made from cotton, then, given the relatively low fixed costs of cotton
production, they are more likely to move to the production of other
commodities (Baumeister et al, 1983:76). As recognized in an early internal
MIDINRA document;
"The fundamental criterion that determines the working of the sub¬
system is the financial return of the crop for the large producers. This
is to say that the principal variables are short term economic variables:
Table 7.11 Nicaragua: Area of Cotton Sown (thousands ofmanzanas)
Productive Sector 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86
State Sector (APP) 22.8 25.4 32.9 47.2 43.6 34.4
Small producers and
cooperatives
12.5 15.2 19.1 41.4 45.5 32.0
Large and medium
scale producers
99.4 92.1 77.2 77.6 75.2 56.6
TOTAL 134.7 132.7 129.2 166.2 164.3 123.0
Source: MIDINRA, cited in Monserrat (1989:96)
Table 7.12 Nicaragua: Cotton Yields Achieved perManzana
in Tons (1980/81 to 1987/88)
Agricultural
Cycle






1980/81 38.4 33.9 36.2 36.2
1981/82 34.8 28.0 30.1 30.7
1982/83 38.2 35.5 40.6 39.3
1983/84 30.5 31.7 36.9 34.0
1984/85 28.4 25.1 29.6 28.1
1985/86 25.7 23.6 29.8 27.1
1986/87 35.6 35.2 43.1 38.8
1987/88 29.6 20.6 26.6 25.9
Source: CIERA (1989), Volume 9, pp.104-111: Tables 49-56
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the anticipatedprice ofcotton, costs of inputs and labor, taxation and
credit conditions. The latter factor plays a very important role given
that cotton production is based on circulatory capital, with very little
fixed capital. The producer does not use his own capital, but instead
money borrowed on a short-term basis." (MIDINRA, 1982) Las
politicas para el sector agropecuario: Presentacion por subsistemas
productivas; quoted in Colbum, 1986:51)
The emphasis placed by the government upon the cheap provision of the needed
inputs to the private sector was problematic because, on occasion, they were
used to enable the sector to function without any risk to the producer's own
capital and without much attention to efficiency or reinvestment. Furthermore,
private producers periodically tended to report inflated costs in an effort to
secure increased credit and higher government prices for their produce. One
tactic was for private producers to reduce costs and then pocket parts of the
credit distributed to finance those costs, through, for example, only applying
parts of reported fertiliser applications. Producers claimed that these tactics
represented the only means whereby they could make a profit under the
conditions determined by depressed international prices and the government
control of their exports (Colburn, 1986:53,57).18
Despite the noted collapse in production during the 1980s, yields were
maintained at a reasonable level, although, on average, they were somewhat
below that achieved in the 1970s. Monserrat (1989:97) gives an average figure
of 11.89 Quintales of ginned cotton per manzana between the cycles 1970-71
and 1976-77, and an average of 10.62 between the cycles 1980-81 and 1987-
88. Figures in Table 7.12 also show the decline in yields that occurred during
the revolutionary period but break down the figures according to the various
property sectors. The table reveals that yields remained highest in the capitalist
sector right up until the 1987/88 cycle, although levels varied considerably
during the decade. On the other hand, although the state sector generally
achieved lower overall yields, it did retain a greater stability of performance,
exhibiting less fluctuation than either of the two private sectors. Yields had been
relatively impressive on the small and medium farms during the initial cycles
but, thereafter, excepting the exceptional 1986/87 cycle, they fell progressively.
The factors influencing the general decline in yields indicated included: the lack
of investment and participation of some of the larger capitalist producers, the
scarcity of resources for all sectors (given the lack of exchange for imports and
18 See below for a discussion of the effects of the evolution of the goverment's pricing policies.
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the economic blockade of the US), the scarcity of labour during the harvest
periods especially during the first half of the decade, the poor organization and
errors in the decision making of the relevant organs of the state (such as
MIDINRA) and the falling productivity of labour.
7.2d(v) Pricing Policy:
With regard to the first of the series of problems noted above, the government
attempted to control exchange policy in such a way so as to provide cotton
growers with relatively cheap imported inputs and an export price which would
provide some incentive to expand production. At first, ENAL had paid
producers in cordobas according to the international price of cotton (at official
exchange rates) and production had fallen sharply. From 1982, however, an
element of incentive was added, whereby the price was fixed for each
agricultural cycle, according to an estimate of production costs, together with a
profit margin of twenty to thirty percent. In this way, the state assumed a major
part of the risks of production, guaranteeing the difference between the
guaranteed price and the international price at the time of sale. Nonetheless, for
the large private producers what they saw as the overvaluation of the exchange
rate meant that the value of such an increase in nominal income was limited.
Ostensibly they argued that the new institutional arrangements meant that they
were faced with a decline in their direct earnings from cotton production
(affecting their willingness to produce), as the cordobas they earned, which,
under the previous system, they had been able to exchange for dollars at a
favourable rate, became worth only a small fraction of what they had been
previously (Colburn, 1986:55-57). In addition, the largest producers had lost
the ability which they had previosly had to pass increasing costs onto the
smaller producers whose cotton they processed or marketed. Nonetheless,
between 1982 and 1985, producers did have the right to buy dollars with a part
of their profits at the more attractive parallel exchange rate, although this was
dependent upon the availability of exchange within the financial system.
Despite the incentives offered, the government was forced to admit that cotton
production continued to be unattratctive, especially after 1984. The
subsidisation of the costs of production, through the low cost of imports, was
proving extremely expensive and yet still had not effected a dramatic
improvement in the sector. In reforms instigated in 1985 guaranteed payments
in dollars were offered to every producer who achieved certain yields in their
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production (largely determined by the quality of soils in the different regions),
but in the context of inflation and severely depressed international prices this
incentive was insufficient to persuade producers to expand their production and
over the following years production plummetted to its lowest level for decades.
By that time, despite the maintenance of heavily subsidized channels for
importation, the escalating costs of production meant that it was impossible for
producers to obtain the many imported inputs that they needed. This was
worsened considerably following the imposition of the US trade embargo in
that year. Eventually the situation became so severe that it became policy for
MIDINRA to try and limit cotton production to the most ecologically
appropriate areas (Enriquez, 1991:162). In addition, Enriquez argues that,
despite increasing levels of mechanization (itself a source of the import
problems), the sector continued to face labour recruitment problems, with the
total number of workers participating in the harvest falling from around
100,000 between 1982 and 1984 to only 17,000 in the 1987/88 cycle, although
this also reflected the fact that the area sown had also fallen sharply during the
same period (Enriquez, 1991:162).
7.2d(vi) The Reforms of the Late 1980s:
By the 1987/88 season, constantly declining production and low international
prices had combined to produce a severe crisis in what was already an
extremely shaky sector. This, coupled with the disincentive of the high costs of
production and the distortion of relative prices, made cotton an unprofitable and
unattractive activity for all producers, factors which conspired to produce a fall
in production to levels lower even than the cycle immediately following the
insurrection.
The 1988 and 1989 economic reforms improved the situation somewhat, but
the prospects, at the time of planting for the 1988/89 cycle, were so bad that
many growers were threatening not to sow cotton at all, unless the government
did something to help them. The government responded, after a series of
meetings with the major producers, by announcing a series of special
mechanisms for the cycle. Interest on debts were cancelled, as were bank
guarantees, as a form ofmonetary incentive to producers. Despite these
measures, the level of cultivation in the 1988/1989 cycle remained low because
of adverse climatic conditions (the effects of Hurricane Joan) and the sector was
hard hit by the massively inflated costs of imported inputs caused by the
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devaluations involved in the economic reforms In effect, the combination of the
price increase and the pro-export economic reforms could not compensate for
the unease still felt amonst producers because of the unprofitable nature of
cotton production during the preceding years (Monterray, 1989:7 and CEPAL,
1989:6).
In response to the continued decline of the sector, in 1989 the government
announced the formation of the National Cotton Commission. This was
designed to ensure the cooperation and communication between the various
actors in the cotton sector within the country and in particular between the state
and the other sectors (particularly the larger capitalist farmers) and to ensure
wider consultation and intervention in the decision making processes within the
sector. The development of the Commission, in tandem with the provision of
new incentives (paid in dollars, in relation to the quality of the cotton grown,19
to those producers whose production exceeded their average production over
the three previous years) as part of the continued programme of economic
reforms in 1989, finally produced an upturn in total production levels in the
final cycle of the decade. Nonetheless, the original target of 51.2 thousand
manzanas was not met because of climatic problems (the target was missed by
1.6 thousand manzanas; SPP, 1990:22, Pineda, 1990, Ricardo, 1989:82).
7.2e Conclusions:
In many ways the experiences of the cotton sector under the FSLN summarize
well the problems which the government faced on the national scale. The effects
of international price movements and the war were extremely pronounced. The
international market failed to provide any incentive for the development of the
sector and necessitated the provision of expensive incentives in the latter cycles
of the decade if any cotton was to be produced at all, with severe effects upon
domestic financial balances. The effects of the collapse in international market
prices can be seen clearly in Table 7.13 where the collapse of cotton production
at the regional scale is shown. The table shows how between 1980 and 1987
the amount of land devoted to cotton production, in Central America as a
whole, fell by over 50% from 265,000 hectares to 118,000 hectares, reflecting
similar falls in production in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala.
19 This was possible for producers because of their increasing ability to attract labour in the context
of growing unemployment. This allowed an increasing reliance on hand-picked rather than
mechanically harvested cotton which improved its quality.
Table 7.13
Central America: Area Harvested and Productivity of Cotton
Area harvested (Thousands ofHectares)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988/
Central America 265.7 231.3 204.2 215.9 224.6 190.1 112.5 118.8
Costa Rica 2.3 0.8 1.0 1.5 2.1 1.6 1.0 1.0 ND
El Salvador 58.2 50.8 48.9 36.7 37.3 27.5 13.0 13.3 12.6
Guatemala 102.3 78.8 59.5 55.9 62.2 67.4 30.7 40.5 40.4
Honduras 8.6 8.0 4.4 4.5 7.6 7.3 4.1 4.0 4.4
Nicaragua 94.3 92.9 90.4 117.3 115.4 86.3 63.7 60.0 40.7
Productivity (Tons per Hectare)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Central America 2.3 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.5
Costa Rica 1.0 2.0 1.7 2.5 1.8 2.3 1.8 1.3 ND
El Salvador 2.0 2.2 2.3 3.1 2.3 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.2
Guatemala 3.5 2.8 2.2 3.1 2.9 2.2 2.6 3.3 2.6
Honduras 2.5 2.3 1.9 2.8 2.4 2.0 2.2 2.0 2.0
Nicaragua 1.1 2.2 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.2
Cource: Figures Provided by FLACSO (Facultad Latinomericano de Ciencias Sociales
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The import dependent nature of cotton production intensified the effects of the
trade embargo in the sector, even without the direct loss of markets, and further
intensified balance of payments problems. The weight of the large and
medium-scale capitalist farmers in the sector also increased the necessity of
incentives and highlighted the recessionary effects of the lack of participation of
the large producers in economic activity during the revolutionary years, despite
the previously mentioned widespread provision of government incentives.
Matters were not helped by the inefficient nature of state production and the
beaurocratic centralism of MIDINRA in the organization of the APP and its
dealings with the other productive sectors. The sector was also beset by the
problems of low labour productivity and the decline of labour supply during the
harvest periods, although the collapse of the sector toward the end of the decade
actually served to intensify the increasing levels of unemploymant apparent
during that period. Finally, despite the initial strides made in the small and
medium sized farm sector, in terms of overall production levels and improved
yields, those producers were left relatively starved of resources.
7.3 The Beef Sector:
7.3a Historical Antecedents:
The development of commercial ranching in Nicaragua was constructed upon a
long tradition of cattle raising. Livestock had been important throughout most
of the long colonial period and, in contrast to the other parts of the Guatemalan
audiencia, the major form of the colonial hacienda in Nicaragua had been built
upon cattle raising rather than agricultural activities. These cattle-based
haciendas had mainly produced beef for the domestic market, although
substantial numbers ofNicaraguan cattle were also sold regionally in
Guatemala. In the years following independence, political unrest continued to
limit the possibilities for the commercial development and modernization of
ranching, although, as argued by Monserrat (1989:117), the export ofmeat and
other cattle-related products continued to have some importance. Cattle raising
continued to play a role in Nicaraguan economic life throughout the twentieth
century, but it wasn't until the 1960s that beef production for export markets
really accelerated, in response to opportunities in the US market. A modern
beef-packing plant was built in 1957 and beef exports increased by 150 million
lbs between 1963 and 1973, whilst the total number of cattle is said to have
expanded by 46% between 1963 and 1971 (Enriquez, 1991:41).
In response to the outside stimulus of the rapidly growing US market, the
Somoza government attempted to capture a growing proportion of national beef
production for the export market by increasing the domestic price of beef,
thereby limiting the size of the domestic market. At the same time, the state also
carried out a number of infrastructural improvements designed to aid the
expansion of the industry. In addition beef production was modernised, to a
limited degree, through, for example, the import ofNorth American breeding
cattle (Enriquez, 1991:41).
The expansion in cattle-rearing occurred in tandem with the migration of
agricultural activity toward the Interior of the country and the zones of the
agricultural frontier. Often the land was originally cleared by peasants (who had
often previously been displaced from the fertile lands of the Pacific by the
expanded production of other export commodities, such as cotton and sugar)
who were then forced to sell out cheaply to the powerful expanding cattle
ranches. The smallholders were then compelled to migrate further toward the
agricultural frontier to clear new lands or, occasionally, were able to rent small
plots on the ranches. In this way the expansion of beef production was
particularly influential in the evolving concentration of land ownership in the
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Post-War period as the land-extensive nature of the sector meant that each
expansion required further tranches of new land, and yet absorbed very little
extra labour from those who had previously farmed that land (Ballard,
1985:2).20
At the time of the revolution, beef exports were still of vital importance to the
Nicaraguan economy, although their participation in the total exports of the
country were subject to some fluctuation as revealed in Table 7.14. The FAO
estimated that there were 2,560,000 head of cattle in Nicaragua in the period
1974-76, although subsequently the sector suffered heavy losses both before
and after the insurrection, through substantially raised slaughter rates
(increasing to an extraction rate of over 25%) and the smuggling of thousands
of cattle across the Honduran and Costa Rican borders (Bonilla, 1990). It is
estimated that the combination of these factors had, by 1983, led to a reduction
in the total number of cattle in the country to a level of around 2,200,00, a loss
of some 360,000 animals (SUAS, 1987:149).
7.3b Characterization of the Nicaraguan Cattle Sector:
At the time of the revolution, the industry still operated at a very low
technological level, making little use of investment, capital and inputs (and very
unintensive use of labour) and, therefore, functioned at a very low level of
productivity. For example, the annual weight gain per animal in Nicaragua
during the years immediately prior to the revolution is estimated at around 28
KGs (compared to 47kg in Argentina and 85kg in the US; Cajina et al, 1989:9).
This suggests that the expansion in beef production was achieved through a
rapid expansion of the area of pasture (this increased by 30% between 1963 and
1971), rather than any intensification or modernization of production; although,
as explained above, this did occur to a certain extent (Enriquez, 1991:41).
Most cattle raising in Nicaragua, therefore, continues to be carried out under
conditions that have altered tittle over the past decades or even centuries (Cajina
et al, 1989:9 suggest that 90% of cattle raising is still carried out with relatively
primitive methods). Traditional breeds dominate the sector and these are raised
on natural pasture without significant application of fertilizers or the use of
processed feeds, and with tittle recourse to vaccinations or deparasitization
20 Warnken (1975) estimates that, on average, the raising of cattle in Nicaragua required five man-
days per animal. The equivalent figure for coffee was, he argued, 168.9 per manzana, whilst the
national average for other agricultural commodities equalled about 43 man-hours.












(Monserrat, 1989:118).21 Despite large loans from the World Bank to facilitate
the development of the sector in the 1960s and 1970s, even the massive
increase in beef production tof that period was achieved through an increase in
the amount of land turned over to pasture, rather than productivity
improvements or technological developments. This means that, in general
terms, the raising of cattle in Nicaragua has remained an extensive activity,
utilizing the abundance of natural resources (vast expanses of relatively cheaply
available land, natural sources of water and shade), rather than the application
of technology or modern livestock farming methods. Traditionally, the larger
ranchers have dominated exports, whilst small and medium sized producers
have served the domestic market. Overall, despite the existence of small-scale
livestock rearing (by 1979 there were about 30,000 producers in the country),
beef production has been concentrated into the hands of largest landowners,
with almost 50% of pasture in units of over 500 manzanas in 1971 (Enriquez,
1991:42).
Throughout the Post-War period, the cattle sector was one of the parts of the
economy most dominated by the Somoza family. Of the seven industrial
slaughter houses (mataderos) established in the country by the end of the 1970s
(these controlled around 60% of national beef production), the Somoza family
owned all but two, and these had not been established until the 1970s. These
mataderos were able to control the national industry through their links to the
three major export agencies serving the sector and a series of intermediaries
who purchased cattle (at relatively low prices) from a certain proportion of the
large number of small and medium producers. In addition, the mataderos were
also important sources of finance in the sector (financing 28% of national
production in 1975). This was facilitated through contracts which imposed rigid
deadlines on producers for the supply of their cattle to the matadero. If this
deadline was missed, for whatever reason, interest rates on the loans made
were raised substantially. That production not captured by the mataderos went
to serve the domestic market and was processed in the smaller 'rastos
municipales, of which there were slightly over one hundred, largely controlled
by local government (Vilas, 1986:77 and Cajina et al, 1989:10,11,20-30).
In the early 1970s the dominance of the Somoza family in the sector was
challenged by a group of independent producers (part of the BANAMERICA
Group) affiliated to the Associacion de Ganaderos Nicaraguenses. Initially, an
21 Most Nicaraguan cattle are of a so called 'dual purpose,' a crossbreed between criolo and Zebu for
both meat and milk production, the meat produced is low fat industrial quality akin to that produced in
Australia and Holland; Bonilla (1990).
attempt was made to buy out the IFAGAN matadero, the most important in the
country. When this was prevented, the group financed the construction of two
new mataderos. This improved the regional distribution of the mataderos, at the
cost of the evolution of severe over-capacity in the sector. A problem which the
FSLN had to confront in the ensuing decade.
7.3c Nicaragua's Cattle Zones:
Three major zones of cattle-rearing can be identified in Nicaragua; the most
important variable being the distribution of rainfall regimes (see Map 2).
a) The Pacific Zone: This region encompasses the Departments of
Chinandega, Leon, Managua, Masaya, Carazo, Granada and Rivas in Regions
n, HI and IV. The region is not tremendously well-suited to the raising of cattle
and, during the six month dry season, the minimum capacity necessary for the
sustenance of the cattle is barely reached. This means that the scarcity of forage
toward the end of the dry season leads to a considerable drop in milk
production and the live weight of animals, and particular problems if the rains
are late in arriving (SUAS, 1987:149). The region accounts for about 26% of
the total pasture land of the country, as well as 31% of the nation's cattle stock.
b) The Central Zone: This region is made up of the Departments of Boaca,
Chontales and Jinotega in Region V and part of Region VI. It is the major cattle
raising area of the country, with the most abundant pastureland (39%) and
around 53% of the total cattle population. It is the only region which boasts a
surplus of pastures but it is also that with the most traditional methods of cattle
raising.
c) The Northern Zone: This region comprises the Departments of Madriz,
Nueva Segovia, Esteli and Jinotega in Region I and part of Region VI. It
contains 14.7% of national pastures and 16% of the total cattle population.
Located in the North of the country it was one of the regions most seriously
affected by the ContraWar and, therefore, the region's cattle producers
suffered serious dislocations during the revolutionary years.
In addition to the regions described, cattle are also raised in parts of the Atlantic
Region (5.8% of national production). Overall Nicaragua boasts an area of
pasture land of between 5 and 6 million manzanas.22
22 The above figures are taken from Monserrat (1989:119) unless otherwise stated.
7.3d Cattle and the Sandinistas:
7.3d(i) Generalities:
During the revolutionary period, ranchers in Nicaragua faced a serious complex
of problems. The most important of these included, a serious lack of access to
inputs, the destruction of infrastructure, worsening terms of trade through a
decrease in the international price of beef and related products (although at the
time of the revolution the price had been at a particularly high level), and
inflationary pressures upon the costs of production. By far the largest
impediment to the success of the sector, however, was the destruction caused
by the insurrection and the later effects of the Contra-War. The costs
occasioned by the insurrection were devastating and the industry never properly
recovered from the massive loss of stock. Furthermore, before and after the
final struggle against Somoza, many of the largest cattle breeders engaged in a
large scale slaughter of their stock, as well as effecting the illegal export of
cattle to Honduras and Costa Rica. Through such processes, the years of 1978
and 1979 saw the highest levels of animals slaughtered in Nicaraguan history,
with an average of 448,000 animals slaughtered per year, and the production of
approximately 136 million pounds of beef annually (see figures below). In
addition, the damage wrought was far worse than suggested by the simple total
of animals slaughtered because those totals also included a certain proportion of
breeding stock, seriously affecting the possible recovery rate and the future
security of the sector.
7.3d(ii) The Evolution of Production:
The data in Table 7.15 shows that during the first half of the decade there was a
sharp recuperation in the overall production ofmeat in the country, which
encompassed both domestic and export markets. Production increased from an
appalling low in 1980 (the lowest since 1969, excepting the collapse of 1974)
to a peak in 1983; although thereafter there was a sustained fall (Cajina et al,
1989:36). The reasons behind this were several. Firstly, the increase in the
number of animals slaughtered annually in the period up to 1983 reflected an
increase in the demand for meat in the domestic market following the
revolutionary triumph and the previously mentioned processes of
decapitalization. Between 1980 and 1984 there had also been a marked
expansion in credit provision to all sectors and the government had offered the
incentive of higher prices for weight and quality. However, in the case of the
315









1972 318 102,714 323
1973 308 97,020 315
1974 220 75,900 345
1975 324 100,764 311
1976 370 111,600 313
1977 382 114,700 300
1978 470 143,820 306
1979 424 127,200 300
1980 348 104,000 299
1981 245 78,100 317
1982 302 92,200 305
1983 309 98,300 317
1984 296 96,100 324
1985 269 76,046 282
1986 228 62,300 273
1987 191 53,637 280
1988 226 nd nd
Source: Elaborated by Monserrat (1989:120) on the basis of figures from Banco
Central de Nicaragua, Dirreccion General de Ganaderia and Anuarios Estadisticos
de INEC. Except figures for 1988 from CEERA (1989), Volume 9. pp. 310:
Table 250.
cattle sector, the generous credit supplied by the Banco Nacional de Desarrollo
often, especially amongst the largest private ranchers, tended to be used to
develop extractive, rather than reproductive, activities. This meant that the
higher levels of cattle slaughtered in the years leading up to and including 1983
reflected the rapid decapitalization of the sector, rather than any expansion in
productive activity. This is reflected in the estimates for the evolution of
Nicaragua's cattle population which are provided in Table 7.16.
From 1984, the lack of productive investment in the large private and state
sectors (see below), the effects of continued decapitalization, and the
intensification of the ContraWar, all served to weaken the sector. Furthermore,
worsening transportation problems and increasing inflation, linked to a fall in
guaranteed prices, meant that the alternative markets of the licensed private
domestic sector (the rastos municipales) and clandestine slaughter-houses
became more attractive than selling to the state. This means that the national
figures for the latter years of the 1980s need treating with some scepticism,
since those figures will obviously not include all the animals killed clandestinely
and the meat produced and sold on the black market. For the government, all
of this represented a continued decline in the official production of beef, which
was made more worrying by the fact that studies also revealed a low level of
restocking, reflecting a lack of productive investment in the sector and the
continued erosion of the total cattle stock of the country (Monserrat, 1989:118).
7.3d(iii) Beef Exports:
In the specific case of the export market an even more depressing picture
emerges. Following the massive totals of 1979, exports collapsed in the next
two years, before increasing again during 1982 and 1983. Thereafter, exports
remained depressed until the end of the decade when totals finally began to
increase once again. The evolution of total export figures, according to volume
and value, are shown in Figure 7.11.
It is interesting to note from the graph that the trajectory of export values and
volumes remained extremely similar, suggesting relatively tittle influence from
the fluctuations of international prices. On closer reflection, however, this hides
some factors of historical significance. Traditionally, the international market
for beef had been one of the most stable commodity markets. The collapse in
commodity markets described in previous chapters was not, however,
ineffectual in this sector. During the 1970s, international beef prices had begun
Table 7.16 Evolution of the Number of Cattle in Nicaragua (Thousands of
animals)
Year Cattle Year Cattle
1952 1,116 1982 2,320
1957 1,182 1983 2,260
1963 1,252 1984 2,350
1971 2,236 1985 2,360
1978 2,800 1986 1,960
1979 2,303 1987 1,800
1980 2,300 1988 1,600
1981 2,290
Source: MIDINRA, Direccion General de Ganaderia; Informaciones
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to fluctuate much more widely than they had previously and, on the whole, they
increased during that decade; although the fluctuations meant very low prices in
particular years (1974 being a case in point). They were then, however, to
decline for most of the 1980s from the high point reached in 1980, with a
particularly sharp fall between 1983 and 1986 which reflected the influence of
the US drought of that year. This had enduced increases in US beef production,
as ranchers there had cut their losses by slaughtering their herds. It also
reflected an expansion in Australian production (Bonilla, 1990 and Monserrat,
1989:116). Figure 7.12 shows the relatively high international price at the
beginning of the revolutionary period and the way in which, even though prices
fell over the following years, they did remain higher than pre-revolutionary
levels.
7.3d(iv) Markets and the Trade Embargo;
Possibly of greater consequence upon declining export levels, than the
evolution of international prices, was the imposition of the US trade embargo in
1985 and the consequent search for new markets imposed upon government
planners in the sector. Even in 1981, 84.4% of all beef exports had still been
destined for the US market (before the revolution the figure had been as high as
97%) with a further 14.4% going to Puerto Rico. The loss of the Puerto Rican
market in 1983, and a declining position in the US market, were crucial blows
in the following couple of years and by 1984 exports to both markets only
constituted 46.4% of total Nicaraguan beef exports, with the difference going to
Canada and Cuba. In 1985, exports to the US increased again but were then
halted completely with the imposition of the trade embargo. By 1990 the two
major export markets were the Canadian (around 70%) and the Mexican
(around 25%). The impact of this was of some importance because the new
markets commanded significantly lower prices. The price received in the
Canadian market was, for example, at least 10 cents per pound lower than
could have been earned in the US market and commercialization in the Canadian
market also involved much higher transportation costs than had been incurred
when the majority of Nicaraguan beef had been exported to the Southern states
of the US (Bonilla, 1990).
7.3d(v) Institutional Changes and the Role of the State:
As has been outlined with reference to each of the commodities considered in
this chapter, one of the first acts of the revolutionary government was to
nationalize the administration of international trade. From 1979, beef exports
passed under the sole control of a new state agency, ENCAR (Empresa
Nicaraguanse de la Carne). This organization saw its chief function as to
attempt the diversification of export markets and obtain the highest possible
price for the beef exported; two criteria which at times, given the experiences
described above, proved to be contradictory. In addition, over the course of the
first couple of years, the seven industrial slaughter houses were also
nationalized and came to be administered under the auspices of the State
company, ENAMARA. These primarily serviced beef destined for the export
market. The smaller mainly private municipal slaughter houses continued to
serve the domestic market. Initially ENCAR had bought animals directly from
the producers and then paid ENAMARA for processing who then returned it to
ENCAR for commercialization. From 1981, however, ENAMARA achieved a
greater degree of autonomy from ENCAR and were able to buy directly from
producers leaving ENCAR as solaly a commercialization agency (Bonilla,
1990). Despite these attempts to manage the sector, the previously outlined
growth in the clandestine slaughter and marketing of cattle severely affected the
ability of the state to capture production for the export sector (as well as the
supply of sub-products to the industrial sector).
Despite enjoying a monopoly over the modem industrial production of beef for
export markets, the state-owned mataderos faced a series of serious problems
and, as shown in Table 7.17, their capture of the official production of beef
never surpassed about a third of the national total. The lower levels shown for
1980 reflected the continuing existence of privately-owned mataderos, whilst,
thereafter, the increasing levels of private production shown in the Table
reflected the continuing tendency for producers to sell to the private municipios
of the domestic market. The relative improvements in the percentage of national
production accounted for by the state mataderos which followed toward the end
of the decade reflected a shift in policy which gave ENAMARA a monopoly in
Regions III and IV (Cajina et al, 1989:60).23 The state's monopoly in those
regions also, however, reflected another problem for the mataderos. This was
that, as the decade wore on, an increasing shortage of spare parts had led to the
23 In 1983 ENAMARA had actually proposed the closure of all the 'rastos municipales in order to
reassert their control over national production. The proposal brought strong protests from many
sectors (including UNAG) and was eventually shelved, although as argued above, a monopoly was
granted in Regions III and IV (Cajina et al, 1989:56)
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Source: CIERA (1989), Volume 9, pp. 300: Table 244
progressive closure of all of the mataderos except for those located in those
regions, further restricting the state's ability to compete with the private sector
in those parts outside of Regions m an IV. A further problem was that, in the
context of growing inflation, the system of guaranteed prices (through which
the mataderos tried to capture beef production) proved increasingly insufficient,
given the escalating production costs imposed by the high price of inputs. This
same process made it more attractive for producers to sell to the private sector.
Overall, the continuing inability of the mataderos to capture sufficient
proportions of national production led to serious problems of excess capacity
and, therefore, decreasing profitability; adding to the growing state losses
involved in the subsidization of the export sector (Cajina et al, 1989:32).
One of the benefits of the nationalization of the mataderos was that it broke the
power which intermediaries, private export firms and the owners of the
processing facilities, had exerted over the smaller and medium-sized ranchers.
These sectors gained from the expansion of credit supply and the improved
provision of needed inputs by the state (especially to the prioritized cooperative
sector). Nonetheless, considering the peripheral location ofmany small and
medium-sized ranchers, they were seriously affected by the dislocations to
transport facilities and infrastructure caused by the war. This imposed a
continued dependence upon intermediaries and large producers, through their
continued monopolized of those transportation and other facilities which
remained. This obviously had a negative effect on production levels, given the
weight of small-scale cattle raising in the country.
Overall, therefore, although the breaking of the exploitative relations that
existed between the small producers and the mataderos had been achieved, it
was only partial, because of the inability of the state to adequately substitute for
the role of intermediaries or offer adequate producer prices (see below). In turn
the transformation of social relations in the sector, whilst part of the FSLN's
strategy for the sector, had the contradictory effect of limiting the ability of the
mataderos to capture a sufficient proportion of total production.
7.3d(vi) Attempts at Modernization:
One of the means whereby the state tried to improve the poor performance of
the mataderos was through a massive programme of investments designed to
improve the productive performance of the state farms and increase the amount
of cattle arriving at the mataderos from that source. Accordingly, throughout the
revolutionary period, the state increased its productive, as opposed to
industrial, presence in the sector, although the majority of beef (about 80%)
continued to be produced by private producers, both large and small scale. The
government thus put considerable effort into the rejuvenation and development
of the primary cattle raising activities of the sector. Two major cattle projects
were developed. The 'Oyathepe' project (located between Lake Nicaragua and
the Oyathepe river) which was intended to encompass the development of
42,000 hectares of pasture for beef production, and the 'Punta Gorda' project
designed to cover an even more extensive area in the South of the Zelaya
Department. MIDINRA (the agricultural ministry) saw the development of these
more technologically advanced farms as the spearhead of a national campaign to
increase beef production. In 1980, as part of the same programme, MIDINRA
also founded the 'National Pasture Programme'. The state sector was also the
site of the rapid development of an artificial insemination programme, with the
inauguration of a Semen Bank in 1983 using imported sperm, as well as native
bulls of high generic quality. The programme also saw the development of
irrigation schemes and the introduction of new grass varieties to try and
overcome the problems of the dry season in the Pacific zone.
Taken together these projects represented an attempt by the state to modernise
and increase the productivity of the sector. Nevertheless, the vast bulk of cattle
raising continued to occur in the private sector and both the capitalist and
peasant sector gained little from the modernization programme; whilst the
productive performance of the enhanced state sector was disappointing. The
large capitalist sector continued to decapitalize and gave little response to the
offering of incentives, whilst the peasant sector remained relatively starved of
funds and increased the proportion of their production marketed clandestinely.
7.3d(vii) The Evolution of Economic Policy and the Balance
Between Export and Domestic Production:
The government faced a severe contradiction in meeting its two major policy
objectives in the sector, the guaranteeing of export revenues and the provision
ofmeat at low cost for the population (as part of a commitment towards meeting
the basic needs of popular consumption). These contradictions enhanced the
economic problems facing the government as the maintenance of artificially low
official prices in the domestic market, in reality, represented the evolution of
public deficits through the difference between the subsidized market prices and
the prices paid to producers by the mataderos. At another level, it also served as
a disincentive for producers to sell to the mataderos, as official prices remained
much lower than those which could be obtained from the private municipal
slaughter houses, who could afford to offer higher prices because of their lower
commercialization costs,24 and the illegal black market slaughter and marketing
of cattle.
Over time, the imbalance of relative prices, especially exchange rates, worked
to the disadvantage of those wishing to export, and further encouraged the
transfer of production from the export to the domestic sector. Bonilla (1990)
suggests that, by 1985, the imbalance between international prices and domestic
prices was such that the international price received for a whole carcass could
only buy 81bs of fillet steak on the domestic market. Under these conditions it
was patently unprofitable to export and yet ENCAR were still required to do so.
Given the problems and lack of progress experienced in the sector, the
government launched a new law in 1986, 'La Ley de Defensa del Patrimonio
Ganadero,' to try and ameliorate the decline of the sector. The law attempted to
exercise greater control over the level of extraction in the sector so that it might
be limited to within margins that were not so threatening to the reproduction of
the herds and the longer term survival of the sector. The previously described
modernization schemes in the state sector were added to, within an attempt to
increase the levels of productivity (through the increasing use ofmore modern
techniques) and ensure a more just distribution ofmeat to all sectors of society;
whilst ensuring that the state municipios received enough supply to improve the
disastrous export situation. The programme was also accompanied by a series
of changes in pricing and incentive policies. Incentives paid in dollars were
introduced to encourage producers to sell their cattle to the state mataderos.
Previously, the prices offered by ENAMARA had been as much as 60% below
that which could be obtained in the private sector let alone on the black market.
In addition, those who offered their cattle to ENAMARA were offered free or
cheap transportation of their cattle to the slaughter houses and improved access
to machinery and inputs. As detailed in Table 7.17, however, in the continued
context of decapitalization, inflation and war, the programme failed to produce
the desired effects and the ability of the state to capture beef production declined
still further in the following years.
24 The private slaughter houses were able offer lower prices because they did not have the same
regional coverage as the mataderos. Furthermore, they were less hygiene conscious, could employ
non-unionized, and hence cheaper, labour, and paid less attention to the quality of the stock which
they purchased.
To summarize, therefore, one of the main features of the revolutionary period
was the shift toward internal consumption within the sector. In 1982 40.9% of
beef slaughtered in Nicaragua was consumed internally. By 1984 this had
increased to 61%. Due to inflationary pressures the prices paid on the internal
market consistently outstripped that which could be commanded by the
guaranteed prices paid for exported meat. To some extent this was a conscious
decision on the part of the government to try and honour its commitment to
prioritizing the satisfaction of basic necessities as much as the generation of
foreign exchange.
The increase in the percentage of production going to the internal market did at
least appear to suggest a governmental success in meeting the needs of the
population, (at least in the provision of this particular commodity), despite the
problems to the overall economy the loss of export revenues represented.
However, Monserrat (1989:122) argues convincingly that much caution should
be exercised before such a claim can be accepted. As Table 7.18 shows, given
the increase in population, the production ofmeat for the internal market during
the revolutionary years still failed to meat the levels per head achieved in the
mid 1970s; although admittedly those peaks occurred during the boom years of
the sector. There is no doubt that there was a considerable increase in the
percentage of beef produced being sold on the internal market but the
disappointing overall national production levels after 1983, and the continued
population growth, conspired to stop the transfer of such an increased
percentage into an increase in the amount of beef consumed per head.
However, despite this, it must be remembered that the national figures cited can
not have included the increasing amount of beef being produced clandestinely
and sold on the black market in the major cities of Regions III and IV. The
officially recorded totals for the export and domestic markets are shown in
Figure 7.13.
7.3d(viii) The Reforms of the Late Eighties:
Export production finally began to recover under the influence of the pro-export
economic reforms of the late 1980s. The most important development was the
recovery of the export price vis-a-vis the domestic. For example, by late 1989
the export price was higher than the domestic by a ratio of about 14:10. So
extreme were the rapid changes that the expansion of exports to the Canadian
market was derided by Canadian competitors as equivalent to 'dumping'
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1972-1977 2,369 48.1 20.2
1972-1979 2,440 50.8 20.6
1980-1987 3,120 60.3 19.5
Source: Monserrat (1989:122) on the basis of figures from the Direccion
General de Ganaderia, INEC and the Banco Central.
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because the Nicaraguan price was suddenly so much lower than those of local
producers (Bonilla, 1990)
As part of the reform process the 'Corporacion Nacional de la Carne was
formed in 1988. The new organization united the role of ENAMARA and
ENCAR under one organization, improving the efficiency of the sector
noticeably. The corporation controlled the seven industrial slaughter houses
(two ofwhich were not functioning by this time) and commercialization in both
the domestic and export markets (although much domestic production continued
to be carried out illegally). Together, the formation of the new organization and
the incidence of the economic reforms gave a considerable impulse to export
production and the industrial slaughter-houses were able to capture a much
greater proportion of national production. Evident in the improvements in
export totals in the final years of the decade described earlier.
7.3e Conclusions:
The beef sector provides one of the best examples of the contradictory
dynamics of the revolutionary process. The decision to stimulate production for
the domestic market and provide beef for popular consumption, at subsidized
prices, seriously constrained the export potential of the sector and the low
producer prices provided little incentive for the largest ranchers to invest in
increasing production levels, or even rebuilding their herds after the destruction
of the insurrection. Decapitalization, in such a context, continued to be a
problem until the latter half of the decade, although it was most significant in
the initial years. Overall, the damage done to the size of the national herd would
take decades, rather than years, to be overcome. The ability of the state to
generate exchange in the sector was seriously constrained by a growing
informatization of production (evidenced in the the growth of illegal black
market slaughtering and marketing of beef) and the consequent inability of the
state to capture a sufficient proportion of national production. It was also
affected by erratic international prices, although the loss of the US and Puerto
Rican markets was far more important in determining the declining value of
exports, as the new markets which had to be found commanded significantly
lower prices.
Attempts to overcome the problems of supply to the state-owned industrial
mataderos, through large-scale investments in state productive activities,
ultimately failed to deliver the hoped for returns and the primary production of
beef continued to be dominated by the private sector. Small and medium
ranchers and the cooperative sector gained from the eradication of exploitative
relations with commercial capital and improved access to credit and other
services but in reality were faced with the same disincentives as the larger
producers. The shift in policy at the end of the decade finally affected an
increase in the level of exports, although this appears to have been at the cost of
increased prices and decreased supply in the domestic market.
7.4 The Sugar Sector:
7.4a Introduction:
Sugar, for both export and domestic markets, has been produced for a good
number of years in Nicaragua and it is a commodity that has experienced
particularly stark fluctuations in international prices over the years. One of the
major reasons for this is that only 20% of the sugar grown globally is ever sold
on the international market. In this way, even small decreases in total
production may result in a dramatic decline in total international supply and
major increases in the international market price. In the 1980s, the international
market for sugar has continued to be extremely volatile, reflecting the growth of
anti-sugar dietary habits in export markets and the influence of over production
of sugar in the European Community. A marked expansion in the production of
sugar had occurred in Nicaragua, and the other Central American republics, in
the decades following the Second World War but was relatively short lived. By
the end of the 1970s, the sector was facing falling production levels, declining
international prices and reductions in the preferential quotas for the US market.
The changing importance of sugar exports to total Nicaraguan exports is shown
in Table 7.19.
7.4b Regions of Cultivation:
The major areas of sugar cultivation in Nicaragua are located in Regions II, III
and IV (see Map 2), with the majority of production concentrated in the first of
those regions. In the 1980/81 agricultural cycle, for example, nearly 70% of
Nicaraguan production was concentrated in Region II (also the main region of
cotton cultivation in the country), with 11% in Region III and nearly 17% in
Region IV. Region II still enjoyed the same concentration of production in the
1987/88 cycle, although production in Region III had increased to nearly 25%
of the total, whilst that of Region IV had declined to a level of only 3.5% (little
more than that produced in Special Regions 1 and 2 in both cycles; figures from
Table 7.21 below)
7.4c Inherited Productive Structure:
Due to the technical nature of sugar production, the sector has largely been the
preserve of large private companies (in 1977, for example, 95% of total
production was in their hands, SUAS, 1987:128). In fact, the ingenios (sugar
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mills) were the first enterprizes in Nicaragua to operate under relatively
advanced capitalist relations of production (see discussions in Chapter Three
regarding the Ingenio San Antonio and its significance at the turn of the
century). Thus, even before the dramatic developments of the 1960s, when the
US boycott of Cuban sugar opened up the US market to Nicaraguan producers
and production expanded from around 32,000 manzanas in 1963 to 55,500
manzanas by 1976, the cultivation and processing of sugar in Nicaragua had
long been dominated by those who controlled the ingenios (Dubois, 1983).
Each of these ingenios operated in a clearly defined territory, producing sugar
on its own lands and purchasing cane, via contracts, from local growers on the
surrounding lands. Thus, historically much of the land devoted to sugar
production has been controlled directly by the ingenios themselves and the rest
has, on the whole, also been tied to the ingenios through yearly contracts.25
Even the contacted growers often tended to be medium-sized and there was,
therefore, relatively little peasant production within the sector. Dubois et al
(1983:9), using figures from the 1971 agricultural census, suggest that, at that
time, 95% of sugar was produced on farms of over 50 manzanas, 4% on those
of between 10 and 50 manzanas, and only 1% on those of under 10 manzanas.
As the importance of sugar to the economy grew, so the importance of those
owning the sugar mills has also expanded. Before 1940, there had been about
23 ingenios, although the massive San Antonio complex produced as much as
three quarters of the national total (Sepulveda, 1984:58). By the time of peak
national production in the 1970s, the number of ingenios had been reduced to
seven, and the industry was dominated by two major interests; the Somoza
group and the Pellas-Lacayo group (the owners of the San Antonio). The latter
group had controlled about 70% of national production in the 1950s,
maintaining its dominant position through monopolization of refined sugar
production and the best rum producing facilities in the country. With the
expansion of the 1960s, the group consolidated its position through the
purchase of two further ingenios (the Monte Rosa and the Amalia; Whiteford et
al, 1987:175). The individuals controlling this group were part of the
BANAMERICA national grouping (see Chapter Three), although, ironically,
25 Of the small amount of national sugar production not processed by the ingenios, Dubois et al
(1983:11) suggest that around 85% related to production which was situated far from the zone of
influence of any of the ingenios.
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the two ingenios purchased in the sixties had been linked to the BANIC group
(Dubois et al, 1983:46).26
The Somoza family had first seriously turned their attention toward sugar
production in that same period. They had bought the Montelimar Ingenio in
1948 (in the revolutionary period this ingenio was renamed Ingenio Julio
Buitrago), and this had undergone renovation in 1952 and was further
upgraded in 1964. Their influence in the sector rapidly expanded in the 1960s
through the purchase of the Dolores (later Benjamin Zeledon) and the Santa Rita
(later Camilo Ortega) ingenios (Whiteford et al, 1987:175 and Dubois et al,
1983:26).27
The surpluses produced in the expansion of sugar production during that period
were marketed entirely in the US, through quotas of white and brown sugar.
Generally, until the 1960s, the price paid for the exported sugar had been less
than could be obtained in the domestic economy but, after the Cuban
revolution, the international price of sugar increased and the quotas of the US
market distributed to Nicaragua and the other Central American republics rose,
stimulating the expansion of export production described above.
In summary, at the time of the revolution, the sector was one of the most highly
technified areas of the economy, both in terms of cultivation and processing
and, as described above, had importance in both the domestic market and the
generation of exchange; although its role in the latter never reached the
significance of cotton or coffee production. Sugar was important to national
employment, however, since the labour requirements per manzana for sugar
cultivation are higher than any other Nicaraguan commodity except coffee
(Dubois et al, 1983:58).
7.4c Sugar and the Sandinistas:
7.4c(i) Production Levels:
Overall, the revolutionary years were not successful ones in the sugar sector.
After the revolution, there had initially been a fall in production in the 1979/80
agricultural season, relating to the disruption of the insurrection and low
international prices. However, in the next couple of years there was a marked
increase in the area under cultivation, especially within the state sector, where
new lands were turned over to sugar production. From the 1982/83 cycle,
26 This reflected the gradual integration of the traditional groups of Nicaraguan capital which
occurred during this period.
27 The machinery at the Santa Rita was dismantled and re-established as a new ingenio at Cubra Hill.
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however, the sector entered into a marked decline, with production levels
entering into a sustained fall and the total area cultivated following suit in the
next cycle. Furthermore, the productivity of the sector declined markedly
during the 1980s, with yields falling by an average of 4.75% per annum
between the 1982-83 and 1987-88 cycles (Monserrat, 1989:105).
There were several reasons behind the decline of the sector. Firstly, the
international price offered little incentive for further developments in the export
potential of the sector, a position intensified by the loss of the US market in the
mid-eighties. The problems of the sector were also intensified through the
imposition of the US trade embargo, as the machinery in use in the sector
(harvesters, processors and irrigation equipment) became increasingly obsolete
and difficulties were encountered in finding spare parts. The lack of exchange
in the economy also hindered the acquisition of the inputs required by the
sector. Even the newly-initiated Victoria de Julio complex (see discussions
below), which escaped the problems of dependence upon American spare parts
to some degree, was never to operate at full capacity. In addition, there were
problems in securing sufficient labour for the harvest periods, especially in
regions II and IV and Special Zone II, as well as marked falls in the
productivity of labour. The latter differed from ingenio to ingenio, reflecting
both the management practices of the mills' officials and climatic variations.28
In the final years of the decade all of these problems were accentuated by the
incidence of periodic droughts.
There was finally, however, a substantial turn around in the period from 1988,
when the formation of CONAZUCAR (Corporacion Nacional del Azucar), the
pro-export economic reforms, a rise in international prices, and the
nationalization of the Ingenio San Antonio, resulted in a considerable
productive recovery.
The evolution of total production levels and the area cultivated are shown in
Figures 7.14 and 7.15.
7.4c(ii) The Export Sector and the Evolution of International
Sugar Prices:
If attention is focused upon the level of exports specifically, the picture that
emerges is, if anything, even less encouraging. Between 1979 and 1981 there
had been something of a recovery in export values. Thus, despite a fall in the
28 Utting (1992:198) quoting Jaime Wheelock, suggests that "traditional work norms had fallen by...
40%.. by the mid-1980s.
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volume of sugar exports in 1980, international prices had recovered from the
low level of the preceding years, which allowed export values to increase
slightly. The following year saw the expansion of both volumes and value, and
the latter reached what would turn out to be its peak level for the whole
revolutionary period, again reflecting high international prices. Between 1981
and 1985, however, export values consistendy declined from a figure of over
$50 million in 1981 to under $8 million by 1985. Part of this fall reflected the
major crash in international sugar prices of this period, which by 1985 had
reached their lowest level for twenty five years. Thus, despite the declining
ability to earn exchange, export volumes had remained relatively steady
between 1981 and 1984 before the sustained fall in prices finally produced a
massive decline in export volumes in 1985. By this time, the export of sugar,
which had previously been one of the most lucrative agricultural activities in
Nicaragua (in relation to investment levels), only remained profitable because of
the high levels of state subsidization. Between 1985 and 1987 international
prices recovered, enabling the value of Nicaraguan exports to rise despite a
further decline in export volumes in 1987. The following year, however prices
crashed again, sending both export volumes and values to their lowest level for
decades. The shifts in government policy from that year, together with a
renewed improvement in international prices, finally saw the sector regain
momentum with a massive improvement in both export values and volumes.
The evolution of the total value and volume of sugar exports are shown in
Figure 7.16, whilst Figure 7.17 details the evolution of international sugar
prices.
7.4c(iii) The Search for New Markets:
As explained earlier, since the boom period of the 1960s, Nicaragua had
exported the majority of its sugar to the US (practically 100% of Nicaraguan
sugar exports were marketed in the US by the late seventies). With the loss of
the US sugar quota, and the implementation of the trade embargo in the mid-
eighties, however, there followed a sustained search for new markets. The
newly formed national export agency, ENAZUCAR, therefore, had to negotiate
new deals with other countries and international companies, in a search for a
long-term alternative to the US market. In 1980 over 80% of exports were still
sold in the US, with the remainder sold in the USSR. The following year the
US market retained its importance, although an important deal was reached with
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the Mexican government which accounted for 17% of exports. By 1982, the
US share had fallen to 55%, with bilateral agreements with the Mexican, Dutch
and Soviet governments accounting for the remainder. In 1983 and 1984 the
US market regained its predominance, although a new outlet was found in
Algeria. With the total loss of the US market in the following years new
markets were found (in various years) in the EC, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Libya,
Iran and even Cuba, whilst Mexico and the USSR also continued to be
important markets (Monserrat, 1989:105, Martinez Cuenca, 1992:41 and
Dubois et al, 1983:76).
7.4c(iv) The Role of the State:
Under the Sandinistas the processing of sugar largely passed into the hands of
the state. Five of the ingenios were nationalized, including the three Somoza-
owned ingenios and the Monte Rosa and Amalia, which had both gone
bankrupt in the years leading up to the revolution. All of the state-owned
ingenios were renamed after heroes from the revolutionary struggle and other
earlier epochs of the nation's history; although the largest ingenio, the San
Antonio, remained in private hands for most of the period. The state, which
also gained lands from the expropriations enacted under the 1981 Agrarian
Reform Law, found itself in control of an area of 23,918 manzanas and, at the
peak of the harvest season, employed over two thousand labourers.
The technical nature of the work earned out in the sugar plantations led to the
sector's workforce being organized under the CST (Central Sandinista de
Trabajadores- the general workers' union) rather than the ATC (Asociacion de
Trabajadores del Campo- the agricultural workers' union) in an attempt to forge
a closer relationship between industrial workers and field workers (Garcia,
1990 and Whiteford et al, 1987:173).29 The initial thrust of the FSLN's
agrarian policy, which was geared toward the improvement of working
conditions on the state farms and in the large private capitalist sector, was
beneficial to the sector. Sugar workers were already relatively well organized,
and a greater number were employed as permanent workers than in other
sectors of the economy. The initial few years saw even greater numbers offered
permanent employment, although as the sector collapsed in the mid-eighties,
29 In fact the sugar sector had been the scene of some dispute between those organized under the pro-
FSLN CST and those organized under the more radical Frente Obrero.
339
and the technification programme intensified, this process was reversed, in both
the state and private sectors, as the total workforce declined.
Despite the expansion of the state sector, private sugar producers continued to
grow cane and sell it to both the state ingenios and the San Antonio, which still
remained of great importance, especially given the fact that it was only ingenio
which could produce refined sugar. In the immediate pre-revolutionary period
the San Antonio had processed about 46% of the cane produced in the country.
During the initial revolutionary years this actually increased to the point where,
in the 1981/82 cycle, the San Antonio accounted for about 53% of total
production. Thereafter, the state sector's importance grew, although it was not
until the 1985/86 cycle that the combined output of the state ingenios surpassed
that of the San Antonio (Whiteford et al, 1987:76). In addition, despite a
considerable investment in modernization, the state sector, by and large,
continued to operate at a loss.
7.4c(v) The Shift Toward Domestic Production:
As was the case in the other export sectors, the marketing of sugar and
molasses were nationalized in the first year of the revolutionary period, with the
Ministry of Foreign Commerce (under the direction of ENAZUCAR) assuming
responsibility for the export side of activities, and the domestic market being
administered by MICOIN (The Ministry of Interior Commerce) through DIASA
in the Pacific and DIZET in the Atlantic. In response to the declining
international opportunities described above, there was a marked increase in the
percentage of sugar marketed within Nicaragua during the revolutionary
years.30 Until 1981, the domestic commercialization of sugar remained
relatively free of state control. In that yearMICOIN introduced a series of
quotas for producers, and state commercialization was expanded through the
nationalization of the Compania Azucerera Nacional (CANSA).
In these initial years the government looked to their investments in the state
sector to expand the overall production of sugar, thereby increasing the supply
for popular consumption without affecting export volumes. The price of sugar
in the domestic market was fixed by the government at a level lower than the
price paid to producers, resulting in the government subsidising consumption to
quite a considerable degree, which also broke the traditional link between
30 This was already at a level substantially higher than that in may other Latin American sugar
producers (Whiteford et al, 1987:175).
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international and domestic prices.31 By 1982, the domestic price was only
0.68% of the international level, although the prices paid to producers
continued to be much higher.
The basic problem with this was that demand consistently outstripped supply as
prices were subsidized at a fixed level. This meant that, by 1982, domestic
consumption represented practically 60% of total sugar production as opposed
to less than 50% in previous years, constituting a worrying loss of export
revenue (Dubois et al, 1983:67-72). The subsidized prices meant that in 1982
Nicaraguans were consuming an average of 46 kg of sugar per person; a level
of consumption equivalent to the majority ofWestern nations. The basic
contradiction facing the FSLN in the sector is illustrated well in the following
quote from Whiteford et al (1983:197, Note 13)
"Under the Sandinistas the pattern (the externally-stimulated nature of
the expansion of the Nicaraguan sugar industry) was reversed:
expansion has occurred due to the increase of internal demand.... The
internal market has always represented a 'loss.' Thus, the government
is confronted with a contradiction: it is bound by its revolutionary aims
to provide at least minimal levels ofsugar, a basic commodity, to the
Nicaraguan population, and yet the increase of consumption has
resulted in a loss offoreign revenues. The consequence of this has
been government support ofsugar production, andparticularly of the
private ingenio
Instead of allowing the expansion in domestic demand to fix a relevant price in
the internal market to ensure a sufficient export quota, from 1982 domestic
rationing was established (Sepulveda, 1984:69). This, nonetheless, largely
failed to affect the balance between domestic and export production which was
maintained at a similar level right to the end of the decade; Zapata (1989:53), for
example, also reports a 60:40 ratio in favour of domestic production for the
1988/89 cycle. The chief means whereby the government tried to meet their
commitments to both markets was, as suggested in the quote above, through
the attempted modernization of the sector which was heavily prioritized in the
national investment programme.
7.4c(vi) Attempts at Modernization:
31 It should be noted, however, that the domestic sugar market was never linked directly to the
international market. For example the monopolistic position of the Lacayo/Pellas group and Somoza
allowed them to fix prices which protected them from the vagaries of international market
movements, passing them on to the producers (Dubois et al, 1983:17).
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From the earliest years the FSLN looked to develop the technical capacity of the
state complexes, thereby lowering their production costs and improving yields
in an attempt to try to reverse the widening losses of the sector which had been
caused by the insolvency of the state sector, the subsidization of basic
consumption and the incentives offered private sugar producers through the
availability of cheap imports and credit. To this end, up to 1984, US$30 million
was invested in the development of the state enterprizes in the sector. Except for
the case of one of these ingenios, which opted to expand its installed capacity,
the rest of this investment was geared toward rationalizing and modernizing the
existing capacity, and in rebuilding capacity destroyed by the war. Through this
process, by 1984, the state ingenios had equalled the yields achieved in the pre-
revolutionary years, a performance which the San Antonio had been unable to
achieve.32 This meant that the 40% higher yields that the San Antonio had
achieved over the other ingenios in the period 1976-78 had been reduced to
only 6% by 1982 (Sepulveda, 1984:71). Nonetheless, these improvements
were not sufficient to ensure that the state ingenios produced without the need
for state subsidization and any progress was only achieved at the cost of heavy
Financial losses.
There were several reasons behind this problem. Firstly, labour productivity
had fallen sharply during the period, despite the improved wages (monetary and
social) achieved by the workforce in these early years. Secondly, the declining
availability of exchange, and the obsolescent nature of the productive capacity
of the state ingenios, meant that the improved yields could not be maintained,
still less improved upon (see discussions below). Zapata (1989:53) suggests
that in the 1987/88 cycle the state ingenios were operating at about half their full
capacity, and that if they had been able to operate at full capacity, average
production costs would have been as much as 21% less.
32 For example the Ingenio Julio Buitrago recorded the highest yields of any ingenio in 1984. A
level of 60.38 tons per manzana (the level in 1980/81 had been 46.72. Over the same period the sugar
content of the ingenio's production had increased from 173.77 to 211.56 pounds per ton (Whiteford et
al, 1987:177).
At a national level the comparative yields were as follows;
Cycle National State San Antonio
1980/81 94.0 78.3 108.9
1981/82 99.1 94.9 102.9
1982/83 93.1 89.1 97.2
1983/84 102.0 98.5 105.6
1984/85 86.0 93.2 78.5
1985/86 91.5 95.3 87.2
(Whiteford at al, 1987:178)
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Given the incapacity of the state sector to play the dynamic modernizing role
assigned to it in the government's overall transformation strategy, the FSLN
were dependent upon the productivity of the private San Antonio ingenio if they
were to improve the overall level of production and the generation of exchange
in the sector. To this end, in consort with the owners of the Ingenio, the state
invested US$110 million to expand its capacity by 20%. At the same time, in
addition to the plans already underway for the modernization of the existing
state ingenios, plans were unveiled for the extensive re-development of one of
the mills, now known as the Victoria de Julio, as part of the Tipitapa sugar
project in Region III. This mill was to be one of the most modern and
mechanized sugar producing facilities in the world. The new mill came into
production in 1984-85 and was built through cooperation (to the tune of
US$229) from countries such as the USSR, Switzerland, Spain , Cuba and
Mexico. In 1985 the importance of the mill was further stressed, as under the
onset of the US trade blockade, the other mills began to suffer serious
shortages of spare parts for their machinery and had to search for new suppliers
from Germany and Switzerland (amongst others).
Following the economic reforms of 1985, the subsidization of domestic sugar
prices was abandoned, which represented a massive increase in the price paid
for sugar by both consumers and those companies purchasing sugar for
industrial usage (such as the production of sweets of alcoholic drinks). The
period leading up to that point had been characterized by continuing and
intensifying losses within the sector. By that time, the only ingenio producing
efficiently was the San Antonio, which continued to count on much lower
production costs. The losses of the sector were also intensified through the
incentives given to producers through the multiple exchange rate system and the
expansion ofmonetary incentives which consistently failed to produce a
productive response (Sepulveda, 1984:71).
In facing all of these problems, and in response to a brief recovery in
international prices, the government initiated a further investment scheme in
1986, which involved the purchasing of new machinery to tackle the particular
problems of obsolescence, lack of spare parts and, through an increasing level
ofmechanization, the periodic shortages of labour. In addition, it was planned
to increase the production of the Victoria de Julio to reach its processing
capacity. As shown in the preceding discussions, however, despite the
continuing high level of investment in the sector which this represented, sugar
production continued to plummet until the 1988/89 cycle.
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7.4c(vii) Sugar Production in the Various Property Sectors:
As has been suggested above, over the course of the 1980s, the State sector as
well as expanding its presence in the processing of sugar cane, also gradually
increased its share of sugar cultivation. Despite its continued weight in the
processing of sugar, production levels at the private San Antonio mill gradually
declined throughout the period, being characterised by poor management, a lack
of investment, but also by a lack of attention from the state. Figure 7.18 shows
the evolution of sugar production in each of the property sectors between the
1980/81 and 1987/88 cycles. The major trends revealed include: the relatively
stable levels of production achieved on the state farms, the increase in
production by the large capitalist sector up to, and including, the 1983/84 cycle
and its subsequent rapid decline, and the periodic increases in small and
medium-scale production (especially in the 1981/82 and 1986/87 cycles). The
regional and sectoral composition of production in the 1980/81 and 1987/88
cycles are shown in Table 7.21. The major difference between the two cycles
were the previously mentioned decline of large-scale private production and the
collapse of small-scale production in Region IV. The biggest improvements in
state production occurred in Regions II and III, although the substantial
production in Region IV in the 1980/81 cycle had disappeared by 1987/88.
Yields peaked in the state and large private sectors in the 1981/82 cycle,
although thereafter the investment in the state sector, saw state yields
consistently outperform those of the private sector. The yields achieved by
small and medium producers were substantially lower, except for the
exceptional 1986/87 cycle, when under the influence of the state's prioritization
of small-scale production, a substantial increase in the total production of those
producers was matched by impressive yields which equalled those of the state
farms, and even surpassed those of the large private producers (Table 7.20).
7.4c(viii) The Economic Reforms of the Late Eighties:
By the 1987-88 cycle the sector was in a criucal condition. In that year
production at the San Antonio fell by a million Quintales leading to its
nationalization during the following cycle (El Nuevo Diario 29th April 1989)
Toward the end of the decade the six state owned ingenios became grouped
together under one central administration which integrated all of the activities of
the sector from the cultivation of the cane to the marketing of the sugar.
Through this scheme it was hoped that production and productivity would be
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Table 7.20 Nicaragua: Sugar Yields Achieved per Manzana
in Tons (1980/81 to 1987/88)
Small and
Agricultural State Sector Medium Large Producers National
Cycle Producers
1980/81 48.1 31.3 59.1 48.5
1981/82 56.3 38.7 53.6 50.6
1982/83 49.6 30.7 49.3 46.7
1983/84 55.0 27.0 55.1 51.3
1984/85 48.6 33.4 42.7 42.8
1985/86 49.2 36.5 47.5 46.3
1986/87 43.5 43.5 43.3 43.4
1987/88 42.9 30.2 38.3 38.8
Source: CIERA (1989), Volume 9, pp. 112-119: Tables 57-64.
Table 7.21 Nicaragua: Regional and Sectoral Composition



















312.5 137.1 1370.0 1820.0
263.8 25.1 - 288.9
200.0 239.7 - 439.8
50.2 34.0 - 84.2
826.6 436.1 1370.0 2632.7
340.8 99.2 849.2 1289.2
429.0 39.0 - 468.0
66.0 - 66.0
36.3 21.0 - 57.3
806.1 225.2 849.1 1880.5
Percentage State Small + Large TOTAL
Medium (as % of
national)
State Small + Large TOTAL










17.2 7.5 75.3 69.1
91.3 8.7 0 11.0
45.5 54.5 0 16.7
59.6 40.4 0 3.2
31.4 16.6 52.0 100
17.9 7.7 65.9 68.6
91.7 8.3 0 24.9
0 100 0 3.5
63.4 36.6 0 3.0
42.9 12.0 45.2 100
Source: CIERA (1989), Volume 9, pp. 112, 119: Tables 57, 64.
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increased and management would be more effective and streamlined. In
addition the creation ofCONAZUCAR helped to coordinate and optimize the
use of resources. The corporation had relative financial autonomy in that it was
able to make use of the resources generated in the sector for investment within
the industry in itself, rather than dependent upon the whims of the national
financial system. In fact, despite the imposition of tighter credit restrictions in
the 1989/90 cycle (this represented a decrease of about 6% in the state's
financing of sugar production) there was finally a turn around in production in
that cycle with total production outstripping that of the year before and
productivity well up. This improvement was largely based upon the
productivity of the San Antonio and German Pomares ingenios (El Nuevo
Diario 25th February 1990).33 The newly nationalized San Antonio expanded
its processing activities from 4,000 tons per day to 6,500 in its first year of
operation.
Despite the advances made in the final couple of years the sector still faced
severe problems, although their intensity varied from ingenio to ingenio.
The ingenio facing the severest problems was the Camilo Ortega in Special
Zone Two. Here, production was extremely inefficient, with the use of plant
that was already practically obsolescent at the time of the revolution and
extremely high production costs due to the same equipment problems, its
geographical location and problems of labour productivity. Nonetheless,
because the ingenio was one of the chief productive activities of the region, it
continued to produce and was ostensibly subsidized by the more profitable
ingenios. Other more generalised problems continued through the lack of spare
parts for the processing and cultivation machinery, transportation shortages and
labour productivity. Some attempts at the modernization of the productive
apparatus continued in these latter years, especially in the ingenio Benjamin
Zeledon. One of the problems this caused, however, was that the continued
mechanization intensified the growing problems of unemployment. For
example, the 1988/89 cycle saw the total number of permanent and temporary
workers employed by the Benjamin Zeledon fall by nearly half, in comparison
to the previous cycle, despite improved production levels (Ramirez, 1990,
Zapata, 1989:63 and Aburto and Chavarna, 1989:27)
33 Jaime Wheelock suggests in an interview in Barricada (July 17th 1989) that if the San Antonio
had not been nationalized it would have closed and stopped producing during the 1988/89 cycle.
Production practically doubled in the year after nationalization.
7.4d Conclusions:
The experiences of the sugar sector during the 1980s provide a number of
similarities to those discussed previously in relation to the beef sector, in
particular, through the domestic orientation of a large section of production.
The Sandinistas had to face the contradiction of their simultaneous desire to
expand popular consumption and export revenues in the sector. For an initial
period, reflecting deliberate policy decisions and the incidence of depressed
international prices, domestic production grew at the expense of export
revenues, as the government prioritized the meeting of the increasing levels of
domestic demand. Eventually, given the importance of the sector in the
generation of exchange, despite the adverse evolution of international prices,
the state had to abandon its subsidization of domestic consumption and turn its
attention to increasing exports. It was not until the end of the decade that this
was finally achieved.
Earlier, the government had attempted to side step the problem by investing
heavily in the state farms and sugar mills in an effort to increase overall
production levels and efficiency, in the hope that basic necessities could be met
without the need to sacrifice export revenues or vice versa. Despite the massive
injections of capital, however, the state farms barely managed to maintain
production levels, and whilst the productivity of the state ingenios was
improved, they remained hostages to the limited supply of spare parts and other
inputs and were plagued with problems of labour productivity.
7.5 Concluding Comments:
This chapter has focused in some detail upon the productive performance of
each of the major traditional export commodities during the revolutionary
period. Many of the general processes at work in the sector, which were
outlined in Chapter Six, have been observed, although their relative importance
has been seen to have varied from sector to sector. In each case, the key
importance of external factors (such as the trade embargo and declining
international prices) and the war in explaining the terrible productive record of
the sector during the 1980s has been stressed. In particular, the factors
concerning international price movements and the impact of the trade embargo
go a long way toward explaining the collapse of cotton production which
occurred in the latter part of the decade, as well as the periodic declines in sugar
production; whilst the intensification of the war seriously affected many of the
most important coffee growing regions. Nonetheless, despite these factors,
even a cursory review of the evidence presented here suggests the importance
of the evolution of the economic policies of the government and how they
interacted with both the evolution of external circumstances and the changes in
the social relations of production which were initiated under the revolutionary
process.
In each of the commodity sectors the initial revolutionary years saw something
of a recovery in total production levels, although the performance of the
different property sectors was not constant. This first period saw productive
responses from both the peasant and capitalist sectors, in the former case
particularly in the production of coffee and, to a certain extent, cotton, and, in
the latter, mainly in the production of beef (reflecting a widespread process of
decapitalization) and cotton. The response of the peasant sector reflected the
relative erosion of the exploitative relations with intermediaries, financial and
commercial capital and the large capitalist sector, under which they had
previously existed, as well as much improved access to finance and producer
inputs. The capitalist sectors also gained from access to cheap credit and
subsidized inputs, as well as monetary incentives, although these often proved
insufficient to encourage a return to pre-revolutionary levels. The period also
saw the construction and prioritization of a state farm sector, although given its
weight in the distribution of resources its productive performance was
disappointing reflecting managerial inexperience and labour productivity
problems.
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As time went on, however, it was observed how the government faced
increasing contradictions in its handling of the relationship between the various
sectors and the evolution of its economic policies. In the beef and sugar sectors
the government attempted to expand popular consumption without affecting the
generation of foreign exchange. In both cases, the only way to achieve this was
through attempts to increase overall production levels. Unfortunately, given the
intensifying military situation such expansion was to prove elusive and the
provision of incentives to the peasant, and especially the capitalist, sectors and
the prioritization of the state farms, failed to generate the hoped for productive
responses. In effect the subsidization of consumption, when coupled with the
provision of guaranteed (albeit relatively low) prices and subsidized access to
imports, was a key factor in the generation of the massive imbalances in relative
prices and the escalating growth of public deficits, which eventually led to the
necessity of the stringent austerity measures of the final years of the decade.
In more general terms each of the property sectors were faced with their own
particular problems within each of the commodity markets. The state farms
were the recipients of the major part of the investment programme in the export
sector (especially in the beef, sugar (although the private San Antonio Ingenio
was also prioritized) and coffee sectors. Despite general improvements in the
yields attained in most activities, the state farms and industrial complexes were,
however, as suggested above, subject to serious labour productivity problems,
an over-centralized administrative beaurocracy which made it difficult for
managers (also extremely inexperienced) to respond to changing circumstances
and also limited the amount of worker participation in decision making and, in
many cases, they were to continue operating at an overall loss.
The lack of participation of the large private sector has been open to various
interpretations. On the one hand, it could be suggested that the low levels of
private investment, and the increasingly poor productive performance of the
larger capitalist farmers, throughout the decade reflected the overarching
presence of the state in the economic life of the country; imposing limits on the
private profits to be made from agricultural activities, through its control of
external commercialization and access to imports, credit and other inputs, as
well as its extensive role in the setting of relative prices, in particular exchange
rates and guaranteed prices. Nonetheless, on the other hand, the state did act to
provide extremely cheap access to imports and offered guaranteed prices to
offset the risks to private capital. In addition, policies were also geared to
ensuring the low cost of labour through the limiting of wage increases (made
possible through the state's attempts to improve the 'social wage' through the
expansion of basic social services). As such, the refusal of large sectors of the
capitalist landowners to invest, or even to maintain production levels, has also
been interpreted as a deliberate decision to act against the government.
As for the peasant sector, production of cotton and coffee in particular had
expanded in the immediate post-revolutionary years through the expansion of
credit supply and the other measures detailed above, as well as the
redistribution of a certain amount of land. Nonetheless, such producers were
consistently undervalued in government circles (reflecting a lack of
prioritization in the allocation of resources), yields remained relatively
depressed and the marginal nature of much peasant production meant that many
producers faced severe transportation difficulties, as well as the same lack of
sufficient incentives facing the larger private producers. Even the turn toward
peasant production that occurred in the years from 1985 was primarily aimed at
the expansion of basic grain production, although the cooperative production of
coffee and cotton was also prioritized, and did little to encourage export
production amongst the peasantry.
The pro-export nature of the economic reforms of 1988 and 1989 finally
affected an improvement in most commodities (the major exception being
cotton) but, by that time, the sector was in a terrible condition. The benefits
which the revolution had initially brought to the agricultural labourers of the
sector, as well as the cooperatives and individual smallholders producing export
crops, had largely been reversed and the basis for the recovery was largely to
be found in the intensified exploitation of labour made possible through the
severe shortage of alternative employment activities, and the provision of
incentives to the large capitalist sector. The competing perspectives on these
issues are returned to in the concluding chapter.
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Conclusions:
"The great achievement of the Sandinistas is that they enhanced
democracy in Nicaragua not only by permitting free elections but also
by creating and expanding the physical and institutional conditions for
popularparticipation on many levels. But in the end, their economic
policies impeded a continuation of these achievements." (Dijkstra,
1992:xii)
The preceding discussions of the performance of the Nicaraguan economy
during the 1980s have shed light on many of the issues explored in the general
debates about the struggles for 'peripheral' socialism, and the contemporary
problems facing the Latin American Left, which were considered in Chapter
Two. Accordingly, these concluding thoughts review the experiences of the
FSLN in government, placing them within the context of the defeat of their
defeat in the elections of February 1990 and the wider issues suggested above.
They also provide a few tentative comments upon the position facing the FSLN,
following their fall from power and the future prospects for the popular sectors
in Nicaragua. This reveals some of the problems involved in attempts to
mobilize support for popular alternatives to Neoliberalism in the region; albeit
under somewhat unique circumstances, given the relationship between the
FSLN and the Chamorro government (see below).
The Electoral Defeat:
About a month after arriving in Nicaragua in June 19891 attended celebrations
held in Managua to mark the tenth anniversary of the revolution. At that time,
there had been a definite air of optimism within the FSLN. At last it seemed that
the war was more or less over and the Frente saw the elections, scheduled for
the following February, as a means of securing international legitimation and
support for their mixed economic strategy and obtaining the internal and external
political stability (and external resources) needed to successfully achieve
economic recovery. On the morning of the 26th February, the following year,
Nicaragua woke up to what had seemed unthinkable. A haggard Daniel Ortega
appeared on television at 6 am recognizing the defeat of the FSLN in the
elections. The UNO (Union Nacional Opositora) presidential candidate Violeta
Chamorro had received nearly 55% of the presidential vote to Ortega's 40.8%;
whilst UNO had won 51 seats in the National Assembly compared to the 39 of
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the FSLN (Brown, 1990).
The Sandinistas were profoundly shocked by the election results, as were the
vast majority of Nicaraguans and outside observers, including the US
administration and even the victorious UNO coalition itself. Most prior
indications had suggested an FSLN victory at the polls. The more rigorous of
the pre-election opinion surveys had generally pointed to a comfortable, if
reduced (when compared to the 1984 elections), FSLN majority; whilst the
UNO election campaign had degenerated into internal bickering and allegations
of corruption, which had culminated in a fist fight at an election rally. Internal
political tensions had also caused other problems, with one of the largest parties,
the Social Christians, pulling out of the alliance in the early stages of the
campaign. Finally, a vicious struggle over the presidential nominations had
nearly broken the back of the coalition. The FSLN, for their part, had
consistently attracted massive numbers of people to their election rallies and
anyone who had been at the end of campaign rally in Managua days before the
election (along with 500,000 Nicaraguans and the Jamaican reggae star Jimmy
Cliff) could not have had many doubts about what the results in a few days time
were going to reveal.
In the years which have followed the elections, and the relatively peaceful
transfer of power, many interpretations of the FSLN's defeat have been
attempted, both within the FSLN (and more generally in Nicaragua) and in a
myriad of external publications and debates. This is not the place for a detailed
discussion of all of these issues (for detailed studies see Vanden and Prevost,
1992; various post-electoral editions of Envio. Barricada Internacional and
Pensamiento Propio: Gonzalez, 1990; Booth and Walker, 1993; Smith, 1993;
Selbin, 1993; Robinson, 1992 and Vilas, 1990a). Instead, the context of the
defeat will be used to explore the significance of the economic experiences of the
Sandinistas which have been detailed in the preceding chapters. Whilst
recognizing that any explanation of the defeat of the FSLN in the elections
which only made reference to the effects of economic policy would be, at best,
partial, an analysis of the evolution and differential performance and effects of
the FSLN's economic policy does shed light upon several of the factors which
contributed towards the erosion of popular support for the regime and their
wider significance.1
1 Amongst the other factors considered to have had effects upon die outcome of the election
were; the triumphalist and rhetoric-laden style of the FSLN's campaign, the heavy US
interference, the threat of continued military aggression from the US in the event of an FSLN
victory, the inability of the FSLN to do away with military service, the Nicaraguan fear of
Lessons from the 1980s:
The growing poverty and misery brought by the economic crisis meant that
arguments concerning its underlying causes, and the types of strategies that
would be successful in overcoming it, were pivotal to the election campaign.
Given the terrible condition of the economy it was natural for UNO to devote
much of their campaign to attacking the FSLN's economic competence. Indeed,
it could be suggested that the FSLN's defeat indicated that UNO had managed to
mobilize opinion within a large enough section of the electorate that the
influences which had contributed most towards their declining economic
situation were to be found in such internal factors as; high levels of corruption
and ineptitude within the FSLN, the inefficiencies of an unproductive 'resource-
hungry' state sector and the limits imposed on individual economic freedom.
Others, even if they accepted the validity of the FSLN's argument that the
economic crisis was unavoidable given the external conditions, were unable to
see how the FSLN would be able to produce any way out of the economic crisis
that they faced. UNO for their part, due to their close relationship with
Washington, were able to promise a rapid economic improvement, via the
inflow of significant foreign resources, the lifting of the trade embargo and an
end to the malpractice and ineptitude they claimed to represent FSLN economic
policy. Their economic plan promised, amongst other equally unlikely claims, to
end inflation within 100 days, a possibility which was grasped at by a desperate
and disillusioned electorate.
The FSLN, on the whole, tended to attribute the development of the economic
crisis to external factors, such as the effects of the military and economic
aggression of the US and the adverse international economic situation (although
they also placed emphasis upon the unproductive attitude of the large capitalist
agro-export producers). Following the elections, however, there has been a
greater recognition of internal economic errors and misconceptions and an
acceptance of their role in a gradual process of alienation from the revolutionary
process amongst the popular sectors. Thus, although it is beyond doubt that, as
argued by the FSLN, the military and economic aggression exerted by the US
played a major role in the development of the intolerable material situation facing
the Nicaraguan people (and, indeed, was intended to make life so difficult for
continuismo (inveterate electoral practices leading to the continued rule of one particular
group)- a legacy from experience of the practices of the Somozas, and the existence of a
punishment vote against those associated with the FSLN who had benefited from the
trappings of political power. I explore these issues further in Brown (1990) and Brown
(1993b)
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the majority of the population that they would be forced to choose between
material survival and 'Sandinismo') this is not in itself enough to explain either
the electoral defeat of the FSLN or the gradual process of alienation noted above
(see Gonzalez, 1990). The revolution had been realized and consistently
defended under such stringent conditions and, in the early years of the war, had
continued to inspire the support of the Nicaraguan people throughout the
extreme hardship that it entailed. The gradual alienation that developed within
parts of the FSLN's support stemmed from the way in which the FSLN dealt
with the contradictions of its chosen model of development as the external
aggression placed it under increasing pressure (See Gonzalez, 1990).
In particular two factors can be stressed. Firstly, there appears to have been
some degree of confusion within the FSLN concerning the role ofmass
organizations. Over time, in response to the worsening economic and military
situation, these organizations, rather than representing particular group interests,
through participation in decision-making, became, in essence, another arm of the
state, via their role in the distribution of state subsidies and the dissemination of
information from the government. Secondly, popular confidence in the concrete
benefits of 'Sandinismo' became increasingly difficult to maintain in the face of
"the material reality ofunremitting war, food shortages and the deterioration of
health and education." (Rowe and Schelling, 1992:183).
Whilst it is extremely important to understand the relationship between the
FSLN and the mass organizations and its effect upon the undermining of the
hegemony of the revolutionary project, the major focus of attention of this study
has been upon the second of these aspects, the failure of the FSLN to meet the
material needs of the Nicaraguan people.2 Thus, the preceding chapters have
charted the evolution and effects of the FSLN's economic and agrarian policies
during the 1980s, in the context of the external factors which buffeted the
economy over that time. Given the inherited structural dependence of the
Nicaraguan economy upon the earnings which it receives from the export of
primary commodities, attention has been focused upon the performance of that
sector as the key to understanding the contradictory dynamics of the
revolutionary process. It has been shown how the FSLN consistently failed to
2 The two points are, however, related, in that the failure of the FSLN to consolidate its relationship
with the mass organizations meant that the economic crisis had more serious effects upon popular
support for the regime than might have otherwise been the case. Thus, as time went on, it became
more difficult for the FSLN to convince the populace that their declining economic situation was due
to the effects of the external aggression, and opposition forces were able to capitalize on the growing
levels of dissatisfaction.
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generate sufficient foreign exchange to fund their programmes of structural
transformation and the provision of extended social services, and that the poor
productive performance of the export sector was a major factor in the escalating
economic crisis which characterized the revolutionary period. The ever-present
need to guarantee export revenues seriously limited the FSLN's policy options
toward the meeting of their social and political objectives and the economic
transformations which they wished to instigate. The analysis of these problems,
outlined in the preceding chapters, suggests a number of conclusions of wider
relevance.
Firstly, the Nicaraguan experience provides further evidence of the inadvisability
of highly centralized technocratic state-led development strategies for 'Peripheral
Socialist' regimes (see the discussions in Chapter Two), especially in the context
of a political programme which aimed at satisfying the demands of a broad range
of interests. The state simply did not have the administrative capacity, or the
detailed information necessary, for such a strategy to be successful. Chapter
Four outlined in some detail how the attempt by the state to directly control the
macroeconomic arena, through the setting of exchange levels, guaranteed prices
and the subsidization of consumption, played a major role in the evolution of the
severe economic disequilibria which characterized the revolutionary years; whilst
the attempts to substantially modernize the productive structure of the economy
(as the basis for future, more articulated, growth), through a large scale
programme of investments in the state sector, tied up resources for long periods
of time without achieving the necessary immediate, or even medium term,
productive responses.
Secondly, the state-led economic strategy was combined with a political strategy
which prioritized the pursuit of national unity. This strategy influenced the
development of economic policies which attempted to simultaneously meet the
needs of all of the major sectors of society (a form of populism as it were). This
proved both economically and politically infeasible. The problem was that the
government attempted to depoliticize the handling of economic policy, through
the idea that the state could direct economic processes in a way which would
serve 'the logic of the majority,' thereby avoiding conflicts between the various
sectors upon which the revolutionary alliance had been forged; as if the basis for
class struggle in Nicaragua had somehow been destroyed by the apparent
triumph of the working classes through the revolution. Thus, although the
continued existence, and even prioritization, of the large capitalist sector was
seen as unavoidable by the FSLN (because of the productive weight, and
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technical efficiency, they thought the large estates represented, and the
impossibility, at least in the short term, of extending state control over the
economy further), the breaking of their monopoly over political power would
mean that their continued role in production would, ostensibly, be subservient to
the needs of the 'people.' Nonetheless, such a dependence upon the private
sector was politically dangerous as well as somewhat naive. To imagine that the
private sector would continue to produce efficiently when deprived of their
political power, or their means of coercion over the labour supply, was
unrealistic. Over time, the continued prioritization of capitalist producers saw the
development of expanding budgetary deficits, as the FSLN attempted to
stimulate private production (through incentives and the manipulation of prices)
and yet consistently failed to achieve a productive response.
Thirdly, despite the failings of the state-led strategy of the early revolutionary
years, the attempts to reorientate economic and agrarian policy in the latter part
of the 1980s imposed their own problems. Despite relative improvements
between 1985 and 1988, the somewhat heavy handed nature of the state
bureaucracy's approach toward the peasant sector (and its lack of prioritization
in the distribution of resources) had, by the mid-1980s, already alienated many
smallholders and had been a major factor in the drift of many peasants into the
ranks of the Contra. The imposition of the economic reforms in 1988 and 1989
then served to escalate the problems faced by such sectors, especially through
limitations imposed upon their access to credit; although the impact of the
liberalization measures also fell heavily upon the salaried workforce (especially
in the industrial sector) and the informal urban sectors. At the same time, the
level of relative inequality showed a marked increase as the popular sectors were
disproportionately affected by the attempts to induce contractions in demand;
whilst the provision of incentives to the capitalist sector were expanded upon
and the gap between the highest and lowest paid public sector workers
increased.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the recessive impact of the economic reforms,
some commentators have argued that, in the medium term, the major
beneficiaries of the processes of liberalization and de-bureaucratization,
instigated by the reforms, could have been the small and medium peasantry
(especially those involved in the production of export crops such as coffee, beef
and sesame). In the short term, however, as the discussion above has
suggested, small-scale export producers suffered seriously from the erosion of
previous benefits. Ultimately, the lack of prioritization and distribution of
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resources to the peasant sector, despite its productive weight even in the
prioiritized export sector, reflected the continued dominance of a technocratic
modernizing vision within the FSLN, and their commitment to the medium-term
maintenance of the agro-export led model of development and the economic
structures which characterized it.
As Baumeister (1991) argues, however, even if the continued importance of
agroexport production was unavoidable, it should not necessarily have meant the
prioritization of the largest, most capitalized, producers (and the state farms),
given the productive structure of the sector. There can be no doubt that there
existed a continuing necessity for the generation of exchange earnings, but one
of the major lessons of the revolutionary period is that the prioritization of export
production need not necessarily have involved the prioritization of the technically
advanced production units of the APP and the private sector. The experiences of
the coffee sector, and the impressive yields attained in cotton production by
cooperatives during the early revolutionary years (before the overall collapse of
the sector), suggest the possibilities for efficient productive responses to
appropriate stimuli on the part of small and medium-sized producers of primary
exports. Unfortunately, the growing realization of the importance of smallholder
production in the sector was not accompanied by a major shift in the allocation
of resources. Even the changes in agrarian policy which occurred in the years
following 1985 were primarily designed to expand the production of basic
grains (and there were some successes in the meeting of that goal). However, it
may well have been more astute to have also given greater impetus to peasant
production of export crops during that period. The lack of measures designed to
achieve this (despite the acceleration of land redistribution) meant that
smallholders and cooperatives were not well placed to take advantage of the shift
in policy toward the export sector involved in the economic reforms of the late
eighties, even though theoretically they should have gained from the measures.
When this was combined with the increasing social differentiation that occurred
in the latter revolutionary years it became increasingly difficult for the
government to justify the liberalization of economic policy or the elevated
salaries of the higher levels of the state beaurocracy. As argued by Peter
Marchetti, commenting on the evolution of the reform programme in 1989;
"What is lacking is a programme for economic reactivation that
leads workers andpeasants to increase production, demonstrating in
practice a positive relationship between economic control of the
process and improvemen ts in production. There is no means for the
masses to progress from the self-management by workers and
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peasants cooperating in popularproductive programmes thatpermits
the participation ofworkers andpeasants in decision-making about
productive and social investment and the distribution ofsurpluses.
Without a more effective programme of this type, there is no means
ofovercoming the confusion of the militants and the masses about
the adjustmentprogramme. Without a more effective reactivation
programme one cannot really justify the salaries which the
technocracy (state administrators)eara.
The only economic justification ofsocial and salarial differentiation
is efficiency. The only ethical justification ofdifferentiation is its
investment in a process that produces more equality. And the only
means ofassuring more equality is to increase the participation of
the workers andpeasants in the management of the means of
production." (Marchetti, 1989a:4)
In more general terms, therefore, although the Nicaraguan experience provides
an example of the limitations of state-led socialist development strategies, it also
shows the political problems imposed by the sustenance of a private capitalist
sector and the problems imposed by the reintroduction ofmarket mechanisms
and their use in determining the organization of production. This raises the
question as to what remained, by the end of the decade, of the FSLN's original
plans for the transformation of Nicaraguan society, as the state's role in the
direction of economic processes began to be cut back and the need for economic
recovery saw the increasing prioritization of the larger producers.
In some ways, the reforms of the late 1980s represented the logical outcome of a
development strategy which had prioritized alliances with the capitalist sector
(over the urban and rural labouring classes, the peasantry and the informal
sector) and which had tried to allow for their profitable reproduction; thereby
imposing political and financial limitations on the scope of transformation. The
attempts to ensure the profitability of capitalist production were less constraining
in the early revolutionary years because of the attempts made to simultaneously
meet the needs of all the major sectors of Nicaraguan society. As the decade
wore on, however, and resources dried up, the government were forced to
increasingly prioritize specific sectors in the distribution of resources.
Eventually, despite the shifts in policy which occurred in the mid 1980s, this
meant that particular sectors of the popular classes (especially the poorest sectors
of the peasantry and the salaried workforce) increasingly shouldered the costs of
the provision of incentives to the large producers. In particular, the reforms of
1988 and 1989 represented the strengthening of the implicit alliance with those
capitalist producers willing to cooperate with the government; as the capitalist
sector were able to reassert, to a certain degree, their control over labour as the
economic crisis intensified (Dore and Weeks, 1992a&b).
One of the problems with this line of argument is that it suggests that there
were viable alternatives open to the FSLN in the formulation of both the initial
expansionist policies and the later changes in direction and tends to ignore the
external constraints within which decisions had to be made. There were of
course compelling reasons behind the FSLN's policy decisions and once
decisions had been taken they often precluded the ability to move significantly
in alternative directions. For example, the implementation of the large-scale
investment projects of the initial years seriously limited the resources which
were available for the funding of alternative less technocratic strategies without
wasting the resources which had already been committed to the large-scale
projects. In addition, once it had been deemed politically, and economically,
necessary to maintain capitalist forms of production (due to the geopolitical
necessity of the maintenance of the private sector and the preservation of their
technical and managerial skills), then conditions had to be conducive to their
continued reproduction. How to ensure this, without compromising the longer-
term goals of the revolution, was one of the major policy dilemmas which
faced the FSLN throughout the revolutionary years, and one which ultimately
remains unresolved.
Whilst the Sandinista revolution may not have led to the establishment of a
socialist state in Nicaragua, the nation which the government of Violeta
Chamorro inherited in 1990 exhibited marked differences from that of 1979.
By the end of the revolutionary period, profound changes in the productive
structure of the Nicaraguan economy had been achieved; 48.7% of agricultural
land was by then in the hands of individual peasant farmers (including 18%
who had received titles but no new land). Furthermore, the overthrow of
Somoza has suggested to the Nicaraguan people the power which lies in
collective action and organization, and the revolutionary period saw
considerable developments in the mobilization and organization of the popular
sectors and the establishment of a constitutional basis for the development of
the first free and fair electoral system in Nicaraguan history.
Future Prospects:
One of the major questions which has been addressed in the years which have
followed the 1990 elections relates to whether the fall of the FSLN represents
the end of the revolutionary process. The appropriate answer would appear to
be, not yet. Much to the chagrin of the US administration, and the forces of the
far right in Nicaragua itself, the government of Violeta Chamorro has proved to
be extremely pragmatic, politically astute, and relatively independent in its
thinking and actions. Its major achievements have been in the political sphere,
through the successful demobilization of the Contra and the way in which its
pragmatic political manoeuvring has avoided the highly polarized country from
degenerating into civil war. After unsuccessful initial attempts to initiate a radical
reversal of the changes which had been initiated during the revolutionary period
(especially through legislation designed to return expropriated properties, be
they agricultural, industrial or residential, to their previous owners), the
government has pursued a policy of 'concertacion' (attempts to pursue policies
through the building of consensus). Fundamentally, this has represented the
realization of the importance to the political stability of the nation of the forty
percent of Nicaraguans who voted for the FSLN in the 1990 elections and the
organizational strength which the FSLN still represents. Such a pragmatic
position quickly alienated the more extreme elements within the UNO alliance
and a strong anti-government grouping has emerged which now dominates the
UNO alliance itself and is pressurizing strongly for a more profound roll-back of
the transformations wrought during the revolutionary years. This group is
centred around the Vice-President, Virgilio Godoy. The major effect of this has
been to push the government into ever greater cooperation with the leadership of
the FSLN, upon whose support it often depends for the passing of legislation in
the National Assembly; although, the ability of the FSLN to influence the
direction of government policy should not be over-estimated.
The Search for an Alternative Economic Strategy:
Since the loss of the 1990 elections the FSLN has been faced with a series of
major internal deliberations. In assessing the experiences of the revolutionary
years, they could either claim that the failure of their original model of economic
transformation was due to the external pressure put upon the revolution by the
US aggression, or they could recognize the, at least partial, failure of their own
strategies, and the way in which they responded to the pressures which
unfolded. Since the elections just such deliberations have been occurring and are
most starkly revealed in the internal struggles which have evolved over the
formulation of alternatives to the Neoliberal policies of the UNO government
and the need for a coherent economic strategy upon which to fight the next
elections in 1996.
The economic programme which has been instigated by the UNO government
basically represents the application of Neoliberal orthodoxy to the attempt to
regenerate the Nicaraguan economy, but the interesting factor is that, apart from
the question of relative speed, the measures of the new government really differ
little from the FSLN's economic strategy of the years from 1988. The FSLN's
success in righting relative prices was built upon by the new government, who
succeeded in containing inflation and engineered a small consumer boom;
achieved through the ending of the trade embargo and wide processes of
financial liberalization. The fiscal deficit was brought under control but at the
cost of large cuts in social spending, massive increases in the level of
unemployment, and the continued collapse of productive activity and investment
levels. In the years which have followed, the promised economic recovery has
continued to prove elusive, and the popular sectors have found themselves
facing dramatically declining living standards.
The combination of initially high levels of incoming resources with the
government's frugal economic policies and the privatization and liberalization
programmes were intended to produce a climate suitable for investment,
encouraging economic reactivation through the freeing of market forces.
Unfortunately, (and rather obviously) such aspirations largely ignored the
political reality facing Nicaragua during this period, in that continued political
instability has precluded any significant level of productive investment.
Moreover, large tranches of the incoming resources have been misused through
the purchasing of foreign luxuries and engagement in speculation by certain
sectors of the business classes. Due to the confluence of all of these factors the
Nicaraguan economy in 1994 remains in a state of virtual collapse. The debt
repayment levels agreed with creditors remain onerous, export levels have failed
to recover (reflecting a lack of leadership from the government in the stimulation
of productive activities),3 whilst more recently declining access to promised
external resources has led to continued cuts in credit allocations, public
investment and social spending. In summary, whilst the UNO government has
proved politically astute in its handling of the various opposing sectors of
Nicaraguan society the implementation of their economic programme has seen
the continued impoverishment of the vast majority of Nicaraguans (Envio.
October 1993).
At present debate rages within the FSLN as to how far the UNO economic
programme should be resisted and what alternative programme should be
3 Between 1990 and 1993 Nicaragua's external deficit represented something like $2 billion
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implemented were the FSLN to return to power in the 1996 elections. With
regard to the former question, the discussions have tended to polarize between
two extremes. On the one hand, some sectors of the party have argued that
overall priority must be given to ensuring economic and political stability in the
country. The dominance of this group within the FSLN's leadership can be seen
from the way in which the FSLN have cooperated, and fostered a close
relationship, with the new government, continuing the implicit alliance with the
moderate sectors of the bourgeoisie consolidated in the 1988/89 reforms. This
position suggests that in the new conditions emerging in Nicaragua the FSLN
must transform itself into something of the semblance of a European social
democratic party and that,
"If the FSLN did not free itselffrom 'old dogmas' it would risk
undermining economic recovery and creating conditions from which
only the right could benefit." (Patterson and Roulston, 1992:239)
On the other hand, others within the party (especially at the grassroots level)
have argued that such a perspective had failed to learn the lessons of the period
in government and accused the advocates of the other position of having totally
capitulated to the apparent limits imposed by US imperialism. At present there
remains a delicate balance between the alliance that appears to have been made
with the ruling bureaucrats against the forces of the far right, and the traditional
leadership that the party has given to the protection of the interests of the popular
classes. This, in turn, represents the ideological struggle between the
formulation of a coherent policy with which to fight the next elections and try to
recapture state power, and the ostensibly more short-term pursuit of the interests
of the popular sectors. Nonetheless, as the FSLN becomes increasingly
associated with the government's failing economic programme, and the social
costs it has entailed, it becomes further removed from its base of support. As
expressed in a recent edition of Envio (September 1993).
"The FSLN are likely to pay dearly for the support given to
Chamorro's economic policy over the past years, support they defend
with the comment that, 'ifwe were in government, we would have to
do the same.'. Despite its ongoing rhetoric against
Neoliberalism the Sandinista base has not yet exerted enough pressure
to force a full internal debate that could lead to the design ofa coherent
and realistic alternative economic proposal."
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This links into the second major issue suggested above, the search for a viable
economic strategy which is sufficiently distinct from the UNO's programme to
retain a popular, 'alternative,' character. Here there are two major problems for
the FSLN. Firstly, the FSLN are likely to be tainted form the similarity of their
final years in government to the economic programme of the Chamorro
government and the implicit support which the party leadership has, on the
whole (the major exception being the more radical position taken by ex-president
Daniel Ortega), given to the government's economic policy. Secondly, there
appear to be few alternatives emanating from either of the major positions within
the party and it remains far from clear upon what economic programme the 1996
election campaign is likely to be run. One of the lessons spelt out from the
analysis of the revolutionary years detailed in this thesis is that there will be no
easy panacea to Nicaragua's problems of economic inequality and dependence
upon external markets. Any attempts at formulating an alternative economic
project for any future FSLN government will have to retain a healthy scepticism
as to the speed and intensity of any processes of social transformation and the
political limitations which this involves. The FSLN will face a similar array of
problems as the current government in the formulation of a coherent economic
strategy for the future. They will need to integrate the economy within the recent
expansion of regional trade (see Chapter Five) but in such a way that it could be
achieved without the costs to worker's rights and wages which the outward
orientation of the integration process has involved up until this point. In
addition, as has been argued throughout this thesis, the performance of the
export sector will continue to determine economic growth rates for many years
to come.
The FSLN and the Popular Sectors into the 1990s:
The assumption, during the revolutionary years, that the FSLN were the
representatives of the popular classes suffered a serious blow in the electoral
defeat (Envio. May 1990:28). To retain their credibility in the years which have
followed, the FSLN have been forced to reconsider both the internal structure of
the party itself (and the accountability of the leadership) and the relationship of
the FSLN as a political party to the mass organizations of the popular sectors
which they had at least helped to facilitate Many of the grassroots organizations
(e.g. the National Workers Front, the Communal movement and the women's
movement) have in the years since the elections asserted a good measure of
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independence from the FSLN and have been at the forefront of the struggle
against the recessive effects of the economic policies of the UNO government,
whilst the FSLN have, on the whole, passively looked on. Jacaranda Fernandez
Mejia for example, the external relations officer of Fetsalud (the healthworkers
union) speaks of the way in which the trade union movement has had to distance
itself from the FSLN now that the party is out of government.^ The trade union
movement is now fulfilling its role as the representatives of the workforce and
not as the administrators of government policy as had largely been the case
during the 1980s.
The abiding legacy of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua has proved to be
the strengthening of the popular sectors, reflected in their organizational
strength, as well as the structural transformations (such as the agrarian reform)
which they have benefited from. In many ways the post-electoral period has
seen the transformation of the revolutionary process away from the leadership of
the FSLN as the popular sectors have exerted their independence from the party.
As suggested by Selbin (1993:135);
"
They (the Nicaraguan people) understood that the hard-won gains of
the social revolutionary process were not tied to one organization, one
program, or one person. Rather the gains of the revolution were based
in them, the people."
It should be noted, however, that the growing independence of the popular
sectors from the FSLN does not signify the abandonment of the Party by the
masses. Most trade unions remain affiliated to the FSLN and the membership of
the party has been greatly extended in the years since 1990. It remains to be
seen, however, whether the FSLN has recovered sufficiently from the shock of
the electoral defeat and has learned the hard lessons of experience to be able to
mount a strong challenge for power in the 1996 elections or, if such a campaign
were to be successful, whether it would lead to any improvement in the position
of the majority of Nicaraguans given the economic and political crisis which
continues to plague the nation.
4 From a conversation following a talk Jacaranda gave on 'Trade Unions and the New
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Nicaragua: Percentage of Total Exports for Major Export Commodities (1961-
1990)
Year Cotton Sugar Coffee Meat Bananas
1961 26.2 4.0 24.9 8.1 0.5
1962 34.5 5.0 17.0 7.7 0.5
1963 37.3 5.6 16.4 8.3 1.3
1964 41.0 4.5 16.8 6.2 1.7
1965 44.2 3.6 17.1 4.5 0.5
| 1966 40.0 1.5 15.4 7.5 0.6
1967 37.8 3.9 14.3 8.6 l_ 2.2
1968 37.0 3.4 14.2 9.9 1.9
1969 28.8 5.3 13.6 13.5 1.4
1970 19.2 5.5 18.0 15.0 0.2
1971 22.2 6.2 15.7 15.4 0.5
1972 25.9 6.3 13.3 15.2 0.5
1973 22.7 4.9 16.0 16.0 2.0
1974 35.7 3.2 12.1 5.7 1.4
1975 25.5 11.4 12.8 7.2 1.3
1976 24.5 10.2 18.0 7.3 1.0
1977 23.7 4.4 31.2 5.8 0.5
1978 21.9 3.1 31.0 11.0 0.5
1979 24.0 3.5 27.9 16.6 1.1
1980 6.8 4.6 37.2 13.2 1.9
1981 24.0 9.9 26.6 4.5 4.1
1982 21.3 8.9 30.3 8.3 2.4
1983 24.2 7.6 33.9 6.9 3.3
1984 32.4 5.1 29.5 4.3 2.9
1985 29.8 2.3 38.6 3.6 5.4
1986 17.2 6.8 42.6 2.1 6.0
1987 16.5 7.2 42.2 4.7 5.2
1988 21.7 2.3 35.0 5.8 6.3
1989 9.0 5.5 28.9 14.8 6.5
1990 H.3
L_ u-7 21.5 17.2 8.2
Sources: Author's own calculations based on the following sources; 1961-1969:
BID-INTAL (1973) Volume 2 Annex 1; 1970-1979: CEPAL Economic Survey of
Latin America, various editions; 1980-1990: Appendix 1
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APPENDIX THREE
NICARAGUA: Average Annual Growth Rates of the Value of
Total Exports and Imports (Percentages)
YEAR EXPORTS YEAR IMPORTS
1950-1960 7.4 1950-1960 9.1
1960-1970 11.9 1960-1970 11.4
1970-1975 18.5 1970-1975 26.2
1975-1980 3.1 1975-1980 3.7
1980-1981 11.1 1980-1981 12.6
1981-1982 -20.1 1981-1982 -21.6
1982-1983 5.6 1982-1983 7.6
1983-1984 -10.0 1983-1984 2.8
1984-1985 -21.8 1984-1985 0.1
1985-1986 -18.0 1985-1986 -9.2
1986-1987 21.4 1986-1987 15.3 |
1987-1988 -29.0 1987-1988 -1.7
Source: UNCTAD (1988) Handbook of International Trade and
Development Statistics and CEPAL (1989) Economic Survey of
Latin America and the Caribbean 1988: pp.461.
APPENDIX FOUR: AGRO-EXPORT PRODUCTION FIGURES BY
CROP AND BY PROPERTY SECTOR





1974/75 _ _ _ 890800
1975/76 - - - 1068200
1976/77 - - - 1102500
1977/78 - - - 1251200
1978/79 - - - 1263100
1974/78 - - - 1115200
1979/80 - - - 1228100
1980/81 182303 604781 497850 1284934
1981/82 211138 588448 528383 1327969
1982/83 336901 613078 618396 1568375
1983/84 225004 486363 358327 1069694
1984/85 310525 413303 391172 1115000
1985/86 184354 319346 265000 768700
1986/87 188647 495006 258347 942000
1987/88 151151 405955 282561 839667
1988/89 920000
1989/90 1076000
Source: CIERA (1989), Volume 9, Page 74, Table 30





1974/75 - - - 7998400
1975/76 - - - 7282800
1976/77 - - - 8159900
1977/78 - - - 9152500
1978/79 - - - 8152400
1979/80 - - - 1244700
1980/81 874781 697316 3306493 4878590
1981/82 885590 461490 2733919 4080999
1982/83 1253660 645696 3170780 5070136
1983/84 1332390 1301881 3056468 5690739
1984/85 1268484 1125324 2214837 4608645
1985/86 879797 765439 1704664 3349900
1986/87 945336 732516 1611185 3289037
1987/88 680500 433300 1086200 2200000
Source: CIERA (1989), Volume 9, Page 76, Table 31
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NICARAGUA: Evolution Of Beef Production (In Millions Of Tons)
Years Production Exports Domestic
1974 66.6 34.6 TfTT
1975 92.3 47.7 44.6
1976 104.0 57.4 46.6
1977 113.5 58.1 55.4
1978 139.1 74.9 64.2
1979 121.4 78.3 43.1
1980 103.7 45.1 58.6
1981 79.4 20.2 59.2
1982 112.8 32.0 80.8
1983 115.3 31.3 84.0
1984 111.8 19.8 92.0
1985 98.4 12.7 85.7
1986 62.3 5.8 56.5
1987 66.0 14.1 51.9
1988 72.2 22.3 49.9
Source: CIERA (1989), Volume 9, Page 298, Table 243











- - 2277600 4175
1975/76 - - - 2858200 5349
1976/77 - - - 2666500 4878
1977/78 - - - 2734000 4612
1978/79 - - - 2980100 4669
1979/80 - - - 2364200 3740
1980/81 826627 436120 1369986 2632733 4261
1981/82 934879 583995 1550880 3069754 4953
1982/83 937195 273415 1712945 2923555 4958
1983/84 1081930 213912 1768321 3064163 5192
1984/85 905687 368882 1229731 2504300 4354
1985/86 1043138 351061 1315201 2709400 4674
1986/87 946093 527514 1068141 2541748 4153
1987/88 806139 225200 849157 1880496 3104
1988/89 3484
1989/90 4953
1*: - in Imperial tons
2+: - in thousands of quintales
Source: CIERA (1989), Volume 9, Page 78. Table 32
Appendix Five:
The Agrarian Structure ofNicaragua's Regions 1
Region I: Esteli. Madriz and Nueva Segovia
This region is dedicated to the production of coffee (it is the second most important
coffee growing region) and tobacco (producing all of the havana crop and a
proportion of the white tobacco), some beef production, and is also an important
national supplier of beans (a quarter of the national total) and other basic grains for
domestic consumption. The region is dominated by small and medium producers,
although there is also considerable export production on state farms and larger private
holdings. The Region has been one of the more heavily affected by the war.
Region II Leon and Chinandega
For the first fifty years of this century, this region was dominated by the rearing of
livestock, basic grain cultivation (it was the most important productive region in the
country) and relatively advanced sugar production. Subesquently, sugar has
continued to play an important role, but the peasant production of basic grains has
been displaced to other regions of the country (with less fertile soils) due to the
dramatic expansion of cotton production. The region is now the most important
region with regard to the production of export commodities, with the most important
national production of cotton (over 95% in 1987/88), sugar (nearly 70% in the
1987/88 cycle) and all the exported bananas of the country.
Region III Managua
The region of the capital city does have some agricultural activities. There is
substantial sugar production (nearly 25% of national production in the 1987/88
cycle), as well as engagement in the cultivation of basic grains, cotton and coffee and
the rearing of livestock, but it is dominated by its commercial and industrial functions.
Region IV Granada. Masava. Carazo and Rivas
Historically this region has demonstrated a very high level of land concentration. For
example in 1979, 70% of the farms of the area were of less than 10 manzanas, and
yet these accounted for less then 5% of the total land of the Region fBarricada April
2nd 1984). Therefore, this region has been one where access to land has been of
paramount importance. Accordingly, it has been one of the regions most affected by
1 For the location of each of the Regions described see Map 4.
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the agrarian reform process. The growth of coffee cultivation at the end of the last
century originated in this Region, although it then spread in other parts of the country
more rapidly, notably Region VI. The region is also an important producer of cotton
(although production fell substantially during the 1980s), sugar, sesame and irrigated
rice, as well as having a sizeable cattle sector and a certain amount of basic grain
production. The most intensive land use occurs around Lake Nicaragua, where the
most technically advanced agro-industrial production occurs, as well as some
cooperative production of vegetables. The Coastal part of the region is dominated by
the large ranches, whilst the region between the lake and coastal zones is given over
to smallholder production of basic grains and livestock.
Region V Boaca. Chontales. Central and Eastern Zelava
This region is the main cattle-rearing zone of the country and, even in 1983, still
exhibited a high degree of land concentration (52% of the area in that year was
controlled by large landowners). Nonetheless there is also a small amount of coffee
production and a reasonable level of basic grain production.
Region VI Matagalpa. Jinotega
This is the main coffee producing region of the country (around 60% of national
production in 1987/88). There is also a good level of basic grain production and some
cattle raising.
Special Zone 1 The Northern Part of Zelava
The largest region in Nicaragua, and also the most sparsely populated. Economic
activities are generally related to mining and forestry.
Special Zone 2 The Southern Part of Zelava
A certain amount of sugar production, some cattle raising and basic grain production,
as well as plantain, and an important sector devoted to fishing and other marine
activines.
Special Zone 3 Rio San Juan
This region is very sparsely populated but does produce basic grains, cacao, African
Palm and some beef. There have also been a number of concessions granted to
logging companies. The area was also affected by the southern conflicts of the Contra
War. The region is extremely isolated from the rest of Nicaragua, being accessible by
water alone for ten months of the year. Historically, the region has been an important
transit route and the source of much international interest in the possibilities of
constructing an inter-oceanic canal. During the Somoza era, the region took on some
significance in the expansion of export production and the provision of an agricultural
frontier for those displaced by the expansion of export agriculture in the other regions
of the country. This combination produced a highly unequal land distribution. There
is a clearly defined frontier between the land turned over to productive purposes
where the majority of the region's population are concentrated, and the relatively wild
forested area now part of the 'Si a Paz' National Park and therefore a protected zone.2
2 The discussion of the different regions of Nicaragua given here draws upon: CIERA, 1989:vol. 9;
Muro et al, 1986 and Barricaria 19/03/83, 20/06/83, 19/09/83 and 02/04/84)
